AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000202030001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 11, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/21: CIA-RDP86T01017R000202030001 GX1
Directorate of
Intelligence
won-seerct-
Afghanistan Situation Report
l-c-ie_ #I
DATE 31 / z 8(e
DOC NO SovA f1 86a r
OCR
P&PD 0
/- Sot' F C e 1 ) -1'r I fJ
79-81
INC/CB
Tup Sec -t
NESA M 86-20033CX
SOYA M 86-20025CX
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COPY 0 8 1
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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT I 25X1
0 SOVIET AND AFGHAN UNITS ON THE OFFENSIVE ~ 2 25X1
Antiguerrilla operations by Soviet and Afghan
regime forces continued in eastern Afghanistan,
A USIA survey in December indicates that few West
Europeans are willinq to support stronq measures
against the Soviet Union for its occupation of
Afghanistan.
RESISTANCE FEARS LOSS OF PAKISTANI CIVILIAN SUPPORT I 3
Afghan insurgents in Pakistan's North-West
Frontier Province are concerned about declining
SUDDort it cause among local residents.
11 March 1986
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This document is prepared weekly by the Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the Office
of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments on the
issues raised in the publication should be directed
11 March 1986
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11 March 1986
NESA M 86-20033CX
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/21: CIA-RDP86T01017R000202030001-3
Afghanistan
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SOVIET AND AFGHAN UNITS ON THE OFFENSIVE
Several Soviet and Afghan operations, begun last month.
continued in Afghanistan in early ch. F
AFGHANISTAN IS LOW PRIORITY FOR WEST EUROPEANS
A USIA public-opinion survey taken last December in
Britain, France, Italy, West Germany, and The Netherlands
indicated that most Europeans believe the Soviets are
maintaining an oppressive regime in Afghanistan that
cannot be considered a legitimate government.
Nonetheless, a majority of the Europeans do not favor
strong measures, such as economic sanctions, against
Moscow. Although there is some support for humanitarian
and economic aid to the resistance, no more than one in
ten Europeans favors supplying the insurgents with arms
and military equipment. With the exception of the
Italians, significantly more Europeans had no opinion on
how to respond to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan than
a year ago.
Comment: The poll suggests West Europeans are
increasingly less willing to challenge the Soviet Union's
actions in Afghanistan. The fading importance of the
Afghan issue to most European audiences probably is a
welcome development to the Soviets, who have sought to
11 March 1986
NESA M 86-20033CX
2 SOVA M 86-20025CX
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the security interests of Western Europe.
portray events in Afghanistan as of minor consequence for
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The guerrillas are considering
war ends Pakistani support for their cause.
of Soviet designs there. In late January, the Afghan
resistance formulated contingency plans in case public
hostility in the NWFP or a diplomatic settlement of the
asking President Zia to implement a propaganda campaign in
the NWFP to reassure inhabitants that the Afghan refugee
presence is a net gain for the local economy and to warn
Comment: The Afghan resistance, concerned that the Soviet
destabilization campaign in the NWFP is succeeding, hopes
to involve Islamabad in more aggressive countermeasures.
In the aftermath of Pakistan's recent successful campaign
against dissident tribal leader Wali Khan Kukikhel,
however, Islamabad probably would be reluctant to raise the
11 March 1986
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Recoilless Infantry Ftamethrowers
R P 0 (Recoil less Infantry Flamethrower)
(.FORESIGHT 2.BARREL 3.LEAF SIGHT 4.FLAMETHRO/ING ROUND
5.STRIKER MECHANISM 6.BIPOD 1.IARHEAD CASE
B.CHECK MARK 9. PROPELLANT CHARGE
Working Diagram of R P O
1.TRIGGER 2.GENERATOR (MAGNETO) 3.MEMBRANE 4.IGNITER
5.CONTAINER OF INCENDIARY MIXTURE 6. PROPELLANT CHARGE
].AMMUNITION CASE
I
I.CONTAINER/LAUNCHER 2.CONTROL ROD/CABLE 3.SLING 4.OPTICAL SIGHT 5.FORESIGHT 6.FORWARD PISTOL GRIP ].STRIKER MECHANISM
B.MOTOR 9. SUPPORTING SLEEVE IO.CHECK MARK 1I.MARHEAD CASE
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government's profile-there- . '. Pakistan's ,new "Ci:v i.-l.i an
government probably also believes an. Afghan. publ i c
relations campaign would be criticized by 'the, opposition
coalition, which recently voted to exclude the refugees
from Pakistan's political life.
IN BRIEF
A mid-level official of 'the Soviet Institute of World
Economy and International Relations recently
characterized the war in Afghanistan as a partisan war
which cannot be won militarily by the Sov.iet,s-,so long
as the insurgents want to fight. 'In a, private'
conversation with an officer of the US Embassy in
Moscow, he asserted that not even another 100,000
Soviet troops would make a difference. The official
said the Soviet military thinks it can win. In his
view, only a political agreement between the Kabul
regime and the insurgents--although icult to
imagine--would stop the fighting.
Plantings of opium poppies have risen nearly 300
percent in Afqhanistan,~
Afghan farmers anticipate a
harvest of more than 900 tons of raw opium gum in
1986.
the Kabul regime has encouraged poppy production by
.purchasing large quantities of opium and by destroy,ing
grain crops while sparing poppy fields.
-- Babrak Karmal returned from Moscow on Saturday,. 7
March.,,,.,He headed the Afghan delegation at the 27th
Congress of the Soviet Communist Party.
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Insurgent Activity
Insurgent offensive activity slowed in February. Execept
for the shootdown of three Soviet helicopters in the Kabul
area in mid-February, guerrilla operations were limited in
the capital region. US Embassy sources reported several
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Soviet and regime military targets in Kabul were hit by
rockets and that there were a few explosions and
gunfights. An insurgent rocket attack on Jalalabad
airfield on 4 February destroyed one helicopter and
damaged the radar site. Guerrilla forces sporadically
harassed convoys north of the Salang Pass.
Outlook
Soviet and Afghan forces are maintaining pressure on the
guerrillas so that the insurgents will have more
difficulty initiating offensives this spring. In
conjunction with their efforts to curtail resupply from
guerrilla rear areas in Pakistan and Iran, the Soviets
probably also hope to force the insurgents to draw down
supply caches. The Soviets, who would like to have the
Afghan Army expand its active combat role against the
insurgents, probably see the Afghans' solo operations in
February as a promising development.
11 March 1986
NESA M 86-20033CX
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