(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000202010001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 26, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 10, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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SUBJECT: Sri Lanka: Arming and Training the Insurgency
Internal Distribution
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SUBJECT: Sri Lanka: Arming and Training the Insurgency
Ms. Sandra Charles
Director, Near East South Asia Region, International Security Affairs
Department of Defense, Room 4D765, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301
Captain Edward Louis Christiansen, USN
Chief, South Asian Regional Plans and Policy Branch
Department of Defense, Room 2E973, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301
Dr. Stephen Cohen
Policy Planning Staff
Department of State, Room 7311, Washington, DC 20520
Mr. James P. Covey
Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director,
Near East and South Asia Affairs, National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building, Room 351, Washington, DC 20500
Mr. Herbert Hagerty
Director, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh
Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Department of State, Room 5247, Washington, DC 20520
Mr. H. Allen Holmes
Director, Bureau of Political Military Affairs
Department of State, Room 7327, Washington, DC 20520
Mr. Philip S. Kaplan
Staff Director for Policy Planning Council
Department of State, Room 7316, Washington, DC 20520
Mr. Ron Lorton
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, South Asia Division
Department of State, Room 4636A, Washington, DC 20520
Mr. Michael MacMurray
Special Assistant for South Asia, International Security Affairs
Department of Defense, Room 4D765, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301
Mr. Marc Palovitz
Special Assistant for South Asia, International Security Affairs,
Near Eastern-South Asian Region
Department of Defense, Room 4D765, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301
Mr. Robert A. Peck
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Department of State, Room 6244, Washington, DC 20520
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Mr. Christopher Ross
Director, Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Department of State, Room 5254A, Washington, DC 20520
Mr. Grant Smith
Director, INS, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Department of State, Room 5251, Washington, DC 20520
Mr. Darnell Whitt
Intelligence Adviser to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Department of Defense, Room 4D840, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301
Dr. Dov S. Zackheim
Deputy Assistant Under Secretary of Defense for Policy/Resources
Department of Defense, Room 3D777, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301
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Central Intelligence Agency
SRI LANKA: Arming and Training the Insurgency
Summary
Tamil insurgents have amassed an arsenal of
small arms, ammunition, and some crew-served
weapons adequate to continue the insurgency at
present levels. They are successfully raising
funds abroad and have access to international arms
marKets as well as to training facilities and
bases for arms smuggling in southern India.
The arms pipe ine
is largely immune to Co om o s efforts to cut it
and to any but exceptionally large-scale Indian
interdiction efforts. Most insurgents have been
trained by their own cadre and by ex-Indian Army
officers increased
training is taking place in Sri Lan a.
This memorandum was prepared byl Ithe Office
of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Information as of
10 March 1986 was used in its preparation. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief, South Asia
Division, NESA,
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I I
The Insurgents' Arsenal
Much of the insurgents' arms and equipment are old or second-hand, but we
believe that they are of good quality and have been kept serviceable.
Small-arms range from hand guns and World War II-era Ja anese-made rifles to
AK-47s and M-16s. cite insurgent use of
machine-guns, mortars rocket- ropelled grenades, hand grenades, land mines,
and explosives.
We do not believe that the insurgents have much sophisticated materiel.
the Tamils have acquired limited numbers of more
advanced equipment, such as night-vision scopes, communications sets, and scuba
gear. Colombo claims that one of its helicopters was brought down in Jaffna
last March by an SA-7, but we cannot confirm that the insurgents have acquired
such weapons.
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In our judgment, the insurgents' relatively unsophisticated arsenal is
adequate for their present level of operations. Over the last six months, the
most common tactics employed against government forces have been hand grenade
or unmanned land mine ambushes. The insurgents mainly operate in small
units--five to 15 men for ambushes--and engagements with the Sri Lankan
military are usually confined to brief fire-fights. Press
reports also indicate the insurgents are able to withstand concerted
government assaults and are capable of organizing upwards of 100 men for larger
actions.
Aquiring Money and Arms
The insurgents' fundraising activities throughout the Tamil expatriate
communities in South Asia, the Middle East, Western Europe, and the US are key
in procuring arms. the People's Liberation
Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), the largest and most politically radical
of the five main insurgent groups, maintains offices or contacts in several
Western European countries as well as Canada, Bahrain, and Brunei which it uses
to raise money and spread propaganda.
The insurgents have augmented their war chest through extortion and bank
robberies in Sri Lanka and by involvement in international drug trafficking.
major drug seizures and arrests of
Tamil smugglers in the west last fall will result in a decrease in the
insurgents' income through the narcotics trade,
reports of local Tamil civilians rebelling against insurgent extortion attempts
suggest that their ability to draw on resources in northern Sri Lanka has been
strained by the prolonged struggle.
Ithe Indians suspect, but cannot confirm,
the Soviets have provided financial support to PLOTE.
They believe these amounts could
not have been raised through expatriates' contributions, bank robberies, or
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drug trafficking but must have been offset by the Soviets. 25X1
We believe that the insurgent groups buy most of their weapons and
equipment in West European and Asian commercial arms markets and from private
sources in India. the insurgents have
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obtained arms in West Germany and the UK through Libyan and IRA contacts and in
Thailand and Lebanon through PLO contacts. these
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arms are collected in Hong Kong and then smuggled to Singapore and on to
Madras. There, shipments are broken up and, along with arms acquired in India,
put on smaller vessels for the final run into Sri Lanka. Some arms are
obtained illegally in India with the help of expatriates and sympathetic Indian
Tamils. 25X1
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Tamil insurgents capture arms in Sri Lanka from the security forces and
through raids on government armories, but captured arms appear to be only a
minor portion of their arsenal. The possibility that the insurgents will
obtain more sophisticated arms, such as anti-tank missiles and anti-aircraft
guns, increases, however, as Colombo beefs up its own forces.
Training
Most insurgents have been trained by their own cadre and by ex-Indian Army
officers in camps in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu. As New Delhi
began last summer to increase its Palk Strait patrolling and seize more Tamil
arms shipments in Madras, however, the insurgents started shiftin bases and
training operations into rebel-held areas in Sri Lanka.
US Embass sources report some Tamil fighters-have been trained in Lebanon
by the PLO Colombo believes PLO
trainers are present in the Indian camps as well. We cannot confirm PLO
trainers in either India or Sri Lanka, but press reports quote an insurgent
leader as saying that "the PLO-trained boys have not exactly proved to be an
asset o our armed strength. Our terrain and conditions are different."
Vulnerability of the Arms Pipeline
Stopping Tamil arms smuggling operations in Madras also would be difficult
because of the insurgents' wide contacts there and the susceptibility of the
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city's customs officials to bribery.
because of difficulties in identifying which boats among hundreds of fishing
craft are engaged in gun-running.
If the Indians were again to blame the Tamils for a breakdown in the peace
talks with Colombo and for increasing violence in Sri Lanka, New Delhi might
increase efforts against insurgent activities. In the case of a stronger
Indian crackdown, the insurgents would be forced to conserve resources. In our
view, diminished resources would push the rebels into more attacks against
civilians and non-military targets in the Sinhalese south, contingencies for
which we think Colombo is ill-prepared.
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