PAKISTAN: POLICY TOWARD AFGHANISTAN IN THE POST-MARTIAL LAW PERIOD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000201880001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 4, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/27: CIA-RDP86T01017R000201880001-1
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SUBJECT: Pakistan: Policy Toward Afghanistan in the Post-
Martial Law Period
DDI
DDO/C/NE
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D/OGI
C/PES
C/PDB
C/NID
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C/PPS/NESA
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C/NESA/SO/D
C/NESA/AI
C/NESA/PG
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CPAS/ILS
CPAS/IMD/DB
Typescript File
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SUBJECT: Pakistan: Policy Toward Afghanistan in the Post-
Martial Law Period
External Distribution:
Mr. Charles Dunbar
Special Assistant for Near East and
South Asian Affairs
Department of State, Room 5515
Mr. Robert A. Peck
Deputy Assistant Secretary,
Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,
Department of State, Room 6244
Mr. Ron Lorton
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
South Asia Division
Department of State, Room 4636A
Mr. Herbert Hagerty
Director, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh
Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Department of State, Room 5247
Dr. Michael Pillsbury
Assistant Under Secretary of Defense for.Policy
(Policy Planning), Department of Defense, Room 4B947
Mr. Darnell Whitt
Intelligence Adviser to the Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense,
Room 4D840, Pentagon
Mr. James P. Covey
Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director,
Near East and South Asia Affairs, National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building, Room 351
Mr. Vincent Canastraro
National Security Council
Room 300, Old Executive Office Building
Dr. Stephen Cohen
Policy Planning Staff
Department of State, Room 7311
Mr. David Hatcher
Department of Defense
Room 4D765, Pentagon
Major William Andrew Ritezel
DAMI, Department of Defense,
Room 2A474, Pentagon
Defense Intelligence Agency ,
DB-1B, Bolling Air Force Base
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Central Intelligence Agency
4 February 1986
Pakistan: Policy Toward Afghanistan
in the Post-Martial Law Period
Summary
Pakistan's moves toward civilian
politics--exemplified by the lifting of martial law
on 30 December--probably will not result in early
changes in its policy on Afghanistan. A number of
potential developments, however--including increased
problems along the Afghan border, a disappointing US
aid package, an economic downturn, or a serious
Soviet bid to undertake negotiations leading to
Soviet troops withdrawals--would make it more
difficult for Islamabad to sustain public and
cabinet support. President Zia and Foreign Minister
Yaqub Khan, who are committed to supporting the
Afghan resistance, almost certainly will continue to
be the principal architects of foreign policy, while
Prime Minister Junejo and the National Assembly will
probably focus more on domestic policy. Although
the extraparliamentary political opposition will
continue to criticize US-Pakistani ties--and by
Pakistan/Bangladesh Branch, NESA. Questions and queries may be
This paper was prepared by
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extension Islamabad's policy towards Afghanistan--it
is unlikely to have enough clout to challenge
seriously Pakistan's current policy supporting the
Civilianization probably will change the style, if not the
subtance, of Pakistan's foreign policy-making. President Zia
retains a firm grip on external affairs and, according to the US
Embassy in Islamabad, his commitment to the Afghan resistance is
unshaken. Nevertheless, Zia will be careful to portray Prime
Minister Junejo as Pakistan's chief executive officer and probably
shares his conviction that Islamabad must assert its independence 25X1
in foreign affairs. Zia and the civilian cabinet will stress that
Pakistan is the final arbiter of its policy on Afghanistan.
We believe Prime Minister Junejo will concentrate on building a
government party and power base. In doing so, he is likely to give
at least the appearance of distancing himself--and Pakistan--from
the United States. His main political vehicle, the Pakistan Muslim
League long has had as goals the achievement of economic
independence and nonalignment in foreign policy. Junejo's
footdragging on going public with the formation of Pakistan Welfare
International, the organization designed to channel humanitarian
aid into Afghanistan reflects his desire that Pakistan's support..
for the Afghan resistance remain low-key.
Although the civilianization process has reduced the prominence
of at least one outspoken and influential critic of the policy
towards Afghanistan--former North-West Frontier Province Governor
Lt. Gen. Fazle Haq--the government almost certainly will have to
contend with other politicians and military leaders who object to
the policy. In discussions between US and Pakistani officials
since the end of martial law, both civilian and military officials
have been quite willing to voice opinions at odds with the "party
line." We believe that consensus building will quickly become a
part of the political process--a development that will both slow
the decision-making process and, on occasion, send mixed signals on
foreign policy to Washington.
The Military--Mixed Views
The military generally supports the government's policy on
Afghanistan, believing that it serves Pakistan's national interest.
They see-it strenghening Islamic solidarity both in Pakistan and
with other Muslim nations. The military also believes the Soviet
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threat to Pak
istan is red
uced as long as Moscow is tied down in
Afghanistan.
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A Weak Opposition
Zia's main civilian opposition coalition, the Movement for the
Restoration of Democracy (MRD), lost one of its principle rallying
points when martial law was lifted. The MRD will continue to harp
about the US-Pakistani relationship, however. It will draw on
widespread popular suspicions about Washington's steadfastness as
an ally to argue that Islamabad's Afghan policy exposes Pakistan to
Soviet retribution. The more extreme among the opposition such as
former Prime Minister Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples' Party (PPP) will
charge that the United States is using Pakistan as a pawn for a
confrontation with Moscow. Some also will argue--the current
warming trend in Indo-Pakistani relations notwithstanding--that the
real threat to Pakistan's security is India and that involvement in
Afghanistan weakens Pakistan's ability to defend itself along its
The opposition, in our view, has its work cut out if it is to
mobilize public opinion against Islamabad's Afghanistan policy. A
recent poll by Gallup-Pakistan in December indicated that most
Pakistanis--even supporters of parties that call for direct talks
with the Babrak regime--endorse current policy toward Afghanistan.
Two-thirds of the respondents opposed direct talks even though many
are troubled about the presence of at least 2.5 million Afghan
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Potential Troublespots
We believe that any of the following developments would make
Afghan policy an exploitable issue for the opposition and erode
support for Zia's Afghan policy in the Cabinet and among the
military:
-- A sharp rise in Soviet military pressure--such as
cross-border raids and deeper air attacks inside
Pakistan--would stimulate parliamentary demands that the
regime defend its handling of the Afghan situation.
-- Serious Soviet overtures about possible troop withdrawals
would encourage those Pakistanis who object to or are
ambivalent about the Afghanistan problem to push for a
reassessment by Islamabad.
-- An aid package from Washington deemed by the Pakistnis to
be inadequate would be viewed by many in the National
Assembly and among the public as another indication of
Washington's unreliability as an ally and the folly of
current policy towards Afghanistan. Still, recent
conversations with US officials indicate that Pakistani
officials are beginning to accept that US budgetary
constraints will mean a post-1987 assistance program that
falls well below Islamabad's request.
-- Economic hardship almost certainly would result in an
outcry against the burden of the Afghan refugees, heighten
economic competition between the refugees and local
Pakistanis, and escalate social violence in the areas where
refugee camps are concentrated. 25X1
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