AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000201770001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 14, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01 CIA-RDP86T01017R000201770001-3 1
Directorate of up Mule[
Intelligence.
Afghanistan Situation Report
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LACK OF RESISTANCE COOPERATION IN ORUZGAN PROVINCE
The month-long seige of Deh Ravod ended with a
withdrawal by Hizbi-Islami forces in the face of
superior Soviet-Afghan forces without informing
their local allies--a move that will probably
increase the already suspicious attitude of local
tribesmen toward "outsiders", at least in
Oruzgan.
PAKISTAN DELAYS ANNOUNCING CROSS-BORDER RELIEF AGENCY 3
Islamabad's sensitivity about publicizing aid for the
Afghan resistance is causing delays in the
implementation of Pakistan Welfare International, a new
humanitarian cross-border relief program.
AFGHANISTAN: RESISTANCE SCORES FEW POINTS AT ISLAMIC 3
CONFERENCE
The Islamic Conference held last week in Morocco
concentrated on Middle East issues and did not give
formal recognition to the Afghan resistance
delegation.
14 January 1986
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This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern
and South Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis.
14 January 1986
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From mid-October to mid-November,~ Hizbi-Islami
(Khalis) insurgents--probably from the Qandahar-Helmand
region--together with locally-based insurgents armed
with rocket launchers, recoilless rifles, and mortars
besieged the district center of Deh Ravod, Oruzgan
Province, some 100 miles nortwest of Qandahar,
Despite heavy Soviet
and regime air strikes the insurgents penetrated the
city limits and overran several military posts. Before
the insurgents could seize control of the city,
however, a large Soviet-Afghan armored convoy and
Soviet paratroopers arrived, forcing the Hizbi-Islami
insurgents to withdraw. The local insurgents, who were
unaware of the Hizbi-Islami's night departure, found
themselves in a hopeless situation and immediately fled
to their villages and the nearby mountains.
the siege of Deh Ravod
followed an unsucessful earlier attempt by the Hizbi-
Islami to secure the cooperation of local insurgents
for an assault on Tarin Kowt, the capital of Oruzgan
Province. Local insurgents reportedly refused to
participate because of the onset of winter,
insufficient supplies from resistance parties in
Quetta, and the inability of the Hizbi-Islami
commanders to guarantee the security of the local
populace.
Local commanders, who were Durani tribesman,
also distrusted the Hizbi commanders, who were Ghilzai
tribesmen, and feared that the latter would seek to
disarm the local insurgents.
Comment: Tribal rivalries, competition for arms and
money, and deep suspicions of outsiders have repeatedly
prevented insurgent groups from uniting across tribal
and geographic boundaries. Local commanders fear that
outsiders will engage in high-risk operations that
endanger the local population. The groups also resent
outside insurgent groups who, in their view, behave as
conquering warlords, and do not share information or
military assets.
14 January 1986
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14 January 1986
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Islamabad is delaying the official announcement and
implementation of Pakistan Welfare International (PWI),
the newly-formed clearing house for humanitarian
assistance inside Afghanistan, according to US Embassy
reporting. The delay has increased concern among
private voluntary organizations that their role will be
curtailed and that PWI may become a tool of US foreign
policy rather than an impartial conduit for
humanitarian assistance.
Comment: Islamabad will move cautiously on any program
that increases the visibility of its support to the
insurgents because of concern that publicity might
increase Soviet pressure on Pakistan. In particular,
Prime Minister Junejo, who with the transition to
civilian rule now has a stronger role in foreign
policy, may be dragging his feet. Nevertheless, there
is still strong support within Pakistan for a program
of cross-border humanitarian assistance and the program
will probably be implemented within several months.
CONFERENCE
Despite Saudi claims that the Afghan insurgents would
receive greater attention this year in the Islamic
Conference (OIC), Afghanistan was assigned a low place
on the agenda of the OIC's foreign ministers meeting in
Morocco last week. At the opening session, the
resistance delegation was denied entry to the main
conference hall and was escorted to the gallery
designated for observers and guests. Alliance
spokesman Gailani was allowed to speak as a "guest,"
but no member government proposed granting the
resistance formal status in the Conference.
Comment: Condemnation of US and Israeli threats
against Libya, and political infighting between Syria
and Egypt dominated the meeting. Absent strong
leadership from Saudi Arabia or Pakistan, the
Conference will continue to avoid giving greater
14 January 1986
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prominence to Afghanistan, in favor of non-
controversial items, such as opposition to the US-
Israel alliance and support for the Palestinians. We
believe the Conference resolution on Afghanistan will
keep the weak language it has had since 1981.
-- The combined So
viet-Afghan operation in the
Bagram area has
ended, 25X1
Soviet and Afghan 2bx1
command posts a
deployed to the
nd an Afghan fire support base
area since late December have
been removed. The 11 Fitter and 11 Hind
helicopters, which were probably used for air
support during the operation, also returned to
their bases in Afghanistan.
-- On 11 January, Radio Kabul announced that the
Afghan intelligence service (KHAD) was upgraded
to ministerial status and renamed the Ministry
of State Security. The timing of the change, so
soon after former KHAD chief Najuibullah's
promotion, may reflect Najibullah's growing
importance.
-- According to regime media, Afghanistan will
expand its Revolutionary Council--the highest
executive and legislative organ in the regime--
by adding non-party members, including
14 January 1986
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representative religious leaders, members of
private industry and tribesmen. Among other
things, the Council will be charged with forming
a commission to draft a new constitution--the
latest in a series of moves designed to improve
the regime's domestic and international
standing.
25 towed
240-mm mortars, 36 82-mm Vasilek mortars, and at
least 15 possible self-propelled 152-mm guns 2S5
at Towraghondi transshipment point. The Soviets
will be markedly increasing their available
firepower in western Afghanistan when this
artillery is deployed. Additionally, the
Soviets may send in additional troops to man the
artillery.
14 January 1986
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