INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SITUATION REPORT #55

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000201280001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 21, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
International Financial Situation Report #55
21 August 1986
Summary
The recent attempt by the Swiss Bank Corporation to substitute interest capitalization for
new money in the bridging loan for Mexico highlights the regulatory differences various creditor
countries. Some European countries allow tax breaks for loan write offs but not for new loans.
The Swiss Bank Corporation's actions on the Mexican loan were unusual as the European banks
generally work out their differences in private to avoid giving the debtor the opportunity to
divide the banks on important issues. Although the US banks generally take the lead on Latin
debt negotiations because of their greater loan exposure, non-US banks collectively hold 65
percent of the LDC debt owed to banks. In other developments:
o Mexico's difficulty in securing commercial bank participation in a $1.6 billion bridge
loan indicates a tough road ahead as talks with banks turn to Mexico's $6 billion new
money request. Contrary to some press reports, the level of new lending Mexico is
requesting has not been accepted by the bank advisory committee.
o
Brazil is encounterin difficulty in completing its 1985-86 commercial debt
rescheduling package.
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banks are refusing to sign the accord until Brasilia formalizes its earlier promise
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to guarantee the debts of three failed domestic banks.
o Argentina may seek interest rate concessions on its foreign debt payments to
compensate for falling wheat prices which it says have been exacerbated by the recent
US decision to subsidize wheat sales to the USSR. Buenos Aires is comparing the role
played by grain in its economy to that of oil in Mexico, and we believe it may request
debt payments be linked to export prices.
o Surprised by the intensity of bankers' reactions, Venezuela has scrapped its FOCOCAM
scheme that would have assumed most of the government-approved foreign debt of the
private sector. The episode demonstrates the Lusinchi administration's lack of
direction in economic management.
o The Philippine government concluded a letter of intent with an IMF negotiating team
in late July The Philippines has requested
$238 million in standby assistance and $270 million from the Fund's compensatory
financing facility.
NOTE: REPORT #56 WILL BE PUBLISHED ON 18 SEPTEMBER 1986.
This situation report was prepared by analysts of the Intelligence Directorate. Comments are
welcome and may be addressed to .the Situation Report Coordinator,
Copy of 75
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KEY ISSUE
Non-US Bank Attitudes Toward LDC Debt Negotiations
The recent attempt by the Swiss Bank Corporation to substitute interest
capitalization for new money in the bridging loan for Mexico is another example of the
different attitudes expressed by some non-US banks with regard to the LDC debt
situation. Although US banks generally take the lead in debt negotiations for the major
Latin debtors because of their greater loan exposure, the role of non-US banks is also
important because these banks collectively hold some 65 percent of LDC debt owed to
banks. Among the major country groups, Japanese banks account for 15-20 percent of
LDC bank debt, British banks 15 percent, West German banks 10 percent, and Swiss banks
5 percent, based on various sources. In the case of Mexico, Citibank leads the bank
advisory committee while the Swiss Bank Corporation leads the European regional
grouping.
Non-US banks are similar to US banks in that there is often a wide divergence in
views among banks in a specific country. Differences occur between large and small
banks as well as between large banks with differing exposures in individual countries.
The Swiss Bank
Corporation's position on the Mexican loan was unusual, however, because the European
banks generally work out their differences in private in order to avoid giving the debtor
the opportunity to pursue bilateral negotiations.
The major differences between US and some non-US banks, particularly European
banks, are the regulatory regimes. Some European countries allow tax breaks for loan
loss provisions. In addition, Spanish, German, and Swiss banks, for example, all have been
encouraged by their regulatory authorities to write off portions of their LDC debt, in
some cases up to 50 percent, In addition, German banks are not
required to set aside reserves against capitalized interest payments but would have to do
so if new money was committed. US banks do not have the same tax incentives nor have
the US regulators required them to set aside major amounts of reserves. Instead, since
1982 US regulators have encouraged US banks to increase capital.
DEVELOPMENTS IN MAJOR COUNTRIES
Mexico
Last week's difficulty in securing commercial bank participation in a $1.6 billion
bridge loan indicates a tough road lies ahead as talks with the banks turn to Mexico's
request for $6 billion in new money over the next 18 months. Swiss banks posed the
greatest threat to the bridging loan, arguing for interest capitalization as an alternative
to new lending. Press reports suggest that considerable pressure and an IMF threat to
withhold $1.6 billion in credits to Mexico softened the Swiss position. Nevertheless,
banking sources expect the issue to reemerge during negotiations over the new money
package, which calls for bank contributions of $3.5 billion this year and $2.5 billion in
1987. All banks reportedly are concerned that ca italizi o Mexico's interest would set an
unwelcome precedent for other troubled debtors.
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Another area of contention will be the setting of a base date to determine the level
of bank participation in new lending. Mexico's bank advisory committee (BAC) is
expected to push smaller regional and European banks to lend an amount proportionate to
their 1982 exposure, even though many of these banks have since written off or swapped
out of Mexican loans. In the end, pressure from larger banks will force most of the
regional banks to fall in line,
government-to-
government pressure may be required to bring some of the larger European banks into
line.
Meanwhile, the economic subcommittee of the BAC apparently has been unable to
reconcile Mexico's new money request with economic data presented by Mexican
Contrary to some press reporting, the level
of new lending Mexico is requesting has not yet been accepted by the banks, and negotia-
tions are likely to remain deadlocked until the subcommittee presents its report to the
BAC. Once there is agreement on the level of lending, we believe completion of
Mexico's new money package is likely to be months off-certainly beyond 8 September,
when the IMF is scheduled to formally accept Mexico's program.
Brazil is encountering difficulty in completing its 1985-86 commercial debt
rescheduling package. The deadline for obtaining approval from the required 95 percent
of its creditor banks was pushed forward to 5 September from 15 August.
banks still are refusing to sign t e
domestic banks. Brazilian officials have indicated to bankers that the issue is unlikely to
be resolved by 5 September,
Finance Minister Funaro stated last month that Brazil will seek through
negotiations to limit external debt service payments to 2.5 percent of GDP next year-
compared to 4.0 percent this year-in an effort to support planned domestic growth of
7.0 percent.
Subsequently, Brasilia issue a press
statement aimed at reassuring bankers in order to keep its current rescheduling on
track. Nevertheless, some creditors believe Brazil will use this goal to justify substantial
new borrowings next year, Other lenders
reportedly dismiss this eventuality because of Brazil's healthy payments position and
unwillingness to obtain a new IMF agreement.
To maintain export and economic growth, most economists indicate that additional
investment funds will be sorely needed. With the Cruzado Plan weakening domestic
capital formation in Brazil, we expect Brazilian officials to push for concessions-new
money or eased interest payments-in the next round of talks with commercial creditors,
expected to begin in October. Moreover, we believe Brasilia will remain steadfast in its
opposition to implement any type of IMF program as a prerequisite for a debt
rescheduling.
Argentina
Argentina is likely to begin negotiations with the IMF soon on a new standby
agreement, according to a US government official. Buenos Aires may seek interest rate
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concessions on its foreign debt payments as well as $250 million from the IMF
compensatory financing facility to compensate for falling grain prices, according to press
reports. The Argentines will probably claim export revenue problems were exacerbated
by the recent US decision to subsidize wheat sales to the USSR. In addition, Argentina is
publicly comparing the role played by grain in its economy to that of oil in Mexico, and
we believe it may request that its foreign financing be linked to agriculture export
prices. Negotiations are likely to be complicated by the fact that monthly inflation hit
6.8 percent in July and is expected to reach 7.8 percent this month.
REGIONAL SITUATIONS
Latin America
In Latin America, the IMF declared Peru ineligible to draw on Fund resources,
Venezuela scrapped its FOCOCAM plan, Cuba resumed making partial interest payments,
The IMF declared Peru ineligible to draw on Fund resources when Lima failed to
clear arrearages by the 15 August deadline. President Garcia used the IMF declaration
of Peru's ineligibility as occasion for a one hour speech in which he castigated the Fund
and sought to increase popular support for his debt stance. Garcia did not threaten any
radical debt action, and we do not expect any since Peru is interested in maintaining
access to other credits. In more measured tones to the press, Central Bank head
Figueroa has stated that Peru still has access to some $1 billion in credit lines already in
process from the IBRD and the Inter-American Development Bank and that Lima intends
Garcia
probably will continue to depict the IMF as unresponsive to the developing countries as
he maneuvers to gain the chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) for Peru
during 1989-1992 when he attends the NAM summit in Harare, Zimbabwe early next
Venezuela
The Lusinchi administration has scrapped its plan to assume most of the
government-approved foreign debt of the private sector. The FOCOCAM scheme, passed
by congress last month, was intended to provide balance-of-payments relief and to raise
revenues to cover next year's fiscal deficit. Although foreign creditor banks favored the
government's assumption of the private sector's debt servicing responsibilities, they
strongly opposed the below-market interest rate and were concerned by the long
maturity the bonds were to carry. According to the Embassy, bankers told Venezuelan
finance ministry officials that negotiations to reschedule the public debt could not
resume until the government found a satisfactory solution for the private debt. To
underscore their dissatisfaction, some banks reportedly cut trade credit lines. Surprised
by the intensity of bank reaction, the administration scrapped the bond scheme. The
fiasco with the private debt scheme has increased tensions with banks, giving the
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political opposition another chance to rail against Lusinchi's uncertain economic
management and in our judgment is likely to further depress investor confidence.
According to the US Embassy, the government now plans to manage the impact of
private debt service on the balance of payments by restricting access to preferential
exchange-rate dollars to those debtors who secure a five-year grace period on principal
repayments from their foreign creditors. Official debt and debts of less than $500,000
will be exempted from the 5-year grace period requirement. In addition, we believe that
the government may reduce the interest spread above LIBOR that is used to calculate
central bank dollar disbursements for servicing private debtors' interest obligations. To
cover the government's 1987 fiscal deficit--a projected eight percent of GDP-the
administration is considering legislation that would allow the central bank to increase
significantly its holdings of treasury debt, according to press accounts. Because such a
move would sharply raise the money supply. some Venezuelan analysts have expressed
concern over its inflationary impact.
After suspending all payments on short-term commercial debt on 1 July, the Cuban
National Bank has resumed partial interest payments and informed creditors that delays
in payment are the result of a shortage of foreign exchange.
Cuba has asked Western banks to provide $300 million in new money, reschedule
$100 million in commercial debt falling due in 1986, and to reschedule the country's
already-rescheduled 1982 and 1983 principal and interest payments, according to press
reporting.
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USSR/Eastern Europe
Among the Eastern Bloc countries, the USSR is expanding its participation in
Western financial markets, and Yugoslavia will probably miss its third quarter targets
with the IMF, technically putting it in default on its 1985-88 rescheduling agreement. I
The USSR, in its continuing effort to mitigate the effects of its hard currency
shortfall, is expanding ties with Western banks and trying out new options in world
financial markets.
Moscow
Narodny Bank recently put together, for the first time, a note issuance facility.
Moreover, in early August, Vneshtorgbank agreed to invest $3.2 million in a yen-
denominated bond issue, marking the first entry of the USSR into the bond market. Last
month's agreement with Great Britain on tsarist bonds in default since 1917 removes a
long-standing impediment to issuance of Soviet bonds.
During a recent seminar with US economists, Soviet officials expressed an interest
in joining the IMF, the IBRD, and other international financial agencies. Financial
observers believe the Soviets hope that such membership would make it easier to tap
international credit markets. While the USSR probably will continue to expand its
external financing activities, this growth will be tempered by an unwillingness to let
dependence on Western financial markets get out of hand.
Yugoslavia
Because of a sharp decline in hard currency earnings, Belgrade may face a
financing gap of $600 million this year and a disruption of its rescheduling agreements
with Western creditors. Unless the trade balance improves, Yugoslavia also may be
forced to seek additional financial assistance from the West to meet its debt service
obligations next year. Belgrade probably
will miss its third-quarter reserve level target under the IMF enhanced monitoring
agreement, Failure to meet the target would technically
put Yugoslavia in default on its 1985-88 rescheduling agreement with com mercial. banks
and reduce its ' ability to secure needed trade credits. Moreover, if the Yugoslav
government continues to largely ignore IMF policy recommendations designed to improve
the domestic economy and trade performance, the activation of the goodwill clause of its
rescheduling agreement with official creditors and provision of debt relief in 1987 could
be endangered.
In Asia, the Philippines concluded a draft letter of intent for a new IMF standby
arrangement, and Indonesia claims it will reexamine its external debt situation after the
April 1987 elections.
Philippines
The Philippine government
negotiating team in late July,
The letter of intent
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was submitted in early August to IMF Managing Director de Larosiere for his approval.
According to press reports, the Philippines has requested $238 million in standby
assistance and $270 million from the Fund's compensatory financing facility. Under the
new standby, Manila has agreed to restructure or dismantle some troubled government-
owned financial institutions-likely including the Philippine National Bank. Manila also
has agreed to liberalize certain trade policies including lowering tariff barriers.
Talks between the Philippines and its bank advisory committee are expected to
begin as soon as the IMF Executive Board approves the letter of intent. Press reports
indicate Manila will seek a multiyear commercial bank rescheduling covering debts of
$3.5 billion falling due from 1987 through 1991. A request for another new money
facility is not anticipated. Negotiations with Paris Club creditors for a rescheduling of
approximately $1.6 billion in official debts are likely to take place in October for
During her upcoming visit to the United States, President Aquino will seek
commercial bankers' support for the recently announced Philippine debt-to-equity
conversion plan. To begin buying up discounted loans and converting them into equity in
Philippine enterprises, Manila needs to raise $250 million, which Aquino will seek from
bankers during her visit. According to press reports, bankers, while supporting the plan
in principle, are already saying the conversion fees being charged by the government are
too high.
Indonesia
Indonesian Central Bank officials
recently indicated Jakarta does not plan to "readjust" the country's external debt this
year despite the sharp reduction in its export revenues due to lower oil prices. However,
they do expect to "re-examine" their debt situation closely after the April 1987
preliminary elections. Indonesia-which had nearly $13 billion in foreign exchange
reserves in January 1986-has drawn down its reserves by $2-3 billion as of last month to
help finance its deficits,
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Jakarta may be trying to utilize short-term trade credits to
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conserve foreign exchange reserves. Given its current level of reserves, Indonesia should
be able to postpone a rescheduling until after the April elections.
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unless the price of oil rises above $20 per barrel, the specter of a
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rescheduling is unavoidable.
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For their part, Indonesia's commercial creditors are rethinking their ceilings on
Indonesian exposure. According to US Embassy reporting, Japanese banks, which had
increased their exposure from $992 million in 1982 to $2.2 billion in 1985, have become
concerned about the state of the Indonesian economy and may take steps to reduce their
exposure. There are indications, however, that the Japanese government through its
official assistance program will pick up any slack caused by Japanese commercial bank
retrenchment. Indonesia may try to obtain a large syndicated
loan from commercial creditors, but response is expected to be lukewarm unless generous
terms are granted. Nine moneycenter banks hold 80-85 percent of US commercial bank
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exposure in Indonesia. Although this presents the opportunity for a club loan, these banks
have all the Indonesian exposure they care to handle at this time. 25X1
Africa/Middle East
Nigeria has drafted preliminary guidelines for a two-
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tier foreign exchange market; and Tunisia is expected to reach an agreement with the
Fund for a new standby next month. 25X1
Egypt
Cairo's primary concern remains the Fund's recommendation that the country
decontrol its multiple exchange rates within one year, which-because it would double
the prices of essential imports-Egyptian officials believe would be certain to ignite civil
unrest. Cairo insists it needs three years to gradually decontrol exchange rates. We
expect Egypt will redouble its efforts toward softer IMF terms in coming weeks;
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Meanwhile, Cairo plans to announce major customs reforms on 22 August which it
believes will boost government revenue by some $600 million over the next year,
according to US Embassy reporting. The IMF and World Bank, however, estimate the
increased revenues at $400 million. Implementation of the reforms would clear the wa
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Nigeria
Nigerian officials have drafted preliminary guidelines for a two-tier foreign
exchange market, but President Babangida privately acknowledged that he cannot accept
al IMF accord because popular resistance
Although Babangida may
eventually extract a commercial debt rescheduling, neither Western bankers nor official
lenders are likely to extend fresh credits without a Fund standby. Nigeria's sagging
economy has suffered a 50 percent drop in oil revenues this year, creating a critical need
for external loans. Army officers have become increasingly disgruntled with Babangida's
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inability to protect military benefits,
believe key officers are likely to rema
in loyal at least through the near term.
Tunisia
IMF staff told US officials last week they are confident that Tunisia-hard-hit this
year by low oil and tourism revenues, a poor harvest, and sagging commodity prices--will
reach agreement with the Fund on conditions for a standby arrangement during talks next
month. The Fund accord would provide Tunis with about $180 million, including a $140
million compensatory facility, before yearend, but IMF staff confirmed the country will
face a tight financial squeeze until Fund and World Bank disbursements are made. Even
with the expected Fund and Bank cash infusions, the IMF estimates Tunisia still faces a
$350 million financial gap this year, which would have to be covered by bilateral donors,
new commercial loans, or debt rescheduling. Tunis prefers to fill the gap with bilateral
assistance, but so far requests for help from Europe have yielded only about $15 million
in additional aid, according to the US Embassy.
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o At the G-77 meeting this week, Ranania proposed a writeoff of much of
the $800 billion Third World debt ...R,ananians suggested the debts of
those LDCs whose per capita inc ane does not exceed $500-600 dollars be
cancelled... the debts of LDCs with per capita incomes between $1000-
2000 would be substantially reduced.
o Bolivia is to begin negotiations on its $930 million commercial bank
debt this week...bankers willing to reschedule if La Paz pays $50
million this year...drawdown of reserves spurred by joint US-Bolivian
anti-narcotics action makes such payment unlikely.
o Colarbia returned to the international bond market after a 14-year
absence... successfully placed $40 million bond issue with Japanese
investors... rapid, positive response indicates strengthened
creditworthiness.
o Cbsta Rica proposing to link debt service payments to econanic
performance when it meets with creditor banks in November...will seek
renegotiation of San Jose's $1.6 billion commercial debt, interest rate
concessions... continuing to renegotiate terms and conditions for a new
OF standby, but new program unlikely before end 1986.
o Ecuador obtained a $75 million IWVW standby arrangement on 15 August...
implemented a floating foreign exchange rate for private sector
transactions and eliminated interest rate ceilings... also signed
agreement with commercial creditors to reschedule the 1986 portion of
its $5.5 billion multiyear rescheduling over 12 years at 1.375
percentage points above LIBOR.
o Paraguay agreed to accept World Bank disbursements--delayed due to
Asuncion's refusal to devalue--at half their previous amount ...plans to
use Central Bank reserves to make up difference... we judge Asuncion has
insufficient reserves to both service foreign debt and cover the
disbursement shortfall.
o Uruguay's legislature voted to substantially raise government
pensions... could cause Nbntevideo to miss fiscal deficit and monetary
targets of its IW-supported program... missed targets would delay over
$100 million in IW, World Bank, and commercial loans.
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Europe/USSR
o Poland is planning to miss a large payment due to Paris Club this year
under the 1986 rescheduling agreement, according to a reliable
source...will cite ambiguous language in rescheduling document as
excuse ...probably will use funds to pay commercial banks and increase
imports.
o llklaysia's $350 million new financing bid drew strong competition among
banks-timing prior to recent elections, however, led bankers to feel
they were being used to boost government popularity by showing what
fine terms Nhlaysia can comnand...loan thought to carry 10-year
maturity, with a split margin of 0.375-0.5 percentage point above
LIBOR.
o Thailand's new Finance Minister Suthi told the presss that financial
stability will be his top priority... plans to maintain a ceiling on
foreign borrowings of not more than 10 percent of GDP...unclear whether
Suthi has the political clout to curb calls for increased government
spending.
Africa/Middle East
o Africa debt conference twice endorsed by OAU Summit in Addis Ababa last
month... indicates African leaders do not yet consider issue closed...
new OAIJ chairman and Congolese President Sassou-Nguesso will feel
obligated to pursue conference.
o South Africa posted $2.5 billion trade surplus for first half of
1986... translates into $1 billion current account surplus for first
half...on track with Pretoria's $2 billion 1986 current account surplus
target needed to meet debt repayments.
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SUBJBCF: International Financial Situation Report #55
Copy No. 1
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Sec. James Baker Treasury
R. G. Darman
James W. Cbnrow
Robert Cornell
Thomas J. Berger
Charles Schotta
James A. Griffin
Doug Mulholland
Robert M. Kimnit
David Mulford
Sec. George Shultz State
John C. Whitehead
Morton I. Abramowitz
Jerome H. Kahan
Michael Armacost
Ralph Lindstrom
W. Allen Wallis
Elliot Abrams
Rozanne Ridgway
Douglas McMinn
Chester Crocker
Gaston Sigur
Richard Murphy
Harry Gilmore
Byron Jackson
S. Bruce Snart
Steve Farrar
Stephen Danzansky
Randall Fort
Leo Cherne
David Tarbell
DCI
ExDir
SA/DDCI
DDI
ADDI
Ch/PES/DDI
NIO Economics
ADD/NIC AG
DDO
Ch/DDO/EPOS
Ch/DDO/NCO
Ch/DDO/AF
Ch/DDO/EA
Ch/DDO/EUR
Ch/DDO/LA
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Ch/DDO/NE
Ch /MD/ SE
D/ALA
Ch /ALA/SAD
D/OEA
D/EURA
Ch/EURA/EE/EW
D/SOVA
D/NESA
DD/OGI, D/OGI
Ch /OGI /SRO
Ch/OGI/FSIC
Ch/OGI/Ea
Ch /OGI /DC D/F I
64 OGI /CA
65 CPAS/ISS/SA/DA
66 Ch/OGI/Pub
67-69 OGI/Pub oyc
70-75 CPAS/ I:VC/CB
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Comnerce
1 - Edwin Truman, Federal Reserve Board
1 - Henry Wallich, Federal Reserve Board
it
1 - David Roberts, Federal Reserve
,
New York
1 - Leo Cherne
PFIAB
New York
NSC
,
,
1 - E. Gerald Corrigan, President,
it
PFIAB
Federal Reserve Bank, New York
1 - John Bohn, Chairman, ExIm Bank
PFIAB
2 - Doug Mulholland, Treasury
OSD (ISA)
1 - Ambassador Richard McCormack, State
1 - Martin A. Wenick, State
1 - Nicholas Burakow, State
1 - Peter W. Rodman, State
5 - Byron Jackson, Commerce
1 - Warren E. Farb. Commerce
1 -
1 - Ron Silverman, OMB
1 - Beryl Sprinkel, CEA
5 -
1 -
1 - C/DO/OED/NCB
1 - Ch /BCD
1- Ch/BCD/IF
1 - Ch /BCD/T
1 - Ch/BM/DI
1 - Ch/BCD/CM
1 - Ch/ISID/FI
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