MALAYSIA''S WAR ON DRUGS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000201200001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 18, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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DATE 7 .1`-
DOC NO G-I M.
OCR 3
P&PD I
en ra Intelligence Agency
18 JUL 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution List
FROM: 25X1
Director of Global Issues
SUBJECT: Malaysia's War on Drugs
1. The attached memorandum, Malaysia's War on Drugs,
presents our assessment of the Malaysian counternarcotics
effort. We judge that, despite a strong beginning, the effort
faces some road blocks which are slowing progress.
2. This memorandum was prepared by
Strategic Narcotics Division, Office of
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3. Questions and comments are welcome and may be addressed
to the Chief, Strategic Narcotics Division, OGI,
Attachment:
Malaysia's War on Drugs
GI M 86-20168, July 1986
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SUBJECT: Malaysia's War on Drugs
OGI/SND/E,
(July 1986)
1
- Mr. Jerrold M. Dion, INM, State Department
1
- Dr. Carlton Turner, SA to the President
1
- Mr. Robert Whitbread, Office of the Vice President
1
- Mr. John Monjo, East Asia/Pacific Affairs, State Department
1
- Lucian Heichler, INR/IC, State Department
1
- Paula Causey, INR/EA, State Department
1
- Ms. Thuy Coyne, DEA
1
- Mr. Charles Saphos, US Justice Department,
Criminal Division
2
- Captain Theodore E. Deming, US Coast Guard
1
- Mr. Douglas P. Mulholland, Treasury Department
1
- National Security Agency
1
- Commander Jack Carney, NNBIS, Long Beach, California
2
- Mr. George Heavey, US Customs Service, Office of
Intelligence
- Colonel Richard Childress, NSC
- Mr. Sean McWeeney. FBI/Organized Crime
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SUBJECT: Malaysia's: War on Dru s
OGI/SND/E
(July 1986)
1 - SA/DDCI
1 - Executive Director
1 - D/DCI-DDCI Executive Staff
1 - DDI
1 - DDI/PES
2 - NIO/CTN
1 - NIO/OEA
1 - C/NIC/AG
1 - DDO/EA
1 - DDO/EA
1 - DDO/CNG
1 - C/ASG
1 - D/OGI, DD/OGI
1 - CPAS/ISS
1 - D/OEA, DD/OEA
1 - OIA/SS
1 - OEA/SEA ITM
2 - SND
2 - SND/E
3 - OGI/EXS/PG
5 - CPAS/IMC/CB (One sourced)
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
17 July 1986
Malaysia's War on Drugs
Summary
In 1983, Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad declared drug
abuse and trafficking Malaysia's number-one national security
threat and launched an ambitious antinarcotics effort that has
subsequently earned a reputation as one of the toughest programs
in the world. Malaysia developed an intensive two-year
rehabilitation program for heroin addicts, implemented a much
needed reorganization and expansion of its government drug
enforcement organization, and instituted a series of tough
antidrug laws. After an auspicious beginning, however, the
aggressive Malaysian antidrug effort now faces some serious road
blocks that are slowing progress. Resources are increasingly a
constraint, particularly in the face of a stubborn national drug
abuse problem combined with the resilience of the trafficking
organizations in Southeast Asia. We judge a few measures--such
as units to analyze drug intelligence, beefed up marine
enforcement, and a conspiracy law--could make a big difference in
the effectiveness of Malaysia's counternarcotics effort.
This memorandum was prepared byl I Strategic
Narcotics/Eurasia-Africa Branch, Office of Global Issues. This
analysis is based on information available as of 17 July 1986.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed to the
Chief, Strategic Narcotics Division, Office of Global Issues, on
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Narcotics: A Recent Problem
Illicit drugs represent a new challenge for Malaysia.
Neither narcotics abuse nor trafficking were major problems until
the early 1970s, and drug addiction had been largely confined to
older ethnic Chinese opium smokers. Proximity to the opium-
producing countries of the Golden Triangle--Burma, Thailand, and
Laos--made Malaysia a frequently used transit point for heroin
and other opiates destined for Asian and Western markets, but
such trafficking generally did not affect local society. As the
pace of economic modernization quickened over the last decade,
however, new and more intensive patterns of drug use and
trafficking began to emerge. Malaysia now occupies a prominent
role in the international drug trade, and along with other
nations in Southeast Asia, is in the midst of what promises to be
a protracted and difficult war on drugs whose outcome is very
Drug Addiction Crisis
During the last 10 years, drug addiction in Malaysia has
grown at particularly alarming rates at the same time that the
country has been making the transition from a rural to an urban
industrial society. According to a Government of Malaysia
report, for example, the number of registered heroin addicts rose
from 22,000 in 1976 to 104,000 in 1984. Kuala Lumpur now
estimates the total addict population at some 200,000 to 300,000
out of a total population of 16 million--an addiction rate 12 to
18 times higher than that of the United States.
The sharp increase in drug addiction has primarily affected
ethnic Malays--some 45 percent of the population--rather than the
Chinese and Indian minorities already settled in urban areas.
Malay youths migrating to urban areas in search of work lost the
religious guidance and emotional support provided by the closely
knit rural family. Many young ethnic Malays apparently turned to
heroin, and the use of drugs among Malays--which was, unlike the
Chinese, not a cultural tradition--mushroomed. The typical
Malaysian addict is no longer an elderly Chinese opium smoker but
rather a young heroin.smoker, with Malays constituting the
largest single group of drug addicts. Over 70 percent of the
I Heroin #3 is a low-cost, low-purity "smoking heroin" preferred
by addicts in Malaysia. Heroin #4, the higher purity heroin
which is injected by addicts in the United States, is a more
expensive product and has few users in Asia. Within Asia, both
products are almost exclusively intended for smoking. As drug
prices increase, however, it becomes more economical to switch
from smoking #3, in which some of the narcotic effect is lost in
smoke, to injecting #4.
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registered addicts are now in the under-30 age group, and are
drawn proportionately from both the Malay and Chinese
communities, according to the US Embassy. The Malaysians report
that the typical ethnic breakdown at Malaysia's drug
rehabilitation centers is 60 percent Malay. 30 percent Chinese,
and 10 percent Indian (see figure).
The Emergence of Domestic Heroin Production
The rising Malaysian demand for heroin and the lure of
higher profits derived from sales of the finished product of the
poppy helped trigger changes in trafficking patterns. By 1980,
the existing ethnic Chinese trafficking syndicates--already well
connected to similar syndicates in producing and consuming
countries and experienced in moving drugs through Malaysia--were
refining heroin themselves. In addition to the higher profits
associated with processing and selling heroin in the domestic
market, these syndicates also found that moving compact morphine
blocks into Malaysia for further refining was less risky than
transporting heroin, which is about twice the volume of morphine
per unit weight (see figure). The establishment of a domestic
heroin refining industry was further encouraged by stepped up
enforcement in Thailand. In the early 1980s, largely because of
stricter controls by the Thai government, traffickers in the
Golden Triangle were unable to obtain acetic anhydride--a
controlled chemical that is essential to refining morphine to
heroin. Malaysian traffickers, however, had easy access to this
substance, which has many legal uses and is readily obtainable
throughout the country.
According to the US Embassy, all of the heroin consumed in
Malaysia plus some for export is now produced in-country. The
production laboratories are primarily located in Pinang State--
the major drug trafficking center--and in Johor, the state
bordering Singapore. Reports from the US Consulate in Songkhla,
Thailand over the past few years have indicated the presence of
heroin refineries near the Thai border, much of which is not
under complete government control. Although the evidence is
inconclusive, we suspect heroin refining there may be
widespread. In one example, a refinery was o eratin on th
border inside Thailand
The
refinery, allegedly protected by Malaysian Communists, was
converting raw opium to heroin base.
The US Embassy estimates that Malaysian refineries produce
between five to ten metric tons of heroin each year, an amount
more than large enough to supply the Malaysian market. Most
lab.oratories are mobile and operate intermittently, processing
morphine or heroin base into heroin #3, the drug of choice in
Malaysia. We judge Malaysian laboratories are also processing
raw opium, although Malaysian officials maintain that all opium
entering Malaysia from southern Thailand is either consumed by
~
local Chinese smokers or transshipped to other Asian markets.
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Addicts in Rehabilitation Centers
Identified by Ethnic Group
The remaining 10 percent of the population consists of other
indigenous groups. Their level of drug abuse is unknown.
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The Government Reacts
Alarmed by rising levels of drug abuse and trafficking, the
Malaysian government finally declared "war" against drugs in
1983. Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad admitted the severity
of Malaysia's narcotics problem and, with great fanfare, launched
an aggressive national enforcement campaign. The government
reorganized its enforcement bureaucracy and enacted some of the
toughest drug laws in the world, including the death penalty for
trafficking--with warnings displayed throughout the country and
announced to all incoming travellers (see figure). Although the
scope and effort of this campaign is unprecedented in the region
and is widely acclaimed as both tough and effective, there are
indications that Malaysia's record in its war on drugs has yet to
The Structure and Thrust of the Antidrug Program
Mahathir is most concerned, in our view, with drug
trafficking, probably in the belief that cutting off or reducing
the flow of narcotics into Malaysia would help reduce abuse
levels. When kicking off the control program in 1983, he called
drugs Malaysia's number one threat to national security and has
since focused the government's prolzram on combatting the criminal
aspects of the drug trade.
The linchpin of Mahathir's current strategy has been the
complete reorganization of the government drug enforcement
machinery (see figure). In 1983 Malaysia created the
Antinarcotics Task Force--an interagency body under the National
Security Council--to initiate, coordinate, and monitor the
antinarcotics activities and operations of the various
implementing agencies and private organizations involved in drug
control. The reorganization placed clear authority for narcotics
matters in the hands of the Deputy Prime Minister. As Chairman
of the National Security Council's Narcotics Committee and Home
Affairs Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister had control over both
enforcement and rehabilitation programs. Until his sudden
resignation from the government in mid-March, Musa Hitam held
this key position. He considered narcotics one of his top
priorities and kept the drug issue in the foreground of domestic
and foreign politics. Mahathir has since taken over the Home
Ministry and named a temporary Deputy Prime Minister from his
party.
Other measures soon followed:
o The government initiated a massive expansion of the Royal
Malaysian Police's (RMP) Antinarcotics unit--Division 8 of
the Criminal Investigations Division and the lead narcotics
enforcement element. From a total of 37 inspectors and
detectives in 1979--all based in Kuala Lumpur and able to
handle only one narcotics investigation at a time--the unit
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Drug Warning Poster
This hard-to-ignore warning greets travelers at Malaysian
airports and is displayed prominently throughout
the country.
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Malaysia's Antinarcotics Structure
1975-1983
Cabinet Committee on Drugs
Minister of Home Affairs
Minister of Health
Minister of Law
Minister of Information
Minister of Social Welfare
Minister of Culture, Youth and Sports
Minister Without Portfolio
Minister of Defense
Minister of Finance
Also attending:
Members of each Ministry, plus the
Central Narcotics Bureau
(under the Law Ministry), Police and
Customs.
Antinarcotics Executive Committee
Deputy Prime Minister, Musa Hitam,
Chairman
Responsible for coordination of
narcotics policy
Antinarcotics Task Force
Khairuddin Ibrahim, Director
To coordinate actions between
government agencies and monitor
compliance with instructions
Almost all enforcement and
non-enforcement implementation of
narcotics policy centered here:
- Police
- Immigration
- Special Branch
- Drug Treatment and Rehabilitation
Division
? Drug prevention and education is
primarily centered in the Education
Ministry but also involves Health,
Welfare Services, and Information.
Musa Hitam, former Deputy Prime
Minister and Home Minister ... his
sudden resignation will undoubtedly
dampen Malaysia's zeal on antinarcotics
initiatives.
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now has a strength of 1,500. In addition, the RMP
established two police antinarcotics teams, each staffed by
20 people, at Ipoh and at Pinang, the heroin refining
center.
o To stem the flow of drugs into the country, the government
tightened security at the Thai border, the primary entry
point for Golden Triangle opiates, and set up a third
antinarcotics team at Alor Setar. Malaysia built a chain-
link fence along the border near Pedang Besar, with a
parallel road and patrol towers set one kilometer apart
(see map). The government also created a Border Anti-
smuggling Prevention Unit under the jurisdiction of the
National Security Council and staffed with personnel from
the Police, Customs, Immigration, and the Rice Board. That
unit is responsible for smuggling interdiction along the
western segment of the Thai border.
o The Parliament passed legislation providing for tougher
punishment of offenders and giving enforcement officials
more power in apprehending suspected traffickers (see
appendix). The new laws enacted over the past two years
included a mandatory death sentence for anyone caught
trafficking in drugs; detention of suspected drug
traffickers for an unlimited period of time; and controls
on the importation of precursor chemicals.
Mahathir has chosen to approach addiction as a sickness
rather than a crime, and the government inaugurated an ambitious
rehabilitation program to treat the existing drug addict
population. A law passed in 1983 provided a comprehensive legal
basis for the treatment and rehabilitation of drug addicts and
extended the minimum period of internment at existing government
centers from six months to two years, to be followed by two years
of aftercare. To date, Malaysia has seven rehabilitation centers
around the country, including three which feature an innovative
"one stop" approach modeled after a successful Singaporean
program. The first of these one stop centers opened in May 1983
at Tampin, and its comprehensive, rigorous program is run by army
personnel. This center provides the full range of services
needed for treatment and rehabilitation, including "cold turkey"
detoxification, stringent military-style training, therapy in
work brigades and eventual job placement. The paramilitary
r.egimen distinguishes this center and two similar ones that have
since been opened from the other four centers.
To discourage the development of new addicts, Kuala Lumpur
also launched a drug education program aimed at informing the
public about the dangers of drug addiction and bringing about
attitudinal changes among users, potential users, parents, and
the community. The current training program includes preventive
education for school counselors and teachers and drug counseling
as part of the gradand post-graduate curriculum at Malaysian
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Thai-Malaysian Border
Malaysian Communist
major operating area
Fence
0 75 Kilometers
0 75 Miles
Major heroin refining
area
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The Score Card
In our view, the Malaysian program has made impressive
initial progress, and ranks far above most other Third World
antinarcotics efforts. Treatment and prevention programs are
staffed and operating, and public awareness--an obvious
prerequisite for success--has grown apace. The reorganization
largely ended interagency turf battles, substantially improving
enforcement capabilities countrywide. More importantly,
government enforcement personnel have not been subverted by the
extensive corruption that has thwarted drug control in other
Third World countries. Nevertheless, when measured against its
objectives--eliminating drug trafficking and reducing the high
levels of abuse--the Malaysian program does not fare so
Drug Addiction Still High
A general lack of facilities is hindering any major progress
in Malaysia's drug rehabilitation program. The US Embassy
reports that the police conduct raids to ferret out addicts only
to find no centers available for treating those they find. The
seven rehabilitation centers now in place have a combined
capacity of only 2,050 patients, and all have long waiting
lists. In the ten years ending in 1984, Malaysia was able to
treat a total of only 10,000 addicts
The number of aftercare facilities and personnel are
even more inadequate; overworked medical officers routinely
handle over a hundred cases at a time. Physicians, hospital
assistants, and occupational therapists are often poorly
motivated and trained. At some centers, none of the employees
have any academic training in treating drug addiction. Not
surprisingly, rehabilitation jobs are seen as "dead-end"
positions and are very difficult to fill. According to the US
Embassy, the three paramilitary centers have had a number of
special difficulties including a series of escape attempts and
allegations that inmates were physically maltreated.
Problems such as lack of training and facilities can be
remedied over time, but we judge Kuala Lumpur's basic approach to
remedying drug addiction also has intrinsic deficiencies. The
drug abuse prevention program currently is targeted at parents
and young adults--not at the adolescents and pre-adolescents who
are most likely to try drugs. In addition, since Malaysian youth
is becoming more tenuous.
the increased awareness and information
about narcotics have yet to motivate the general populace.
Corrtnunity involvement in drug abuse programs remains- limited, and
efforts to mobilize parent groups, village leaders, and Islamic
clergy have been slow in getting off the ground.
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It is too early to judge whether Malaysia's approach to
curing drug users will work. The first group of addicts who
began Kuala Lumpur's new two-year rehabilitation program have
only recently been released, and no statistics on their
recidivism are available. In any case, less than 1 percent of
the estimated addict population can now be treated each year.
Thus, the program is clearly not able to keep pace with the
growing number of addicts--which, based on new cases reported to
the government over the past three years has grown by 32,500--and
is not likely to cut significantly the pre-1983 national
recidivism rate of approximately 80 percent. Moreover, the
newly-cured drug addicts almost inevitably return to the social
settings which caused their problems initially and have available
only limited aftercare to help them maintain their drug-free
status. Rehabilitated addicts--despite the "vocational training"
received at the centers (typically iron work, furniture building,
farming)--face tough competition for jobs. Malaysian employers--
like those in other countries--are likely to choose an equally-
Trafficking Control: Some Limited Success
Stepped up law enforcement was initially successful in
disrupting the narcotics trade, but trafficking organizations
have quickly adjusted to the new, less permissive environment.
Traffickers in Malaysia, for example, are now ordering heroin
base rather than morphine to avoid using the controlled substance
acetic anhydride in the refining process, 25X1
The use of sea routes to move narcotics from 2bX1
southern Thailand to Malaysia is also becoming more common as
traffickers seek to avoid crossing the Thai border by land.
Kuala Lumpur's plan to begin constructing a 25-kilometer wall
along the border in the Betong area, although directed primarily
against Malaysian Communists, may also encourage traffickers to
switch to sea transportation. 25X1
The reorganization of the government's antidrug apparatus,
coupled with the massive expansion of the police, has resulted in
some moderate success at the street level. According to police
statistics, heroin seizures increased from 46 kilograms in 1981
to 243 kilograms in 1984, causing the street price to rise during
1985. Preventive detention of traffickers without trial is
proving to be a particularly useful tool for police seeking to
keep suspected traffickers off the streets. The US Embassy
estimates that about 900 drug suspects are now in detention in
Malaysia.
According'to the US Embassy, enforcement officials, however,.
seem to be making no progress against the major traffickers who
control the production and transit of drugs through Malaysia and
who must be shut down if Malaysia is to control the illicit
trade. Many of the police officers added to the antinarcotics
units are new, and they still lack the leadership and experience
necessary for detailed narcotics investigations. Thus,
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traffickers who are caught and subsequently charged with drug
trafficking or held in detention without trial are, by and large,
small time operators. At the same time, excessive reliance on
detention may be leading to laziness and poor police work.
Although the number of detainees is increasing, actual arrests on
drug charges declined in 1985, an indication that the police
might not be doing the investigative work that would result in
trials and convictions. The death penalty, according to the US
Embassy, is having little effect against major traffickers, who
are rarely caught with drugs in their possession.
In our view, lack of follow-up enforcement of the law
controlling acetic anhydride appears to be preventing any
progress in reducing heroin processing-in Malaysia. Although the
law strictly controls the importation and use of acetic
anhydride, few violators have been charged, and we judge the
chemical remains easy to obtain. Indeed, some is deliberately
mislabeled and goes through Customs without being checked.
Because chemical shipments from countries known to produce acetic
anhydride may be subject to greater scrutiny, traffickers are
also transshipping it through second countries to avoid
detection, according to the US Embassy. Once in Malaysia, acetic
anhydride, is very difficult to monitor and can be easily diverted
Although the Pinang State area is the major refining center
in Malaysia, we judge the nearly exclusive attention by
enforcement officials on that region is resulting in too little
enforcement in other areas. The lawless and remote jungle at the
Thai-Malaysian border is an ideal location for an illicit
activity such as heroin refining. Thai traffickers may already
be relocating their heroin production facilities there to avoid
enforcement and competition in the Golden Triangle area. The
area also could quickly become a safe haven for Malaysian
Prospects For Improvement
On balance, Malaysia's slow progress is more a result of
limited resources and know-how than lack of will. Resources are
likely to remain a constraint; the economic downturn in 1986 will
probably prevent any sizeable increases in the funds available
for narcotics control, particularly enforcement. There are no
signs that Malaysia's willingness to take on the drug problem is
diminishing, although Musa Hitam's withdrawal from the government
because of personal conflicts with Mahathir may temporarily slow
Malaysia's impetus. Musa Hitam's personal interest in solving
Malaysia's drug problem and his advocacy of expanded
antinarcotics cooperation with the United States will be hard to
replace. Nevertheless, Kuala Lumpur has not wavered-in the face
of criticism from international human rights groups about the use
of the death penalty and preventive detention. This
determination was highlighted recently when Kuala Lumpur hanged
two Australians convicted of,trafficking and given the death
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Drug abuse prevention is generally less resource-intensive
than rehabilitation or enforcement, and Malaysia is considering
improvements we judge will make the prevention program more
effective. Kuala Lumpur is looking into drug prevention
education in secondary schools and has signed an agreement with
the US to develop a parent group/private sector drug awareness
program. Prime Minister Mahathir's wife, Dr. Siti Hasmah, a
widely respected physician, was spurred into action by Mrs.
Reagan's conference on drug abuse last year and has taken a
personal interest in promoting drug awareness in Malaysia. She
sponsored a national conference to launch a "Parent's Movement"--
modeled on the US group, "PRIDE"--to fight drug abuse in Malaysia
in October 1985, which will be followed by a similar conference
at the regional level. Although in the near term, the total
number of drug addicts may continue to rise as a result of the
expected economic slowdown in Malaysia, the rate of growth of new
addicts may already be slowing. The number registered during
1985 was about half that registered in 1984, according to the US
Drug trafficking and refining are more intractable problems
in a resource-poor environment, and Kuala Lumpur has yet to find
an effective way to tackle the major traffickers and users. The
traffickers' use of.sea routes is virtually unimpeded because of
Malaysia's limited maritime enforcement capability, and a
shortage of trained personnel almost guarantees slow progress in
In our view, a number of additional measures could make a
big difference in helping Malaysia break what is essentially a
stalemate between the enforcement community and the drug trade:
o Kuala Lumpur badly needs special analytical units able to
sift raw intelligence on narcotics activities and provide
the police with information such as profiles of typical
traffickers, methods of operation, and smuggling routes.
At present, Malaysian enforcement officials, for example,
focus on interdicting narcotics entering Malaysia largely
because they do not have good finished intelligence on
routes through and out of Malaysia. Though police get
impressive interro ation r
Such
analysis wu d allow the v[ to target traffickers more
effectively.
o With the growing use of sea routes by traffickers,
reorganizing the Malaysian maritime enforcement effort--
which lacks a clear chain of command--becomes an
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imperative. According to the US Embassy, Malaysia already
has an efficient system of vessel registration and some 200
marine patrol boats. Nevertheless, there are 14 agencies
involved in maritime search and rescue, law enforcement,
and piracy suppression, and coastal surveillance efforts
remain ill-coordinated and ineffective, according to the US
Embassy. Malaysia's Maritime Enforcement Coordinating
Center lacks clear authority to direct the activities of
these 14 agencies. Kuala Lumpur needs encouragement to
undertake this reorganization as soon as possible, and will
also need to find a supplier for the functional training,
aircraft, patrol craft, communication sets, and night
vision equipment needed to allow the Coordinating Center to
carry out its maritime interdiction responsibilities. 25X1
o If its police are to be effective against major narcotics
brokers who operate behind the scenes, Malaysia will need
to enact a conspiracy law that would allow for the arrest
and prosecution of drug traffickers who are not in physical
possession of drugs. Such a law would be unlikely, in our
judgment, to become a vehicle for official abuse as the
Mahathir administration has been relatively restrained in
its use of controversial le islation such as detention
without trial. 25X1
In our view, none of these improvements are likely to take
place unless the government maintains strong leadership over the
program. Musa Hitam's recent resignation dealt Malaysia's
program a potentially serious blow. Restructuring the marine
enforcement effort or guiding a conspiracy law through
Parliament, for example, requ.ires a full time and committed
leader of national stature. Mahathir certainly has the stature
and has demonstrated the comni-tment. He faces other equally
urgent issues, however, and already has his hands full with pet
projects. Unless he appoints a narcotics czar to oversee both
policymaking and implementation of the program, we judge that
some of the antinarcotics effort's initial gains could be
reversed.
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G
Appendix
Recent Antinarcotics Legislation
Legislation enacted in the past two years includes the:
Dangerous Drugs (Amendment) Act
o Provides for mandatory death penalty for persons caught
trafficking narcotics. The law defines trafficking as
being in possession of 15 grams or more of heroin,
morphine, or a mixture of the two; 1000 grams of raw or
processed opium; or 200 grams or-more of marijuana. Since
1975 when the death penalty was first introduced in
Malaysia, over 30 people have been hanged for drug
trafficking with another 54 people appealing or awaiting
dates for hanging. As a built-in safeguard against misuse,
this law must be passed by Parliament again after five
years.
Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act
o Empowers the Minister of Home Affairs to order the
detention without trial of suspected drug traffickers. The
police must inform the detainees of their charges, but do
not have to build a case against the trafficker for
presentation in a court of law. Every two years an
Advisory Board--a panel of six lawye s with half appointed
by the Prime Minister and the other half appointed by the
King--reviews the case and can extend the detention for an
unlimited period if the offender is considered a
"continuing security threat." Prior to the enactment of
this law, suspected drug traffickers were detained under
the 1969 Emergency Ordinance which allows the government to
detain suspects for a maximum of two years, although upon
release it can put them under "restricted residence" for an
additional two years. According to the US Embassy, since
the new law's enactment in May, 22 people have been
detained with an additional 35 people detained under th
Emergency Ordinance transferred to its jurisdiction. 25X1
Drug Dependents (Treatment and Rehabilitation) Act
o Empowers any Police or Customs officer with the permission
of the public prosecutor to intercept, detain, or open
parcels in the process of being delivered through the post;
intercept messages sent or received through
telecommunications; intercept or listen to conversations
through telecommunications. This act authorizes the police
to expand the use of wire telephone taps in narcotics
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Poisons Ordinance Amendment
o Provides for imprisonment not exceeding 14 years and not
less than three years with whipping of not less than six
strokes for possession of acetylating substances such as
acetic anhydride without a license. The law also calls for
the monitoring of all legal imports of acetic anhydride
from the time of entry to the time of use.
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