SYRIA: SCENARIOS OF DRAMATIC POLITICAL CHANGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000100770001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 15, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 30, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution List
~ ~ JUL 1986
SUBJECT: Syria: Scenarios of Dramatic Political
Change
1. This memorandum presents a number of possible scenarios
that could lead to the ouster of President Assad or other
dramatic change in Syria. It thus complements Intelligence
Community assessments and estimates that focus on probable
further developments in Syria. The analysis, purposely
provocative, aims to make explicit and bring to the forefront of
our thinking the diversity of challenges that could force
political change in Syria in the years to come. Because the
analysis out of context is susceptible to misunderstanding,
external distribution has been severely restricted. Please limit
circulation in your office and do not reproduce the document.
Your thoughts on the analysis and suggested indicators are
welcome.
2. We will send you similar papers on other countries as
they are completed.
Attachment:
S ria: Scenarios f ramatic
Political Change
GI M 86-20099Lj, 8 July 986,
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SUBJECT: Syria: Scenarios of Dramatic Political Change
(GI M 86-20099L) 25X1
External/non-NFIB:
Copy 1 The Honorable Dennis Ross
Special Assistant to the President and Senior
Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs'
National Security Council
2 The Honorable Richard W. Murphy, Assistant
Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs, Department of State
3 The Honorable William Eagleton, US Ambassador,
Damascus, Syria
4 Mr. Richard H. Solomon, Director, Policy Planning
Staff, Department of State
5 The Honorable Fred C. Ikle, Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, Department of Defense
6-9 DI Rep/OLL
10-12 Extra Copies (OGI/FSIC/PI Room 2G28 Hqrs)
External NFIB:
13 The Honorable Morton I. Abramowitz, Director, Bureau
of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
14 Mr. Douglas P. Mulholland, Special Assistant to the
Secretary for National Security, Department of Treasury
15 VADM E. Burkhalter, Jr., USN, Director,
Intelligence Community Staff
Internal?
16 DCI
17 DDCI
18 Executive Director
19 NIO/NESA
20 SRP/ODCI
21 C/PES
22 DDI
23 D/OGI
24-26 OGI/EXS/PG
27 OGI/FSIC
28-29 OGI/FSIC/PI
30 D/CPAs
31 SA/DA/CPAs
32-36 C/IMC/CPAs
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OGI/FSIC/PI
OCR/DSD/DB
D/NESA
C/NESA/AI/D
C/NESA/AI/L
C DO NE
(28 July 86) 25X1
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SYRIA: SCENARIOS OF DRAMATIC POLITICAL CHANGE*
This memorandum explores alternative scenarios that could lead
to the ouster of President Hafiz al-Assad in Syria. Specifically;
it seeks to clarify the individuals and groups that might impel or
impede takeover attempts and presents indicators that would
suggest specific scenarios are unfolding. The analysis, purposely
provocative, does not attempt to predict the likelihood of
specific outcomes other than in the broadest sense. Rather it
provides a structured way of thinking about dramatic political
change in Syria on the basis of observable events and thus a
greater ability to recognize the potential implications of key
developments.
SUMMARY
The sixteen years that Assad has been in power belies the
tensions below the surface of Syrian politics. Syria is governed
by an Alawi minority whose rule is deeply resented by the Sunni
majority it dislodged from power two decades ago. Factionalism
plagues the political and military elite, and the military's
strong tradition of coup plotting--dormant since Assad took
control in 1970--could reassert itself.
*This memorandum was prepared by (Foreign
Subversion and Instability Center, Office of Global Issues.
Information available as of 30 July was used in this report.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed to
Chief/Political Instability Branch, OGI
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We judge that the most likely scenario of dramatic change in
Syria is a power struggle over succession. Despite his poor
health, Assad has failed to designate a successor or otherwise
provide for a transfer of power. Should he name his brother,
Rif'at al-Assad, to succeed him or should his brother assume power
upon Assad's death or incapacitation, we believe Rif'at's powerful
military enemies would be likely to oust him.
Mismangement of a conflict with Israel o.r of Syria's role in
Lebanon also could trigger a coup against Assad. The
Alawi-dominated military would be especially quick to move, in our
view, if setbacks in either area sparked domestic unrest that
jeopardized the Alawi's dominant status.
Tensions between Alawis and Sunnis have been muted in recent
years, but the potential for serious communal violence remains. A
Sunni rebellion in the late 1970s and early 1980s ended when Assad
crushed the Muslim Brotherhood that spearheaded it. Although we
judge that fear of reprisals and organizational problems make a
second Sunni challenge unlikely, an excessive government reaction
to minor outbreaks of Sunni dissidence might trigger large-scale
unrest. In most instances the regime would have the resources to
crush a Sunni opposition movement, but we believe widespread
violence among the populace could stimulate large numbers of Sunni
officers and conscripts to desert or mutiny, setting the stage for
civil war. ~ 25X1
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Under most circumstances Moscow's position in Syria should
remain strong, but should Syria suffer another devastating
military defeat at the hands of Israel new leaders might decide to
look elsewhere for military equipment. A shift to a Western arms
supplier also could prompt parallel efforts to seek Western
financial advice and support.
Apart from the impact of a major defeat by Israel, Moscow's
status in Syria would depend on the makeup of a new regime. The
continuation of Alawi dominance would be most beneficial to Soviet
interests. The value of an Alawi regime to Moscow would diminish,
however, if the new government fell victim to political
infighting, forcing the Soviets to choose sides in a series bf
power struggles. If the Sunnis gained power, Moscow's position
would be weaker because of Sunni resentment of Soviet support for
the Alawis.
From Washington's perspective, we believe the worst outcome
would be a series of military coups brought on by a succession
struggle or major military setback. Assad's practice of dividing
power among his subordinates could make it difficult for a single
leader to consolidate power. Prolonged intraelite conflict would
return Syria to a pattern of chronic instability prevalent before
Assad and render Syria an even more dangerously erratic force in
the region. Leadership changes would thwart efforts to forge
diplomatic agreements with Syria, and a weak government in
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Damascus might heighten Syria's attractiveness as a base for
terrorism.
US standing with Syria probably would remain essentially
unchanged with the emergence of a new Alawi military regime
resolved to maintain the course set by Assad. We expect such a
regime would continue Syria's involvement in Lebanon, along with
its confrontation with Israel, its support for terrorism, and its
close ties to the USSR.
We judge that US interests in Syria probably would be best
served by a Sunni regime as it might well include relative
moderates interested in securing Western aid and investment. Such
a regime probably would be less inclined to escalate tensions with
Israel.
THE PRESENT SCENE
According to the US Embassy, President Assad's position is
strong, with Syria enjoying unprecedented stability and a high
degree of grudging respect in the Arab world. Mindful of the
coups that were commonplace before he came to power in 1970, Assad
has controlled the military through a network of security
organizations and specialized military units commanded by
hand-picked loyalists. Concessions to key groups--particularly
the Sunni business elite--and large doses of repressive force have
minimized civil dissidence. Assad's confrontation with Israel and
his maneuvering in Lebanon have added to his stature among the
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Syrian populace by making Syria a key player in Middle East
politics.
Syria's stability, however, rests on the skill of Assad whose
health has been failing. Assad experienced a major heart attack
in 1983
I He has not designated a successor, and
the succession mechanism specified in the Syrian constitution has
not been tested.
serious factionalism centering 25X1
around Assad's brother, Rif'at, plagues Syria's ruling elite.
Since November of 1985, Rif'at has been in self-imposed exile in
Paris 25X1
According to US Embassy and
We believe Rif'at's actions were prompted by
concern that his opponents were attempting to undercut his power.
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Assad intervened to avert open fighting and forged a
compromise between competing factions by creating three vice
presidential positions. After stripping Rif'at of command over
his military units--the Defense Companies--Assad compensated
Rif'at by making him Vice President for Security Affairs. Foreign
Minister Khaddam--Rif'at's bitter enemy--became Vice President for
Foreign Affairs, and Bath Party leader Zuhayr Mashariqa assumed
the post of Vice President for Education and Cultural Affairs.
However, neither Rif'at nor his rivals are
satisfied with the arrangement, leaving Assad's regime vulnerable
to further infighting.,
Several Western scholars have observed that factionalism
within the ruling elite is paralleled by sectarian tensions within
society. The Alawis who now dominate the Syrian government under
Assad--himself an Alawi--once were a rural underclass subservient
to the Sunni majority. According to the US Embassy, Assad's
development programs have benefited rural areas at the expense of
cities--where Sunnis are concentrated--and the nationalization and
formation of large industries have reduced the fortunes of Sunni
tradesmen and business groups. Socialist economic reforms and an
Islamic revival led to armed uprisings by the Muslim Brotherhood
and other ,Sunnis in the mid-1970s. Assad finally crushed the
rebellion in 1982, but only after attacks on Sunni urban
strongholds left thousands dead. 25X1
The economy is~Syria's most pressing internal problem, and
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hopes for near-term improvement are dim
Real GDP has declined over the last three
years, foreign exchange reserves are depleted--making it difficult
to purchase imports used for basic consumer goods--and the defense
effort consumes over half of the government's current
expenditures. The US Embassy reports that the vast majority of
Syrians are finding it increasingly difficult to afford basic
necessities. Assad has relied heavily on foreign assistance to
keep the economy afloat, but aid from moderate Arab states is
declining--from $1.8 billion in 1981 to only $800 million in
1985--and tensions with Iran threaten to reduce assistance from
Tehran.
Efforts to reform the economy by expanding the private
sector--launched by newly-appointed Minister of Economy, Muhammad
Imadi--may prove effective, but the US Embassy notes that Imadi is
encountering resistance from hardline socialists in the Bath
Party establishment led by Prime Minister Kasm. According to the
US Embassy, the recent discovery of two new oilfields probably
will improve matters somewhat, but not for the next two years. In
the interim, we believe the anticipation of new oil revenue may
weaken Assad's resolve to reform an economy plagued by inefficient
socialist policies and incompetent managers.
Syria's involvement in Lebanon and its confrontation with
Israel also could prompt challenges to Assad's rule, in our view.
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Assad has limited Syria's direct role in Lebanon by working mainly
through surrogate militia factions, but we believe he is
determined to achieve Syrian hegemony in order to check Israel's
influence and prevent Lebanon from becoming a base for subversion
against Syria. Assad could expand Syria's role in Lebanon to
levels unacceptable to the military and general populace, or,
conversely, the military could become frustrated with his
reluctance to take stronger action. Assad has generally avoided
moves that could provoke war with Israel, but we believe his drive
to achieve strategic parity with Israel could foster an armed
clash that would undermine Assad's internal position should he
mismanage it or suffer a serious defeat.
Syria is the centerpiece of Moscow's influence in the Middle
East. Moscow thus has a vested interest in major policy shifts or
changes in Syrian leadership. The Soviet Union and its East
European allies provide virtually all of Syria's arms, and the
Soviets deliver more weapons to Syria than to any other Third
World client. In spite of his dependence on Soviet military aid,
Assad has remained wary of excessive Soviet influence, and, in the
view of Western observers, has demonstrated his independence by
taking actions contrary to Soviet wishes such as the invasion of
Lebanon in 1976. The Soviets have tolerated Assad's independence,
but we believe actions by Assad or--more likely--a~successor that
seriously jeopardized Moscow's stake in Syria could prompt Moscow
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to intervene by backing factions likely to protect Soviet
interests. I I 25X1
Assad's Inner Circle
power in Syria largely resides
respectively. Both are Alawis responsible for keeping watch
on the military and the population in general.
with special responsibilities
for checking internal challenges to the regime. 25X1
the principal anticoup force billeted next to the
presidential palace.
Each advisor is personally close to Assad, as well as part of
has used to stay in power. Thus each is in a strong position to
succeed Assad. To varying degrees, all are opponents of Rif'at
Assad.
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Rif'at Assad
Rif'at's power is at a low ebb, but we believe he will remain
a key player and potential successor to Assad. Rif'at lost his
traditional powerbase--the Defense Companies--in the power
struggle of 1984.
Rif'at's blatant opportunism and
his reputation for corruption and brutality further harm his
prospects.
Nevertheless, despite ample cause and clear opportunities to
_ do so, Assad has not forced Rif'at out. This suggests that
Rif'at's ultimate source of power--his relationship to Assad--is
still intact. In 1985, according to the US Embassy, Assad quashed
an attempt by Rif'at's enemies to remove him from the governing
body of the Bath Party
In the Embassy's view, Assad may
see Rif'at as an integral part of a system that has kept the
President in power longer than any previous Syrian ruler.
Other Notable Figures
Other individuals less powerful than Assad's inner circle but
in positions that might enable them to play a role in a.future
power struggle include:
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--Mustafa Talas. Defense Minister and Deputy Prime Minister;
as a potential successor to
Assad but, because he is a Sunni, only in a figurehead role.
--Hikmat Shihabi. Army Chief of Staff; a Sunni also
considered a candidate for a figurehead presidency.
--Abd al-Halim Khaddam. Vice President for Foreign Affairs;
another Sunni and possible figurehead president,
Khaddam came to power with Assad in
1970-and is his principal foreign policy advisor.
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--Abd al-Rauf al-Kasm. Prime Minister; a Sunni who heads the
bureaucracy, he has been much criticized 25X1
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--Muhammad al-Imadi. Newly-appointed Minister of Economy and
Foreign Trade; a Western-educated technocrat and a Sunni
whose influence could grow if his program of private sector
expansion improves Syria's economy. 25X1
The Military
Assad maintains tight control
over the 400,000 man Syrian military by involving himself in
military affairs, using the intelligence services to keep tabs on
it, and appointing politically reliable Alawis to senior officer
positions. Thus far there has been no evidence of significant
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antiregime activity among the military. Sectarian cleavages,
however, at least potentially jeopardize cohesiveness. Sunnis
make up 60 percent of the Syrian officer corps but are
concentrated in junior officer ranks; enlisted men are
predominantly Sunni conscripts. We believe that a renewal of
communal violence between Alawis and Sunnis could inspire Sunnis
in the military to turn against the regime. 25X1
The Bath Party
The party is headed by Assad and dominated by Alawi military
officers. After the armed forces, the party is the key
institution in governing Syria, with a nationwide network of
organizations for implementing the regime's socialist program.
The Bath party thus sets Syria apart from other countries in the
region, particularly Iran, where religious institutions and
doctrines shape political life. Although party functionaries have
been loyal to the regime thus far, we believe they would resist
changes by Assad or a successor that threatened to undermine the
party's position in Syria. 25X1
Alawis
The Alawis make up about 12 percent of the population and are
the key support group for the regime. Assad has maintained their
allegiance by concentrating Alawis in the higher echelons of the
military and government and by adopting policies that favor rural
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areas. Although literacy among Alawis is low--10 to 15
percent--an educated Alawi elite has emerged and provides the
Alawi community with critical links to the government power
structure. Alawis are divided into four confederations, each
consisting of 7 to 10 tribes and each with its own tribal and
religious leader. Rivalries among clans and tribes exist; should
a power struggle develop in the military or the government among
Alawi elites, we believe factions based on clan or tribal
loyalties could form.
Sunnis
The once-dominant Sunnis make up over 60 percent of the
population and are most prominent in the urban areas. Alawis
seized control o~ the government from the Sunnis in the 1960s and
nationalized major industries, leaving the Sunnis with a small
corner of an economy they once dominated. Sunnis are likely to
bear the brunt of recent economic reverses that affect the cities
more than the rural areas. Sunni opposition to Alawi rule peaked
in the mid-1970s with a fundamentalist revival and the onset of
violent opposition to the regime by the Muslim Brotherhood.
Resistance lasted until 1982 when Assad's troops killed thousands
of Sunnis in the city of Hamah.
Although the Muslim Brotherhood's suppression drastically
reduced armed dissidence, we judge a significant potential still
exists for another Sunni opposition movement. In part the
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Brotherhood's role was to exploit and orchestrate opposition
activity by other organized groups including professional
associations which participated in general strikes, students who
demonstrated, professors who staged mass resignations, and bazaar
merchants who shut down their businesses. These groups still
exist, and under proper leadership they could coalesce into a
large movement.
Should a new Sunni challenge to the regime develop, certain
sectors of the Sunni populace are especially likely to play a
large role. They include urban traders and artisans who are
disadvantaged by competition from state-run businesses and who
were the prime constituency for the Muslim .Brotherhood; Sunni
students, intellectuals, and young professionals who formed the
base of support for the militant faction of the Muslim
Brotherhood; and remnants of the Brotherhood itself who could
become leaders in a new Sunni opposition movement.
In building the following scenarios we do not intend to imply
that instability in Syria is imminent or inevitable. Assad is a
tough pragmatist well-equipped to cope with challenges to his
rule. Serious problems loom, however, and the capacity of Syria's
leaders to manage these problems cannot be taken for granted.
These scenarios are presented in the order of likelihood from most
to least likely. Following each scenario is a list of
indicators--a series of observable events--that signal milestones
in the scenario's progression.
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SUCCESSION POWER STRUGGLE
Despite his unpopularity, Rif'at, as Assad's brother, is
well-positioned to seize power upon the President's death or
incapacitation. His prospects for success would hinge on how
quickly he can rebuild his powerbase before Assad departs the
scene. We expect, however, that Rif'at's tenure would be
short-lived, largely because he has amassed a formidable array of
enemies. Even if his opponents were inclined to permit Rif'at to
govern, Rif'at's likely efforts to remove his opponents in an
effort to consolidate his power would force their hand. Before
long, we believe senior military leaders such as Ali Duba would
try to oust Rif'at.
Rif'at is so unpopular that even the prospect of his
succeeding to the presidency might trigger a coup while Assad is
still in office. Although not likely, we believe Assad's
designation of Rif'at as his successor or some other action by
Assad pointing unequivocally to Rif'at's succession almost
certainly would prompt countermeasures by Rif'at's enemies.
Initially, they would try to persuade Assad to change his mind or
maneuver to reduce President Assad's powers. Should these
measures fail, however, we believe Rif'at's opponents would
seriously consider moving against both Assad and Rif'at.
Assad's practice of dividing power among a circle of close
lieutenants would make it difficult for a single leader to assume
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control quickly, in our view. More likely, we believe a junta
composed predominantly of Alawi officers would take power. To
enhance its legitimacy and broaden its base of support, the junta
might install a prominent Sunni civilian as a figurehead
president.
We judge that the lack of a dominant leader could easily
undermine this arrangement. Factional infighting over the
division of power probably would develop quickly, with clan and
tribal cleavages reenforcing the splits. Moreover, disagreements
would arise over how to address the multitude of problems
currently facing Syria: confrontation with Israel, a badly
faltering economy, Syria's role in the Middle East peace process,
its involvement in Lebanon, and Syrian-PLO relations.
Under these conditions, Syria could lapse into a cycle of
military coups, with no leader able to maintain power for long.
Divisions among Alawis, in turn, would encourage Sunnis to try to
reassert their dominance, thus setting the stage for serious
sectarian strife or even civil war if effective Sunni opposition
groups were to develop.
Indicators of the Developing Scenario
o Hafiz demotes or retires enemies of Rif'at.
o Assad cuts back further on his work schedule; trips abroad
for medical treatment become more frequent.
o Assad designates Rif'at as his successor or upgrades his
control over key sectors of the government such as the armed
forces.
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o Rif'at begins to stand in for Assad at official functions or
takes over day-to-day management of the government.
o Military units commanded by Rif'at's enemies redeploy nearer
to Damascus and other key installations.
o Alawi clan leaders publicly align with leaders of different
factions within the junta.
o Key members of an Alawi-dominated junta resign.
Despite Assad's record of careful brinksmanship, we believe
Syria's ongoing confrontation with Israel or its involvement in
Lebanon could spawn military reverses serious enough to undermine
Assad's regime. Armed conflict with Israel could develop in a
number of ways. Syria's continuing military buildup--begun in
1978 to achieve strategic parity with Israel--could trigger an
Israeli preemptive attack, particularly if Arab-Israeli tensions
were mounting. Assad's recent missile deployments in Lebanon and
Syria could prompt an Israeli strike, possibly stemming from the
downing of an Israeli aircraft. Finally, war with Israel would
ensue should Syria attempt to retake the Golan Heights--a longtime
objective that Assad recently reaffirmed.
In our view, Assad's determination to achieve hegemony over
Lebanon--long a goal of Syrian rulers--might cause the President
to enlarge Syria's role by ordering regular Syrian military units
to do most of the fighting instead of relying on surrogate militia
factions. Mounting casualties would spark unrest among Sunni
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junior officers and conscripts in Lebanon should they perceive
Assad's growing involvement in Lebanon as an Alawi misadventure.
Alternately, the Syrian military might become seriously
disgruntled if Assad persisted in depending mostly on militia
factions in the face of both mounting casualties among Syrian
troops supporting the militia and a lack of progress in asserting
Syrian control.
We believe the military would be eager to move against Assad
if military reverses threatened Alawi rule by provoking serious
domestic unrest. A humiliating setback on the Golan Heights would
have the greatest potential for triggering antiregime protests.
Should unrest develop, Sunni business leaders--already hurt by
Assad's economic policies, according to the US Embassy--might use
the issue of military mishaps to build support for a challenge to
Assad and other Alawis. We judge that Assad would put down
antiregime activity, but if he acted ineptly or used excessive
force, this would encourage further unrest. Military leaders
would be especially alarmed if Rif'at or another person with a
similar reputation for brutality was given responsibility for
restoring order. In our view, Assad's failing health would give
added impetus to coup plotting, particularly if senior Alawi
officers who are close to Assad decided that his condition had led
to an ill-advised military decision or was hampering the
President's ability to blunt domestic challenges from the Sunnis.
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Should outbreaks of antiregime activity continue or grow while
Assad showed no signs of reversing course--or perhaps tried to
recoup losses by ordering even harsher measures--we believe the
military would try to replace him before an antiregime movement
could gather momentum. They probably would establish a junta and
move to quiet unrest, combining carefully measured force with
concessions to key groups. Prospects for continued instability
would depend on how effectively this program was implemented and
how far along efforts to build an antiregime movement had
progressed.
Indicators of the Developing Scenario
o Political pressure in Israel builds for a stronger response
to Syria's arms buildup and missile redeployments.
o Syria suffers a military setback at the hands of the
Israelis.
o Syrian casualties in Lebanon mount sharply.
o Antiregime activities, including demonstrations and strikes,
continue despite brutal suppression of earlier protests.
o Assad vows to crush dissidents and hints at a new Syrian
military initiative against the Israelis or warring parties
in Lebanon.
o Assad fires key military officers for criticizing his
policies.
COMMUNAL VIOLENCE ESCALATES INTO CIVIL WAR
Sunni dissidence has been minimal since Assad crushed the
Muslim Brotherhood in the early 1980s, but deep-seated tensions
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remain--keeping alive the potential for minor incidents to grow
into major flareups of communal violence. For example,
disgruntlement over price hikes, altercations between Sunni
citizens and security forces, or anger at privileges accorded to
Alawis at the expense of Sunnis could foster small-scale protests.
Excessive government force in quelling such disturbances might be
seen by Sunnis as evidence of a government vendetta against all
Sunnis, precipitating even larger protests by other Sunni groups.
Sunni merchants and artisans probably would launch protests
similar to those staged in previous years, for example by closing
down businesses and the bazaars in Harrah or Aleppo and possibly
Damascus. Sunni students would stage campus demonstrations, and
Sunni professional associations would organize work stoppages.
Mistaking the new protests as a resurgence of the Muslim
Brotherhood, the government would step up its use of force and
launch violent attacks on a broad spectrum of Sunni community
leaders as well as on those engaged in protests. Regime efforts
to restore order would founder if government violence against
protestors inspired broad-based communal violence between Alawis
and Sunnis.
A general campaign of Alawi violence against Sunnis might push
even moderate Sunnis to join the opposition. Remnants of the
Muslim Brotherhood--some returning from exile in Iraq--could
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provide a core of leadership for the movement. Although the
regime has the resources to crush such a venture, we believe
brutal attacks on Sunni civilians might prompt large numbers of
Sunni officers and conscripts to desert or to stage mutinies in
support of dissidents, and Iraq might supply them with sufficient
weapons to launch a civil war.
Indicators of the Developing Scenario
o Strikes and demonstrations demanding government action to
end discrimination against Sunnis become frequent.
o Security personnel force businesses to reopen and confiscate
the inventories of many.
o The government conducts indiscriminate roundups of Sunni
leaders.
o Syrian leaders accuse Iraq and the Muslim Brotherhood of
fomenting unrest.
o Violent incidents including bombings of Sunni social
gatherings take place; Sunnis retaliate with similar
violence against Alawis.
o Government attacks on suspected Sunnis dissidents increase;
sometimes razing whole blocks in Sunni residential areas.
o_Sunni troops refuse to fire on demonstrators; some units
mutiny and join growing Sunni opposition movement. ~ 25X1
THE SOVIET ANGLE
Although Syria's alliance with the Soviet Union is
long-standing, the accession of new leaders could set the .stage
for a weakening of bilateral ties. A humiliating military defeat
by Israel would be the most likely trigger for a new policy
because it would further call into question the value of Soviet
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military equipment and training--the basis for Syria's
relationship with Moscow.
Although Syria turned again to the
Soviet Union to replace its equipment losses, another serious
defeat by Israel might convince new leaders that Syria should seek
arms from other sources such as France. A shift to a Western arms
supplier could, in turn, spur economic reformers like Minister of
Economy Imadi to look to the West for financial aid in
implementing his program of private sector expansion. Imadi
encouraged Western governments and firms to invest in Syria during
the 1970s. An aggressive attempt by Moscow to check these
developments by backing the opponents of such moves--most likely
Syrian officers bent on maintaining close ties to Moscow or
hardline Ba'thist socialists--would offend Syrian nationalism and
deepen antiSoviet feelings.
Apart from the effects of a major defeat by Israel, Syria's
willingness to move away from the Soviet Union would hinge on the
composition of a new Syrian leadership group. We believe Moscow's
interests would be seriously jeopardized if Sunnis came to power
through a civil war. Many Sunnis resent the Soviets because they
are closely identified with Alawi dominance, and Sunnis would be
especially hostile toward the Soviets if they had supported Alawis
with military equipment and advisors in a civil war. Moreover,
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25X1
the vested interests that some Sunni businessmen have in economic
reform would make them more willing than Alawi military leaders to
establish economic links with the West.
Moscow's interests would be best protected if an Alawi
military regime determined to perpetuate the status quo under
Assad came to power. Such a government would be most inclined to
maintain close ties with Moscow and hostile relations with
Washington. At the same time, it would avoid reckless military
moves that could trigger a dangerous encounter with Tel Aviv or
Washington. The usefulness to the Soviets of an Alawi regime
would diminish, however, if infighting developed among Alawis.
Coups might again become common, confronting the Soviets with the
possibility of losing ground in Syria should they fail to back the
winning side.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
Among the various scenarios of dramatic change, we believe the
worst outcome for Washington would be chronic
instability--occasioned by a series of military coups--that denied
Syria coherent leadership and rendered it an even more volatile
force in the region. The United States and other parties to the
Middle East peace process would find effective diplomacy with
Syria increasingly difficult, and a weak central government in
Damascus might add to. Syria's attractiveness as a haven for
terrorists.
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A less threatening, but still ominious, outcome for the United
States would be the rise of a strong Alawi regime dominated by the
military. An Alawi junta would continue Assad's maneuvering in
Lebanon, his confrontation with Israel, and his support for
terrorism. Moreover, Moscow would maintain its foothold in Syria.
Washington would be likely to gain only if the new leaders,
lacking Assad's skill at careful brinksmanship, engaged Syria in a
losing war with Israel that led to a political realignment and a
pro-Western shift in Syria's policies.
In our view, US interests would be best served by a Sunni
regime controlled by business-oriented moderates. Business
moderates would see a strong need for Western aid and investment
to build Syria's private economy, thus opening the way for
stronger ties to Western governments. Although we believe such a
government would give some support--or at least pay strong
lipservice--to Arab causes, this group's preoccupation with
economic development and its desire to limit the role of the
military would give Sunnis an incentive to avoid a war with
Israel. We believe Washington's gains would be mitigated,
however, if Sunni fundamentalists assumed power. Although Syria's
secular traditions would make it extremely difficult for religious
zealots to establish an Islamic Republic, should they succeed they
would likely deepen hostilities with Israel and provide support
and sanctuary to terrorist groups.
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