PAKISTAN OPIUM PRODUCTION, 1985

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000100270001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 30, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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30 January 1985
Chief, Terrorism/Narcotics Analysis Division
Office of Global Issues
SUBJECT: Pakistan Opium Production, 1985
1. The attached memorandum, Pakistan: Increase in Opium
Production, presents our assessment of Pakistani opium output in
1985. We estimate increased cultivation and improved weather
brought Pakistan opium production to 70 metric tons.
2. This memorandum was prepared by analysts from the
Strategic Narcotics/Eurasia-Africa Branch, Office of Global
Issues, and the Directorate Analytical Support Group.
3. Questions and comments are welcome and may be addressed
to the Chief, Terrorism/Narcotics Analysis Division, OGI
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Pakistan: Increase in Opium
Production GI Pf 86-20015,
15 January 1986,
1--~',le
DATE $(~ IC'~~ ~ I J 25X1
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OCR
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OG I/ TPdAD /NAR/E
Distribution:
1 - SA/DDCI
1 - Executive Director
1 - DDI
1 - DDI/PES
2 - NIO/CTN
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - C/NIC/AG
1 - DDO/NE[
1 - DDO/CPN
1 - C/ASG
1 - D/OGI, DD/OGI
1 - CPAS/ISS
1 - D/NESA, DD/NESA
1 - OIA/SSD/NAB
1 - NESA/SO/P
2 - TNAD
2 - TNAD/NAR/E
1 - OGI/PG/CH
1 - OGI/EXS/PG
8 - OGI/PG/CH (One Sourced)
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Incease in Opium Production
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(30 January 1986) 25X1
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Central Intelligence Agency
Nhshin~on, ~. C zooms
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
15 January 1986
Pakistan: Increase In Opium Production
Summary
Estimated opium production in Pakistan rose to around 70
metric tons in 1985 despite intensified government eradication
efforts. Some of the increase was due to recovery from drought
in 1984. !lost resulted from expanded cultivation in the tribal
areas of the North-ieTest Frontier Province where the government
does not have direct control and where any attempt at large-scale
eradication would risk civil war. We expect rising opium prices
in 1986 will cause a further increase in cultivation in these
tribal regions and promote some recultivation in merged areas
under greater central government control as well. Certain
goverruaent efforts such as a large show of force in the merged
areas, crop substitution programs, or infrastructure development
in tribal areas could slow this trend over the long term. On
balance, however, we judge that stringent measures to immobilize
major traffickers would prove more effective in keeping drugs out
This memorandum was prepared by
Strategic Narcotics Eurasia-Africa Branch, Office of Global
Issues, and by Analytical Support Group. This
analysis is based on information available as of 15 January
1986. Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed to
the Chief, Terrorism/Narcotics Analysis Division
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Introduction
Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) has long been
a large opium producer, reaching its zenith in 1979 at nearly 800
metric tons (see map). Islamabad managed to reduce opium
production to about 45 tons in 1983, partly by eliminating poppy
cultivation in the areas of the province under its complete
control--the so-called settled areas. In addition, prices fell
in the areas where it governs wiTth the consent of the provincial
authorities--the so-called merged areas. We believe that 1983
may have been the nadir for Paki to oin ilium production. In 1984,
cultivation began to increase significantly in the tribal areas
where the government cannot enter without the agreement of tr al
leaders or a massive show of force. Our 1985,
survey indicates that the upturn has continued, with the greatest
increase in cultivation again occurring in the tribal areas of
the NWFP where growers currently face no eradication threat. C
The 1985 Crop
We estimate total Pakistani opium production for 1985 to be
about 70 metric tons, a sizeable jump from our 1984 estimate of
over 40 tons see Table 1 The actual increase was probably
much smaller; extensive poppy 25X1
cultivation in areas not covered in past surveys. Although poppy
cultivation can move or spread rapidly, we judge that not all
this newly identified cultivation occurred in one year.
Consequently, we now believe that total Pakistani opium
production in 1984 was toward the high end of our 40-60 ton
range. 25X1
increased opium output.
general were also higher ,than in 1984, contributing to the
We estimate the total area cultivated for 1985 at about
5,000 hectares, a significant increase over last year's estimate
of over 3,000 hectares. Again, some of this increase probably
took place in 1984 but was not detected. Yields for 1985 in
an improvement over ast year s dry weat er
hectare.
conditions, causing slightly higher yields in the merged areas.
The same was true for the tribal areas, except for Mohmand, where
continued drought held down yields. The highest yields--almost
19 kilograms per hectare--were reported in Dir Agency. Gadoon
and Bajaur also had high yields--approximately 14 kilograms per
Growing Areas
About half of Pakistan's opium is now cultivated in the
tribal areas. Most of the remainder is grown in the merged
areas, with only a few tons originating in some of the more
remote settled areas. Although production is nearly evenly
divided between tribal and merged areas, most of the recent
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increase occurred in the tribal regions where counter-narcotics
efforts have been essentially limited to interdiction (see Table
2). Eradication programs have continued in the merged areas
where production has increased only moderately since 1983.
The tribal areas--where growing opium has been a way of_ life
for centuries--pose a nearly insurmountable problem for
Islamabad's efforts to control poppy cultivation. The Government
of Pakistan must consult tribal authorities before taking action
or applying national laws in tribal lands. Any tribal leader
consenting to government eradication would have to be certain
that tribesmen saw government assistance as more than offsetting
their losses from eradication. Furthermore, any successful
development program would require a sustained government
presence. The tribesmen are well-armed and prone to violence if
they believe their independence is being threatened. These
characteristics and the remoteness of this region, which in many
areas has no roads or government outposts, make instituting
development programs aimed at crop substitution currently
impossible.
Poppy cultivation is difficult to estimate in the tribal
areas, not only because of its remote location, but also because
the situation there is so dynamic. With the threat of
eradication posing a greater risk to growers in the merged areas,
the growers in tribal areas are rapidly expanding their
activity. The volatile situation in the tribal areas is largely
responsible for the uncertainty associated with our 1984 and 1985
estimates:
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o In Bajaur, the timing enabled us 25X1
to see poppies in the flowering stage. As a result, we
were able to classify as poppy plants cultivation we
suspected last year but could not confirm.
In Mohmand, on the other hand,
1983 to 1985. Again
we judge that some of the increase
actually occurred in the previous
Aside from the fact that yields tend to be somewhat lower in
the tribal areas, the emergence of the tribal areas as the
primary growing region does not appear to be inflicting any
serious hardships on the opium and heroin trade. Indeed, the
areas of expanded cultivation are even closer to refining
laboratories along the Afghan border through which the raw opium
must pass before export as heroin.
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In the merged areas, opium cultivation patterns are more
stable and easier to track. ~~x1
confirmed a modest--compared to the tribal areas-- 25X1
increase of 20 percent in cultivated area. Eradication in the
merged areas and an assurance of further intervention if the
poppy ban is ignored are responsible for slowing the growth of
opium cultivation there. The current government "carrot an~3
stick" approach in the merged areas--enforcement coupled with the
provision of an alternate means of livelihood for farmers--could
potentially prove effective over the long term. The necessary
development programs are costly, however, and must compete with
attractive financial incentives offered by traffickers.
Government Control Programs
On balance, Pakistan opium control programs have been
successful in reducing production in areas where they have been
tried. To date, these programs have been implemented only in the
more accessible regions of the merged areas. The United Nations
Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) and US assistance programs
have been the primary mechanisms through which Islamabad has
attempted to suppress opium production.
The UNFDAC's pilot project in the Buner region of Swat has
effectively eliminated poppy cultivation. The UNFDAC has
extended its efforts to include a joint project with the
Government of Pakistan's Special Development and Eradication Plan
(SDEP) in Dir. The first phase of that program eliminated
cultivation in an area that in our judgment would have produced
about a ton of opium. In Malakand, the State Department-funded
program--the model for the new Dir project--prevented cultivation
of an estimated 2 tons of opium. A final eradication and
development program--a US-funded project begun in 1983 in
Gadoon--has so far produced only limited results in suppressing
poppy cultivation. In support of these various projects, the
Government of Pakistan last year undertook its own aerial survey
of poppy growing areas for the first time.
As eradication efforts are extended into more remote areas,
large shows of force by Islamabad will probably be necessary to
persuade farmers to forsake poppy cultivation. The inhabitants
of Dir--which produced more than one quarter of Pakistan's opium
this year--are fiercely independent and can be expected to react
to government attempts to eradicate their poppy crops much the
same as would the tribesman along the Afghan border. A schedule
has not been set for the extension of eradication programs into
the tribal areas along the Afghan border or for Khoistan and the
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Black Mountain region where eradication would be even more
difficult due to the remoteness and semi-autonomous nature of
those areas.
Outlook
Because of continuing high prices, we expect Pakistani poppy
cultivation to continue to increase in 1986. As successful
control programs cut the supply of opium from the merged areas,
prices offered by traffickers and stockpilers--who need to build
up inventories drawn down during Pakistan's opium production
decline in the early part of this decade--will likely rise.
According to the US Embassy in Islamabad, those involved in the
opium trade expect prices to jump 40 percent during 1986.
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We suspect that any increase in opium supplies will come
from the tribal areas where any attempt at large-scale
eradication efforts likely would lead to a virtual civil war.
Current Government of Pakistan eradication plans do not include
the growing areas in the tribal regions, but we do not rule out
the possibility that the government could eventually implement
successful eradication there. A big first step would be a
government program to build roads, because Islamabad would
presumably control roads and adjacent land as it does now in
accordance with the agreement worked out between the tribes and
the government when the Pakistani state was established.
Until the Pakistani Government believes circumstances are
right to begin eliminating poppy in the inaccessible tribal
regions of Pakistan, the successes in the merged areas will be
outweighed by continued increase in the tribal regions. At the
same time, Islamabad is losing its ability to move against heroin
refining because processors are relocating operations across the
border in the lawless environment of eastern Afghanistan.
We believe Islamabad could offset its limited ability to
reduce opium cultivation with enhanced efforts to immobilize
major drug traffickers. Pakistani enforcement officials have
identified the major traffickers in Karachi and other large
cities, but lack of funds and rampant inefficiency and corruption
hamper effective investigation and prosecution. These problems
likely will be exacerbated by the recent lifting of martial law,
as provincial autonomy receives a boost and organizational
capabilities presumably decline. Continued eradication and
development efforts in merged areas and vigorous prosecution of
traffickers could, however, significantly reduce Pakistan's
supply of opium and heroin to international markets.
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Estimating Pakistani Opium Production
We derive our estimates of opium production in Pakistan with
a statistical methodology in which a sample
is analyzed along with collateral information to extrapo ate
total output. The process may vary each time it is applied,
depending largely on the quantity and quality of the available
but the essential information and basic analytic process
are the same in every case:
o The potential growing area for poppy is defined using
imagery, agronomic data, and collateral reporting.
o The number of fields observed on imagery is counted and
their average size in hectares is determined by
measuring from imagery.
o Sam le cultivation area--the number of hectares in the
imaged area devoted to poppy cultivation--is estimated
by multiplying the number of fields observed by their
average size.
o Total cultivation area--the number of hectares judged to
~6e~evoted to poppy production throughout the growing
region--then is extrapolated statistically.
o Estimated opium field per hectare is obtained
by st~u y- ng the imagery
evi ence o crop vigor.
o Total production is calculated by multiplying estimated
opium yield by the extrapolated total cultivation area.
o Net production is estimated by subtracting the opium
loss due to eradication.
In Pakistan, this method is repeated for each district or agency,
because weather conditions and cultivation patterns may vary from
one region to the next.
Pakistani opium cultivation is particularly difficult to
estimate
Poppy is grown primarily in small plots with other
crops rom which it is often difficult to distinguish. Timing
plays a key role; flowering poppy is much easier to identify than
non-flowering poppy.
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evert a ess, a er our years o o serva ion, we ave
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good understanding of the growing region and are now ahle to
stratify it into areas of low and high density cultivation. This
increases the accuracy of the estimate and reduces the range of
potential error.
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Table 1: Change in Opium Production in Pakistan, 1984-85
District/Agency Hectares Yield (kq/ha) Output (MT)
1984 1985 1984 1985 1984 1985 $change
Dir
Gadoon
Malakand
Bajaur
Mohmand
Other (A)
810 1060 18.5 18.5 15 20 + 33
820 1070 13.4 13.6 11 14 + 27
130 0 15.4 ---- 2 0 -100
430 1670 11.6 13.6 5 23 +360
230 570 13.0 12.4 3 7 +133
840 880 11.9 9.4 10 8 - 20
46 72 + 56
(A) The estimate for the entire country includes minor producers
represented by the "other" category. 25X1
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Table 2: Change in Cultivation Location, 1984-85
District/Agency Hectares
1984 1985 $Change
Merged Areas:
Dir 810 1060
Gadoon 820 1070
Malakand 130 0
1760 2130 + 20$
Tribal Areas:
Bajaur 430 1670
Mohmand 230 570
660 2240 +240$
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a
Opium-Growing Areas in Northwestern Pakistan, 1985
Afghanistan
Boundary repre entation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Tribal
Area
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B
~Arnazei
Major opium-growing area (four to 25
fields per square kilometer)
Minor opium-growing area (less
than four fields per square kilometer)
Suspected opium-growing area (unknown
density)
Settled area
Merged area
Tribal area
Province-level boundary
Division boundary
District/agency boundary
Subdistrict boundary
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