OSR REVIEW OF USAREUR STUDY ON SOVIET WEAKNESSES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000700230014-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2005
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: December 16, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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SUBJECT OSR Review k Study on 25X1
Soviet Weaknesses
1. We have reviewed study on the
Exploitation of Soviet Weaknesses and have some
general impressions and more specific comments to
pass on. The study correctly points out that the
Soviets are not "ten feet tall", but would suffer from
the same sort of problems that would plague any army
trying to accomplish the rather ambitious missions
the Soviets appear to have set for the;nselves. While
many of these weaknesses are common to NATO forces
as well, most are associated uniquely with offensive
operations on which the Soviets rely primarily.
Certainly some of the weaknesses cited could be ex.?
ploited by NATO commanders, but it should be considered
that Soviet writings show an awareness of the weak-
nesses in their operational doctrine and reflect
efforts which would be taken to prevent NATO from
capitalizing on them. Moreover, the recognition of
opportunities is only the first part o' the problem;,
NATO commanders must also have sufficient uncommittec
forces to respond to such opportunities in a ti1,,Aly ~Vli 11
manner when they arise. i;I
2. Our analysts also had a number of comments
which are tied to specific references in the study. L; L
described as a carefully considered tradeoff than a
hidden weakness. If possible, attacks certainly
should be made on exposed enemy, f1nnkc
Soviet operat.innal doctrine
I
accepts the concept that the flanks of many advancing
units will be exposed. This would more accurately he
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be recognized that such attacks require a strong
reserve and that Soviet doctrine has plans for dealing
with attacks on the flanks of advancing units.
Second echelon and reserve units would be responsible
for dealing ,?:.ith both bypassed units and units which
attack into unprotected flanks of first echelon units.
The Soviets consider that exposed flanks will be most
common when they are in the. exploitation phase of an
offensive when they would have already caused a major
disruption of the enemy's force and possibl.v have
already engaged or isolated those enemy forces which
would have to make these flank attacks.
Concentrating forces before a
lry for any army. Soviet doctrinal
writings certainly recognize this problem and call for
limiting the resulting exposure to enemy nuclear or
conventional fire to an absolute minimum by concentra-
ting rapidly from the march opposite the point of
attack. Again, this is a weakness unique to the
offense, but exploitation requires responsive intelli-
gence and a rapid reaction capability.
{Vo don't anticipate that Soviet
second echelon units would "pass through" first
echelon units. Soviet doctrine calls for the second
echelon to renew the assault on a different axis or,
if the second echelon is exploiting a gap created by'
the first echelon, the first echelon forces would
move aside to protect the flanks of the exploitation
force.
If the Soviets were achieving the
rates cited in the study, resistance would not be
intense and logistics requirements--particularly for
ammunition-?-would be reduced. There is no evidence
that the structure of the Soviet logistics system
would pose any unusual constraints on Soviet rates of
advance beyond those associated with any rapidly
advancing army. If Soviet forces were sustaining a
rate of advance beyond what their logistics system
could support, NATO for all practical purposes would
have already been defeated.
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It is doubtful. that ovie
operate without infantry support
in areas Where antitank defenses wore present and
effective. While individual tanks or small isolated
units certainly will be subject to ambush by missile-
armed tan}: killer teams, we do not believe these
ambushes would pose a significant threat to Soviet
strategy.
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I I There is no evidence that the
Soviet army overa is more logistically constrained
for sustained operations than NATO armies. While
i_ndividuo.l Soviet units may not be capable of con-
d::cting sustained combat operations as long as
comparable NATO units, they are intended to be
replaced more frequently than are NATO units. It is
true that Soviet strategy stresses the short, fast
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moving campaign, but there is no reason to believe
that Soviet logistics could not support larger
operations should they prove necessary.
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