INDIA'S NAVY IN TRANSITION: PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS FOR A REGIONAL FORCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000700080017-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 16, 1999
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: August 1, 1975
• Content Type: IR

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No Foreign Grssem
No Dissenr Abroad
Controlled Dissem
Background Use Orrly
Intelligence Report
India's Navy in Transition;
Prospects and Problems for a Regional Force
SR I R 75-13
August 1975
ropy i Q -r
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIVNAI 5ECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 006827
Exempt Rrom general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption cotspory:
~ SBII), (2), and (~)
Automatically declassified on:
Dare Impossible to Determine
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India's Navy in Transition: Prospect; and
Problems for a Regional Force
Surr~mar;~
India is striving to expa.^.ri and upgrade its navy, already the dominant
ind;genous naval force in South Asia, in the belief that it can thus gain a
larger voice in decisions affecting the greater Indian Ocean area. Although
the navy will improve its capabilities in the next few years, it is likely to
remain !imitea to a regional role.
The Indian navy is organized as a coastal patrol, escort, and anti-
submarine force with missions of defending India's territorial and coastal
waters and protecting its coastal shipping routes.
lndia assesses Pakistan as its most likely threat, and hence deploys most
o its nava~ fiorces from the west coast base at Bombay, which is also the
navy's principal rei~air facility. Naval facilities are being improved and
expanded there and elsewhere. Soviet technicians have assisted in the devel-
opment afi a naval complex on the east coast at Vishal;hapatnam, and several
construction projects are under way in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in
the Bay of Bengal.
Foreign aid ~Nill continue to be a major determinant of India's success
in building a more powerfi!I naval force. India has never been able to meet
the navy's needs alma, and this situation is unlikely to change soon. fn
recent years a large quantity of naval equipment has been bought from the
USSR, the primary source of weapons since imposition of tl~e US?IJK arms
emba~yo in 1965. Und :r a 1975 Indo-Soviet arms agreeme;.t, New Delhi
reportedly will receive maritime reconnaissance aircraft, minesweepers, anti-
submarine warfare helicopters, guided missile destroyers or cruisers, and
patrol guided missile boats.
Wary of the political perils of dependence on a singly; arms supplier,
India has been circumspect about its naval ties with the Soviets and has
sought to confine the interchange to that dictated by need. It has fended off
attempts to develop the relationship into anything like the intimacy of the
erstwhile Indo-British association, Specifically, New Delhi has consistently
rebuffed di, act Soviet requests for long-term use of Indian port facilities.
Moscow pra:.ably will use the proposed expansion of US facilities at Diego
Gar?:ia as an argument for obtaining the use of Indian port facilities. The
Soviets recognize India's caution but remain alert, after nearly a decade of
military cooperation, for a chance to gain special privileges.
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No Foreign 1':r~em - No Dissem Abroad - Controlled Disaem -Background Ltse Only
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
August 1975
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
India's Navy in Transition: Prospects
and Problems for a Regional Force
Motivated by a new perception of its strategic:
environment, India is taking steps to upgrade and
expand its navy. 1~3;-ocates of naval expansion see
a more powerful navy as a means to augment India's
position of don;finance on the subcontinent--reinforced.
by the 1974 explosion of a nuclear device--and to
enhance its influence on developments in the greater
Indian Ocean area. New Delhi has watched with concern
the Indian Ocean operations of US, Soviet, and French
naval forces in the aftermath of Britain's withdrawal
of ?.ts military presence east of Suez, India is also
keenly aware of the burgeoning strength of the Iranian
navy and of Tehran's expressed interest in the Indian
Ocean. And on the horizon, some Indian estimates
foresee the arrival of Chinese naval units in the area.
This report assesses the Indian navy's current
capabilities and reviews its efforts to expand ar~d
improve. In particular, India's naval aid relatioxi-
ship with the Soviet Union is examinee:, The study
concludes with a discussion of the navy's prospects
for fulfilling its aspirations.
Comments and quezr.es regarding this publication are welcome.
They may be directed tc: the Middle Fast/
South Asia Branch, Office of Strategies Research, code 143,
extension 4287.
25X1 Aga
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No Foreign Dissrm - No Dissem Abroad - Contn~iled Dissem -Background Use Only
Motives for Naval E~.Pansion .
5
Rival Naval Forces _
5
Current Missions and Deployments ~
7
Basing and Support
9
Capabilities and Shortcomings
13
Sources of Supply
19
Outlook
28
Indian Naval Command Organization (CP~rt)
8
Indian Naval Commands and Operating Areas
(h9ap)
lI
Indian Naval Combatants (Photographs)
14
Ships in the Indian iQavy
30
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Performance of the Indian Navy in the War with Pakistan
3-17 December 1971
India's aspirations to naval power were reinforced by its navy's
performance in the 171 conflict vaith Pakistan. In the first combat
engagement of its existence, the navy seized the initiative, inflicted on
the Pakistanis major Icsses far out of proportion to its e~vn, and quickly
gained superiority in the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea.
The Indian navy was innovative in the use of its Osa class guided
missile patrol boats as offensive rather than defensive weapons. A nave!
task force of four Osas, a cruiser, and eight destroyer escorts attacked a
Pakistani patrol south of Karachi on 4 December and with Osa-borne
Styx antiship missiles sank a destroyer and a minesweeper. Having no
counter to the Osas, the commander in chief of the Pakistani navy
ordered most of his first-line ships into Karachi harbor and offered .r;
further contest.
On 8 December, the Indian group boldly approached ICzrechi and
launched Styx missiles into the merchant ship anchorage area, sinking
one ship and damaging three others. The missiles also ignited petroleum
storage tanks at a nearby refinery.
In the east, Indian fiorces functioned virtually unchecked from the
outset and rapidly neutralized Pakistani naval contingents at C'~ittagung
and Chalna with air strikes launched from the carrier V~krant. Pakistan's
one fleet submarine, the Ghazi, a former US unit of the "tench class,
shadowed the carrier when it deployed from the west coast to the east
coast prior to tl~e outbreak of hostilities. But the submarine sank on the
first night of the war-possibly because of a torpedo handling accident,
although the Indians took credit for its destruction.
India's only war loss was a destroyer escorrt torpedoed by a
Pakistani Daphne class submarine.
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No Foreign Dissem - No Drssem Abroad - Contro!!ed Dissem -Background Use Only
Motives for Naval Ex ansion
New Delhi's steps to expand and upgrade its navy
have been motivated by the perception of a changed
strategic environment. For many years, India as-
signed a relatively low priority to developing its
naval forces . The Indian armcy and air force had
overriding requirements, and New Delhi was preoccupied
with possib7.e overland threats from China and Pakistan.
In the late sixties, India's naval ambitions
were stimulated by the withdrawal of Britain's m~li-
tary presence east of Suez. The Indians became con-
cerned that nonregional powers would be tempted to
vie for a position of dominant influence in the
Indian ocean--a competition they believe would im-
peril the security of the littoral states, exsce r-
bate local tensions, and interfere with India's own
aspirations for preeminence. But New Delhi's pro-
tests against encroachments and its support of an
Indian Ocean zone of peace--from which nuclear weapons,
foreign warships, and military bases wculd be banned--
have failed to prevent foreign intrusion. Advocates
of naval expansion ha:re argued that a potent Indian
force would dispel notions of a power vacuum in the
area, reduce temptatiorjs of the great powers to in-
crease their naval presence there, and give :India
a larger voicE in decisions affecting the regionr
further enhancing its general position of dominance
on t-.he subcontinent.
Rival Naval Fords
The Indian navy proved that it is South Asia's
most powerful .naval force by its impressive victory
over Pakistan :i.n 1971 (see box) . Pakistan has since
improved its navy somewhat, but it is still a small
force, limited to escort, minesweeping, and coastal
patrol functions. The Indians would win any renewed
conflict with Pakistan today, and the disparity be-
tween the two navies is likely to increase with time.
Still, the Indians keep a watchful eye on the Pa;{istani
force and will be concerned if it acquires more ad-
vanced weapons or expands signiFicautly.
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The Iranian navy also is of concern to India
because of its share in a massive military expansion.
program. Tehran now has the largest and most capable
naval force in the Persian Gulf, and the Shah has
stated that Iran's security frontier extends into the
Indian Ocean. Talks and economic agreements in re-
cent years have warmed Indo-Iranian relations, but
New Delhi clearly remains wary of Iran's intent:ions
regarding a future role in the Indian Ocean.
The Indians consider that Iran could be a source
of naval weapons and support for Pakistan in the
event of renewed Indo-Pakistani hostilities. In
25X1 C point of fact, the
existence of a mutua defense assistance agreement
25X1C between Pakistan and Iran--probably concluded in
mid-1973--- stipulates that Pakistan would re-
ceive limited military assistance for defensive
purposes in the event of an attack by India or Afghan-
istan or both. Naval aid would include "men-of-war,"
reconnaissance of waters of mutual interest, and logis-
tical support for Pakistani ships.
India is keenly aware that the US and Soviet navies
have become more prominent in the Indian Ocean since
the British withdrawal. The Indians oppose major rein-
forcement of either force, and they are apprehensive
about an unending naval arms racz. They were alarmed
when both the US and So~,riet naval contingents were en-
larged during the Indo-Pakistani war in 1971 and fol-
lowing the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1973.
The USSR has mGintained a small task force in
the Indian Ocean continuously since 1968, bum any
Soviet plan for extenders deployments of significantly
larger naval forces has apparently been constrained
by prior commitments of naval forces to other areas,
the long steaming time to the area from tre home
wat~,rs of the various Soviet fleets, the lack of a
local repair facility, and the costs, both economic
ana political, of deploying a large force there.
Although the reopening of the Suez Canal diminishes
some of the logistical problems associated with
maintaining an Indian Ocean presence and gives Soviet
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naval power added flexibility, it will not in and of
itself cause the Soviet force there to be enlarged.
The Soviets have failed in attempts to gain regular
access to Indian port facilities but do routinely use
Berbera in Somalia for replenishment, crew rest, and
emergency repairs. In addition, the Soviets make
limited use of ports at Basrah and Umm Qasr in Iraq
and at Aden.
US naval ships in the Indian Ocean, attached to
the Middle East Force, have be=n home-ported at
Bahrain in the Persian Gulf since the late forties.
The Bahrain government notified Washington after the
Arab-Israeli war in 1973 that the port would be ur.,-
available to US forces after October 1974, but thin
agreed to allow continued access, at least until 1977.
The US intends to expand the facilities at B.ritish-
owned Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago, where a
small naval communications station is now located.
The prospect of a Chinese naval presence in the
Indian Ocean is especially unwelcome to New Delhi.
Knowledgeable Indians, discounting reports that
Chinese submarines have appeared in the Arabian Sea
and Bay of Bengal, do not believe that China's navy
currently poses any threat. Some Indian estimates
allege, however, that by 1980 China will be seeking
naval facilities on the Indian Ocean littoral.
These reports speculate that, even without such ir.-
stallations, Chinese nuclear submarines eventually
could menace the subcontinent and India's maritime
trade routes--a threat that would not materialize
until the mid-eighties according to current US
National Intelligence Estimates.
Current Missions and Deployments
The Indian navy is organized as a coastal patrol,
escort, and antisubmarine force in furtherance of its
missions of defending India's coastal and territorial
waters and protecting coastal shipping. (see chart, next
page.) To counter a possible attack from Pakistani
naval forces, the bulk of the fleet is deployed from
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Western Naval Command
Bombay
Commander in Chief
(flag officer)
Western Fleet
Commander
(flag officer)
Shore establishments at:
Bombay
Okha
Jamnngar.
Lonavla
INDIAN NAVAL
COMMAND ORGANIZATION
CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF
Naval Headquarters
i1Tew Delhi
Southern Naval Command
Coohin
Commander
(flag officer)
Ships, aircraft and
shorn establishments at:
Cochin
Mormugao
Coim`ontore
Eastern Naval Command
Vishakhapatnam
Commander in Chef
(flag officer)
Eastern Fleet
Commander
(flag officer)
Ships at Vishakhapatam
Calcutta
V isliakhnpntnam
Mddrns
Andaman and NicobarIslande
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Bombay, the headquarters of the Western Naval Command.
(see fo.Zdout map.) Most of the other ships are based
in the Eastern Naval Command at Vishakhapatnam and
Port Blair. A token contingent is stationed at Cochin,
headquarters of the Southern Naval Command.
The navy is continuing to make some changes in
deployments, although most of the force will prob~
ably remain in the Western Naval Command. Until the
early seventies, Soviet-built combatants were based on
the east coast and former British ships were stationed
on the west coast, in part because Moscow insisted on
restricting third-country access to ships it provided,
but also for logistical reasons. The continuing ex-
pansion and improvement of facilities have allowed
the navy to align deployments more closely with tac-
tical requirements. Disregarding the Soviet prohibi-
tions, the Indians moved Osas from Vishakhapatnam to
Bombay just before the 1971 war. Petyas and subma-
rines received in the postwar period have been based
at Bombay as wel~ . 25X1 C
in the u ure a navy wi station some
Osa guided missile boats at Vishakhapatnam to augment
surface forces in the east. The navy may also per-
manently assign a few Osas, Petyas, and submarines
to the Andaman Islands to enhance capabilities to
monitor traffic transiting the Straits of Malacca.
Basing and Support
Bombay is the location of the Indian navy's prin-
cipal operating and repair base. Expansion of the
crowded naval base and dockyard facilities there has
been in progress for years, but some Indian navy
officials complain that it has not kept pace with
the demands of the growinct fleet.
25X1 C
Nonetheless, repair and
25X1 C
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overhaul facilities have been improved, and comple-
tion of current construction projects will enhance
the capabilities of the base to service the force.
The navy is gradually expanding and ~:~.ograding
other facilities. Soviet technicians have assisted
in developing the complex at Vishakhapatnam, which
comprises a naval base, dockyard, and training center.
Work on the base started in 1965, but the entire com-
plex will not be operational for several more years at
the present rate of construction.
Several naval construction projects are under way
or have been completed in the Andaman and Nicobar
Islands, about 750 nm east of India in the Bay of
Bengal. Expansion of the installation at Port Blair
on South Andaman Island, including a naval station
and repair facilities, is continuing. A naval gar-
rison and supply depot are being built on Camorta
Island in the Nicobars, also the site of a naval sta-
tion. An airfield and supply depot are located on
Car Nicobar Island. In addition, coastal batteries
reportedly are being constructed in the island chain.
Relatively minor changes have been made so far to
facilities at Mormugao, Cochin, Calcutta, and Madras.
The navy is developing a small forward base near the
Indo-Pakistani border at Okha, which was used as a 25X1C
swaging area for Osa guided missile patrol boats
during the 1971 conflict.
- the navy in the early seventies proposed pro-
jects fcr a 15-year development plan--establishing a
naval air station at Madras, developing a base for
minesweepers and patrol boats at Haldia, building
local naval facilities at Mangalore and Tuticorn, and
creating a naval prese~~ce in the Lakshadweep Islands.*
* Some military construction is reported to be in progress on two
islands in the Lakshadweep chain, but it may be an air force
project.
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5 destroyer escorts 3 amphibious ships
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and Iho olhor Is usod only for training purposos.
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But there is no evidence that the government has sanc-
tioned any of these schemes.
Capabil:'ities and Shortcomings
The Indians are moving to correct shortcomings in
their navy's defensive capabilities and to upgrade its
modest offensive capabilities. By Western standards
mucr more would be required, but the deficiencies must
be viewed in relative terms. By regional criteria,
the navy is already a capable--and the dominant--force.
Inventory. The navy has some comparatively modern
and capable ships and aircraft, including F class sub-
marines, Osa class guided missile patrol boats, and
Petya class destroyer escorts from the USSR; British-
designed Leander class frigates, and British antisub-
marine `~olicopters. (A .listing of ships by type and
class is appended.) Yet much of the inventory is ob-
solescent because the Indians have sought to use their
equipment as long as possible. Several of the British-
built warships, dating from the forties and fif ties,
are rapidly approaching retirement age. Three Emergency
class destroyers and two Hunt II patrol escorts were
scrapped during the past two years. The remaining Hunt
patrol escort now functions as a graining ship. Several
of the oldest ships--a Leander class cruiser launched
in 1932 and a River class and two modified Black Swan
class patrol escorts completed in 1943--are used only
for training. Five of the navy's seven minesweepers are
nearly 20 years old, and its LST(3) class tank landing
ship was built during World War II. The navy's vrigina3
force of about 60 Sea Hawk fighter-bombers his dwindled
t~ a total of little more than 21 aircraft, and few of
them are operational at any one time.
Antisubmarine Warfare. Even though India's anti-
submarine capability is adequate to overcome the
threat of Pakistan's few submarines, New Delhi is
anxious to correct some deficiencies. For reasons of
security, only minimal tactical information accom-
panied the British and Soviet ASW equipment supplied
to the Indians, who have yet to develop a fully sat-
isfactory antisubmarine tactical doctrine of their own.
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INDIAN NAVAL COMBATANTS
INB.Niui~iri ;
Leander Class DEH
(ASW Helicopter Destroyer Escort)
:Y~4 Apri11974 Bombay ,
~-~ INS`Nir~hat {
O$A-~ Lnige E3~ded Missile ~eati
,;:~ Apt~l.Y9'74~oe~Yiay R ~ . ,.
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25X1 C
25X1 C
25X1 C
frequent lonc*-range searches for
with the Western Fleet and aircraft was limited so vv
long as India's submari:~e force was home-ported on
the eu::t coast, but basing of some submarines at
R~mbay :gas alleviated this problem.
Dependent for maririme patrol on nine Super
~onstella.tions under the control of the air force,
the India.s are ill prepared to conduct effective or
25X1X6
fissions are flown on an "on-call" basis. Navy
25X1X6
requests for searches must be approved by an Indian
air force authority in Bombay, which then relays in-
structions to the operational squadron, based about
80 miles southeast of Bombay. The Super Constella-
tions rarely conduct searches mare than 200 to 300
miles from the coast. .Although the aircraft stage to
other airfields for operations in eastern and southern
waters, they probably are deployed most readily and
most often over western waters---the Arabian Sea, the
area of greatest concern.
During the past decade, the navy has acquired
ships and aircraft with sonar systems that have en-
hanced its capabilities for the se~:ond phase of anti-
submarine operations--localization. While continuing
their efforts to procure improved sonar systems, the
Indians are making some changes in deployments to
take advantage of the more capable equipment already
obtained. For example, one squadron of Sea King heli-
coptzrs, equipped with a dipping sonar--a versatile
but short-range detection system--probably will be
assigned to the carrier Vikrant. Still, units with
inadequate sonar--such as some of tl:~ old British-built
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combatants - -remain in the inventory. Their vulner-
ability was made evident by the less to a Pakistani
submarine of a Blackwood class destroyer escort during
the 1971 war.
Having located an enemy submarine, the navy can at-
tack it with a variety of weapons, including mortars,
rockets, depth charges, and ship- and aircraft-launched
torpedoes. Most of the former British ships are
equipped with less effective dE.pth charges and mortars,
but Soviet-supplied Petyas are armed with rocket
launchers, and F class submarines carry antisubmarine
torpedoes. Western-designed Sea King and Alouette-III
helicopter s are equipped with light-weight MK.44
torpedoes.
Minesweeping. The Ind?:an navy has a shortage of
minesweepers. All seven minesweepers--four coastat and
three inshore boats--are stationed in Bombay, and any
other area would be, at least initially, without
countermeasures to a miring attack. The Pakistanis
laid mines in Bengalee waters during the 1971 war,
and the Tnd fans had trouble clearing them because of
the characteristics of the mines and local conditions.
The Pakistanis possess a limited minelaying capability,
however, and they probably could not cripple the
Bombay port area with mines.
Air Defense. The navy's ability to defend the
fleet against air attack is weak but improving. Per-
haps its best weapon for this is the Seacat surface-
to-air miss ile--a point defense system wit: a maximum
effective ran3e of about 14,000 feet. Yet only the
two in-service Leander class destroyer escorts are
armed with the system. Dual-purpose naval guns and
fire control systems on several of India's British-
designed c~~mbatants can deliver fire up to. about
38,000 feet, but these obsolescent guns have a rate
of fire of only some 15 to 20 rounds per minute. The
76.2mm gun s aboard the Petyas have a rate of as many
as ~0 rounds per minute for brief periods,* and their
vertical range of about 45,000 feet is the longest
in the navy. To intercept hostile aircraft beyond
the range of the antiaircraft guns, the navy might
call for protec'~ion by air force fighters, depending
* Reloading requirements limit the actual duration of fire to
about one half minute.
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on fleet deployments. The carrier-borne Sea Hawk
fighters are intended primarily for strike o~-?=ations,
and alone they could offer only a thin line u~ de-
fense for the fleet.
Antiship Missions. Osa class p4trol boats with
Styx antiship guided missiles give t}1e Indian navy
a capability against surface ships unmatched in South
Asia. The seakeeping limitations of these boats
effectively confine them to coastal deployments, but
this was the field of operations in the 1971 war, and
the navy was able to exploit the best characteristics
of the Osas.
Carrier Operations. The aircraft carrier Vikrant
provides prestige as the only ship of its type in the
northern Indian Ocean and offers the potential of ex-
tending somewhat the navy's strike capability. It can
accommodate up to 10 obsolescent Sea Hawk fighter-
bombers in addition to six to eight antisubmarine war-
fare aircraf t. The ship itself has suffered front en-
gineering problems, especially in its boiler ~~ystem,
but the boilers were replaced in the course of a re-
cently completed general refit, and the navy plans to
keep the carrier ir, service for at least another decade.
Amphibious Warfare. Three Polnocny-II class medium
landing ships and an LST (;,; class tan;:-landing ship
offer the potential of a minor capability for am-
phibious warfare, and in fact'-, the navy did make a
small amphibious landing in what is now Bangladesh
during the 1971 war. The I:idians have no naval in-
fantry units, however, and use the ships mostly for
transport and logistical tasks. There is little
need to develop an amphibious capability and, even
after receipt of three more Polnocnys on order from
Poland, the navy most likely will continue to use
the ships as it does now.
Repair and Maintenance. Problems with repair
and maintenance have downgraded the o erational readi-
ness of the fleet. 25X1C
t11e successful performance of the navy in the hostil-
ities of 1371 ~-:ould be partially attributed to advance
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preparation which permitted the readying of ships for
combat.* Navy officials have complained that repairs
-_frequently needed for the overage combatants--are
in the USSR. One Indian submarine arrived at the ship-
yard in Vladivostok in December 1974, but whether Moscow
has agreed to repair two more is ui;.knewn.
Logistics. There are shortcomings in tree navy's
logistic sy~tent. The Yisk inherent iil overreliance
on Bombay for supplies and repairs--a dependence
that would hinder extended combat. operations if the
fleet were denied access to the base--is diminished
by the unlikelihood that any regional fleet could en-
force such a blockade. For support operations at sea,
the navy has a replenishment oiler, a submarine tei~3er,
and a submarine resc~ie ship, but these ships would be
unable to satisfy the requirements of a large task
force for fuel and minor repairs, and some naval ships
would have to return to shore bases.
Still, the navy has found the overhaul and repair of
even some of its newer ships a burc~er~. For example,
until the repair facilities at Vishakhapat*sam are
completed, the Indians are unable to undertake the
refit and overhaul of their F class submarines, ai;d
they have asked the Soviets to do the work on three
Because the navy obtains many of its spare parts
from foreign sources and delays in shipments are
common, i~t has trouble keeping adequate stocks on
hand for its diverse inventory. In the event of a
conflict, the navy could be t""aced witr, the prospect
of curtailed supplies. Still, the Indians have
steadily increased the output of locally manufactured
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items for their navy, and this indigenous production
capacit;y has extended the period through which India
could sustain naval combat operations, currently
estimated at abaut two months. 25X1C
Tropicalization. Operations in tropical waters
have posed problems for the Indian navy.
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the navy's ships had been esigned to
function in temperate climates, called for priority
attention to air cor_ditionin.g of appropriate spaces
in ships not yet tropicalized to prevent the degraded
performance and premature aging of electronic equip-
ment. 25X1C
Sources of Sup lp~r
India's ambition to improve and expand its navy
has been hampered both by its slow progress toward
self-sufficie:zcy in production of naval equipment
and by difficulties iii acquiring foreign-made equip-
ment. Although foreign assistance will remain the
only practical means of upgrading the navy in the
foreseeable future, there are constraints including
the unavailability--for a variety of reasons--of
particular items of equipment, a relatively small
naval budget,* and New Delhi's reluctance to draw
down its foreign exchange reserves, particularly in
light of the additional outlays necessary for oil,
food, and fertilizer.
Soviet Aid Terms. The terms on which the Soviets
supply military aid to India are more favorable than
those of Western arms suppliers. Mos.:ow generally
has required a 10 percent payment on delivery, with
* Althouch the defeaise expenditures of the navy increased by
30(? percer: ~ be-tween fiscal years 1968 and 1975 (coMpared with
about 131 percent for the air force and 71 percent for the arc~y) ,
its share of the total defense budget is still small--about 9
percent. The air force allocations in 1975 amounted to 20 percent
of tY.e budget an:? the army received b3 percent. (India spent
$2.96 billion-~-23.09 billion rupees--for defense in FY')5, about
3.8 percent of itrs GNP. j
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the balance financed under a 10-year credit at about
2 percent interest. Moreover, India can pay for most
of. the material via a form of barter in whicl: the
amounts earned or owed as a result of Soviet-Indian
trade in commodities are recorded in a debt-clearing
account in India. This system avoids a direct i]rain
on India's reserves of foreign exchange. (In some
cases, however, New Delhi might earn hard currency
by selling some of ?tY~ese conunoditi:ss in i.nternati.or~al
markets.)
At the end of 1974, India. ha~x an outstanding mi3i-
tart' debt to th.e USSR of approximately $650 rni?_lion,
and its debt paymPr.t obligation in 1974 for military
aid way about $100 million. Anew military aid agree-
ment concluded in February 1975 has added X200 to $500
rnillion to India's military account with the Soviets.
The Indians in late 19?3 asked the USSR to liberalize
the terms of its military aid by granting a repayment
moratorium of two years, extending loan periods to 15
years, and removing interest charges altogether. But
this appeal and another in September 1974 to ease pay-
ment schedules on debts already accumulated apparently
were rejected.
Status of Soviet Deliveries. Soviet aid to ttie
Indian navy has included ships, ~craining, and technical
assistance. Under the initial contract of September
19G5, India received five Poluchat-I class motor gun-
boats, four F class submarines, an Ugra class subma-
rine tender, five Petya class destroyer escorts, a.nd
two Polnocny-II class landing ships. Eight Osa class
guided missile patrol boats and a submarine rescue
ship were delivered under a February 1969 agreement.
Moscow agreed in October 1971 to supply another four
submarines and five Petyas, delivery of which was
completed in early 1975. A few crews for Petyas and
submarines were trained in the Soviet Union before
Moscow helped to establish and initially staff the
training facility at .ishakhapatnam for successive
crews. Some Osa crews also received training in the
USSR.
the Indians
ordered another eight Osas in early 1972 for delivery
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egin d
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Moscow
.
every in 1978 of large warships
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starting about 1975, and negotiations for them are
known to have continued at least into 1973. An
Indian request in early 1974 to fit the Osas "already
on order" with more advanced missiles and to convert
one to a command-and-control ship indicates that a
contract was signed, although the delivery schedule
finally decided on is unknown.
The conclusion of a new arms agreement during
Soviet Defense Minister Grechko's visit to India in
February 1975 follows several years of intensive
efforts by the Indians to procure still more Soviet
naval equipment. New Delrii sent several delegations
to the Soviet Union, including one in August 1972 and
a follow-up group in March 1973. Then the Indians
sent a detailed list of "urgently needed" naval arms
just before a visit to Moscow by Defense Minister
Jagjivan Ram in July-1973, but Ram failed to obtain
a substantive commitment. He and Admiral S. N. Kohli,
chief of the Naval Staff, next submitted special re-
quests for the equipment directly to their Soviet
counterparts in August 19'13. More discussions on
arms were held during Bre.zhnev's visit to India in
late November 1973 and when Kohli flew to Moscow in
early 1974. Defense Secretary Govind Narain headed
a follow-up delegation in April 1974, Kohli led yet
another in October 1974, and Narain went back to
Moscow in December 1974. 25X1C
the ussx will supply most of the naval
equipment India has been seeking from the Soviets.
There are still several unknowns in the equation, how-
ever, including specific types ar~d amounts of some of
the items to be delivered.
-- Guided missile destro
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India has previously
asked for Krestas and Krivaks, but they are
among the USSR's newer and more advanced sur-
face combatants, and Moscow has need for them
in its own naval modernization program. Ghat
type and class of ships the Soviets will pro-
vide is uncertain.
-- Maritime reconnaissance aircraft: The three
IL-38 May aircraft which the Soviet Union has
reportedly agreed to supply to India are scred-
uled to be in-country by 1977. 25X1X6
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Production of the IL-38 ceased in
1974, and about 50 are in the Soviet inventory.
The Indians expressed interest in acquiring
Mays after a Soviet offer in August 1972 to pro-
vide six BE-12 Mails the following year brought
no results. 25X1C
India. will receive its first
Soviet minesweepers in 1976. The total number
of these units--listed as Yurka class fleet
;minesweepers--to be s~ipplied is unclear. India
has asked for as many as six minesweepers-
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-- Patrol ~~uided missile boats: India reportedly
will obtain a total of three Nanuchka class
guided-missile patrol boats--one in late 1976
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and the remaining two in the first half of
1977. To date no Nanuchkas---which first be-
caine operational in 1970--have been exported
by the U:~SR, and the So-riet navy currently has
only a dozen in service plus one under con-
struction and three fitting out. The initial
report of New Delhi's request for this type of
Soviet naval combatant dates from January 1974,
when the Indians asked for two to four improved
and modified 800-ton missile boats. 25X10
-- Antisubmarine warfare helicopters: The USSR
apparently has agreed to provide the Indian
navy with four KA-25 Hor?none A antisubmarinE
helicopters, and
- the number may be increased to seven.
~ A delivery schedule has not been
disclosed.
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A team of Soviet specialists visited India in
the spring of 1971 to review possible site
locations, discuss technical matters,? and deter-
mine the cost of the system, but talks were
subsequently stalled by disagreements over tech-
nical specif ications--the Indians wanted longer
range capabilities than the Soviets thought
necessary.
V/STOL aircraft: India's requirement for Soviet
V/STOL fighter aircraft apparently will remain
unfulfilled. The Soviet V/STOL fighter will not
enter operational service until 1976, and the
USSR is unlikely to export any for many years.
Moscow has generally disclaimed that it could
supply suitable replacements for India's carrier-
borne fighters.
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Problems in Arrangements with USSR.
25X10 numerous complaints by the
Indians about Soviet naval aid, including charges of
inferior equipment, delays in delivery, understated
need for maintenance and repair, meager supplies of
25X10 oils and lubricants, and shortages of spare parts.
tht~ Soviets responded
only halfheartedly to appeals fcr badly needed spare
parts during the months preceding the 1971 war.
From the Indian point of view, the So~~:. ats i:ave
charged dearly for certain operational spares and
for special modifications such as are required in
tropicalization of ships. And at times the Indians
have been unable to make satisfactory repairs or
even to request replacement parts because equipment
was accompanied ry too little technical data.
Anxious to avo'd the political perils of de-
pendence on a single arms supplier, India has been
circumspect about its naval ties with the Soviets.
The Indians have sought to confine the interchange
to that dictated by their needs and have fended of~
attempts to develop their relationship into anything
approaching the intimacy of the erstwhile Indo-
British association. Al~iivugh the Indians would
like to enhance their ability to use Soviet-supplied
ships effec:`:ively, chariness about sharing tactical
information--probab~.y mutual t~ some extent--has so25X1C
far precluded joint naval exercises.
25X10 Indian rejECtion of Soviet pro-
posals to establish joint naval facilities--a station.
for monitoring submarines or an oceanographic re-
search installation--or to conduct joint hydrographic
surveys.
New Delhi has refused direc=. Soviet requests for
tong-term use of Indian port facili~~ies for berthing,
provisioning, and repairs. In keeping with its
stated policy of nonalignment, India has chosen to
clear Soviet naval ships for port visits on an ad hoc,
indivi3ual basis, as it does ships of other nations.
The Soviets' suggestions that their presence in the
Indian Ocean is fostered in part by concern for
Indian security have failed to obtain favored treat-
ment. Moscow probably will use the proposed expan-
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sion of US facilities at Diego Garcia as an argument
for obt~z?.nir..g use of Indian port facilities, but New
Delhi li;:el~r will again refuse.
F.n Indc.-Soviet treaty , covering search for and
recovery Gf spa~^e objects, was under negotiation from
late ~.~?;' until at least nti_d-1974, but appears to have
stalezrv::ed. TF~.e f:reaty woul~~: ave accorded the Soviets