THE 'GREAT DEBATE': SOVIET VIEWS ON NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND ARMS CONTROL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000700080015-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 17, 1999
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: August 1, 1975
• Content Type: IR

C1A~SR
~~~`~i~a~ Deb
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No Foreign Dissem
Intelligence Report
~'be `Great Debate': Soviet Views on
N~?clear Strategy and Arms G'ontrol
~9enFidenliRF
SR IR 75-~?
August 1975
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subeect to Criminal Sanctions
Classiflad by 006827
Exempt for general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11654, azsmption category
6 SB (3)
Automatical y declassifisd one
Date Impossible to Determine
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a ~~UCfhr_
The 'Great Debate': Soviet Views on
Nuclear Strategy and Arms Control
Key Findings
From mid-1973 to late 1974 a debate was conducted in the Soviet press concerning the
nature of nuclear war and the significance of strategic military power-a debate that
appeared to mask more practical concerns about defense and arms control policy. The
rhetoric was similar to disputes in the fifties between Malenkov and his opponents, and to
those of the mid-sixties at the outset of the Soviet !CBM buildup. During the 1973-74
debate:
-One group, political commentators associated mainly with the USA Institute in
Moscow, stressed the futility of strategic arms competition, the economic ber~fits of
arms control, the declining political value of military Dower, and the emptiness of
any concept of "victory" in nuclear war.
-The second group, military wr?tens affiliated with the Main Political Directorate of
the Armed Forces, stressed the need for vigilance deapite detente, the continuing
political utility of military p:;wer, and the belief that "victory" in nuclear war
remains possible.
The controversy over strategic doctrine in an era of political detente suggests un-
certainty, possibly disagreement, in higher councils over Soviet strategic force objectives for
the future.
controls negot atiofns mayradverosely affect,Soviet defense, polacy~ pa ticularld~/ stray
tegic force posture.
-The arguments of the political analysts suggest a greater willingness among some
someemovement towa d~ tt~eo encept ofomutual assuredtdestrurctionnas~th ~keypto
strategic sufficiency.
-Although Soviet leaders have avoicled clear identification with either group, General
Secretary Brezhnev has made statements that reflect the arguments of the political
commentators, whereas Marshal Grechko's remarks closely resemble the pcsitions of
the military writers. It is unlikely, however, that the civilian-versus-military lineup of
the public dispute accurately reflects debates among the leadership over defense
policy and related doctrinal matters. Brezhnev and Grechko, in fact, are closely tied
politically and probably share common views on defense policy.
- Rather, the debate suggests the existence of doubts or reservations behind the
working consensus of the Soviet political and military leadership on questions of
defense and arms control policy.
-The subsidence of the public debate prior to the Vladivostok Summit and the
military's approval of that meeting suggest that the practical defense policy
questions underlying the doctrinal issues have been compromised, probably to the
satisfaction of the military.
The debate may indicate that some Soviet decisionmakers are concerned about the
effects current Soviet force modernization programs could have on SALT and hence on the
future of detente. As long as the Soviets seek to pursue both detente with the West and
steadily improving strategic force capabilities, it is likely +.hat the Soviet doctrinal dispute
over then tune of nuclear war will persist and reappear in public.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
August 1975
The 'Great Debate': Soviet Views on
Nuclear Strategy and Arms Control
The Soviet press, from mid-1973 to late 1974,
carried a series of disputatious articles on how the
USSR should view the possibility of nuclear war and
on the significance of strategic military power. The
debate was generally articulated below the highest
levels and was often cloaked in ideological terms. It
implied not only awareness of the challenge of detente
to Communist orthodoxy, but also disagreement within
the Soviet elite over the correct military policy to
be pursued as an adjunct of detente diplomacy.
The `wo groupings most prominently involved in
the exchange were commentators associated with the USA
Institute of the Academy of Sciences and military
writers affiliated with the Main Political Director-
ate (MPD) of the Armed Forces. The military ideologues
used Marxist-Leninist formulation:: to take a skeptical
line on arms control and SALT-related issues, which
the other group tended to view more favorably. The
debate thus assumed ~ civilian-versus-military com-
plexion despite the lack of any evidence that such
Comments and 4~eries regarding this publication are welcome.
They may be directed to of the Strategic Evacuation
Center, Office of Strategic Research, code 143, extension 4346.
25X1 Aga
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a clear-cut division of views exi-cs within the Soviet
leadership.
The same ideological issues-?-probably masking
very practical concerns about cue.' ~~nse and arms-control
policy--had been tY-e subject of ~~. similar dispute in
the period 1965-67 at the outse~ of the Soviet ICBM
buildup. The recent debate is :.lso reminiscent of the
disputes between Malenkov and I~~~~s opponents in the
fifties, although in the recen{- Abate the arguments
of the moderates--the political commentators--were
more intensely and more freque~~tly presented in the
open press.
These parallels, along with the timing of the
recent debate, suggest that the issues reflect higher
level policy disputes on defense posture. The USA
Institute commentators, some with high- level Party con-
nections, stressed the futi?:ity of arms competition,
the economic bene?its of -arr~:.~ control, the declining
political value of military power to both sides, and
the emptiness of any concep': of "victory" in nuclear
war. The military writers .;tressed the need for
vigilance despite detente, the political value of
military power, and the be:'.i.ef that "victory" in nu-
clear war remains possiblE. On at least one occa-
sion, the military ideoloc;ues openly polemicized with
the first group, accusing them of dangerous and
heretical views.
Soviet Politburo members have, by and large,
avoided clear identification with either side of the
debate. Party General Secretary Br_ezhnev has made
stztements that resonate with the "softer" side of
tre argument, but he *~evertheless continues to speak
of the need for a strong defense, Defense Minister
Greahko's arguments have at times resembled the for-
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mulations used by the military T~~riters, but he has
counterbalanced the heavy emphasis he places on the
need for a strong defense with his personal endorse-
ment of Brezhnev's detente policies.
There is no reliable way of measuring the degree
to which the recent polemic represented high-level dif-
ferences over strategic policy. Soviet commentary on
strategic questions is often intended for the benefit
of foreign av!~iences, and writers for the USA Institute
are particularly attentive to what elite audiences in
the West would like to hear. The debate recently ob-
served in the Soviet press may have been encouraged to
create a false image of "soft-liners" embattled by
"hard-.liners" in the Soviet leadership, an image that
may have tactical utility for Moscow in negotiations
but rarely describes the true complexities of Soviet
decisionmaking. The debate probably was not a pure
contrivance, however, because the issue of how to
deal with strategic nuclear power is a real and press-
ing one for the Soviet regime--one on which believing
Marxist-Leninists can reasonably differ.
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Pa e
The Khrushchev Years
5
The 1965-1967 Dispute
10
The Debate Since 1973
17
Thy "Quantifiers" tinder Attack
18
Nuclear War as Suicide
19
The "Quantifiers" Attack Military
Expenditures
21
Nuclear War as a Continuation of
Politics
22
Bovin RESporids
25
The Leadership Speaks
25
The Election Speeches
28
Kulikov--A Cap to the Debate
3Q
Implications
31
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The Khrushchev Years
After Stalin's death, the realties of the stra-
tegic environment--its new nuclear dimension--impressed
upon the Soviet leadership the need to update tradi-
tional Leninist-Stalinist doctrine on the nature and
consequences of modern war. Malenkov, Stalin's s:zc-
cessor for a time as Chairman of the Council of
Ministers, obser~?ed in a speech on 12 March 1954
that, "with the Existence of modern means of destruc-
tion," a new world war would mean the "destruction
of world civilization."
Malenkov's statement, even though repudiated by
the leadership fallowing his ouster, reflected the
reasoning that eventually led to a sweeping shift
in Soviet doctrine on t:he inevitability of war with
the so-called imperialist camp. Khrushchev, once
firmly in power, deemed it safe tc assert that because
of the developing favorable shift in the correlation
of forces a major war was no longer "fatalistically
inevitable." This change in view was partly prompted,
he claimed, by his realization that nuclear war would
entail unprecedented suffering for a~.' mankind.*
Khrushchev's explicit revision of Leninist-Stalinist
dogma on the inevitability of war with the West became
a focal point of Sino-Soviet polemics in the early six-
ties. The Chinese attacked the Soviets for their failure
* Malenkov apparently believed that a "minimum deterrence"
strategy could assure peace and thus free the scarce resources
needed to improve the Soviet standard of living. Malenkov's
rivals, allied with Khrushchev, had at first contended that a
new world war would lead to a Soviet victory, a position ration-
alizing a more elaborate and more expensive military establish-
ment because it implied the development of war-fighting and war-
winning capabilities. After Malenkov's removal in 1955, Khrush-
chev decided that the USSR's interests could best be advanced by
deemphasizing its general-purpose forces in favor of strategic
nuclear missiles, while increasing resource allocations to
consumer-oriented programs.
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to deralop a more aggressive international policy and
for having revised the accepted Marxist norms on the
relationship between war and politics. They were
especially provoked at the time of the Cuban missile
crisis in the fall of 1962 by the decision of the
Soviets, in acquiescence to US demands, to dismantle
their missiles on the island. The Soviets, in turn
accused the Chinese of opting for world war while the
USSR was allegedly committed to a policy which would
avoid Armageddon but would ensure the victory of the
Communist side. In the aftermath of the Cuban crisis
Khrushchev himself asked rhetorically:
~,Yho would be left...after a nuclear war?...do
the autY:ors of these assertions know that if all
a:?ailable nuclear charges were detonated, this
would produce such a contamination of the Earth`s
atmosphere that no one knows what plight the
survivors would find themselves in--whether they
would not envy the dead?*
The Chinese retorted by eschewing revis.iorism,
claiming:
In the opinion of Soviet leaders the emergence of
nuclear weapons has changed everything.... [They
mean] that after the emergence of nuclear weapons
war is no longer a continuation of politics, there
is no longer any difference between just and unjust
wars....This is the philosophy ~f willing slaves.**
The Chinese accusation that Soviet doctrine no
longer distinguished between just and unjust wars
would appear to be simple hyperbole. There was, how-
ever, more substance to the charge that the Soviets
had abandoned Lenin's teaching on war as a continu-
ation of politics, which Lenin had adopted from the
19th century Prussian military philosopher Karl von
~lausewitz.
* Pravda, 20 July 1963.
** Official Chinese statement, Peking Radio in English, 31 August
1963.
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War is the continuation of politics by other (especially forcible)
means.
This celebrated dictum belongs to one of the deepest writers on
military affairs, Clausewitz. Marxists have always justly considered
this position as the theoretical basis of their views on the n?~eaning of
any given war.
V. I. Lenin, Socialism and War, 1915
Soviet commentators, in their eagerness to but-
tress Khrushchev's doctrinal shifts, produced some
extreme formu?.ations. One commentator, Boris Dmitriyev,
for instance, reconstructed Lenin's dictum to read:
"War can only be a continuation of madness." He
warned that:
...in the fire of thermonuclear war, if. it is not
prevented, whole countries and whole continents will
be consumed. If such a war should break out, nu-
clear bombs and deadly radiation will spare no one--
neither in major cities, nor in the jungles, nor in
the mountains. Under such conditions war cannot be
a continuation of politics....*
Whale all Soviet writers embraced Khrushchev's
revision of the "inevitability of war" thesis, some
like Dmitriyev gent further. Dmitriyev's views seemed
to bridge the gap from the non.inevitability of world
war to the conclusion that nuclear war would mean the
destruction of civilization and Bence would be devoid
of any political utility.
Dmitriy~v's Zrguments conflicted with the tradi-
tional views of the armed forces on the political
utility of war. Nevertheless, the military's support
appears to have been successfully enlisted in the
* "Bras, Hats: Peking and Clausewitz," Izvestiz~cz, 25 September
1963.
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Political aims are the end and war is the means, and tl~e means can
never be conceived without the end.
Clausewitz, On War, l 832
common ideological campaign to refute Chinese attacks.
The military's contribution consis~ed of a series
of resolute resta~cements of the continuing Soviet
commitment to Marxist-Leninist theory and the rejoinder
that the "aggressive forces of imperialism" remain
extraordinarily powerful, even though Soviet forces
are strong enough to deter an attack. The military's
rebuttal of ~che Chinese position revealed the philo-
sophic distance still separating its own formulations
from those advanced by propagar_dists for Khrushchev's
peaceful coexistence tactic. The Soviet-Chinese
dialogue gave the military a framework with which to
attempt a restructuring of official public doctrine
on nuclear war. Military writers came to grips with
such questions as (1) the extent to which nuclear war
can be regarded as a rational continuation of politics,
(2) whether this type of war has any political utility,
and (3) who if anyone would be victorious in this
ultimate encounter.
A Red S~Lar article by military philosopher Col. P.
Trifonenkov challenged the Chinese assertion that the
traditional Leninist dictum on war had been exorcised
from Soviet doctrine.* He wrote: "The principle that war
is a continuation of policy by forceful means has never
been disputed by any Marxist-Leninist and cannot be dis-
puted." Trifonenk.^. ;; then reiterated KhrusY~chev's "re-
visionist" hypothesis that the shift in the correlation
of forces had made it possible to avert a new world war.
In December 1963 Marshal Sergey Biryuzov, chief
of the General Staff, joined the growing Sino-Soviet
dialogue on war and politics.** Refuting Chinese
accusations of doctrinal infidelity, Biryuzov stated
that the Leninist definition must not be "interpreted
dogmatically." Biryuzov advanced the principle that
nuclear war would be a continuation of policy but of
* "War and Policy," Krasnaya 7vezda, 30 October 1963.
** "Politics and Nuclear Weapons," Izvestir~a, 11 December 1963.
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War is not only a political act but a real political instrument, a
continuation of political transactions, an accomplishment of these by
different means. That which then remains peculiar to war relates
only to the peculiar nature of its means.
Clausewitz, On War
a policy which would be "rash and senseless"--a char-
acterization which could not by definition apply to
Soviet ~,ol~~.cy. "Mankind faces a dilemma, " Biryuzov
warned, "either to avoid a new world war or to find
itself in a position whose consequences are difficult
to foresee in full. "
Biryuzov seemed to lean more toward a Pyrrhic
interpretation ~f the outcome of nuclear war. Tri-
fonenkov, in attacking the Chinese pcsition, had
adopted an even less sanguine position than that taken
by Biryuzov. In reexamining the Cuban missile crisis
he postulated a nonn egotiated ending in which the
result would have been "a world in ruins to the ad-
vantage of no one."
Both Biryuzov and Trifonenkov stressed the need
to prevent a world war. "The more powerful our armed
forces are and the better they are equipped," Biryuzov
emphasized, "the more reliable they will be as guaran-
tors of lasting world peace." Thus, he cast the
raison d'etre of the military in terms of deterrence
and the prevention of war.
Maj. Gen. N. Sushko and Maj. T. Kondratkov, writing
in Communist of the Armed Forces, theoretical journal
of the Main Political Directorate, distinguished be-
tweFn war. as a continuation of politics and war as an
instrument (purposely selected) of policy.* The
validity of the former was reaffirmed, while the latter
formulation was called into question with the warning
that nuclear weapons had "made war an exceptionally
dangerous and risky tool of p!_,licy. "
Khrushchev's revision of a number of Marxist-
Leninist tenets forced the Sovie~ military establish-
* "War and Politics iZ the 'Nuclear Age'," Kom,iunist Vooru-
zhenn~kh SiZ, No. 2, January 1964.
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ment to update those ideological canons that provided
the theoretical underpinnings for many cf its tradi-
tional positions. It seems likely that, in rallying
to the defense of Lenin's dictum, the military under-
stood the stakes were higher than pure doctrine. Thy
military appears to have knowingly engaged the Chinese
in debate while trying to restructure its own positions
to the demands of the nuclear age--?this in a manner
which would support. its institutional preferences on
defense posture.
The resulting military pronouncements had all the
outward appearances of sustaining Khrushchev in his
position on the future of East-West relations. The
military adhered to the position that a new world war
was not inevitable. It continued to interpret nuclear
war as a continuation of politics, with the qualifying
caveat that war was now severely limited as an instru-
ment of policy. And there was a tentative movement by
several military writers to describe surviving a nu-
clear war as a Pyrrhic victory. By coming up with a
doctrinal position supportive o~ Khrushchev's peacef al
coexistence policy, the military, in fact, produced
a series of arguments which ultimately were used to
justify its own preferences on the Soviet military
effort.
The debates of the fifties and early sixties clearly
had overriding political motives--first in Khrushchev's
struggles against Malenkov, and later in his polemics
with Peking. But at the core of both debates remained
the enduring problem: how to reconcile the demand--im-
posed by traditional strategy and communist ideology--
for the ability to win an all-out war with the great
cost and *'~robable futility of attempting to acquire
that ability.
The 1965-1967 Dis ute
One of the influential military theoreticians
while Khrushchev was in power was Nikolay Talenskiy,
a retired major general who had become associated with
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the Institute of Marxist-Leninist History. He was a
highly visible spokesman for Khrushchev's views on
deterrence and peaceful coexistence and played a sig-
nificant role in shaking off the restraints imposed
b1 Stalin upon Soviet strategic thinking. He became
a regular participant in the Pugwash conferences on
science and world affairs and authored several articles
which supported Khrushchev's thesis on the total un-
acceptability of nuclear war. Clearly, Talenskiy
articulated policy views on these matters which clashed
directly with the positions commonly voiced by spokes-
men for the Ministry of Defense.
Early in the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, when it was
still unclear how vigorously Khrushchev's successors
in=ended to imp?-ove the Soviet Union's strategic pos-
ture, Talenskiy reasserted his Khrushchevian position
on the political futility of modern war:
In our days there is no more dangerous illusion
than the idea that thermonuclear war can still
serve as an instrument of politics, that it is
possir~e to achieve political aims by using
nuclear weapons and at the same time survive,
that it is possible to find acceptable forms of
nuclear war.
Within a year Talenskiy was explicitly criticized on
the pages of Communist of the Armed Forces and Red
Star for his assertion that nuclear war would mean
suicide.
The first to attack him was Lt. Col. ye. I. Rybkin,
a faculty member of the Lenin Military Political Academy
who specialized in *~Iar:~cist-Leninist interpretations of
the nature of war. v~riting in Communist of the Armed
Forces, Rybkin criticized Talenskiy by name and warned
that "to maintain that victory in nuclear war is in
general impossible would be not only untrue theoreri-
cally but dangerous from a political point of view."**
* "The Late War: Some Reflections," Mezhdunarodnar~a Zhizn',
No. 5, May 1965.
** "On the Nature of I3uclear Rocket War, " Kommunist Uooruzherm~kh
SiZ, No. 17, September 1965.
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Victory, acc~~rding to Rybkin and the other military
philosophers who have discussed the problem, presup-
poses "vigilance," a term with clear i3eological and.
morale implications that can also serve to justify
demands for military expenditures.
Despite the esoteric nature of the arguments pre-
sented, concrete policy aFi`ared to have been at issue.
The same month that Rybkin's article was published,
Red Star came out with an article by Col. I. Sidelnikov,
Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, that strongly sug-
gested the linkage between the criticisms of Tulenskiy
raised by Rybkin and the more practical policy consid-
erations which concerned the military writers.* Sidel-
nikov warned that some people were ignoring "the serious
danger of a world war," created by "imperialist mili-
tary adventures," and consequently were asking the mis-
guided 1uestion: "Is it necessary to maintain large
armies and. spend large amounts on the maintenance of
armed forces?"
Sidelnikov warned that peace could r~c~ be pre-
served unless the Soviet state continued to "spend
large amounts on the equipment and maintenance of the
army and navy," so as to "firmly preserve military
superiority over the imperialist countries."' If war
should become a reality, such resolute peacetime plan-
ning would then "become one of the decisive factors
for the utter defeat of the imperialist aggz~essors.'~
By emphasizing the "imperialist" threat and alluding
to the possibility of victory in a "world wa.r" the
* "V. I. Lenin on the Class Approach in Determining t:he Nature
of Wars," Krasnaya Zvezda, 22 September 1965. Sidelr.~ikov
buttressed his attack on "minimum deterrence" an3 troop reduc-
tion wish appropriate citations .from Lenin:
The very best army, one most loyal to the cause
of the revolution, will be immediately routed bYl
the enemy unless it is satisfactc-rily armed, sup-
plied with provisions, and trained. (PoZnoz~e
Sobraniye, vol. 35, p. 408)
He who has greater .reserves, more sources of power,
more staying power in the thick of the fray will
win in a war. (Vol. 39, p. 327)
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War must be conducted realistically or it should not be conducted
at all. Ti here is no middle ,round.
V. I. Lenin, Marc;i 1918
military philosophers implicitly voiced their 3is-
approval of any concept of a minimal or deterrence--
only posture and signaled their preferences for war-
fighting military capabilities.
Ter; months later Talenskiy was attacked by still
anoi~her military officer specializinS in ideological
matters. In a Red Star article, Doctor of Philosoph-
ical Sciences, Col. I. A. Grudinin repeated Rybkin's
challenge to Talenskiy, noting:
...such an assertion [Talenskiy's point that
nuclear war would be suicidal] is not only in
error, but it is harmful because it can shake
one's assurance in our victory over the aggressor
and the consciousness of the necessity to be
ready at any moment for armed struggle with the
use of nuclear rocket weapons.*
P.long with the essential question of the possiblity of
victory in nuclear war, both Rybkin and Grudinin
affirmed the continuing validity of an updated version
of the Clausewitzian dictum that war is a continua-
tion of politics--i.~, that nuclear war could arise
from political causes and can be successfully waged
for political ends.
In January 1967 an authoritative Red Star editorial
upheld the views of Rybkin, Grudinin, and Sidelnikov
on the Communist world's inevitable victory in a nu-
clear. war. The victory formulation was presented in
an abstract fashion that has since been adopted on a
number of occasions:
Should the imperialists dare to unleash a world
nuclear war, the peuples will no longer tolerate
* "On the Question of the Essence of War," Xrasna~a Zvezda,
12 July 1966.
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a regime which pushed them into devastating wars.
The pe~~~~les will crush and bury imperialism.
Also confirmed were Rybkin and Grudir_ir~' s view that
nuclear war, like conventional war, would st~l1 be a
continuation ~f politics even though its usefulness
as an instrument for the implementation of policy had
become severely limited.
The publication of the January 1967 Red Star edi-
torial seemed to bring to an end, at least for a time,
the debate on the "nature of nuclear war." The logic
of the off icial line appeared to be:
-- Nuc l~~ar war, like all previous wars, would be
the "continuation of politics by violent means"; that
is, it would arise out of political causes--foremost
among them the immutably aggressive nature of impe-
rialism--and it has to be thought about and planned
for with a view toward a politically useful outcome,
not the mutual destruction of the opponents.
-- The politically meaningful outcome that Soviet
military planning should strive for is the victory of
the USSR and its allies no matter how extensive the
damage suffered.
-- It is therefore necessary, whatever the impedi-
ments, to strive fox a military posture--based especially
on strategic nuclear capabilities, both offensive and
defensive- -that has the greatest prospect of a~:ieving
some form of victory in nuclear war, and to ~.ssert, as
an article of faith, that military deficiencies on the
Consnunist .side would be offset by the political col-
lapse of t:he Western world in a nuclear conflict.
These military authorities were clearly arguing
for overal 1 expansion of Soviet strategic and other
* "Theory, Politics, Ideology on the Essence of War," Krasruzz~a
Zvezda, 24 January 1967. IU.1rushchev on occasion used this same
formulation, which falls short of an explicit claim 'chat the
USSR would defeat the US in a nuclear war. In the recent debate,
Rear Adm. 5helyag again evoked the "people's" initiative.
(See "Two World Outlooks--Z'wo Views on War," Kra snaz~a Zvezda,
7 February 1 974.)
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military capabilities, and rejecting any notion that
Soviet strategic efforts could be limited to acquiring
a minimum deterrent that would only punish an aggressor
but not defeat him.
How Soviet political leaders viewed this doctrinal
matter is not altogether clear. They obviously ap-
proved the Soviet buildup of strategic arms that began
about 1965. No doubt some of them endorsed the doc-
trinal views promulgated ~n Soviet mi~.itary organ .
Others may not have, but took the view ~~hat a massive
strategic buildup was necessary to provide a reliable
well-over-minimum deterrent within an overall stra-
tegic posture that was quantitatively competitive with
that of US forces and politically sufficient to the
needs of a great power. The humiliation of the Cuba;
crisis and the buildup of US strategic forces in tae
early sixties lent urgency to this requirement, quite
independent of doctrinal rationalizations.
In any case, the debate over the "essence of
nuclear war" c?id not entirely disappear. In March
1968 the journal Problems of PhiZosop hz~ carried an
article by A. I. Krylov, claiming that mankind was
being confronted by the choice between survival or
extinction.* Krylov cited such luminaries as Chair-
man of the USSR Council of 1Kinisters Alexey Kosygin,
Soviet philosopher P. N. Fedoseyev, Italian Communist
Party leader Palmiro Togliatti, and American scientist
Linus Pauling, on the suicidal nature of nuclear war.
The leading powers, Krylov warned, had already accumu-
lated enough nuclear weapons to "annihilate the
population of the Earth." Military s trategy, Krylov
emphasized, would have to be subordinated to a "politi-
cal strategy of preventing a world thermonuclear
catastrophe."
The only known response to Krylov's assertions ap-
peared in the restricted ~~ersion of Mi Z i tart' Thought .
* "October and the Strategy ~f Peace," Vopro sz~ FiZosofii, No. 3,
March 1968.
** The Question of the Sociological Aspect of the Struggle Against
the Forces of Aggression and War," Voz~ennar~a NysZ', No. 9, September
1968. This publication is a limited-circulation journal for com-
missioned officers of the Soviet armed forces.
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Maj. Gen K. Bochkarev attacked Krylov's "death of
civilization" thesis point by point. Bochkarev argued
that Krylov's position was riddled with inconsistencies
and that official adoption of his interpretation of
nuclear war as a matual suicide pact would make it
impossible to prepare a meaningful strategy for victory.
This "no victor" the~;is would, it was claimed, u:dermine
efforts to raise the military's combat readiness and
its morale. Although Bochkarev posited a future nuclear
war as mankind's "greatest tragedy" he firmly denied
that it woulc? be an "absolute catastrophe."
Bochkarev proffered the opinion that the outcome
of a nuclear war would depend on the ability of the
combatants to utilize the findings of their respective
scientific and technical communities during peacetime
to "improve the means of mass destruction as well as
to work out procedures, methods, and means for protec-
tion against them, and to paralyze the destructive
effects of these means on the human organism." Im-
perialism and not socialism would disappear in the
abyss of nuclear war. Despite such optimism, Bochkarev
assured his readers that this Soviet position in no way
represented a preference for war over peace. On the
contrary, the possibility that the Soviets could com-
pletely and decisively defeat "the military machine
of the imperialist states" served to bolster Soviet
efforts to avoid a nuclear war.
Krylov and Bochkarev produced two of the more
obvious arguments over the pros and cons of a deter-
rence-only doctrine. Krylov seemed to be arguing in
favor of some variant of minimal deterrence and was
perhaps making an early case for detente and arms
negotiations with the West, while Bochkarev opted for
the development of a war-winning capability. The
appearance of Krylov's article mare than three years
after Khrushchev's removal testifies to the tenacity
of the issues in dispute. It probably is related in
same way to the doctrina'. sorting-out that had t.o take
place as Soviet leaders deliberated on the prospect.
of SALT negotiations with the US. Those sharing
Krylov's view surely welcomed the coming negotiations.
Those of Maj. Gen. Bochkarev's persuasion may or may
not have resisted them, but they were clezrly concerned
that Soviet doctrine on nucle