MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEFENSE POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000700080005-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 17, 1999
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: March 1, 1975
• Content Type: IR

I ~ ~ ~ .. ~~ved for Release ~l~lO~fyCI~~~T04808R000700080005.3
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~nents ~r~ ~C hina I mprications
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Intelligence Report
Militar~- Developments in China:
Implications for Defense Policy
~~
SR i R 75-4
March 1975
11?
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 01459
Exempt from general declassification schec!ule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
? 58(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically doclassificd on:
Date Impossible to Dolermine
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Military Developments in Chir.a: Implications
for Defense ?olicy
Principal Conclusions*
Since '1971 and the demise of Defense Minister Lin Piao, several changes in
China's defense programs and policies have become evident. These include a sub-
stantial slowdown in production and deployment programs for aircraft and surface-
to-air missiles; aleveling-off of strategic missile, naval, and ground force weapons
procurement; a renewed effort to limit the authority of military leaders in party and
government circles; and a reallocation of some resources from defense to civilian
industries.
Viewed in retrospect, political, economic, and military factors appear to have
prompted Peking to begin a major reassessment of its foreign and military policy
about 1959. Internally, the Cultural Revolution had left China with serious un-
resolved problems. Internationally, the US clearly was developing an entirely new
policy for the Far East, whicl~ could be expected to include some move toward
rapprochement with China. At the same time, the Soviet Union had replaced the US
as China's principal threat.
By 1971 China had created a modest nuclear strike force and sizable ground
and air forces that appeared sufficient to deter a Soviet attack. Moreover, the
developing Sino-US relationship reduced the chances of military moves against China
by either tine US or the USSR. Thus, the times appeared propitious for a new
political-military policy geared to China's perception of a new, less menacing
environment in eastern Asia.
This study reviews the implications of the policy changes that the Chinese have
been implementing for the past five years, to provide insights into their strategic
thinking and discern likely developments in their military forces and programs.
- In China's view, strategic sufficiency can be achieved by a combination
of military power and diplomatic maneuvering. Improved Sino-US re-
lations, with its hoped-for deterrent effect on the USSR, may in part
have prompted Peking to build its nuclear strike force more slowly than
originally planned for the seventies.
- Peking evidently presumes that its small nuclear force already constitutes
a deterrent to Soviet strategic attack, and expects that China's massive
conventional forces will discourage nonnuclear attacks by any nation.
- China will pose no direct military threat to the US at least through this
decade.
China's shift of resources from defense to civilian industries constitutes a
long-term commitment that would inhibit the resumption of rapid pro-
"The Defense Intelligence Agency and some analysts in CIA take exception to the conclusions of
this report. Their reservations are noted in the Annex.
SR I R 75-4
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curement rates if Peking were tp perceive renewed military threats.
Despite cutbacks in arms procurement, China will remain a dominant
Asian military power as its forces continue to receive modest increments
in equipment.
China's current policy is founded on the existing power balance and
carries an implicit commitment to restraint. Peking's military' initiatives
probably will continue to be selected judiciously to provide moderate
gains at low risk and to avoid a direct challenge to US or Soviet vitas
interests.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
March 1975
Military Developments in Chir_a:
Implications for Defense Policy
Introduction
Since 1969 many significant developments--political,
economic, military, and diplomatic--have rad implica-
tions for China's defense policy and the state of its
armed forces. Some of the most important of these
events are:
Political
-- Reduction of the involvement of the armed
forces in politics and other nonmilitary
activities after the Cultural Revolution.
-- The fall of Defense Minister Lin Piao and
removal of leading defense officials.
-- The rotation of eight military region com-
manders and the termination of many of their
nonmilitary duties.
-- The appointment of civilian cadres to be
army chief of staff and to head the General
Political Department.
Comments and queries regarding this report are welcome.
They may be directed to of the Eastern Forces 25X1A9a
Division, Office of Strategic Research, code 143, exten-
sion 6926.
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--
A reduction in the level of defense
ment; a halt in the growth of most
production programs.
procure-
weapon
--
Emphasis on development. of the civilian
economy and importation of industrial plants
and technology.
Military
-- A recognition of the USSR as the foremost
military threat; the shift of more forces
toward the northern border in response to
the Soviet buildup.
-- A substantial reduction in output of nuclear
de_ivery vehicles despite a buildup in produc-
tion facilities for nuclear weapon materials.
-- A continuation of weapon research and devel-
opment generally at a measured, unhurried
pace, but no cor_struction starts for long-
range missile deployment.
-- An increase of military training within the
armed forces after the Cultural Revolution.
Diplomatic
-- A rapid reduction of US forces in Southeast
Asia.
-- The promulgation of the Shanghai Communique,
and the opening of a new era of Sino-US detente.
-- The seating of China by the UN.
There is little room for argument about the facts
of the foregoing events, but the way in which they
affect military policy and force capabilities is sub-
ject to various interpretations. The thesis of this
memorandum is that the Chinese have instituted basic
changes in their military policy, which is now notably
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different from the policy held through most of the
sixties. These changes suggest that China has adopted
a less menacing posture toward the US and will be less
likely to enga-fie in a rapid buildup of strategic and
conventional arms.
An alternative exp)_anation is subscribed to by
some analysts in CIA and by DIA. They conclude that
China has not made any fundamental changes in its
policy but rather is maktin.g temporary adjustments in
its military programs and that Peking still has strong
incentives to continue to develop and produce arms in
greater quantities--particularly its ICBMs and the
SLBM. Their view is outlined in the annex.
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Page
Signs of Change
5
Slowdown in Weapons Procurement
6
New Percepti~,n of External Forces
8
Political, Budgetary, and Other Factors
11
Implicatons of Current Military Policy
14
Annex: An Alternative Interpretation
17
Grap}?s
Estimated Costs of Chinese Military
Procurement
7
China's Military Procurement and
Total Industrial Production
9
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Signs of Change
Harbingers of .a change in status for the Chinese
military forces appeared in 1969 as the destructive
phase of the Cultural Revolution ended. Cadres of
the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA)~were admonished to
hold correct political views and to shun arrogance.
Many were also ordered to relinquish their nonmilitary
posts and return to the barracks. Since that time,
civilian party leaders have been phasing the PLA out
of civil government and politics, and there has been
a marked emphasis on professional military matters
and training.
Irrespective of the political background to this
change, there were, in 1969, compelling military
reasons to get the army back to soldiering. The So-
viet invasion of CzechosloJakia, the promulgation of
the "Brezhnev Doctrine," and the Ussuri River clashes
all underscored a growing Soviet tizreat. Peking ac-
cordingly reoriented and enlarged the ground forces
in northern China and continued to increase the levels
of military production. China's need to respond mili-
tarily to the Soviet threat may have come at a for-
tuitous time for those who were concerned over the
growing PLA influence in the political sphere. What-
ever the initial motivation, military influence in
the party and government was purposefully reduced
of ter 1969 and that practice has continued.
A major turning poin:`_ appears to have occurred
in late 1971, at about th~~ time of the demise of
Defense Minister Lin Piao and the purge of his close
associates. By that time, the likelihood of a Soviet
attack had diminished and heavy expenditures for
military programs may have been challenged. Mili-
tary opposition to a cutback in procurement and
resistance by some military elements who were reluc-
tant to see the armed forces lose their preeminence in
party .and government circles may have helped pre-
cipitate the Lin crisis. In retrospect it appears
that the decision to put tighter reins on the military
may have created conditions permitting a fresh assess-
ment of military programs and policy for the first
time in many years.
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Slowdown in Weaoons Procureme'^t
Basic Chinese military polic1~ at the close of
the sixties called for an ever-increasing buildup of
conventional and nuclear forces for deterring attack.
The Soviet Union and the United States were the main
enemies, with the threat from the north daily becoming
of increasing concern. Following the Sino-Soviet
border clash in 1969 the USSR was identified as the
principal enemy, and China's military production
effort mounted sharply.
The first firm sign of a fundamental change in
this policy of growth became evident in 1972, when
overall military procurement, as measured in US dollars,
declined by more than 25 percent from that of 1971.
Since then, procurement has remained steady at the
new lower levels (See graphs at right.) The slow3own
in weapon programs since 1971 has had these results:
-- Fighter aircraft production has dropped by
75 percent, and the SAM defense network has
expanded very slowly.
-- Bomber production is very low and may have
ceased.
Airfield construction starts have dropped
sharply from the level that had been main-
tained over the preceding eight years.
-- No new fixed missile sites are known to have
been started (although there may be continuing
slow deployment of semimobile launch units).
Deployment of the 3,000-3,200-mile nominal
ICBM has been limited and may have stopped,
with only three known launch silos now ap-
proaching operational status.
No operational site construction has yet been
detected for the 6,000-7,000--mile ICBM (the
only one that could strike the western USSR
or the continental US) which has been under
development since 1967.
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Estimated costs
of Chin~s~= n:ilitary~ proc~orament*
index 1969=100
secret
eeDloo 2-76 C:A
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-- P rocurement for the ground and naval forces
has leveled off generally, and some important
programs have been stopped or appreciably
slowed .
-- O ther developmental programs--particularly
those for the SSJ3N, its related missile, and
follow-on fighter aircraft--appear to have
slowed appreciably.
Two factors suggest that the lower levels of mili-
tary procurement represent a pronounced departure from
previous military policy and strategic planning in
China. F first, Peking has expended an enormous amount
of resources since the late fifties to develop new
facilities for producing weapon-grade nuclear mate-
rials. The size of these facilities, which are
reaching operational status, suggests that Peking
previously had an ambitious plan to develop a sub-
stantial arsenal of nuclear weapons. Now, just as
these facilities can support a much higher demand for
nuclear weapons, it is apparent that the Chinese have
slowed, rather than accelerated, the procurement of
delivery vehicles. This strongly supports the inter-
pretation that an earlier decision to push ahead
rapidly i n the advanced weapons field was subsequently
modified. Second, the drop in procurement, occurring
at a time of rising industrial production, dramatically
altered the relationship between military procurement
and industrial output that had prevailed in China since
the early sixties. (See graph at right.)
In retrospect, the earlier deemphasis of military
influence in the political sphere following the Cul-
tural Revolution could be interpreted as the result
of the PLA's return to soldiering, hence only an un-
certain signal of change, but the sharp reduction
in weapons procurement after 1971 appears more clearly
to reflect a reassessment of military priorities.
New Perception of External Forces
From the Chinese perspective, the outside world
in the seventies must appear very different from that
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China's military procurement and
total indl~.~strial producti?n*
250
Index 1965=100 ,
1961 62 63 64 65 66 67 G8 69 70 71 72 73 74
?The Indlca;ed level of military procurement In 1974 is based on preliminary data.
Note' because of methodological differences In the preparation of data
for military procurement and total Industrial production, this chart should be treated
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25X1 C
of the sixties. This difference first began to ma-
terialize in 1969 with the serious Sino-Soviet border
confrontation and President Nixon's pronouncement of
the Guam Doctrine. By 1971 both the Soviets and the
Chinese had shifted substantial numbers of military
units to the border areas. In contrast, the outlines
of a Sino-American rapprochement had been unveiled in
the Sino-US talks in Warsaw and the Kissinger trip to
Peking to plan the China visit of the President.
China's admission to the United Nations and the
Shanghai Communique ended Peking's isolation and
relegated Taipei to the diplomatic sidelines. The
cease-fire in Indochina and the beginnings of a US
military withdrawal from Asia helped to promote the
Sino-US detente.
Tl.ese developments suggest that from 1969 onward
there was a growing need for the Chinese to reassess
their policies. Indeed, 25X1C
in 1969 China had already acknowledged
the Soviet Union as the primary external enemy. In
the course of the ensuing policy reviews, Peking
apparently determined to use the Sino-US detente as
a counterweight to the Soviet threat--nuclear or con-
ventional. Adoption of such a strategy would open up
a wide range of policy options, both economic and
military.
The Chinese leadership could well feel confident
in an assessment of this type. They had created by
1971 a retaliatory nuclear capability ready for use
against the USSR, although capable of striking tar-
gets only in eastern Siberia. Some 11 or 12 opera-
tional missile sites were deployed in the northeast
quadrant of China. These were supplemented by a
force of 30 TU-16 bombers. Peking could rightly
. figure that the likelihood of a Soviet surgical
strike against China's nuclear facilities had been
greatly reduced. Moreover, the Chinese probably
believed that the newly positioned ground forces in
the northern military regions could defend against
any conceivable Soviet conventional invasion force.
Lastly, the traditional Soviet concern for Europe
remaine~3 a factor constraining the scope of Soviet
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actions in relation to China. Thus China's leader-
ship could conclude that the times allowed some re-
duction in direct military expenditures.
Political, Budgetary, and Other Factors
The internal power equation in China today also
differs greatly from that of the sixties. Lin Piao,
former minister of defense and designated successor
to Mao, died in September 1971, reportedly after the
failure of an attempt to assassinate Mao and seize
control of the government. Several of Lin's close
associates fell with him, including the PLA chief of
staff, the head of the air force, and the political
commissar of the navy. Military representation on
the Central Committee has also dropped appreciably.
By the end of 1973 the leadership was in a position
to shift eight of China's 11 military region com-
manders to new regional commands, and in all cases
to take away their most important provincial party
and government posts. More recently, civilians were
selected for the posts of PLA chief of staff and head
of the General Political Department. With diminished
authority in the regions and at the censer, the mili-
tary establishment has clearly lost the preeminent
position it enjoyed in the post - Cultural RevolutioYi
period and probably exerts less influence today in
policymaking.
There is a striking temporal correlation between
the fall of Lin Piao in 1971 and the manifestations
of a slowdown in arms procurement. The fact that
China's air arm has been heavily affected by this
new policy is probably also significant, as the air
force was implicated in the Lin "coup."
These circumstances suggest three conclusions
which, while not easily proven, are logically consis-
tent with the evidence at hand:
-- Full implementation of the new policy prob-
ably required the removal of Lin's proteges
from the political scene.
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-- The fact that efforts to reduce the military's
influence began in 1969 but gathered .steam
later on strongly suggests that military ele-
ments which had coalesced around Lin resisted
the move toward a reduced political role for
the PLA. Controversy over this move may have
been a factor in bringing the Lin crisis to
a head.
-- China.'s arms procurement policy since 1971
suggests that, in some areas at least, an
element of retaliation against segments of
the military establishment considered polit-
ically unreliable has been at work.
If some military elements resisted the change to
a slower rate of military buildup, they may have done
so not only on strictly military grounds but also
because control of a large share of China's economic
resources obviously gave the PLA additional political
muscle. Conversely, China's civilian leaders prob-
ably believed not only that a change in military
policy was consistent with China's new international
position, but also that by restricting the military
budget the political ~.nfluence of the military estab-
lishment could be curbed as well. Arguments along
these lii!es may not yet have died away completely;
recent propaganda suggests that China`s civilian
leaders still find it necessary to assert the cor-
rectness of the present division of resources.
In a wider sense, the high costs of, and compe-
tition for, resources--both skilled manpower and
materials--also supported a policy change. The recent
Chinese emphasis on developing agriculture and ci-
vilian industry bears this out. The Chinese, more-
over, are purchasing industrial equipment--especially
fertilizer, petroleum extraction, petrochemical, and
steel ?plants--from the technologically advanced
nations of the Free World.
The germinatiuzi of this import program seems to
have paralleled the transition to a new military
policy and may 'nave been an early reflection of the
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reassessment of priorities. In 1972-1973 alone, the
known value of industrial plants purchased abroad
amounted to 1.2 billion US dollars. These facili-
ties will eventually draw on some of the same re-
sources as does weapons production, hence long-range
planning for resource allocations must have had some
role in the reduction of weapons procurement.
The obsolescence of China's military equipment
then being produced also may have supported arguments
for a reduction of procurement, Most Chinese weapon
systems are based on Soviet designs of the mid-fifties.
Technological problems may account in part for the
nonappearance of new weapon systems, Scientific and
technological training, which was disrupted during
the Cultural Revolution, still has not fully recovered,
and there is increasing evidence of difficulties in
the management of research and development programs
throughout the country. Some weapon development pro-
grams are under way--new fighter and amphibious air-
craft, the long-range ICBM, and probably an SLBM
system. In each case, however, the development has
been under way for some time and the pace of the
program seems unhurried and deliberate, and there
is no clear evidence of related production programs.
In sum, it appears likely that Peking's current
policy is based on the belief that detente and de-
terrence have together eased the threat to China
from either superpower. Peking appears to presume
that the USSR would not wish to initiate a nuclear
attack against China because of the unknown degree
of retaliation from China's surviving strategic
farces and the fear of a US reaction. The slowdown
of China's missile deployment suggests that Peking
is satisfied that in the present environment rela-
tively few missiles are sufficient. To discourage
a conventional attack, the Chinese clearly expect to
maintain their large military forces, Finally, the
Chinese have launched a propaganda campaign to depict
themselves as a lesser military concern to the USSR
than are the US and its NATO allies. They have warned
the Western nations that the USSR is "making a feint
in the East while attacking in the West."
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Under these circumstances, China's leaders p-ahably
feel that some slowdown of defensA procurement--pai?-
ticularly in strategic weapons--will not materially
endanger national security. The resources thus saved
can eventually be used to strengthen China's civilian
economy--an important strategic factor in its own right.
Implications of Current Military Policy
Apparently we are now seeing some results of a
basic reassessment of China's foreign and military
policies that will have long-term effects. The
strategic "use" of the US to counter the USSR appears
to be a basic policy goal of a China that now seems
committed to a more deliberate buildup of arms and
poses no direct military threat to the US, at least
through the remainder of this decade. Furthermore,
Peking's new policy of procuring strategic weapons
more slowly than previously planned could diminish
the relative significance of the Chinese threat in
Soviet military planning. China's civilian leaders--
Mao in particular--may believe, in fact, that the
current slow rate of deployment of strategic weapons
will keep Soviet anxieties about the threat from
China well below the flash point. This in turn makes
it possible to maintain Sino-Soviet poZiticaZ tension
at a high level without undue risk of war. This
cautious approach to the problem of missile deployment
turns Lin Piao's alleged argument--that political ten-
sions with Moscow must be reduced while procurement
of strategic arms presumably goes ahead at full speed
--on its head.
Indeed, there is diminishing substance to the
Soviets' argument that they face a serious buildup
of forces in the East, as the Chinese will be in no
position to initiate hostilities against the USSR
for some years to come. But neither will the Chi-
nese abandon their territorial claims and their
avowals of political orthodoxy in the world Communist
movement. They will continue to maintain a vigilant
military posture along the border. Sino-Soviet dif-
ferences--particularly over the issues of territory
and orthodoxy--are not directly involved in the
SSF.~~E~'
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present slowdown of weapons procurement. Tacitly,
however, such a slowdown could work to ease the ten-
sions in Sino-Soviet relations after Mao's departure.
Despite a policy of restricting military procure-
ment, China continues to improve and modernize its
forces and is determined to remain a dominant mili-
tary power in eastern Asia. Because the success of
the present policy would be best assured by restraint
on its part, however, China's attitude toward its
Asian neighbors will piobably coiztinue to be cautious.
As its forces expand and improve--even with the slow-
down, China's growing naval prowess is noteworthy--
we should anticipate a more forward posture in rela-
tion to areas considered to be Chinese territory.
Traditionally, these areas include large portions of
the South and East China Seas, Taiwan, and certain
disputed border territories along China's southern
border. We can expect the Chinese to undertake cer-
tain low-risk military actions--for example, that in
the Paracels in early 1974--for moderate gains.
China's decision to shift resources to civilian
industries appears to constitute a long-term commit-
ment that cannot readily be reversed. China is un-
likely to stop plant importation in mid-stage or to
adopt foreign or military policies that would en-
danger that program and the dividends it promises.
Meanwhile, some existing weapon plants cannot easily
increase production without a lengthy start-up period;
this is particularly so for strategic missiles. Con-
struction of a fixed missile site; moreover, would
require two to three years from start to operational
status, and a force buildup would take at least five
years to make a meaningful difference in the threat
to the US or the USSR. On the other hand, production
programs for such general purpose force weapon systems
as fighter aircraft, tanks, and armored personnel
carriers could almost certainly be increased signifi-
cantly in a relatively short period--perhaps less
than a year. This capability was illustrated in the
high production rates achieved in the aftermath of
the Cultural Revolution. As time goes by, however,
an upsurge in programs to produce obsolescent weapon
systems becomes less likely.
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There is no evidence that the Chinese have trans-
ferred emphasis from military procurement to R&D.
Our information on the military R&D effort is frag-
mentary but the available evidence suggests that
developmental work continues to move ahead slowly
and steadily on a broad front, much as it has in the
past. Peking is preparing for future nuclear tests,
and developmental work continues on selected stra-
tegic systems and weapons fir conventional forces,
but there is no indication of higher (or lower)
priority. In general, it seems likely that progress
in military research and development will continue
at a relatively slow pace over the foreseeable future.
The present general ordering of military versus
civilian priorities probably will persist through
this decade even if Mao passes from the scene. This
is because the~most important bases of this ordering--
the cost and difficulty of a more am~?~tious strategic
weapons effort and the urgency of China's need to
modernize and increase its agricultural and indus-
trial production capacity--will continue to be con-
trolling factors through this decade and beyond.
Because China has a population about four times that
of the US, even the projection of a conservative 2
percent annual growth in population means that China
must be prepared to feed, house, and clothe an addi-
tional 200 million people within the next decade.
This challenge is the greater because of the rela-
tively small industrial base and because China has
only about half as much arable land as that avail-
able in the US.
In future Chinese reassessments of military
policy, however, international considerations will
undoubtedly remain a predominant factor. So long
as the status quo is preserved--with China facing
no other military rivals except a nonthreatening US
and an intransigent USSR--there is a high likelihood
that China's policy of restricting weapons procure-
ment in favor of industrial development will continue.
Major changes in the status quo, however--such as a
resurgent, rearmed Japan or a belligerent, nuclear-
ar-?,d India--could induce the Chinese to divert
resources once again toward the development and
production of weapons.
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An Alternative Interpretation
The alternative view presented in this annex--
one shared by DIA as well as by some CIA analysts--
is that the Chinese did not institute basic changes
in military and foreign policy in the early seventies.
The dissenters believe the data at hand do not indi-
cate that the long-range goals represented in the
military policy of China's leaders have changed sig-
nificantly. Neither do they believe that China's
foreign policy rlow views a wary dete~ite with the US
as necessarily a song-term factor in the Sino-Soviet
power balance.
Grounds for Dissent. The more general grounds of
the dissenting vie~a include a timing problem caused
by the dating--implicit in this paper--of critical
decision points. For example, it is entirely possible
that Lin Piao was in no position to influence events
in China after the fall of 1970. Yet the preceding
analysis suggests that changes in military production
goals could not be made until after his death in the
fall of 1971. Perhaps more to the point, however,
is the fact that it is difficult to place a reason-
ably definite date on the alleged policy changes. In
any event, 1969 seems early for any major shift,
whereas 1972, as indicated, could postdate Lin Piao's
loss of influence by as much as two years.
From the more particu~ar standpoint of military
analysis, the lowez levels of weapon procurement
noted since 1971 do not appear to represent the end
result of a significant change in military policy.
Reduced hardware procurement has been almost entirely
the result of Peking's terminating or drastically
cutting back production in four aircraft procrams.
These program cuts account for about 80 percent of
total procurement savings. In particular, it is the
drop in one--the MIG-19 program--?from a monthly rate
of 50 in 1971 to the current rate of 15 per month
that provides the cornerstone of the assertion that
the Chinese have shifted military priorities.
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Aircraft Issue. There are two major problems in
citing the drop in aircraft production as indicative
of an across-the-board trend. First, all the aircraft
cut back are of 1950s design--not obsolete, but in-
adequate by modern standards. In the case of an im-
mediate threat, such as that perceived from the Soviet
Union in the early seventies, the Chinese would logi-
cally ha?re emphasized production of military equip-
ment that could be quickly added to the inventory.
As the threat, or perceived threat, of imminent
attack receded, however, so too would the impetus to
produce out-of-date equipment. The Chinese, moreover,
now have what they may well consider to be an adequate
inventory of M1G-19s (about 2,000 in operational units)
and are making at leas some effort to design and pro-
du~~e more modern aircraft. Admittedly the program
is slow, but the Chinese evidently lack the breadth
of technological know-1^.ow to proceed faster.
Second, the Chinese are still building aircraft
at all but one of their plants, although production has
tapered off at each. Thus they retain the potential
for expansion of production at any time.
Other Programs. Savings achieved by possible
reduction of other programs probably have been eco-
nomically insignificant--for example, the armored
personnel carrier program. In the case of air defense
equipment, on the other hand, antiaircraft artillery
is now being observed in increasing quantities and
there is evidence that the Chinese are resuming the
deployment of surface-to-?air missiles around Peking.
As for the rate of deployment of strategic missiles,
either concern for force targetability and vulner-
ability or dissatisfaction with the CSS-X-3 could
have caused Peking to abandon temporarily the con-
struction of additional missile silos by mid-1970--
more than a year prior to Lin's demise. Technical
difficulties or an overrating of Chinese capabi._ities
may well account for the fact that weapon R&1D pro-
grams are not progressing as rapidly as intelligence
analysts expected earlier.
On balance, the current status of Peking's mili-
tary devei.opment and production programs permits the
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continuing buildup of most conventional armaments
along well established lines and at peak rates
achieved in 1971. This is a reasonable course in
view of what appears to be a continuing though slow
growth in the size of the army. Moreover, China's
current military programs are consistent with the
continued development and deployment of strategic
delivery systems such as the SLBM or "semimobile"
land-based systems--and these systems, as well as
future silo-based systems such as the CSS-X-4, prob-
ably will continue to be developed and deployed at
whatever pace Chinese technology and resources permit.
Finally, reduction or near termination of production
programs could not retrieve much of the investment
costs embodied in military plants or release much
highly specialized equipment and human talent for
use in the civilian sector. Nor does it constitute
a commitment against speedily reinstituting produc-
tion of military equipn'ient in available, if only
partially active, military-industrial facilities.
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