CHINESE POLITICS AND THE SINO-SOVIET-US TRIANGLE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170030-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 6, 2008
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: August 1, 1975
• Content Type: RS

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Tap Secret
Research Study
Chinese Politics
and the Sino-Soviet- CIS Trian qle
State Dept. review completed
NSA review completed
Top Secret
25X1 25X1
August 1975
Copy
N2 97
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
`FFICE OF POLITICAL RESEARCH
August 1975
CHINESE POLITICS AND THE SINO-SOVIET-US
TRIANGLE
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FOREWORD
This study examines Chinese policy toward both the Soviet Union
and the US in the critical period since 1968 when tl. 2 current contours
of the Sino-Soviet-US triangle began to emerge. It focuses on the
complex and interrelated problems of how ;'.:e domestic political
struggle within China influenced the conduct 'f Chinese foreign
policy and how changes in the international envir,,nment have shaped
the course of Chinese domestic politics. While it s generally accepted
that there is an intimate relationship between he domestic politics
and foreign policy of modern nations, no study exists which system-
atically investigates this difficult problem witn regard to Chinese
politics and Chinese policy toward the two superpowers since 1968.
Part I sets forth a series of general propositions and describes an
experimental conceptual framework which is based largely on the
"bureaucratic politics" approach to foreign policy analysis. Part II
uses this hamework to reconstruct the Sino-Soviet crisis of 1969, a
major turning point in Sino-Soviet relations nd in the transformation
of Chinese policy toward the US. Part III ',,ruses on the relationship
between foreign policy issues and the fall of Lin Piao and his sup-
porters in 1971, another key event which cared the way for further
progress toward the normalization of Sine US relations. Part IV dis-
cusses the prospects and implications for he US. The focus through-
out is on the basic forces at work within Chinese politics which have
been influential during the period of leadership by Chairman Mao
Tse-tung, and which are likely to continue to shape China's domestic
and foreign policies in a post-Mao era.
It should be noted that this study is experimental and its judgments
are often highly interpretive and speculative. While it attempts to
synthesize a considerable amount of material, some of it only recently
available, the study is not intended to be a definitive history of the
subject. Indeed, on the basis of the evidence now available no defini-
tive account is possible no matter what approach to the problem is
taken. It is hoped that the study will stimulate thought and discussion
of the issues involved among those concerned with the subject and
lead to a re-examination (using this and other research approaches)
of the critical areas of disagreement which emerge.
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CONTENTS
Page
FOREWORD ..................... ....................... .......... iii
PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS ........................................... 1
THE DISCUSSION . .. .......................... ...... ... ....... 5
1. INTRODUCTION: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND
METHODOLOGY ...................... ........ .... .. .... 5
Overview .................. 5
......................................
A. Status Sensitivity .............................................. 5
B. Policy Clusters and Coalitions ............................ ... . 6
C. Methodology: A "Bureaucratic Politics" Approach .... ..... ...... 9
D. The Players ............... .................................. 10
II. TURNING POINT: THE 1969 CRISIS IN SINO-SOVIET
R ELATIO14S ... ............................................. 12
Overview ........................................................ 12
A. Traditional Explanations ........................... ........... 13
B. The Internal Setting ............................................ 14
C. Foreign Policy Differences ..................................... 15
D. Changes in the External Setting ........................... ..... 16
E. A Radical Counteroffensive ............................ ........ 17
F. Lin Piao and the Military ...................................... 18
G. Cancellation of the Warsaw Talks ................... ........... 19
H. Bureaucratic Politics and the 2 March Clash . .................... 20
1. Internal Politics and the Soviet Question .............. ........... 22
J. Aftermath ......................................... .......... 22
III. WATERSHED: THE FALL OF LIN PIAO ........................ 24
Overview .................................. 24
............ ........
A. Traditional Explanations ....................................... 25
B. Foreign Policy Differences ..................................... 26
C. Policy Issues and Power ........................................ 29
D. Resource Allocation ........................................... 30
E. Internal Politics and the Soviet Question ........................ 33
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US ........................... ....... 33
A. The "Collusion" Theme as a Key Indicator ....................... 33
B. The Level of Tension .......................................... 3.5
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1. Alternatives for Enhancing China's Power and Status ................... 7
2. Two Models for Analyzing Foreign Policy 9
Page
FIGURES
Damansky Island 12
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PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS
From the time that an opening to the US was first seriously con-
sidered as a policy option in Peking in 1968, this question and the
related question of the proper stance toward the Soviet Union, have
been bitterly divisive issues within the Chinese leadership. Indeed,
a protracted, disruptive, and ultimately violent realignment of domestic
political power within China was necessary before what came to be
called "Mao's revolutionary line in foreign policy" could be imple-
mented.
During this process of realignment, there were two events which
marked major turning points: the Sino-Soviet border crisis of 1969
and the internal upheaval that led to the fall of Defense Minister Lin
Piao and most of China's top central military leaders in September
1971. During the first of these, Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Premier
Chou En-lai resorted to provoking a serious crisis with the USSR
primarily in order to influence the course of the struggle for power
within China and the overall direction of China's foreign policy.
During the second, Lin and his supporters attempted to seize power
rather than accept the transformation of China's domestic and foreign
policy that was underway in 1971. While the 1969 crisis did not im-
mediately halt the march toward increased influence and power of
Lin and his supporters, it did slow it to some degree, as well as
provide a powerful rationale for future steps to improve Sino-US
relations. And while the fall of Lin Piao did not end the power and
influence of the military in Chinese politics, it did diminish it enough
both to clear the way for progress in Sino-US relations and to reorder
China's priorities in the key areas of military expenditures and eco-
nomic modernization.
A reconsideration of these events and of the course of subsequent
Chinese policy suggests the following insights into the patterns of
interaction between domestic politics and foreign policy in China.
The intensity of the struggle within China's leadership over policy
toward the Soviet Union and the US reflects the f uct that foreign
policy issues have become intimately bound up with a number of
closely related domestic policy issues; these include the central problem
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of the proper strategy for enhancing China's power and prestige and
the closely linked problem of resource allocation. Even more basically,
the contention over foreign policy mirrors a struggle for political domi-
nance within China.
? Lin and elements within the military opposed the opening to
the US precisely because of what it implied in terms of resource
allocation and what that meant in terms of their influence a.-]
power. The increased sense of security that would grow out of
improved relations with the US, they reasoned quite correctly,
would lead to pressures for smaller military expenditures.
? They also saw that improved Sino-US relations would lead to
an expansion of the influence of their principal rival, Chou En-
lai's moderate coalition, a group that both favored this line in
foreign policy and stressed economic modernization rather than
military strength as the most effective means of enhancing China's
status and power in the world.
? Following Lin's fall, China's scarce resources were allocated
away from defense expenditures and toward economic develop-
ment, and Chou and his allies in the moderate coalition accel-
erated their march toward the strong position they now hold
in Chinese politics.
Tension in Sino-Soviet relations is in large measure a function of
the intensity of the internal power struggle within Peking.
o The March 1969 crisis, the most serious in the history of Sino-
Soviet relations, was an outgrowth of the jockeying for power
and related debates over foreign policy that preceded the Ninth
Party Congress (April 1969).
? Immediately following Lin's abortive 1971 coup, the civilian
leadership deliberately and systematically exaggerated the
threat of war with the Soviet Union to create a crisis atmosphere
conducive to party unity (luring a purge of pro-Lin military
figures.
? A similar escalation of expressed Chinese fears of a Soviet attack
came in conjunction with China's Tenth Party Congress in 1973,
when foreign policy issues re-emerged as a central element in
the intenial power struggle.
? Overall, tension in Sino-Soviet relations has declined since 1969,
because the extension of control by the moderate coalition has
produced a somewhat more stable internal situation and because
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the implementation of the moderates' foreign policy program
has resulted in a lessened sense of international isolation and a
decreaF-d feeling of vulnerability to the Soviet threat.
? Nevertheless, should there be a serious future challenge to the
moderate policy coalition, its leaders would be inclined to use
additional provocative acts against the Soviets or an anti-Soviet
propaganda campaign in order to exaggerate the external threat
for domestic political purposes.
Just as the internal power struggle has affected China's external
actions and policies, so changes in the external environment have had
an important impoct on the course of China's internal politics.
? The escalation of the Vietnam war undercut a trend toward
flexibility in China's foreign policy that had emerged in 1964
and 1965, and thereby set the stage for the xenophobic foreign
policy of the Cultural Revolution.
? Numerous events in 1968-the first indications of a possible
US disengagement from Indochina, the Soviet invasion of Czech-
oslovakia, and the election of a new administration in Wash-
ington-allowed moderates in China to argue that the inter-
national situation required steps toward decreasing tension with
the US.
? Chinese uncertainty about the direction of US policy in Indo-
china during 1970 and 1971 gave ammunition to the opponents
of an opening to the US and at one point the entire thrust of
this policy was called into question.
? The Nixon-Brezhnev summit meeting of 1973 and certain con-
comitant Soviet moves led to an intense internal debate within
China and renewed pressure on the moderates to alter China's
policy toward the US.
Future changes in the external environment in general and US
policy in particular are likely to have an important impact not only on
Chinese foreign policy but also on the course of politics within China.
? Any rapid or significant progress in Soviet-US relations unless
counterbalanced by offsetting US moves toward Peking would
lead to renewed debate within China over the wisdom of the
present course in foreign and domestic policy.
? A US action such as the establishment of full diplomatic rela-
tions with Peking could paradoxically lead to a further lessening
of Sino-Soviet tension since this would probably strengthen the
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moderates' hold on power, decrease their need to play up the
Soviet threat, and generally decrease Chinese frustrations re-
garding their nation's influence and recognition in the interna-
tional hierarchy.
? At the same time, full normalization of Sino-US relations would
probably strengthen the moderates enough to allow them to
imp!.ment pragmatic policies which could considerably expand
economic and other ties with the US and non-Communist coun-
tries generally. Expanded Chinese relations with the US would
by themselves sustain a certain level of tension in Sino-Soviet
relations, as would the continuing competition of the two Com-
munist powers for influence in Asia and elsewhere. To the degree
that expanded ties with the US provided additional technology
and greater resources which could be used to strengthen Chinese
military capabilities, these developments could over time de-
crease the differences between the civilian moderates and some
elements of the military, thus producing a more stable leader-
ship coalition in China with a vested interest in maintaining good
relations with the US.
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THE DISCUSSION
1. INTRODUCTION: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
AND METHODOLOGY
OVERVIEW
The opportunities and risks to the US in its
dealings with the USSR and China are heavily
eond:ticncd by the quality of relations between
the two Communist powers. Thus the prospects
for war, conciliation, or continued tension between
the two is one of the most critical issues facing
US foreign policy. It is at the same time one of the
most complex analytical problems facing the In-
telligence Community. The purpose of this intro-
duction is to elaborate a system tic conceptual
framework for interpreting the relationship between
Chinese politics and Chinese policy toward the
USSR and the US. The major goal is to identify
the basic patterns of Chinese politics, as they im-
pact on foreign policy, that would be likely to
endure in a post-bfao, post-Chou era.
At the core of this framework is the observation
that while all Chinese leaders are acutely conscious
of the need to enhance their nation's status and
power in world affairs, there has been serious and
protracted dissension over the optimum cluster of
domestic, economic, defense, and foreign policies
to pursue in order to do so. The basic assumption
is that these clusters, or policy alternatives, arc
supported by Chinese leaders representing bureau-
crc: irall y-based policy coalitions, and that the con-
tention for power and influence among these coali-
tions has shaved and is likely to continue to shape
the course of Chinese politics and foreign policy.
This framework and the subsequent analysis in
this study reflect what has come to be called the
"bureauc,atic politics" approach to foreign policy
analysis. It views the Chinese government not as
a rational monolith which makes foreign policy
decisions designed solely to optimize Chinese na-
tional interests, but rather as a number o com-
peting "players"; foreign policy is the political
outcome of the interplay and infighting among
these players, each of which tends to interpret the
national interest in terms of its own factional
interests.
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A. Status Sensitivity
Partly because of rational balance-of-power cal-
culations and partly because of the sensitivity of
leaders in Peking about China's status as a world
power, fear of Soviet domination has long been the
central issue of Chinese foreign policy and a key
to the dynamics of Chinese politics generally.
Chinese concern about an intolerable inconsistei,cv
between their own image of their proper role and
their actual ability to influence world politics
expl ns in good measure the de.ision to break
the bonds of economic and military dependet.cy
on the USSR of the 19.50s.? Indeed, the final break
in Sino-Soviet relations came in the early 1960s
when the Soviets refused to continue their aid to
China in developing its own nuclear weapons, the
single most convincing symbol of great power
s' atus, and when the Soviets publicized the size
'There is obviously a wide g^' between China's military
anu industrial achievements-relatively meager as comp'red
with the USSR and the US-and the massive size of its
territory ar,d population. This disparity, and the historical,
cultural, and ideological mind set which in the past made
the Chinese think of themselves as the "central" or the
"middle kingdom" of the world, account for China's ex-
treme sensitivity over its "status inconsi-tent" position in
world affLirs. The concept of status inconsistency was first
developed by soci? logists working in the field of social
stratification to explain individual and group behavior
within a society. According to the classic definition by
Mix Websr (Essays in Sociology, Oxford University Press,
1946), stctus goes beyond objective measures of achievement
and pow--r into such subjective areas as acceptance by key
groups within society. Further, if the individual's perceptions
of his own achievement and status do not correspond to the
status ascribed to him by society, he is in a "status in-
consistent" position. W'he-t situations occur which emphasize
the rap, the individual's psychological stress can cause
aggressive behavior.
In recent years, a small body of theoretical literature
in "interr,,,tional stratification" has carried the status in-
consistency theme into relations among nations. For example,
Johan Caltung ("A Structural Them y of Aggression,"
Journal (, ' Peace Research, 1964, pp. 95-119) interprets
Germany's behavior before World War I in terms of the
gap between its military and industrial capability and
its perception of denied prestige as measured by the pos-
session of a large overseas empire. The most comprehensive
book ?,n the subject is Michael David Wallace, War and
Rank Among Nations (1973).
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of China's debt for economic aid, an act which
infuriated the Chinese because it demean,d their
status and flaunted before world opinion their
dependence on the Soviet Union.
Since then, most Chinese decision makers have
remained acutely concerned about the need to
reduce the power advantage held by the USSR,
in order both to relieve the threat of Soviet pressure
and to enhance China's authority as a world power.
There has, ho%-ever, been bitter conte-ition among
Chinese leaders over the optimum cluster of po-
litical, economic, defense, and foreign policies to
pursue to achieve these ends.
B. Policy Clusters .:nd Coalitions
For analytical purposes, three alternative policy
clusters can be identified, and for e ach of these,
a policy coalition, which seeks to promote the ele-
ments of the cluster not only to influence policy
but also to contend for political power. These
p,Aicy cl,isters and coaiitions, though obviously
simplified for analytical purposes, are nonetheless
believed to be reasonably accurate in their repre-
sentation of the basic general ten3encies in the
complex Chinese political sc_uc. Indeed, much of
the course of Chinese politics since 1968 can be
explained by reference to the struggle for power
ar.d influence among the coalitions.`
'There is increasing recognition among specialists in
Chinese affairs that a new and systematic analytical frame-
work is needed. On this point Professors Michel Oksenberg
and Steven Goldstein argue in the March-April 1975 issue
of Problems of Cwmmunism that the study of Chinese poli-
tics is at a "cr iseroads," and that "the governing models
of the past . . . have been tested and found wanting." In
their article, "The Chinese Political Spectrum," Problems of
Communism, March-April 1974, Oksenberg and Goldstein
present a new a salytical frarne?.vor!. which focuses on
'opinion clusters' in Chinese intellectual history as they
relate to the questions of how China should respond to
the West and the challenge of economic modernization.
In contrast to Oksenberg-Goldstein, another new approach
developed by Michael Pillsbury of the RAND Corporation
focuses not on ideas or issues, but rather on the patterns
of Chinese power struggles ("ratterns of e'linese Power
Struggle.: Three Models," a paper presented at the Uni-
versity Seminar on Modern China, Columbia University,
1974).
The framework presented in this paper draws on elements
of both of these approaches, accepting the idea that
"clusters" exist, but trying to ink them to the dynamics
of the internal power struggle, especially at the nexus
where domestic politics and foreign policy interact.
- Policy Cluster I, the radical alternative, is in-
ward look=ng and visionary. It seeks to enhance
China's status and power by creating an ideo-
logically pure nation that would be self-reliant
economically (i.e., revolutionary spirit would
increase production and overcome all -)bstacles
to de%elopment) and would gain influence
on the world scene through example (and
through supporting revolutionary movements
elsewhere ). It is inclined toward isolationist
views and is vehemently anti-Soviet and anti-
US. It has a strong bias against "experts" and
believes in "polit - in command." The primary
bureaucratic base ' support for this cluster
is the "radical" wing of the Chinese Commu-
nist Party.
- Policy Cluster II, the moderate alternative, is
by contrast outward looking and relatively
pragmatic. It seeks to enhance China's power
and status through a combination of diplomacy
and economic modernization. It is less con-
cerned with ideology and makes diplomatic
calculations in terms of their consequences
for the global balance of n over, an approach
which led it to favor an opening to the US
as a counterweight to Soviet power. While
it opposes reconciliation with the Soviets. it
does so primarily for reasons of state-to-state
rivalry rather than for ideological reasons.
This cluster's modernization strategy relies
heavily on the importation of Western tech-
nology, places a heavy emphasis on "experts"
and reverses the radical slogan putting
eccnomics ratl?cr than politics in `ommand.
Because of its heavy emphasis on economic
developnu'nt, the moderate alternative favors
the relatively inexpensive military strategy of
relying on an "aroused populace" rather than
heavy expenditures on military technology to
meet the Soviet threat; it uses the added
argument that improved relations with the
US would further enhance China's national
security, thus diminishing the need for heavy
expenditures in the area of advanced weapons
technology. The primary base of support for
this cluster is in the civilian bureaucracies,
especially those concerned with economic af-
fai,s and foreign policy.
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Alternatives for Enhancing Chit
General Strategy
Rejected Policy Cluster
Aeliance on the
Soviet Union
Policy Cluster I
The Radical Alternative
Primary Base of
Bureaucratic Support:
Chinese Communist Party
Policy Cluster 11
The Moderate Alternative
Primary Base of
Bureaucratic Support:
Civilian Bureaucracies
Policy Cluster III
The Military Alternative
Primary Base of
Bureaucratic Support:
Military Establishment
? Ally and work closely with the
threatening power ?
? Rely on one's own efforts and
eschew or deemphaslze con-
tact with other countries
? General goal: enhance China's
status and power by creating
an ideologically pure nation
worthy of leading the world's
revolutionary forces
? Increase contacts or form
alliances with rivals of the
threatening power
? General goal: enhance China's
status and power through a
combination of diplomacy and
modernization of the economy
? Despite differences generally
accept Soviet lead ideologically
ncing China's Power and Status
differences, generally
Soviet lead ideologically
?
SStress ideological purity at f
-
)me and abroad
Jent'Ify with the Third World
Eological purity at
nasize communist ide-
Deemphasize communist ide- ? 6'.balance
ology
0146
a b J
~ once of power ? i;.
'philosophy
Play role in world politics as
participant in world communist
movement
? Generally follow Soviet line
in world affairs
? Inclined toward isolationist
views
?
Vehemently anti-Soviet & anti.
US
? Strong theoretical support for
? world revolutionary movement
Some actual support for rev.
olutionary insurgencies on
China's border
? Strongly favors opening to the
West
? Opposes reconciliation with
Soviets
Y non-ideological
? Increase contacts with rivals 4 Essentially non-ideological ? r
of threatening power, but also
ameliorate tension with ,
threatening power
? General goal: enhance China's
status and power by increasing ? F
military capabilities, especially o
in the field of advanced weap?
ons, and at the same time,
decrease China's immediate
military vulnerability by lessen.
ing tension with Soviet Union
? Opposes opening to US on
grounds that Washington is
"colluding" with Moscow in
areas which endanger China's
national security
? Advocates some amelioration
of tension with USSR
Economic Policy
? Reliance on Soviet aid, loans
and technological assistance
? "Self Reliance"
? Oppose expanded economic
contacts
? "Politics in Command"
? Rely on revolutionary vision
and spirit to increase oroduc?
tion
? Strong bias against "Experts"
? Allocate resources away from
military expenditures and to.
? ward economic development
Emphasis on importation of
Western technology for rapid
? modernization
Pragmatic
? "Economics in Comm.,nri"
Heavy reliance on "Experts"
? Channel scarce resources to-
ward military technology even
at the expense of geoeral
economic developments
Defense Policy
? Reliance on Soviet arms and
military assistance
? "People's War"
? Conventional forces plus
"Aroused Populace" to meet
? threat
Continue to develop but not
overemphasize advanced
weapons technology
? Emphasis on acquisition and
development of advanced
weapons technology
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d Status
Economic Policy
Defense Policy
u,nw
nd technological assistance OIIu
military assistance
threat
Continue to develop but not
over emphasize advanced:
annel scarce resources to- ? Emphasis on acquisition and
h
e expense or geueraf weapons technology
nomic developments
0 Cor.,ventional forces plus
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The 1950s: The Rajected Alternative
During most of the 1950s Chino followed the general policy of allying and
working with the Sov,dt Union to further the goal of advancing the interests of the
communist bloc against the forces of "imperialism" in general and the United
States in particular. To enhance China's economic and military capabilities, Peking
relied on the importation of technology from the Soviet Union and accepted grante?
and longterm loans to finance their economic modernization. Militarily, they
relied on the Soviet nuclear umbrella and the importation of advanced Soviet
weaponry such as jet aircraft.
1958-1961: The Radical Alternative
In the late 1950s, the Chinese became increasingly dissatisfied with their
status in the world communist movement, and increasingly restive to assert their
own ideological leadership against the Soviets. They we P also acutely conscious
of their exclusion from the thermonuclear club of great powers, and of their slow
pace of economic development under Soviet hitelage.
The Chinese, therefore, embarked on a course of action which reflected many
of the elements of the radical alternative, (that is, Policy Cluster U. By launching
the Great Leap Forward, a massive effort to further the industrial strength of Ch'na
by stirring up the revolutionary spirit of the masses, they aimed toward becoming
economically "self-reliant."
After two years of frenzied effort, the failure of the Great Leap was increasingly
apparent. Nevertheless, during this period the Chinese had rejected the centralized
Soviet model for the development of their economy and had laid the groundwork
for a completcfbreak with the Soviets in other areas.
1962-1965: The Moderate Alternative Foreshadowed
During this period the break with the Soviets became final, and elements of
Policy Cluster II carne to the fore though many of the tendencies of the radical
alternative in the foreign policy area continued. The extremes of the Great Leap
were abandoned and a more pragmatic economic course was set which emphasized
realizable goals. Foreign trade was also increased, and in 1963 and 1964, the
Chinese went so far as to negotiate for the purchases of whole plants from Japan
and Western Europe. Concomitantly, steps were taken to establish or improve
relations with ceitain non-communist nations.
1965-1958: The Radical Alternative
Before the elements of the moderate alternative could become established,
the external setting was altered by the increases in international tension that
accompanied the escalation of the Vietnam war. China's early efforts to expand
ties with Japan and Western Europe ran into serious trouble, and the moderates
who had favored this opening were discredited. Frustrated in this early attempt
to enhance China's status through increased international intercourse, and
fearful that even if successful, the opening to the West would lead to a decline
in revolutionary elan. Mao and the radicals launched the Great Proletarian
Revolution, a movement which in its foreign policy dimension carried the radical
alternative io the extreme of cutting off virtually all forms of traditional intercourse
with the international community. An intense xenophobic isolationism characterized
Chinese policy and both the US and the Soviets were condemned with equal fervor.
1968-1975: A Realignment of Domestic Political Power
1968: Numerous events in the external setting-first indications of 'JS
disengagement from Indochina, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the election
of a new administration in Washington-allowed the moderates to take the first
steps toward improved relations with the US.
1962- In February these early steps toward the US were reversed by a
coalition of the military and radicals. In March, with Mao's support, the moderates
took the drastic step of provoking a serious Sino.Soviet crisis in an attempt to
regain the initiative in the internal power struggle and to pro :rte a powerful
rationale for the opening to the US.
1970-1971: While the 1969 crisis slowed their advance, the military coalition
maneuvered toward an ascendant position. The moderate coalition and Mao
continued to push for improved relations with the US and resisted advocates of
ameliorating tension with the USSR. Rather than accept the transformation of
policy underway in 1971, the military coalition under the leadership of Defense
Minister Lin Piao attempted a coup against Mao and the moderates, and the
struggle between moderates and the military reached a crisis stage resulting
not only in the fall of Lin but also in a massive purge of China's top military leaders.
1971-Present: The fall of Lin Piao was a clear-cut victory for Premier Chou
En?laf and the moderates. They therefore moved over the next few years to imple.
ment both their domestic and foreign policy programs. Diplomatically, they ccn?
tinued to place great emphasis on improved relations with the West, receiving
President Nixon in early 1972, and normalizing state-to-state relations with a
growing number of countries including Japan and West Germany. In the economic
field, new emphasis began to be put on developing scientific and technical expertise
and importing Western technology and tec,.nological knowledge, and beginning
in late 1972, there was a major drive to import whole manufacturing plants from
the West. During 1973 contracts were signed for over one billion dollars of plant
technology, over ten times the amount contracted for in any given pre-Cultural
Revolution year.
While the Fcurth National People's Congress held in early 1975 was generally
dominated by the. moderates, advocates of the , dical and military alternative;
still retain powerful positions and the contention tL '.)ower within China continues.
Figure 1. Alternatives for Enhancing China's Power and Status
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- Policy Cluster III, the military alternative, is
essentially non-ideological. Its general goal is
to enhance China's position by increasing
China's military capabilities, especially in the
field of advanced weapons technology. It
opposes the opening to the US not only because
it doubts the US can be an effective counter-
balance against Moscow, but also because
it fears that Soviet-US "collusion," especially
in the area of strategic arms limitation, could
pose a serious threat to China's national se-
curity. Its advocates, therefore, reject the basic
premise of the moderates that improved rela-
tions with the US enhance China's national
security, and deeply resent their tendency to
sacrifice expenditures on military technology
in order to rechannel them toward general
economic development. Supporters of the mili-
tary alternative generally feel that it would
be far more prudent to decrease tension with
Moscow to some degree while continuing to
make the development of a credible nuclear
deterrent a first priority. This alternative is
advocated primarily by elements in the mili-
tary establishment, especially the air force and
other components heavily dependent upon
advanced technology.
The chart on page 7 summarizes the main
points of the three status and power alternatives
outlined above, indicates the bureaucratic base of
support for each alternative, compares them with
the rejected alternative of close ties with the Soviet
Union, and shows how each alternative views rela-
tions with the US. It also provides an overview of
the periods within recent Chinese history when
each cluster has been partially dominant, dominant,
or in contention for dominance.
C. Methodology: A "Bureaucratic Politics"
Approach
The framework outlined above and the subse-
quent analysis in this study draw heavily on the
insights of the "bureaucratic politics" approach to
foreign policy analysis. In the terms used by Gra-
ham Allison in his Essence of Decision, it views
Two Models for Analyzing Foreign Policy Decisions
Unitary! Itatlonal `~
Questions Posed Why did the government.decide
Focus of Attention ; The rGais Or:Oble'dives of the
Pattern of If the government has done X It
Inference and must have`Yiad A goal o,r,objective
Explanation in mind ;''explanation'.invoives
600061 776
showing ;how a ; particular: action
was reasonablegiven thisobject-
nation Will do by` asking:;what . is
Figure 2. Two Models for Analyzing Foreign Policy
9
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Bureaucratic
Politics
What kind of bargaining among
which players yielded the critical
decisions and a :tions?
The perceptions, motivations,
positions, power and maneuvers
of the players
If a government performed an
action it was the result of bar.
gaining among players in the
game-who did what to whom
to yield the action?
To predict, identify game in which
the issue arises, the relevant
players, and their relative power
and skill
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the Chinese government not as a "unitary rational
actor" that makes foreign policy decisions solely
through objective calculation of the best way to
optimize national interests, but rather as a num-
ber of competing "players" who contend for power
and influence and use foreign policy as well
as other issues during this struggle. Power is "frac-
tionated" rather than unitary, and any given action
is the outcome of the interplay and infighting
among the players rather than the result of a strictly
rational and non-partisan assessment of national
interests. Each player becomes involved in conten-
tion over precisely what "national interests" de-
mand, and each tends to define such interests in
terms of his own individual political goals and
the organization or faction he represents. Indeed,
solutions to problems seldom follow from a de-
tached and cool assessment of the alternatives;
deadlines, events, and crises force players to take
stands and defend them. In Allison's terms, this
describes the "bureaucratic politics" model of for-
eign policy analysis.* The chart on page 9 com-
pares the two models and shows how the dif-
ferent approaches pose different questions, follow
different patterns of inference and explanation, and
thereby tend to result in different predictions about
future actions.
In terms of research techniques, therc is in fact
no basic difference between working with the clas-
sical unitary actor framework and the more com-
plicated bureaucratic politics model. In both ap-
proaches, the analyst uses the best evidence avail-
able and then attempts to reconstruct the views
of the decisionmakers whose actions or policies he
is trying to understand. The difference is that in
one case the analyst assumes that all decision-
makers deliberate and act as one with solely the
best interest of the state in mind, whereas in the
other case he assumes that there exists a group
of decisionmakers who are contending for power
and influence and who often act against one an-
other to enhance their own personal position even
'Readers familiar with Allison's approach will be aware
that what is described above are his "Model I" and "Model
Ill." While elements of Model II, the Organizational
Process Model, are reflected in the analysis that follows,
the primary emphasis is on showing how a variation on his
Model III can be used to illuminate a set of complex intel-
ligence problems.
in some cases at the expense of what others may
strongly believe are the best interests of the state.
In one case, the analyst imaginatively reconstructs
"China's" best interests; whereas in the other case,
he attempts to reconstruct the goals, aspirations,
and tactics of each of the participants in the internal
debate over what China's best interests are at any
given point.*
D. The Players
The first requirement of the bureaucratic politics
approach is to identify the key players in the po-
litical struggle and to specify which of the three
policy alternatives outlined above each generally
advocated. Before doing so, however, it is important
to note that each policy cluster represents a gen-
eral tendency, or, as the nomenclature implies, a
cluster of tendencies rather than a dogmatic or
clearly defined program of action. No individual
Chinese leader adheres without deviation to all
the tenets of any specific cluster, and individuals
who generally support one tendency may over
time come to alter their views and swing toward
another alternative. With this caveat in mind, we
can say that the principal leader of the moderate
coalition was Premier Chou En-lai, that the radicals
were represented by Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-
yuan, both of whom had risen to prominence dur-
ing the Cultural Revolution, and that the military
coalition was headed by Defense Minister Lin
Piao. * *
'This process is what historian-philosopher R. G. Colling-
wood called the "historical imagination"; Stanley Hoffmann
calls the same process "imaginative reconstruction," Thomas
Schelling speaks of "vicarious problem solving," and Hans
Morgenthau uses the term, "rational re-enactment." Col-
lingwood was addressing the fundamental epistemological
question of how we know what we know about social and
historical reality; Hoffmann, Schelling, and Morgenthau
are addressing how we know and judge the behavior of
national leaders involved in the foreign policy decision-
making process.
*'While Lin had worked closely with the radicals during
the Cultural Revolution, his identification with their goals
and policies appears in retrospect to have been largely
opportunistic. A Chinese official interpreting this early
period recently observed that Lin "had tagged along with
the left wing in the late 1960s and had gone along with
many of their policies," but that he was not in fact a
"leader of the leftists."
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1)uriu!~ the course of c?onleotion fort ;tower and
infiu(nce itnnntg these Ti'l'ts, (:hairotan \lao I?S'-
tung of worts' pl;t\'((I the central-anti usually
the donti)ill tt-talc. Mira pro)ill ly mutt( nutty
decisions ill r'lative isolation. Nonetheless, the co-
alition I'acl'rS regularly sought to inilnence the
Chairman to gain his powerful Support for their
initiatives. Ile, in tutu, atteniptc(l to maintain Iris
overall position of. primacy in p;u-t by carefully
assessing the rcluti\ c strength of the c?ont'n(ling
coalitions and by playing ,off each ,group against the
others. Nonedwl'.ss, in this process, he uappe;urs it
tint's to have been forc?'(i-at the very least pot-
su;uled by colic-('r11 alxntt the consteli;ttion of forces
r;tis'd against hint-to rc\crsc Specific policies or
positions he had previortsly takcu.
?I h' degrc(' of Mao's dominance has, of course,
long hecn it c?outentie is issue among analysts of Chi-
nese affairs. In touts of further dcvciopiuents, ltow-
this olnostion is likely to become incl-casiliffly
less c?ru- ial given the ,growing e\ idence thus ciao
is now dccr'asing his active involvement in Chi-
nese politics. With this in mind, the ,goal of the
friuoework presented her(', IS w'll as the case
strt(li('s that follow, is not to resolve the complex
issue of Mao's role, lint rather to illu:ttinate to the
The "Players": Left to right, Chiang Ching, Chou En-tai, Lin Piao, Mao Tse-tung
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degree possible the antecedents and character of
basic forces within China which are likely to
continue to shape the course of Chinese polii:cs
and foreign policy in a post-Mao era.
II. TURNING POINT: THE 1969 CRISIS IN
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
OVERVIEW
On 2 March 1969 an unusual incident occurred
on the frozen Ussuri river near the desolate island
which the Chinese call Chen-pao and the Soviets
call Damansky. On numerous occasions since the
early 1960s, there had been periodic non-shooting
skirmishes in this and other areas along the disputed
Sino-Soviet border. On 2 March 1969, for the first
time, Chinese soldiers opened fire on a Soviet
patrol, killing 7 Soviet soldiers and wounding 23.
On 15 March, the Soviets retaliated with a full
scale military engagement in the same area during
which hundreds of troops on both sides were killed
and injured. Following these conventional military
exchanges, Soviet spokesmen hinted in a number of
forums that a nuclear attack on China might be-
come necessary. By August 1969, the situation had
deteriorated so badly that some Western observers
were convinced that war was inevitable in the
near term.
Traauwnal explanations of this incident focus
either on the territorial goals of China in initiating
the crisis, or argue that Mao wanted to so embitter
the Chinese people against the Soviets that they
would never again be tempted to accept the Soviet
"revisionist" road. The argument below presents
an alternative explanation: it attempts to show that
the origins of the crisis lie in the struggle within
China for power and influence prior to the April
Ninth Party Congress, and in changes in the ex-
ternal setting during 1968 which opened the way
for a basic shift in Chinese foreign policy.
For some years prior to the crisis, the radical
coalition had been dominant in China. During 1968,
however, a number of events, including the opening
of the Paris peace talks and the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia, gave the leaders of the moderate
coalition the chance to argue for a shift in Chinese
policy toward an opening to the US. In the fall
of 1968, basic decisions were made to move in
this direction by Mao and Chou, but these were
Sino-Soviet Border:
Chen-pao/Damansky Island
U~- Chen-pao/
Damansky Island
C-
China
CHINA
Chcn?pao/
Damansky Island USSR
Unur,
NORTH
KOREA
KhnAa
Figure 3. Chen-poo/Damonsky Island
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apparently reversed in mid-February 1969 because
of opposition from the radicals and elements of the
military.
At least in part in order to regain the domestic
political initiative, Mao and Chou decided to
sharply increase tension with the Soviet Union by
provoking a bc, der clash-the critical 2 March
incident at Chen-pan island. Despite continued op-
position by the military and the radicals, by the
end of 1969 the moderate coalition, with Mao's
approval, had succeeded in using the Soviet threat
to justify and implement the steps toward an open-
ing to the US which had been prevented in Feb-
ruary.
A. Traditional Explanations
While the possibility exists that the 2 March
incident was an accident, the weight of the evidence
suggests that, at a minimum, the Chinese ordered
a change in operating procedures which led to the
clash.*
The question is, why was a decision made to
embark on this high risk procedure at a time when
the country was still very weak internally and
isolated diplomatically? The most comprehensive
*Prior to 1973, only the Soviets had given n detailed
version of the events of 2 March. During the heightened
tension in Sino-Soviet relations in 1973, however, the
Chinese decided to get their own version into the record.
They invited the pro-Chinese journalist Neville Maxwell
to visit the border area in June, and had him briefed by
the People's Liberation Army (PLA) officer who was in
charge of the patrol involved in the fighting. Even allow-
ing for the self-serving nature of the Chinese story, the
account adds some important new details. The most im-
portant of these is the assertion that following some Feb-
ruary pushing incidents, a change in patrolling procedures
was ordered which provided for a concealed Chinese armed
patrol to parallel the regular one and come to its aid if
the Soviets repeated their previous bullying tactics. This
was done, and when shots were fired on 2 March 1969,
the shadow patrol stepped out of its concealed position and
opened fire. Whether or not one accepts the Chinese claim
that the Soviets troops fired first, the fact remains that
a change in procedures was ordered by the Chinese which
made an armed clash far more probable, and that this must
have been recognized by the Chinese authorities that ordered
t):e change. For a full account, see Neville Maxwell, "The
Chinese Account of the 1989 Fighting at Chen-pao,"
China Quarterly, October-December 1973, pp. 730-739.
intelligence study of the subject offers the follow-
ing explanation:
Mao's purpose wi..; not to attain it victory for internal
use or to blacken the Soviet image internationally, but
rather to assert his claim to the island. In wiping out a
Soviet border guard detachment, he gambled that the
Russians would not escalate either by launching a big
ground-force or conventional air attack or by attacking
with nuclears. He apparently hoped that the Russians
would not respond at all militarily because the Chinese
claim to Chen-pao was so clearcut and had been
implicitly conceded in the 1364 talks.*
Another motive, according to this interpretation,
was to warn the Soviet Union that China could not
be pushed around.
The only other detailed study of the 1969 clash,
a RAND Memorandum by Thomas W. Robinson,
offers a variety of other possible explanations. The
one he appears to be most comfortable with "pre-
sumes that Mao was in full control of politics in
China," and that the Chairman "hoped that perma-
nent national hatred for the Russians would follow
a serious military clash," thus immunizing China
against the virus of "Soviet revisionism." * *
As to the first of these interpretations, the Chinese
certainly had good historical claims to Chen-pao.
But while this might account for why that par-
ticular location was chosen for the clash, it does
not explain why China's leaders would want to
concern themselves with relatively minor territorial
issues at a time when they were preoccupied with
the far more serious business of preparing for a
party congress. Moreover, during the history of the
border negotiations China's actual territorial claims
have repeatedly appeared to be less important than
the general goal of maintaining tension in Sino-
Soviet relations. Chen-pao, a desolate, scarcely in-
habitable swamp of an island totally lacking in
military or economic value, would hardly seem
worth asserting a territorial claim to at the risk of
a Soviet retaliation of unpredictable magnitude. And
**Thomas W. Robinson, "The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute:
Background Development and the March 1969 Clashes,"
RM-6171 (RAND Corporation: Santa Monica, 1970), p. 54.
25X1
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M
Chen-pao/Damansky Island
if the Chinese wanted to warn the Soviets that they
could not be pushed around, they certainly failed
since the Soviet initiated clash of 15 March proved
exactly the opposite.
As to Robinson's argument, there is little doubt
that the domestic impact of the incident was a
major consideration in Man's calculations. But this
explanation fails to depict the context realistically.
Why, for example, should Mao time such an action
in 1969 when, in the aftermath of the Cultural
Revolution, the spread of Soviet revisionism was no
longer a pressing issue?
In short, both explanations see Mao as making
a critical decision in virtual isolation from the con-
straints of either domestic or international politics.
In contrast, the present reconstruction of the crisis
attempts to link it both to the ongoing domestic po-
litical struggle within China and to changes in the
global setting which occurred in 1965 and 1969.
B. The Internal Setting
In the period that preceded the 1969 Sino-Soviet
crisis, China had just begun to emerge from the
throes of the Cultural Revolution. Both the party
organi;rations and the govcrnnu'ntal ~urcaucracy
had i;evn severely weakened by that domestic up-
heaval, and the military establishment had been
brought in to fill the resultant power vacutun. As
Minister of Defense, Lin Piao was in charge of the
single most powerful bureaucracy in China, even
if it was not fully under his control. After having
pleased Chairman Mao by working closely with
his wife Chiang Ching and other "radical" elements
during the most violent phase of the Cultural Revo-
lution, Lin in 1965 and 1969 used the army to re-
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establish order and dissolve the Red Guards, a
decision that must have pleased moderate elements
in the army and displeased radical elements in the
party. The overall effect, however, was to greatly
enhance the influence and power of Lin and the
military coalition.
While Premier Chou En-L,i undoubtedly saw
the restoration of order as a step in the right di-
rection, he and his moderate coalition were none-
theless clearly fighting an uphill battle against their
opponents. In the jockeying for power that occurred
in the year or so prior to the Ninth Party Congress
in April 1969, Chou often took the offensive and
was able to influence key decisions, but the outcome
of the Congress shows that he and other moderates
were in a precarious position and that Lin and his
allies were expanding their influence and strength
at the expense of the moderates and the radicals
alike.* The new Politburo, writes A. Doak Barnett,
emerged from "a chaotic situation of violent
struggle' which saw a purge of party leaders
"wholly unprecedented" in the history of Commu-
nist China.**
C. Foreign Policy Differences
In terms of foreign policy, there were major
differences among the three key players who were
seeking to influence Mao. In the first half of 1968,
Mao, Chiang Ching, and Lin Piao were all in agree-
ment with the dominant tendency of the period, the
radical alternative. Among the top elite Chou En-
lai was the only major dissenter from the radical
cluster and the principal advocate of the moderate
alternative. While he had reluctantly accommo-
dated himself to the isolationist tendencies of the
Cultural Revolution period, he almost certainly
was searching for some lever to alter the basic
lines of Chinese policy.
It was not the first time Chou had found him-
self trying to turn the direction of policy away
from the extremes of xe.iophobic self-reliance. In
fact, in the early 1960s, he had engineered an alter-
native both to the over-dependence on the Soviet
Union of the 1950s and to the excessive self-reliance
of the Great Leap Forward (1958-60). To a degree
far greater than is generally recognized, Chou set
a foreign policy course in 1963 and 1964 which
foreshadowed the opening to the West of the 1970s.
His policy-which was explicitly endorsed by
Mao-was to compensate for the final break in
Sino-Soviet relations by making an opening to "the
second intermediate zone," that is, Western Europe
and Japan, and to follow this with the importation
of Western technology for the modernization of
China's economy. He accepted the need for China
to develop its own nuclear force to face the Soviet
military threat, but he realized that this would
hLve to be supplemented by diplomacy and eco-
nomic modernization.*
At the outset, Chou was remarkably successful.
Relations were normalized with France, talks with
West Germany were initiated, and there was prog-
ress toward normalizing relations with Japan. Chi-
nese negotiators opened talks with West German
businessmen for the purchase of a steel rolling
factory, and a deal was completed with the Japa-
nese for a vinylon plant. China exchanged journa-
lists with West Germany and Japan, and trade
offices were exchanged between Peking and
Tokyo. * *
By late 1984, however, Chou's opening to the
West began to encounter increasing difficulties,
primarily because of the increase in international
tension generated by escalation of the Vietnam w?r.
Sato came to power in Japan in late 1964, and,
bowing to US pressure, vetoed the sale of a second
vinylon plant to China. Secretary of State Dean
Rusk successfully implored the West Germans to
cancel the sale of the steel rolling complex to "a
country allied with North Vietnam." Negotiations
*While Chou also loyally pursued the more "revolu-
tionary" aspects of Chinese policy during this period as is
clear from his tour through Africa (1984 ), his subsequent
actions suggest that he was less tha;i enthusiastic about
their utility.
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for normalization of relations with the West Ger-
mans were broken off. Chou had come up against
a store wall.
In these circumstances, Chou's opponents were
given an opportunity to challenge his position, and
Mao himself probably was disillusioned to a con-
siderable degree. Chou had tried to enhance China's
strength anal prestige by aligning China with the
second intermediate zone against the Soviets and
the US, and had failed. The moderate leaders who
had advocated that position, including Chou, were
weakened, and therefore in a shaky position to op-
pose Mao when he decided to launch the Cultural
Revolution, which in its foreign policy dimension
represented a return to "self-reliance" and xeno-
phobic attacks on both the Soviet Union and the
US.
D. Changes in the External Setting
During 1988, a number of events occurred which
gave Chou an opening to resurrect elements of his
pre-Cultural Revolution program. For one thing,
certain Soviet actions-especially the invasion of
Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces in August
and the proclamation of the Brezhnev Doctrine
justifying Soviet intervention in the internal affairs
of other ,;acialist countries-offered dramatic and
concrete evidence of the seriousness of the Soviet
threat to China.
just as important, several developments under-
scored a movement towards US-Soviet cooperation.
The Chinese naturally enough interpreted this as
"collusion" by the superpowers which raised the
spectre of the Soviets being freed to apply pressure
against China with greatly diminished concern for
their Western flank. First, of course, the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty was signed by the US,
the USSR, and other countries in late June. In early
July, Moscow announced its willingness to open
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the JS. Fur-
thet, the Chinese saw the US protest against the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August as rela-
tively mild. Most galling of all, perhaps, the US
and the USSR had "colluded" in arranging for the
May peace talks in Paris between the US and North
Vietnam. Chou probably interpreted this movement
for possible settlement of the Southeast Asian con-
flict without a Chinese role as a direct and heavy
cost of the self-imposed diplomatic isolation of the
Cultural Revolution.*
If the first two trends repre:?ented challenge-a
third represented opportunity: signs that the US
might be interested in improving i 'lations with
China. This was implicit in the fact that internal
pressures were mounting for a US withdrawal from
Vietnam, and that the US presidential campaign in
process centered on the theme of ending the war.
In this crisis atmosphere the 12th Plenum of the
Eighth Party Congress met in Peking in late Octo-
ber 1968. The agenda addressed questions of when
to hold the Ninth Party Congress and what policies
and personnel changes to ratify there. While all
outstanding differences could not have been re-
solved at the Plenum, there is little doubt that the
major issues were discussed and that the jockeying
for power and position that precedes a party con-
gress was begun in earnest.**
The one major foreign policy decision that fol-
lowed the Plenum represented a triumph for Chou
and the moderates, made possible in large measure
by the above changes in the external setting. De-
spite Mao's sympathies for the radicals and their
policy orientation, Chou apparently convinced Mao
to make a bold shift in the direction of Chinese
foreign policy. Basically, Chou must have argued
that the best way to shore up China's shaky inter-
national situation vis-a-vis the Soviets and to slow
the pace of Soviet-US collusion was to lay the
groundwork for improved relations with the United
States.
Within days of the close of the plenum on 31
October, Chinese media began to take a less harsh
line in commentary on the US. When President
Johnson announced a bombing f alt over North
Vietnam on 3 November, his speech was published
can Relations and the Struggle for Power in the Kremlin,
June-November 1961 (1973), paints a vivid picture of a
similar situation in Moscow prior to and during the 23rd
Party Congress of the CPSU.
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in full in People's Daily without the usual vituper-
tive attacks on Washington. The New China News
Agency's (NCNA) comment on Richard Nixon's
election was carefully worded and avoided the
harsh personal denunciations that had characterized
Peking's treatment of Johnson. More significantly,
subsequent commentaries on Nixon's election
argued that he had won precisely because of his
pledges to reduce the US military presence in Asia.
With this preparation, a Central Directive was
issued on 24 November over Mao's signature
which contained a long section explicitly stating
that it was often necessary to enter into negotia-
tions with one's enemies. Two days later, a Chinese
Foreign Ministry statement was published calling
for revival of the Sino-US ambassadorial talks in
Warsaw on 20 February.* While the statement
made clear that Washington should expect no
major Chinese concessions during the scheduled
talks, it was nonetheless apf. Trent that Peking
wanted to open a substantive uialogue, a remark-
able turnabout given the vehemence with which
the Chinese had denounced North Vietnam for
making essentially the same decision a few months
earlier. In addition to his moves to alter China's
US policy, Chou also began in October and No-
vember to rebuild China's ties with a number of
other countries in Asia and Eastern Europe that
had been the victims c,f "Red Guard Diplomacy."
The basic lines of the moderate policy alternative
with its heavy reliance on conventional diplomacy
had begun to reemerge after years of suppression.
E. A Radical Counteroffensive
Chou's initiative almost immediately began to
encounter opposition within China. As Chinese in-
fighting so often appears to do, this opposition
took the form of articles which criticized current
policy through analogy with similar situations in
the past. In December, a series of articles violently
The first ambassadorial level talks betw";n the US and
the People's Republic of China were held in Geneva in
1954, the primary topic being problems related to the
Korean war. Over time a broad range of additional bi-
lateral issues were discussed. In 1958 the venue of these
talks was shifted to Warsaw. During the 134th session in
early 1968, the Chinese bitterly denounced the US and
suspended the talks indefinitely.
Radical Leader Yao Wen-yuan
denounced the foreign policies of Liu Shao-'hi, the
former Chief of State who had been purged during
the Cultural Revolution for his "bourgeois" policies.
The opening shot came on 2 December in an article
in the radical Shanghai paper Wen Hui Pao, which
pointedly attacked Liu for betraying China's in-
terests to the US during his visit to Indonesia in
1963. Significantly, the article attacked those who
opposed any new condemnation of Liu's foreign
policies.
Other articles, usually on subjects in the "cultural"
sphere which Chiang Ching, Yao Wen-yuan and
the radicals controlled, accused Liu of "capitulating"
to the US and not fully exposing its "criminal acts."
In a reference which had obvious immediate impact,
one article stated that Liu's unwillingness to attack
US policy had "amazed and startled even the
bourgeois newspapers and periodicals of the West."
Since Chou's muting of China's criticism of the US
had generated considerable speculation in US
papers over China's apparent policy shift, the
article's target was obvious.
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A theme of many of the articles was that Liu
had incorrectly favored use of peacful negotiations
in dealing with the US rather than following the
correct line of using armed force against the US
and its ally, Nationalist China. "Taught by our great
leader Chairman Mao," one article concluded, "the
Chinese people were clear headed and refused to
believe the nice words of the US imperialists ......
an especially ironic statement since Mao had just
directed that the Chinese people get used to the
idea of negotiations with the "enemy," i.e., the US.
Clearly, both Chou and the new policy line en
dorsed by Mao were under heavy attack from the
radicals who opposc-1 any change in the foreign
policy of the Cultural Revolution and therefore any
softening of China's stance toward the LS.
25X1
F. Lin Piao and the Military
25X1
While abundant evidence exists that Lin had
become an opponent of the opening to the US
by 1971, the problem remains of pinpo`.ntiw- when
and why this foreign, policy issue becariu inter-
twined with the power struggle between Lin and
Mao, which can be dated at least back to 1969.
It seems highly unlikely that any Chinese leader
charged with dealing with national security issues
could have ignored the dramatic and threatening
events of the spring and summer of 1568, and un-
questioningly reaffirmed his allegiance to the sterile
radical alternative. However, Lin could have at-
tempted to counter Chou's initiative by insisting
on an offsetting step toward the SLviet Union.
Indeed, it is precisely this "error" that i i and
his fellow military conspirators were to h- charged
with following their fall from power.
Certainly, many Chinese military leaders had
long harbored a strong distrust of the US and
Japan, as well as historical memories of the PLA's
cooperation with the Soviet army, and it would
not be surprising to find many of them gravely up-
set over a policy which advocated diminishing ten-
sion with the US while continuing to maintain
a high level of tension with the USSR. Moreover,
a plausible case could be made for reducing the
immediate threat of a Soviet attack by some re-
conciliatory gesture toward Moscow, and they re-
allocating China's resources toward building the
kind of advanced weapon's capability that would
be a credible deterrent to Soviet aggression.* 25X1
In addition to the internal logic of this recon-
struction of the military view in 1968-69, there is
evidence
that suggests that Lin was indeed at odds
with Mao and Chou over foreign policy issues dur-
ing this eat 1v period.
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'5X1
25X1
Other indications of a split over foreign policy
at this time
deserve consideration.
First of all, th- re-publication on 26 November 1968
of Mao's 1949 speech which justified negotiations
with one's enemies could just as easily be applied to
negotiations with Moscow is with W't'ashington. And
while the speech was edited prior to publication
to exclude many historical anomalies, upon publica-
tir'*r it still retained the phase, "the world anti-im-
perialist front headed by the Soviet Union," a re-
;narkable editorial oversight given the state of Sino-
Soviet relations in November 1968. Commenting cn
the extensive justification of China's anti-Soviet
policy in the major report at the Ninth Party Con-
gress, Thomas Robinson observes "it is possible that
the entire Maoist a .ti-Sos L, policy was under at-
tack during, and presumably befor^, the Con-
gress." ??
Lin also had very good reasons for opposing the
opening of talks with the US quite apart from the
specific foreign policy implications of the move.
Stricti, in terms of he rivalry with Chou and his
alli 's in the civilian bureaucracies, Lin would not
have wanted Chou to garner credit for an important
initiative, especially at a time when critical per-
sonned decisions were be'ng made regarding the
composition of the Politburo to oe chosen by the
Ninth Party Congress. In ti _ "violent 'truggle" that
Doak Barnett describes as preceding the Congress,
rivalries and differences over a host of matters
would have motivated Lin to try to discredit and, if
possible, reverse any policy associated with Chou,
his most influential rival. Thus, both the military
coalition and the radicals, each for their own
reasons, were probably in a tacit if not overt al-
liance aimed at reversing the first tentative step
toward the opening to the US.
G. Cancellation of the Warsaw Talks
Despite opposition from the radicals as well as
Lin and the military coalition, Chou persisted in
the course he had set with Mao's approval. As late
as two days prior to the scheduled talks with the
US, preparations were proceeding on sched"le in
\\'ar,aw. Then, as abruptly as Chinese policy had
shifted toward the opening to the US, Peking an-
nounced on 18 February 1969 that the talks would
not be held. Soon thereafter, the restraint that had
generally characterized Chinese media treatment
of the US since November gave way to the virulent
and abusive propaganda style of the Cultural Revo-
lution.
The circumstances of this turn a?.vay from an
emergent new Chinese policy suggests ti' -t both
Mao and Chou may have b^en overruled b} a coali-
tion of the radicals and the elements in the military
responsive to Lin Piao. Alternatively, Mao and
Chou may have reasoned that given the strong op-
position of the radi 'c and the military, a tempo-
rary retreat was in order. In any case, this dramatic
reversal almost c: rtainly reflected the growing
strength of the Lin forces.*
At the same time Washington raised an issue
which hurt the moderates' case. In his press con-
ferencc of 8 February, President Nixon not only
reiterated U5 interest in SALT negotiations with
the Soviets, he also justified his ABM program by
saying it was directed against the "Chinese nuclear
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threat." That the President had touched a raw
nerve of China's status sensitivity was apparent
from the fact that NCNA did not eves, mention
Nixon's remarks on the ABM system and the Chi-
nese nuclear threat in its story on the press con-
ference. While t.us incident should not be exag-
gerated, it does appear that the press conference
gave opponents of Chou and Mao additional am-
munition in their campaign against the opening
to the US. Certainly the ostensible reason given
by the Chinese for cancelling the talks-the defec-
tion of a Chinese attache in Europe in early Feb-
ruary--is not a sufficient explanation fo; the turn
around.
25X1 H. Bureaucratic Politics and the 2 March
Clash
That Mao and Chcu had been reversed on an
initiative in which they had invested considerable
prestige is only one of a number of indications that
they may have been politically on the defensive
at this time.
It was in these circumstances, just 12 days after
the planned Warsaw talks were cancelled and some
30 days before the opening of the Ninth Party
Congress, that Chinese troops attacked Soviet
soldiers near Chen-pao and touched off the most
serious crisis in the history of relations between
Communist China and the USSR. Since the Chinese
Politburo was already debating the wisdom of a
major shift in its foreign policy sta:tce, this debate
almost certainly influenced any decision regarding
an attack on the Soviet Union. Those segments of
the military that followed Lin Piao's lead probably
were concerned about the initial steps taken toward
the US and desirous of a more evenhanded policy
which included an attempt at reconciliation with
the USSR. It would thus seem highly improbable
that most military men would have favored a delib-
erate provocation against the Soviets, especially at
a time when military forces were still being used to
restore infernal order.
On the other hand, a clash with the Soviets
would serve the interests of Mao and Chou in a
number of areas. Most importantly, it would be a
strong reassertion of Maas personal authority fol-
lowing the 18 February setback and the general
trend toward greater power for Lin and the military.
Secondly, it would make it far more difficult for
the coalition to sustain a case that Sino-
So. iet relations should be improved. Thirdly, the
resultant increase in Sino-Soviet tension would pro-
vide dramatic justification for an opening to the
US. And finally, it would serve the purpose of im-
peding the trend toward Sov* * --US "collusion" by
demonstrating the aggressive military nature of
Soviet behavior. In short, it would serve both the
foreign policy and domestic political purposes of
these key Chinese decisionmakers.
This line of explanation, howevor, raises very
difficult questions: if Lin and his supporters on the
Politburo had been strong enough to reverse Mao
and Chcu on the question of the Warsaw talks,
why would they not have had enough clout to
prevent an action which was not in the best
interests of the policy line they advocated? More-
over, since Lin was in charge of the defense bu-
reaucracy, how could a decision requiring a military
action be taken without his approval?
While it is possible that Mao and Chou con-
fronted Lin directly on this d:cis:on and simply
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ordered him to take steps to implement it, it seems
more likely that, given their weak political position,
they pursued their goals in a less direct manner
by circumventing the normal chain of command
and ordering Chen Hsi-lien, commander of the
Shenyang Military Region, either to attack the
Soviets or to alter patrolling procedures and get
tough with the Soviets, thereby increasing sub-
stantially the chances of a clash.
But why would Chen Hsi-lien agree to a request
from Mao or Chou which in effect would involve
him directly in the internal power struggle in Pe-
king? First of all, Chen's own personal ambitions
were well sei ved by an increase i ~ tension on the
Sino-Soviet border. There is a direct relationship
between the relative military power exercised by
China's regional military leaders and the potential
influence they wield. As commander of the largest
of China's military regions, except for Peking, Chen
wielded considerable influence, but his position
had been weakened by early 1969 because the re-
quirements of the Cultural Revolution had led to
the transfer of two of Shenyang's eight armies
to more heavily populated areas in China. The 1969
bo;;ler crisis, however, led to the redeployment of
th c :e armies back to Chen's command and this,
along with his role in the crisis, probably influenced
his elevation to the Politburo at the Ninth Party
Congress. Moreover, his subsequent career sug-
gests that he has enjoyed the added trust and
appreciation of Mao and Chou ever since the 1969
crisis. At a crucial juncture in 1974 when Mao and
Chou's policies were again under fire, Chen was
made commander of the critical Peking Military
Region, and, in early 1975 Chen was elevated to
the rank of Vice Premier at the National People's
Congress which was dominated by the moderates.*
Thus, given the kind of political infighting that was
under way in 1965 and 1969, it is plausible that
Chen would have obeyed a direct order from Mao
without consulting Lin Piao.
Othe- aspects of the events surrounding the 2
March incident support the view that the attack
was not carefully planaed by China's defense estab-
lishment, but, instead, was arranged on short notice,
and ex,,cnted without the knowledge of higher mili-
tary authorities in the normal chain of command.
Chen-Pao, for example, was an unusual site for a
thougi,`ful military planner to select for a clash with
the Soviets since no sizeable Chinese military in-
stallations or airfields existed nearby, and Soviet
forces were highly concentrated in the area. In
addition, no major preparations were made prior
to the attack, and there were indications that Chi-
nese military authorities in Peking were at bast
as surprised that the clash had occurred as were
Soviet authorities.
This interpretation of the 2 March clash, in short,
has Mao and Chou acting hastily and for highly
political purposes rather than deliberately and
solely with concern for what China's national in-
terests required. That they were prepared to risk
the death of hundreds of Chinese soldiers and con-
ceivably even war with the Soviet Union is thus
a measure not only of how high they calculated
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the stakes in the internal power struggle, but also
of how badly they wanted to discredit those within
China who opposed the opening to the US. Cer-
tainly the message that Mao could count on the
loyalty of China's second most powerful military
i. gional commander would not be lost on Lin in
the continuing power struggle.
!. !nternal Politics and the Soviet Question
It is important to note that Soviet leaders were
closely following events in China -.nd that their
interpretation of Chinese politics and foreign policy
at this time was similar r) the one presented above.
Soviet diplomats observed at the time
that the Congress a urt er Lolated Chou and
the "tcehnecrats," and expressed the view that Chou
had emerged from the Co" "re" with a "diminution
of real power."
a number of anccTes m t e oviet
press at t is time referred to opposition to Mao
among military leaders,* More ominously, one So-
viet official stated in April that Moscow was closely
watching the development of "centrifugal tenden-
cies in China," including provincial leaders who
often found themselves at odds with the center. If
the situation in China disintegrated further, he
said, and "local elements" requested help from the
USSR in its struggle with the "Maoist leadership,"
the Soviets might respond positively. Finally, Mos-
cow ordered a substantial reduction in all propa-
ganda attacks against Peking once the Ninth Party
Congress opened, another indication that some So-
viet faders may have believed that a less hostile
leadership might emerge from the internal struggle
going on within China.**
Given this perspective, it is not surprising that
the Soviets tended to relate the 2 Marsh clash to
Chinese domestic politics. Soon after the incident,
Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin told American of-
ficials in Washington that the border clash was
instigated with an eye toward the opening of the
Ninth Party Congress. The 21 March issue of New
propaganda during the Tenth Party Congress in 1973.
Times, stated flatly that the clash was an outgrowth
of the "power struggle" within China. Though
neither Dobrynin nor the New Times article offered
any supporting detail, their interpretations at least
raise the possibility that Moscow's views on the
internal Chinese political situation were being
shaped by information supplied by highly placed
sources within the Chinese leadership.*
J. Aftermath
In the immediate aftermath of the 2 March inci-
dent, many observers dismissed the clash as of
little significsuuce, yet another border skirmish
which would quickly blow over. The Soviets also
appeared initially to nave wanted to avoid a major
propaganda exchange. A border clash without some
follow-up, howev,.r, would have served neither
the domestic nor foreign policy goals of Mao and
Chou. Indeed, it is interesting to note that if the 25X1
goals had been focused primarily on territorial
issues, then subsequent Soviet probes aimed at
reopening the border talks would probably have
been accepted more quiccly. But instead of limiting
themselves to sending a diplomatic protest note to
Moscow, Mao and Chou implemented a massive
anti-Soviet campaign.
Nationwide demonstrations began on the day
after the clash. By 7 March some 260 million Chi-
nese had participated in mass rallies denouncing
Soviet revisionism and vowing vigilance along the
border. In addition, angry demonstrations were
staged outside the Soviet Embassy from 3 through
6 March and then resumed on 11 March, a tactic
which drew a parallel response in Moscow on 11
March. Following the Soviet counterattack on 15
March, the anti-Soviet demonstrations resumed,
and Chinese propaganda continued to attack Mos-
cow shrilly. The message to the domestic rivals of
Mao and Chou was unmistakable: anti-Soviet senti-
ment was strong among the Chinese people and
anyone favoring lessened tension with Moscow was
treading on very unpopular ground.
During the Ninth Party Congress, which opened
on 1 April, Mao and Chou continued to exploit the
*This, of course, is what the Chinese themselves strongly
suspect, and there is at least enough circumstantial evidence
in this regard to suggest Chinese fears about Soviet inter-
ference in their internal affairs is not the product of an
exaggerated paranoia.
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crisis with the Soviets, even going so far as to
have one of the officers involved in the border
clash appear before the assembled delegates. The
key document presented at the Congress was the
Political Report, and in the drafting and redrafting
that preceded the formal presentation, Mao and
Chou almost certainly used the implications of the
crisis in their dispute with Lin over the foreign
policy line to be taken.* In this they were partially
successful. The report formalized the view that the
Soviet Union was as serious an enemy of China
as the US, though, possibly in defer;;nce to Lin's
demands, Moscow was not yet named China's
principal enemy. Moreover, the denunciations of
the US were relatively routine; the Vietnam war,
a key cause of continued Sino-US tension, was not
even mentioned.
Other sections of the report, however, reflect
Lin's influence. In addition to insisting on language
which left the door open for improved relations
with the USSR, the leader of "world socialism," *
the report asserted that Peking's foreign policy was
"consistent" and that it was "not based on expedi-
ency," a probable slap at the moderates who wanted
to take the expedient route of dealing with the US
in the face of a Soviet threat. The debate over the
contentious issues in the report continued to be a
central issue in Chinese politics in the months
following the Congress.
While there were ups and downs in Chinese
propaganda throughout the remainder of 1969, ten-
sion in Sino-Soviet relations remained high, in large
measure because until September the Chinese con-
tinued aggressive border patrolling and this resulted
in additional armed clashes, and because Moscow
responded by dropping veiled hints about a nuclear
Voting at the Ninth Party Congress are: Mao, Lin, Chou, Chen Po-ta, Kong Sheng,
Chiang Ching, Chang Chun-chiao, Yao Wen-yuan.
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strike. By August and September a number of
Western observers, including some intelligence
analysts, had concluded that a Sino-Soviet war was
inevitable in the near term. Whether or not the
Chinese themselves expected war is not certain,
but there is little doubt that they were alarmed
and that the crisis atmosphere reinforced the posi-
tion of the Chinese moderates who were disposed
to be receptive to the overtures for improved Sino-
US relations which were coming out of Washington.
In what was almost certainly a compromise be-
tween the moderates and their opponents, the
Chinese agreed in October to open negotiations on
the border dispute with Moscow, and then in Jan-
uary 1970 announced they would be willing to re-
schedule the aborted February 1969 Warsaw talks
with the US. While it almost immediately became
apparent that they were not taking the Sino-Soviet
border talks seriously, they tried to keep up momen-
tum in relations with the US by meeting in Warsaw
in February 1970 and then scheduling another ses-
sion of the bilateral talks for May 1970. Thus, the
basic foreign policy goal of justifying steps toward
an ope:iing to the US was well served by the 2
March crisis; though, as discussed subsequently,
Lin's drive toward expanding his power and influ-
ence in party affairs was not derailed but only
slowed. He continued to oppose each move in the
direction of Sino-US rapprochement. In this con-
text, the Sino-Soviet clash of 1969 was a prelude
to the decisive confrontation between the moder-
ates and the military which began in 1969 and came
to a crisis two years later-the fall or- Lin Piao.
III. WATERSHED: THE FALL OF LIN PIAO
OVERVIEW
By almost all surface criteria, Lin Piao had won
a stunning victory at the Plinth Party Congress, pri-
marily at the expense of Chou En-lai, his principal
rival. Chhou's power base was in the Bove: nmental
bureaucracies, and of the six men drawn from this
sector on the Politburo in 1968, all but two, Chou
and Li Hsien-nien, lost their positions at the Con-
grsss. Eleven military men were added to the Polit-
buro, a majority of whom were apparently Lin
supporters. Lira's close ally Chen Po-ta,was named
to the crucial Standing Committee of the Politburo,
and more importantly, the Congress formally
adopted a new constitution designating Lin by
name as Mao's successor. Lin, it appeared, was well
on his way to supreme power within C-iina. And
yet, in just over two years after the 1`iinth Party
Congress, Lin had fallen from power following an
iniense and ultimately violent struggle within the
Chinese leadership.
Lin's fall was far more than the purging of a
single individual. It was preceded by an elaborate
conspiracy against Mao that involved a large number
of individuals, and was followed by a massive
purge of virtually all of China's ranking central
military leaders. In the context of the framework
presented in this paper, the Lin Piao affair repre-
sented the crisis stage of the struggle for power
between the moderate coalition and the military
that had been under way since the winding down
of the Cultural Revolution in 1968. In relative terms,
the radical coalition played only a marginal role.
Most previous explanations of the Lin Piao crisis
have down-played the role of foreign policy issues.
By contrast, this study presents the view that these
issues, and more specifically what they implied
in terms of resource allocation and the resultant
balance of power between the moderate and mili-
tary coalitions, are central to explaining the course
of events that preceded. Lin's abortive 1971 coup.
In brief, Lin appears to have consistently opposed
any steps toward rapprochment with the US
throughout 1969 and 1970. He apparently seized
on the US invasion of Cambodia in the spring
of 1970 to argue for the cancellation of the sched-
uled Sino-US talks in Warsaw and to persuade
Mao to make a series of reconciliatory gestures
toward Moscow. This shift toward Lin's approach
to foreign policy came to an abrupt end following
the Second Plenum of the Ninth Party Congress in
August 1970 when the balance of internal political
forces began to tilt against Lin. Soon thereafter,
there was a major change in China's propaganda
line and by December 1970 Mao felt strong enough
to extend the historic invitation to President Nixon.
Lin's continued opposition to the opening to the
US is well documented, but what is more difficult
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,in Piao presenting the Polit;cal Report at the Ninth Party Congress
to explain is- t(/ty It(, felt compelled to risk a con-
frontation with \lao on this issue. The (tstt'er (ip-
parerttly lies in the fact that concomitant with the
critical debates over foreign polict/ issues in 1971,
there was (tit intense struggle Deer the allocation
of scarce resources, u'it/t Lin and his supporter.s
favoringg the (onttun(ation of the big/t lcrel.' of mili-
fary expenditures they had obtained for 969-15)71.
If Chou suc((cded in enhancing Chinas sense of
securilrl by improved relations with Washirwton,
they reasoned, a key element in their rational' for
high military e.rpcndittires' would be undercut. They
may also have argued that Soviet-(%S progress ill
SALT posed a major danger to (;Moo's national
security and that the ('S was, because of its "col-
lusion" nit/t the USSR, an untrustwortht/ cottnter-
balanc( to Sorict potter.
These issues there so intimate/t, linked that the
old rluestion of tt'hether domestic or foreign policy
considerations were paramount misses the more int-
portanl point that in China there does not appear
to he a wide division bett(een the worlds of the
foreign and (lomestir policynuik('r. In the words
of Foreign Minister Chino Luau-lino "foreign poli-
cies are inseparable from domestic policies" in
China.
A. Traditional Explanations
Most pres'ioos stndi('s of Lin's fall have concluded
that the' "central issue" in the crisis was Mao's
decision to rcasscrt civilian control over a military
cstahlishrncnt that had grown too powerful as a
result of the Cultural Hcyolotion, and tilt- military's
tiltintatcly yiolcnt resistance to moves designed to
intplenu'nt this decision. By contrast, these studics
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dismiss the heated debates over foreign policy
issues among China's leaders as "more tactical than
causative or fundamental in nature," and suggest
that Lin's favorable references to Moscow were
made only "to score debating points."* While the
discussion that follows does not dispute the view
that the Lin crisis was ultimately over whether
"civilians" or Lin Piao and his military supporters
would rule China, it does attempt to show that the
debate over foreign policy was not a tactical side-
show but rather a central and fundamental issue
in the power struggle that preceded Lin's abortive
coup.
B. Foreign Policy Differences
As early as 1969, Lin had found himself at odds
with Mao and Chou over whether or not to begin
the process of improving relations with the US.
After apparently derailing the first attempt to re-
new the Warsaw talks, Lin used every occasion
possible to criticize Chou's line that improving
relations with the US should be a priority objective
of China's foreign policy. In the fall of 1969, he
probably insisted that if the Warsaw talks were
rescheduled for February 1970, Sino-Soviet border
negotiations would also have to begin. And then
in April 1970, the US and South Vietnamese in-
vasion of Cambodia gave Lin the leverage he
needed to press for a major shift away from the
opening to the US and toward some form of
reconciliation with Moscow. Lin undoubtedly
argued that this US action proved that a major
premise of Chou's policy-that the US was with-
drawing from Vietnam and therefore no longer
constituted a threat to China-was erroneous. Using
this argument, lie apparently convinced Mao not
only to cancel the scheduled May 1970 session of
the Warsaw talks, but also to revert to the anti-US
rhetoric of the Cultural Revolution. In a statement
approved personally by Mao and issued on 20 May,
the US was shrilly condemned, and President Nixon
was assaulted as a perpetrator of "fascist atrocities."
Significantly, within hours after it was issued, Lin
personally read this statement to a massive rally
in Peking organized by the PLA. Moreover, an
authoritative joint editorial in June took a s-Avage
swipe at Chou and the modes ate coalition by stat-
ing that the "principal criterion" for judging a loyal
revolutionary was his attitude toward the US.
Lin was also apparently active in engineering
a change in the direction or Chinese policy toward
the USSR. The earliest indication came during
Mao's and Lin's joint appearance at the May Day
rally, an event which marked the first time the
two leaders had appeared together in public in
some six months. On this occasion, Mao went so
far as to exchange comments with the chief Soviet
negotiator to the border talks, an important sym-
bolic gesture.
Just as significantly, there occurred at this time
a marked and prolonged decrease in the volume
and virulence of anti-Soviet propaganda. From 22
April until 8 September, Peking issued no authori-
tative direct attack on Moscow and there was a
notable restraint in the few anti-Soviet stories that
were printed. Most remarkably, there was virtually
no commentary on the Brezhnev Doctrine on the
1970 anniversary of the August 1968 Soviet inva-
sion of Czechoslovakia. Indeed, the topic of the
Brezhnev Doctrine which had received enormous
media treatment in 1968 and 1969 was addressed
authoritatively dur.,ig this period only once-by
Chou En-lai. While at first Moscow continued its
propaganda attacks unabated, by early summer the
Soviets had begun to restrain their own polemics.
And on 15 August, tht. Soviets dispatched Deputy
Foreign Minister Ilichev to Peking as their newly
appointed chief negotiator in the border talks.
One of the clearest indications of tension between
the moderates and the military was the marked
schizophrenia evident in Peking's treatment of Army
Day on 1 August. While Chou En-lai's statement
just prior to Army Day stressed the dangers of
the Brezhnev Doctrine and the joint editorials on
1 August pointed to the Soviet build-up on the
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Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng, left front, reviewing PLA troops
Sino-Soviet border, the major speech of the day
by the PLA's Chief of Staff Hua.,g Yung-sheng
made almost no mention of the Soviet threat.
Indeed, Huang concentrated his fire almost solely
on the US and the danger it posed for China's
national interests.*
*Huang, who was almost certainly acting on Lin's behalf
was purged following Lin's abortive coup in 1971
Events began to move rapidly against Lin and
his military supporters soon after Army Day. While
Mao may have been susceptible to Lin's arguments
in the period immediately following the Cambodian
invasion, reasoning perhaps that a brief tactical
shift toward the USSR would have an impact on
US policy, he almost certainly was displeased to
see how far Lin was carrying things. It was in
these circumstances that the Second Plenum of the
Ninth Party Congress convened-in August 1970.
At the Plenum, Lin and his supporters gambled
that they were in a strong enough position to
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challenge Mao on the crucial issue of whether to
retain the constitutional position of Chief of State.*
They not only lost this gamble but Lin's close
associate, Chen Po-ta was purged and branded a
Soviet agent, a clear indication of the extreme
dangers of even appearing to adapt a "soft" line
toward Moscow. In addition to these setbacks, Lin
also apparently lost out in the debate over foreign
policy. At any rate, the communique that was
issued following the Plenum took a foreign policy
line that differed markedly from the thrust of
Chinese policy in the previous four months. While
some restraint was evident in the communique,
Moscow was authoritatively denounced for the first
time since prior to the Cambodian incursion, and
the moderates' policy of improving relations with
the US avid other "friends all over the world" was
strongly endorsed.
The Plenum's communique was followed by an
even harsher attack on Moscow in an authoritative
People's Daily Commentator article on 13 Septem-
ber. The NCNA report accompanying the Com-
mentator article emphasized this sensitive issue
of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia comparing
it to Hitler's invasion of Poland. Moscow responded
in kind and the brief thaw in Soviet-Chinese rela-
tions was replaced by a period of harsh invective
which lasted until January 1971 when a new period
of relative calm set in, as a result of a Soviet effort
to wind down the polemics.
Concomitant with the escalation of Sino-Soviet
polemics, there were a number of major advances
for the moderate coalition's program in other areas.
In the three months following the Plenum, recogni-
tion agreements were concluded with four coun-
tries including Canada and Italy. State-to-state
bilateral relations with Burma also improved, a
key barometer of the influence of the moderates
on policy. At the level of ideology, a major doctrinal
departure was apparent in a November speech by
Chou's close associate Chiao Kuan-hua. Chiao re-
formulated and expanded the concept of peaceful
coexistence by stating that it applied to relations
between "all countries whether they have the same
*Mao had made clear that he wanted the title and
position abolished; Lin, reasoning that this diminished his
own prestige as Mao's heir apparent and would impair his
own authority when he succeeded Mao, strongly resisted
this change.
or different social systems." This contrasted sharply
with the previous authoritative statement on the
subject made by Lin Piao at the Ninth Party
Congress. Lin at that time had made an important
distinction between the principles to be applied
to capitalist and socialist countries, stating that the
former should be dealt with on the basis of peaceful
coexistence while relations with the latter should
follow the principle of "proletarian international-
ism." Chiao's statement marked a clear and unam-
biguous shift away from an ideologically based
foreign policy to one emphasizing state-to-state
relations, and thereby constituted a major victory
for the moderate coalition.
These developments set the stage for Mao's cru-
cial interview with Edgar Snow in December 1970,
during which Mao said that President Nixon "would
be welcome" to visit Peking. While it can be argued
that Mao had alread, iined up a consensus behind
this initiative, there are also reasons to believe
that Mao, perhaps in consultation with only Chou
En-lai, decided to float the concept of a Nixon
visit and then wait to see how strong the reaction
would be within China's top leadership. He un-
doubtedly expected strong opposition, and may have
decided on a bold move making China's invitation
a fait accompli that would be difficult to reverse,
even by a leader with the political clout of Lin Piao.
It is also important to note that Lin and his
military supporters were faced by early 1971 not
Chairman Mao confers with Writer Edgar Snow, left
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25X1
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only with rapid progress li Sino-US relations, but
also with a major change in the direction of China's
policy toward Japan, a nation that virtually all
Chinese military men looked upon as an historic
enemy and as a potentially very powerful future
enemy.*
Lin Piao and his supporters
had opposed the opening both to the US and Japan.
Thus, moves toward improving relations with the
Japanese were probably as hotly debated as the
Sino-US issue.
C. Policy Issues and Power 25X1
At a critical point in any policy debate between
leaders at the pinnacle of power, differences over
issues become so intense that it is not the policy
itself which is paramount, but rather the authority,
power, and influence of the leader advocating the
policy. And at this juncture the debate over policy
is transformed into a struggle for who will hold
the ultimate power to decide the issue. In 1973
no less an authority than Deputy Foreign Minister
Chiao Kuan-hua said that debates over foreign
policy issues occur frequently, but that if one
opposes a whole series of decisions, one becomes a
prime candidate for being stripped of all power
and purged from the party and government.*
In this context, the key question is not whether
Lin Piao opposed the opening to the US and Japan,
but why he judged that this issue was important
enough to run the ultimate risk of strongly and
*Chiao, who became Foreign Minister in 1974, made his
statement in response to the following direct question: "It
appears that on a number of occasions in the last decade
foreign policy issues have been a matter of serious debate
and division. I realize that this is a sensitive .uestion, but
could you give us your views on this matter?"
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repeatedly opposing a policy that clear'y had the
approval of Chairman Mao himself.
Part of the answer to this question lies in the
dynamics of the rivalry between Lin and Chou
and their respective power bases. Very early in
the protracted debate over policy toward the US
and the USSR, Lin put his prestige on the line
and probably argued that the US would remain
deeply involved militarily in Asia and would there-
fore remain a principal enemy of China. Chou
made a different estimate which eventually proved
correct. Lin also probably argued that in the proper
circumstances Moscow would be willing to make
a significant move to decrease Sino-Soviet tension
and that this option should be explored. Chou
countered that Moscow would offer only unsatis-
factory gestures; and in this, also, events proved
him right. So jr '"olicy debate after policy debate,
a certain dynar propelled both Lin and Chou to
attack the posi;.uns of the other in order to dis-
credit the policymaker as well as the policy.
The roots of Lin's intransigent position, howe""er,
prob..'' 'y lie even deeper. He and his supporters
were _ repared to risk their careers because they
realize.l that the power they had attained, as well
as the even more exalted status they were seeking,
were jeopardized by the implications of the policies
advocated by their rivals in the moderate coalition.
Decreased tension with the US and Japan and
the increased sense of security that would grow out
of improved relations with a nuclear power like
the US, Lin and his supporters reasoned, would
lead to pressures for smaller military expenditures,
especially in the areas they believed to be critical-
nuclear weapons, missiles, aircraft, and advanced
military technology in general. And with a declining
military budget, their influence and authority would
also decline. Having fought his way to within a
short distance of ultimate power in China, Lin
saw the prospect of a reallocation of China's re-
sources away from his power base in the military in
general and the air force in particular as a direct
assault on his personal authority. Thus, rather than
see their power and authority drained away by the
thrust of the mode.. `e coalition's program, Lin
and his supporters first opposed this program at
every possible juncture, and, when this failed, at-
tempted to seize power to reverse the unwelcome
transformation of China's d'imestic and foreign
policy that was gaining momentum in 1971. 25X1
D. Resource Allocation
First of all it is important to note that discussion
of the parameters of China's Fourth Five Year
Plan (1971-1975) had begun in late 1970 and con-
tinued until after Lin's fall in late 1971. The debate
over allocation of China's scarce resources under
the Plan was almost certainly sharply contested.
Thus, concomitant with the debates over foreign
policy issues came an intense struggle over re-
source allocation, a struggle which inevitably be-
came entangled with the specifics of the quarrel25X1
over foreign policy.
Throughout the summer of
1971 numerous articles in People's Daily as well 25X1
as some Radio Peking broadcasts focused attention
on the problem of whether "electronics" or "steel
and iron" should take priority in advancing the
development of the national economy. A 13 June
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article in People's Daily argued that one group of
"political swii 1lers" within China (i.e., Lin and
his group) saw "atomic technology and jet engine
technology" (i.e., electronics) as the key to enhanc-
ing China's power and status in world affairs. A
Radio Peking broadcast on 20 August was even
more pointed. It charged that the same group of
"swindlers" believed that advanced weapons were
the "key to victory," and that once China possessed
them, "all imperialists will be finished and over-
thrown." Significantly, these views were sharply
contrasted with those of Mao who was quoted as
condemning any strategy which was premised on
the concept that "weapons decide everything."
It should be noted that this interpretation of
Lin's fall from power does not argue that foreign
policy issues were more important than the general
issue of civilian versus military rule. In effect,
foreign policy sues were so intimately linked to a
cluster of other issues that they formed an integral
part of the overall struggle between the moderate
coalition and the military coalition. A debate aver
resource allocation and foreign policy was the im-
mediate catalyst because it brought to a head the
entire question of the continued predominance of
the military in Chinese politics and society. Mao
and Chou were undoubtedly engaged in a broadly-
based campaign to prevent Lin and the military
from expanding their power still further, and to
do so they not only confronted this issue specifi-
cally, but also used the thrust of their foreign
policy program to focus the debate on the concrete
issue of resource allocation.* Just as in 1969 when
they had used a foreign policy crisis to further
their domestic goals, so in 1971 they used arguments
drawn from the implications of their diplomatic
program for the same purpose.
*In this reg:_td it is interesting to note that Mao himself
has stated explicitly that one tactic he employs is to attack
his opponents on the basis of issues rather than to confront
them directly.
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All of this points to a general view that there is
not as wide a divisio? in China as in the US be-
tween the worlds of the foreign and domestic
policymaker; indeed, it is reasonable to conclude
that the small number of men at the apex of China's
political structure do not make any significant dis-
tinctions between the spheres of domestic, foreign,
and national security policy. Indeed, Foreign 14in-
aster Chiao Kuan-hua has stated explicitly that in
China " for eign policies are inseparable from domes-
tic policies," and that no separate formal decision-
making structure for foreign policy similar to the
National Security Council exists iii China.
E. Internal Politics and the Soviet Question
in the immediate aftermath of Lin's demise in
Septcmbr 1971, the leadership stniggle between
the moderates and the radicals apparently inten-
sified. For about ten or twelve days between
roughly 12 September and 25 September, the top
leadership met in Peking to thrash out the measures
that were to be taken in the wake of the crisis.
During this period, the radicals may well have
attempted to take advantage of the uncertain situa-
Just as in 1969 when the lea&rsl,ip struggle
intensified prior to the Ninth Party Congress,
China's central leadership resorted to playing up
the Soviet threat in the unsettled and fluid situa-
tion that followed Lin's abortive coup.
25X1
25X1
Indeed, a crisis atmosp ere was
transmitted not only to party cadres but alsc to
China's informed public. Summing up his impres-
sions of what was going on, a resident of Canton
stated that in September there was "a period of
intense war alert during which hostilities with the
Soviet Union were expected at any tirne "
In reality, however, China's central leadership
was far more concerned about possible Soviet
manipulation of the internal conflict within China
express their view that the Soviets not only have
had lines of coin mu nication to certain elements
within China, but also that the Soviets consistent)
try to exacerbate differences within China.
25X1
IV. IMPLICATIONS P OR THE US 25X1
A. The "Collus*,on" Theme as a Key Indicator
Since they began the transformation of China's
domestic and foreign policies in 1968, backers of
the moderate alternative have had to fight a two-
front domestic war. On the one hand, they have
1)(4-n opposed by the radicals who were hostile
to ?- e moderate policy cluster for ideological rea-
so. . On the other, they have been opposed by the
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military coalition not only because it was seeking
supreme power in China, but also on grounds of
"national security."
While the leverage of the radical coalition on
policy decisions has now been considerably re-
duced, this apparently is not the case for the mili-
tary coalition.* This is for three reasons: many
military leaders have their own independent power
bases; they almost certainly have sympathizers
within the moderate coalition in general and the
foreign policy establishment in particular; they have
a strong argument which is cast in terms of China's
vital national security interests. Their argument
probably would go something like this:
A basic premise of the moderates' rational security
pro tram is that "contention" will always win oat over
"co 'usion" in Soviet-US relations, and that China can
therefore count on a powerful US as a counterbalance
to the USSR in world affairs. This premise, however,
is extremely dangerous because it does not take into
consideration two very real possibilities: 1) the first
is that the US, because of domestic political and eco-
nomic difficulties as well as international setbacks,
may fall seriously behind Moscow in terms of the
global balance of power and therefore he unable
to adequately fill the role of a strategic counterbalance
to Soviet power; 2) perhaps in part because of the
above, the US may well find it convenient or even nec-
essary to place such a great emphasis on improved
relations with the Soviets, especially in the critical area
of strategic arms limitation, that it will be willing
to sacrifice its relations with China to attain this goal.
Rather than rely on the US as strategic counterbalance
to the USSR, China must in the short term ameliorate
tensions with Moscow to decrease the immediate threat
of a nuclear war that China could not win, and, in the
long term, place emphasis on building up a credible
nuclear defense structure that could ensure China's
security in the face of the USSR, the US, or Japan
should it become a nuclear power. Thus, China is
endangering its national security by placing too large
. .hare of its nationa! resources in the service of
economic development rather than milits,y expendi-
tures, and the diploma'.ic rationale for fallowing this
course may well be i.acorrect because it fails to take
inte consider: Lion the prospect that Soviet-US c tnpe-
tition in world affairs could well be replaced by a
degree of cooperation that
ld
wou
seriously endanger
25X1 China's national security.
Seen in this perspective, events which signal sig-
nificant or rapid progress in Soviet-US relations,
especially in the area of strategic arms limitation,
are likely to lead to renewed debate within China
over the wisdom of its present stance, and could
lead to an increase of the relative power of the
military coalition.* Indeed, in the immediate after-
math of the Nixon-Brezhnev summit of June 1973
and the signing of the Soviet-US agreement on the
prevention of nuclear war, a "sharp and intense
struggle" occurred within Chiua over the implica-
tions of this event. For the first time since 1969,
Chinese propaganda stressed the theme of "col-
lt'sion" instead of the standard line, reiterated by
Chou at the Tenth Party Congress, that "conten-
tie would always predominate over collusion in
Soviet-US relations.** Significantly, a ranking mem-
ber of the foreign ministry establishment appears
to have written the analysis that touched off this
struggle, and it is probable that he was supported
by elements within the military establishment dur-
ing the debate. Before it had run its course, the
moderates once again resorted to a round of vitriolic
anti-Soviet propaganda in public and dire private
and public warnings of the prospect of an immedi-
ate Soviet threat. Indications trtat the military per-
sisted in pushing for some adjustment in China's
foreign policy stance continued until December,
when an authoritative Red Flag article, most prob-
ably approved by P'rao himself, criticized those who
**One such article accused Moscow )f using the Soviet-
US agreement on the prevention of nuclear war to proclaim
the successes of its "peace diplomacy," while still carrying
out "nuclear intimidation and blackmail against the people
of various countries." NCNA also replayed caustic article
from a Japanese leftist journal entitled 'The Illusion and
Truth of the US-Soviet Summit-the Real Features of Soviet
Social Imperialism." Brethnev's goal in the summit talks,
the article argued, was to "strengthen the hegemonic rule
of the two superpowers": the article also warned that world
issues should not he settled by the "wisdom" of the super-
powers. Similar themes were evident in a theoretical article
in Red Flag which reflected extreme sensitivity to Brezh-
nev's boast that the political climate of the world is deter-
mined by the Soviet Union and the US. In one of the most
defensive statements in the piece, the article asserts that the
US and the USSR "certainly cannot det"rmine the fate of the
world' since the "people and the people alone are the
motive force in the making of world hictnrv "
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wanted to make friends with China's close neigh-
bors rather than ally with distant nations. And
while =.t cannot be demonstrated conclusively, it
seem" likely that the massive reassignment of Mili-
taiy Reg-onal Commanders that Mao ordered in
December 1973 was partially motivated by con-
tinued opposition within thA military establishment
to Mao's "revolutionary line in foreign policy." Since
this reshuffle, it has appeared at various times that
Mao was preparing a massive purge of those ele-
ments in the military that were still resisting him
and his policies, and there are some indications that
he is presently displeased that this has not
occurred.*
The important point to note here, however, is
that the military coalition remains an influential
factor in Chinese politics, and that US policy and
action toward the Soviet Union, especially on the
issue of SALT, could have an important impact
on the configuration of political power within
China.
B. The Level of Tension
ON erall, tension in Sino-Soviet relations has de-
clined since 1969, in large measure because the
moderate policy coalition has extended its control,
the internal situation has become somewhat more
stable, and China has received grea:2r recognition
from the international community. Nevertheless,
tension could easily again flare up if during the
protracted and delicate succession process already
and,,r way, a group within China were to become
predominant which judges that its interests woulra
be served by a provocation such as the 1969 border
clash. Whether or not such a situation evolves
depends in part on events outside China in genera'
and on the actions of the USSR and the US in
particular.
US moves which would enhance China's status,
such as establishing full diplomatic relations, would
probably strengthen the ,noderates' hold on power
and their commitment to the policy of expanding
ties with non-Ccminunist countries. Paradoxically,
such developments would probably also serve to
lessen the imperatives pressing elements in the Chi-
nese leadership toward periodic crises with the
USSR. Nc' only would the leadership have a de-
creased nc::d to play up the Soviet threat to deflect
attack from domestic critics, but-with more self-
confidence regarding China's status in the interna-
tional hierarchy-these leaders would probably be
more willing to en*-er into serious negotiations with
Lie Soviets over the border issue. If Moscow were
careful to take Chinese sensitivities into considera-
tion by making a substantial conciliatory gesture
(such as a sizable drawdown of its forces in the
border area), some fonn of mutually acceptable
border arrangement could conceivably be worked
out.
Even if some form of border arrangement were
concluded, Sino-Soviet competition and contention
would not cease. While the primary impact of a
border arrangement would be to decrease substan-
tially the chances of some future border incident
escalating into a nuclear war, China's interests
are at odds with the USSR's throughout Asia,
and a border agreement would not end the struggle
for influence and power there and in the rest of
the world.
Moreover, even if there were some improvement
in Sino-Soviet relations, the US would still have le-
verage for maintaining Sino-Soviet competition. The
moderates, having been strengthened by normaliza-
tion of the Sino-US relations, would probably allow
the logic of their thesis on enhancing China's status
to carry them even further in their pragmatic search
for power and prestige through conventional di-
plomacy and economic development. Indeed, given
the right circumstances, a moderate Chinese gov-
ernment might in the future be amenable to expand-
ing substantially its cultural, economic, and even
military ties with the West in general and the US
in particular. Should the Sino-US relationship ad-
vance along these lines, there is little doubt that
there would be serious Soviet concern, and that
this would express itself in increased Sino-Soviet
tension.
At the same time, expanded ties with the US
would over ti: -ie directly or indirectly provide
greater resources for meeting the military coalition's
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goal of strengthening China's military capabilities. tary, a development which in turn would con-
Arid an amelioration of irternal antagonisms on tribute to the strength and stability of a Ch:neso
this issue is likely to increase support for the mod- leadership coalition with vested interests in maiq-
erates among at least some elements of the mili- taining good relations with the US,
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