AUTHORITARIANISM AND MILITARISM IN SOUTHERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170029-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 1999
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: March 1, 1975
• Content Type: RS

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Research Study
A UTHORITARL4I*ISM AND
MILITARISM IN SOUTHERN
EUROPE
OPR 403
March 1975
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Subject to General Declassification Schedule
of E.O. 11652, Automatically Downgraded at
Two Year Intervals and Declassified on
March 1982
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE OF POLITICAL RESEARCH
AUTHORITARIANISM AND MILITARISM IN
SOUTHERN EUROPE
NOTE: This study was prepared by the Office of Political
Research. Other agencies and CIA offices were consulted, but the
study has not been formally coordinated and does not represent an
official CIA position. The issuing office is aware that the complex
and controversial matters discussed lend themselves to other in-
terpretations. Comments on the paper will be welcomed by the
author, , code 143, extension 5441.
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FOREWORD
This study, on Authoritarianism and Militarism in Southern
Europe, is a relatively new form of intelligence production, which the
issuing office has labelleca "functional research." The major purpose ;s
to analyze important political phenomena that are so common that
there is a tendency to take them for granted-either not to define them
at all or to define them in value terms that fit special cases. This series
attempts to provide value-free definitions and assessments that cut
across borders and regions and that offer intelligence officers and pol-
icy-makers alike a framework :~)r a more systematic grasp of subjects
they encounter regularly under many different guises.
The object of functional research, then, is to elaborate a useful
analytical framework for country and regional specialists as well as for
generalists. In this study, examines the circumstances un- 25X1A9a
der which the various forms of authoritarian rule tend to emerge and
persist, the characteristic strengths and weaknesses of such regimes,
and the constraints on the development of the prerequisites for stable
democratic practice. Subsequently, Spain, Yugoslavia, Portugal,
Greece, Italy, and Turkey are covered in case studies to indicate how
an assessment of authoritarian traditions and practices can serve to
complement and place into perspective other ways of examining the
complex issues determining the course of events in Southern Europe.
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Page
FOREWORD .............................................. iii
KEY JUDGMENTS ........................................ 1
THE DISCUSSION ......................................... 3
THE PROBLEM, THE APPROACH, AND THE
OBJECTIVES .......................................... 3
AUTHORITARIANISM .................................. 4
The Nature of the Beast ................................. 4
The Why and Wherefore ................................. 5
Strengths and Weaknesses ................................ 6
MILITARISM ........................................... 7
THE SCENE IN SOUTHERN EUROPE ................... 8
The Problems of Authoritarian Succession:
Spain and Yugoslavia .................................. 8
Spain ................................................ 8
rugoslavia ............................................ 11
Opening Pandora's Box: Portugal and Greece .............. 14
Portugal .............................................. 14
Greece ................................................ 18
Democratic Institutions in Jeopardy: Italy and Turkey ....... 22
Italy ................................................. 22
Turkey ............................................... 24
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS ...................... 27
v
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-Although it takes many different forms, modern day
authoritarianism can be viewed as a distinctive political
system-one which generally places far less arduous demands on a
society than either totalitarianism or representative democracy.
For many nations it is, in effect, the only feasible system of rule.
For many more, particularly for those with long-standing
authoritarian traditions, it offers an easy way out when an attempt
at democratic (or, in the case of Yugoslavia, totalitarian) practice
runs into trouble.
-The societal characteristics and problems that give rise to
military intervention and to prolonged or recurrent authoritarian
rule are similar, and these conditions tend to be especially
prevalent and pronounced in "developing" countries beset by the
disruptive impact of belated modernization.
-Even when civilians are at the helm, the internal dynamics of
authoritarian rule tend to keep the military involved in politics it a
significant way-whether as an active participant in policy-making
councils, an intermittent veto group, or simply the ultimate arbiter
of political strife.
-Thus, for most of the world today, authoritarianism and
militarism are norms, not aberrations. And if world-wide
economic strains continue to exacerbate the problems associated
with modernizing change, the chances are that both ph,?nomena
will become even more common in the decade ahead.
-Under certain circumstances, authoritarianism can be a fairly
stable and effective form of rule over comparatively long periods of
tim...-even in countries which have passed well beyond the initial
stages of social and economic development.
-Nevertheless, the key internal balances and trade-offs upon
which the successful operation and stability of authoritarian rule
depend are easily upset. Hence, most authoritarian regimes are
prone to recurrent crisis and political violence. And while such
domestic turbulence may trigger movement toward more efficient
and possibly more democratic government, it is more likely to
result in paralysis and the emergence of still another ineffective
authoritarian regime.
-As a long term proposition (i.e., anything over five years), direct
military rule has a propensity to suffer from a number of distinct
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and potentially serious weaknesses. But in the short to medium
term, it would seem to make little difference per see whether soldiers
or civilians head up an authoritarian regime.
-To be stable and effective, any non-totalitarian
regime-whether authoritarian or democratic-must b= in basic
consonance with prevailing customs and circumstances.
Moreover, a nation's political culture cannot be changed by fiat:
although far from immutable, its evolution is a function of overall
societal development.
-Succession presents a delicate problem for any authoritarian
regime. As illustrated by the atmosphere of uncertainty prevailing
in Spain and Yugoslavia today, this is particularly true of per-
sonalistic dictatorships. At best, both countries are likely to ex-
perience fairly lengthy periods of instability once their present
supreme leaders leave the scene.
-Efforts to establish representative democracy face formidable
obstacles in fragmented societies endowed with strong
authoritarian traditions and subject :o the destabilizing pressures
of rapid social and economic change. Portuguese prospects for a
relatively swift and orderly transition to democratic rule-poor
from the outset-are now virtually nil. And although Greece is off
to a far more promising start, there is at least an even chance that
it will revert to some form of authoritarian rule within the next five
to ten years.
-In both Italy and Turkey, weakly-rooted democratic institutions
are currently being tested by the combined weight of incongruous
traditions, pressures associated with modernizing change, and
world-wide economic strains. In Turkey, another interlude of'
direct or indirect military rule is a distinct possibility. And even in
Italy, the longer-term outlook for democratic rule is guarded.
-The outlook for Southern Europe as a whole over the next ten
years is for considerable turbulence and political experimentation.
And while the prospects for the survival or revival of democratic
practices vary widely throughout the area, the chances are that the
bulk of this experimentation will focus on differing forms of
authoritarian rule.
-There is a danger that this situation could result in the
emergence of new extremist dictatorships of either the left or the
right. Moreover, continued political instability alone might breed
xenophobic nationalism.
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THE PROBLEM, THE APPROACH, AND THE
OBJECTIVES
Over the past several decades, authoritarian
government and direct military intervention in politics
have been either constant or recurrent phenomena in
most countries of the world. Some observers, par-
ticularly those who perceive the widely disparate
manifestations of authoritarian rule as mutant or nas-
cent forms of totalitarianism or democracy, consider
this to be an unnatural and therefore transitory state
of affairs. This paper, how,:ver, is based on the
premise that, for all its variants, modern-day
authoritarianism is itself a distinctive system of
rule-one in essence neither totalitarian nor
democratic, and one in which the military establish-
ment generally plays a significant political role.
It is further postulated that the factors favoring
authoritarianism and militarism are similar, and that
these factors tend to be especially prevalent and po-
tent in "developing" countries beset by the destabiliz-
ing effects of belated modernization. To put it
directly, for most of the world toda,, authoritarianism
and militarism are norms not aberrations. Indeed, the
only practical governmental alternatives for a very
large number of nations are between different kinds of
authoritarian rule-rather than between
authoritarianism on the one hand, and either
democracy or totalitarianism on the other. And if
world-wide economic strains continue to exacerbate
the problems associated with modernization and
development, the chances are that both
authoritarianism and militarism will become even
more common in the decade ahead.
The principal objectives of this research study are
(1) to examine the causes, nature, and consequences
of authoritarian rule and of the separate but overlap-
ping phenomenon of direct military intervention in
political affairs, and (2) to assess the local and inter-
national implications of both. Although the obser-
vations and judgments concerning authoritarianism
and militarism advanced herein are intended to have
broad applicability, the geographic focus of the paper
is limited to the non-totalitarian states of Southern
Europe.
Why Southern Europe ? First of all, most recent ef-
forts to explore the sources and effects of
authoritarianism and militarism have retained a
rather traditional focus on the demonstrably
"backward" members of the international com-
munity; hence, there is a distinct analytical gap to be
filled. Then too, the US has a major strategic stake in
the Mediterranean Basin. Although there are other
regions that share this distinction, there is no
other area where so many unsettling trends and
forces-including nationalism, modernization,
irredentism, religious and ethnic conflict, great power
competition and intervention, and the personal am-
bitions of the individual leaders-are as openly and as
vigorously at play. Because of this, the internal af-
fairs of states which border the Mediterranean or its
approaches tend to be particularly likely to spill over
onto the international stage.
Moreover, the turbulent course of political
developments in Southern Europe over the past cen-
tury provides ample illustration of the nature,
strength, and persistence of authoritarian imperatives
in developing countries; the diversity in form and
direction of military intervention and authoritarian
rule; and authoritarianism's fundamental strengths
and weaknesses as a modern-day political system.
Within the memory of living man, Spain, Portugal,
Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey have all ex-
perienced recurrent and prolonged periods of
authoritarian rule. Three a the six are currently en-
dowed with incontestably authoritarian regimes. Of
the remainder, only Italy has clung to a democratic
form of government throughout the post-World War
II era-setting something of a record for political in-
stability and inefficiency in the process.
There are, of course, innumerable factors that will
influence the evolution of domestic and foreign policy
in Southern Europe. It is not the purpose of this paper
to proffer some sort of quick and easy substitute for
painstaking case-by-case analysis. Rather, it is hoped
that the generalizations about authoritarianism and
militarism and the brief country assessments set forth
below will furnish a useful analytical framework for
more definitive country studies.
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It is perhaps more difficult tcday than ever before to
group governments into neat categories. Not only are
there nearly twice as many independent countries
than just a decal= or so ago, but in most cases there is
little correlation between constitutional pretension
and political practice. Although nearly all contem-
porary regimes claim to be democratic, relatively few
can be classified as representative democracies by any
meaningful definition of the term. An even smaller
number can usefully be considered totalitarian dic-
tatorships. The remainder can be divided up in many
ways. It ;s postulated here, however, that for all their
variety the governments of most post-traditional
societies fall within the bounds of a third and less
demanding system of rule: authoritarianism.'
The Nature of the Beast
In an authoritarian system, predominant power is
exercised by a single leader or narrow autocratic elite
neither responsible to the general public nor fully sub-
ject to legal restraints. At the same time, however, a
limited number of relatively autonomous special
interest groups can and do influence the political proc-
ess. This last-mentioned trait-hereafter subsumed
under the rubric of limited political pluralism-re-
quires special emphasis: of all characteristic features
of authoritarianism, it is perhaps the most critical to
understanding the dynamics and limitations of the
system.
Although the leaders-ip of an authoritarian regime
effectively stands abovt the law, its freedom of action
is restricted in often p~ edictable ways by the constant
need to manage and manipulate interest group
pressures and conflict. Control is maintained through
a combination of repression of clearly inimical in-
dividuals or groups and conscious efforts to play the
remaining political actors off against each other in
such a way that none becomes strong enough to
challenge the existing order or even to appear to offer
a viable alternative. This is hardly an easy task at
best; and, as will be illustrated in subsequent discus-
Professor Joan,). Linz is one of the foremost academic proponents of
the concept of a distinctive authoritarian system of rule. Linz's earliest
and most complete statement of his model is presented in his "An
Authoritarian Regime: Spain," in Cleavages, Ideologies, and Party
.Syslrnts, cd. Erik Allardt and Yrjo Littunen (Helsinki: Wcstcrmark
Society, 1964), lip. 291-342.
sion of potential succession problems in Spain and
Yugoslavia, its difficulty increases with the number
and variety of groups whose interests must be taken
into account.
Directly or indirectly, the armed foress play a key
role in the establishment of any authoritarian regime.
Thereafter, even if power passes to (or remains in)
civilian hands, latent instability and the con-
flict-oriented dynamics of authoritarian rule usually
insure that the military establishment continues to
play a significant political role-whether as an active
participant in policy-making councils, an intermittent
veto group, or simply the ultimate arbiter of political
strife.
The internal dynamics of authoritarian rule also
impose certain practical constraints on ideological ri-
gidity, electoral practices, and even levels of popular
political mobil iz,ition.-Within these bounds, however,
authoritarianism can take many forms-not only with
respect to general ideological orientation, but (as il-
lustrated by variations in the number and type of
political parties found under authoritarian rule) in
terms of organizational structure as well. For ex-
ample, all political parties were banned during
Greece's recent interlude of military.-ule. Both Spain
and Yugoslavia presen'ly have one-party systems, but
Franco's National Movement and Tito's League of
Communists are poles apart in terms of functional
role and institutional strength. There are multi-party
authoritarian systems as well: what might be termed
the "predominant party" type has long beer: ex-
emplified by -political practice, while an of-
ficially imposed two-party variant is currently
employed in Brazil. 25X6
Although it is generally relatively easy to dis-
tinguish a multi-party authoritarian regime from a
representative democracy, the dividing line between
authoritarianism and totalitarian dictatorship at the
other end of the political spectrum is less evident.
Indeed, many non-democratic governments seem to
'Even though efforts to rally and organize the population may be re-
quired at certain critical points in the evolution of any authoritarian
regime, the sort of sustained and extensive politicization of the citizenry
found in both representative demos. acics and totalitarian dictatorships
is basically incompatible with the domestic imperatives of limited
pluralism. In time, such politicization would simply overtax the system
by whetting popular expectations, generating a destabilizing prolifr a-
tion of groups seeking to influence the political process, and alienating
those established elites which were threatened with the loss or diminu-
tion of their traditional prerogatives.
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exhibit some or all of the traits generally attributed
to totalitarianism.' But on close examination, only the
more rigid Communist regimes seem to fill the bill.
For example, in all, other possible candidates for this
distinction, the monopoly parties lack the cohesion
and political clout of their counterparts in the classic
Fascist, Nazi, and Soviet models. Political repression is
commonplace, but vigorous efforts to employ the full
range of totalitarian thought and behavior controls
are notably lacking. And while lip service may be paid
to the goal of a monolithic society, conflicting interests
are both recognized and-within limits-tolerated as
essential to the operation of the authoritarian system.'
The Why and Wherefore
Under most circumstances, authoritarianism places
far less arduous demands on a society than either
totalitarianism or representative democracy. In ad-
dition, it is adaptable to a wide range of local con-
ditions. For many nations it is, in effect, the only, feasi-
ble system of rule. For many more-particularly for
those with long-standing authoritarian traditions-it
offers an easy way out when an attempt at democratic
practice runs into trouble.
There are many factors which bear on the establish-
ment and persistence of authoritarian rule-a fact un-
derscored by that phenomenon's seemingly capricious
record.` Among these, cultural and historical heritage
(e.g., the constellation of hierarchical, patronal, and
corporatist customs that make up the so-called
"Iberian tradition"), deep-seated societal cleavages and
conflicts, external inspiration and pressures, and the accident
of charismatic leadership frequently play particularly
prominent roles. But in recent years at least, the key
catalytic factor has most often seemed to be the disrup-
'A particularly comprehensive listing of the characteristic features of
totalitarianism is provided in Carl J. Friedrich and Zbrgnicw K.
Brzezinski, 7bin/ilanarr Dulalarhip and ;Iulonac. Second Edition
(Cambridge: ! lanyard University Press, 1965), pp. 22-23.
Since no totalitarian system has been able to repress all pluralistic
tendencies, the difference here is one of degree. Indeed, it can be argued
from the slow but steady rise in the influence of professionally-based
sub-elites in he USSR that the Soviet system is itself inching toward
authoritarianism.
`Authoritarian regimes have emerged as the result of breakdowns o
colonial rule, of traditional societies. and of existing democrrcies. At
least one (Yugoslavia's) grc,?. out of an infant and ill-starred totalitarian
dictatorship. Some have persisted, changing in nature and leadership
over time. Others have given way to more democratic forms of
government. often only to reemerge in new guise just a few, years later.
lire, impact n social and economic changes associated a ith
rnodernitiation.'
Not only does the modernization process itself favor
efforts to centralize and expand political authority.
but by fostering political lag or political decay, it can
result in it breakdown of domestic order and a con-
seq.lcnt imposition (or reimposition) of authoritarian
rule. Political lag may be defined simply as the failure
of political development (particularly ins?itution-
building) to keep pace with socio-economic develop-
ment. Political decay refers to the actual breakdown
of established political institutions which, for one
reason or another. are no longer suited to the times.
Although felt everywhere, the destabilizing effects
of modernizing change are quite naturally most
pronounced-and most widespread-among states
that are still in an early or middle stage of social and
economic development.- The problems faced by such
nations are enormous. Rapid increases in literacy, ex-
posure to mass media, industrialization, urbanization,
and per capita income expand the politicaay relevant
segment of the population and generate a sharp rise in
expectations. Whether or not such factors as poverty
of natural resources or traditional ethnic animosities
pose additional complications, the general prolifera-
tion of new social forces and requirements places great
strains on existing political institutions. And if these
prove resistant to or incapable of necessary adap-
tation, cithsr political lag or political decay ensues.
A society thus afflicted generally enters (o lapses
back into) what political scientists now commonly
refer to as a praetorian phase, i.e., one characterized by
the politicization of all significant social groupings
and the lack of political institutions strong enough to
mediate, refine, and moderate their interaction."
Under these conditions, contending groups in-
A detailed analysis of the political ramifications of xxio-e(vnonhir
change will be presented in ()PR's forthcoming 7hr 1'../tn !
Inrplnu!nnn ../.1ludrnu_anon: The Bra-i/tan Caw.
s a group. x?sc countries n rg h ies c Iiarai(cri7c(i as nc-
tims of /,/,I pd ehvrlopmrnt. 11'IhctIwr because of foreign (Ion I ination.
geographic or se;f-imposed isolation, the strength of traditional
customs and institutions, or a combination of these and other fac-
tors, all of them were rather late entrants in the modernization
game. And lo add to the other probtenhs they face in trying to catch
up, the destabilizing impact of social and economic change ill-
creases with its uacc
'A detailed analysis of practorianism is provided in Samuel I'. Ilun-
tington's t'difsa) Order in Cha,iitn& .Coitrlir., (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 19681, pp. 79-82 and 192-263. CPYRGHT
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creasingly resort to various forms of direct action (e.g.,
bribery, coercion, terrorism, work stoppages. and
demonstrations), and the military establishment is in-
evitably drawn towai d the center of the political stage.
The overall situation strongly favors the imposition of
a iaw?-and-order authoritarian solution, even if only on
an interim basis. Indeed, in those countries which by
dint of local circumstance habitually seem to suffer
from ,, lack of strong political institutions, military
coups and revolving-door authoritarian governments
have become characteristic features of the political
scene.
Strengths and Weaknesses
Obviously, authoritarianism is far from a sure-fire
cure for socio-economic growing pains. Its repeated
and sometimes dramatic failures are evidence enough
of this. But most of these failures have occurred under
circumstances which would have made it very difficult
to establish and maintain any sort of effective
government. Effectual rule is, in fact, an elusive quali-
ty for most of the v.?orld; whatever the form of
government, the requirements are stringcnt.
At the minimum, effective political authority-the
power to promote and, when necessary, to guide basic
societal change-requires (1) the consent (or at least
passive acceptance) of most of the governed and (2)
the suph ?rt of those institutions which, individually or
collectively, have been entrusted with a virtual
monopoly over the means of coercive force. The first is
in large part a function of political organization and
legitimacy. The second is basically a question of sub-
ordinating the armed forces and paramilitary police to
government direction. Both are characteristic features
of stable democracies and totalitarian dictatorships.
By extension, they are critical to the performance and
prospects of an authoritarian regime as well.
In practice, the form, general orientation, effec-
tiver.ss, and stability of any given authoritarian
t,;ime are conditioned by the interplay of a host of in-
ternal and external variables. But even though the mix
of operative factors is aifferent in every case, these are
certain general problem areas bearing an the question
of effective political authority that are common to all.
Hence it is possible to gauge the outlook for a par-
ticular authoritarian government on the basis of its
performance with respect to a fey: basic tasks. Briefly
stated. they are:
-Cenlralu e and e?.rpnrd political power. Stable
authoritarian rule rests on clear-cut hierarchical
relationships. Yugoslav ex: ?ience illustrates how
elusive this goal can be in a country where cultural-
ly and economically based aspirations for greater
regional autonomy are strong.
-Develop an aura of legit man through some combination
of trod:tional, charisnmlic, and legal-rational con-
suleralion.c. The short lived loannidis regime in
Greece was particularly deficient in this regard.
-Fstahlish stable political institutions ( i.e., organi. alions
and procedures much are both effective and valued in their
own ri{'hl i. The importance of this task is sometimes
obscured by the personal skill and stature of
leaders like Tito and Franco. Nevertheless, in the
absence of political institutions capable of accom-
modating conflicting societal interests and of
mediating inter-elite disputes, a society will retain
strong praetorian tendencies..' And this, in turn, will
increase the chances of popular alienation, more
frequent resort to repression and violence, and
bitterly contested succession.
-Rationalize and increase the comprten(v )f the
o ernmcnlal bureaucrac v. This is essential because the
administrative apparatus nat only plays a major
role in determining economic performance, itself it
key factor affecting domestic harmony, but also
substitutes for political action as the primary
means for assuring social ordt-r and justice. In
Spain, for example, bureaucratic shortcomings
have undercut efforts to use a combination of social
welfare programs, paternalistic labor laws, and
elaborate grievance procedures to mute demands
for politically independent trade unions.
--Co-opt or neutralize potential challen{rrs at an early
slq{'e-particularly those alts are members of, or allied
with, dissident factions within the military establuhmenl.
As amply illustrated by the e ;serience of most
authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe d firing
the past fifteen years alone, the conflict-oriented
dynamics of limited pluralism generate a special
need in this regard. They also require development
of it parallel capacity to defuse potentially conten-
tious domestic and foreign policy issues through it
flexible mix of repression, compromise, and diver-
sion-lest these issues polarize the society and
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thus deprive th,, regime of much of its room for ma-
neuver and base of support.
Although this list of chores seems formidable, weak
performance in one or another field is often at least
temporarily offset by such things ; rising living stan-
dards or charismatic leadership. Indeed, the record
shows that under certain circumstances,
authoritarianism can be a fairly stable and effective
form of rule over comparatively long periods of
time-even in states that have reached a complex and
demanding middle stage of social and economic
development.
\~rirlhrlru, file lea ndrrrm! ',alrnrrr~ urrd bade-,ff
nf,"n ;,ltr,lr ll;r t,r~~r,~ (1 ,~/'mee't?n goof ,l'rhrltlt ?I
'IuIlr"rrlurr,nr ruL err, ,:,rlt ,(f,,,1. Ilencc,
most ;nnhorit;man rc?ginu?s arc. I ront? to re( urr'ni
crisis and revert to political yiolcn' e (both goycrn-
trtcnt-'ponsored and oppositi?nisi 1. tiontetintcs such
turbulence serves as ;t (atillyst for (.%()lutionary h;ulge?
tox\ard more efficient and possibly more (lento( ratio
government. \Iorc often it results in paralysis and
the c?ntergcnce of still another ine?ffe(tile authoritar-
ian regime.
.\110111'I, clear systemic cyeakness stems front Ili(,
fact that, unlike repre'se'nt;ttiye dc?mocrae y, autltor-
itari;tnisni has no built-in mini h;ntistn for orderl\
political succession. Thus each auttloritarian regime
must clcyisc its own, it rc?yuircnunt cyhich adds ur-
gency to the need to Legitimize .end institutionalize
its rule. P,?rsonal dictatorships ;ire p;uiicul,trly yul-
m?railc? to so ace ?ssiott rlifiaulti's. -'.%vn if. 1,k' I'r;nuo
join Tito. the supreme ruler makes claboi,ite are;otgc-
tnents for succession. inclttrling constitutional Itro-
yisions for till. division of his offices ;tnd pocyc?rs. Ili(-
basic components of this lit-%% system are liken to he
dornnl111 111(1 untested until alter hc? has ;u to;illy de-
parted the'c'ne. I'hen. ill the ihsc?ncr? of his stthilii-
ing inllucnce. they tnay protc imuiip;thle of function-
ing ;is intemlcd.
Although the fact that both the conditions \shi(i,
I;n or authoritarian rule ;nil tf,e (I\ t)inttlt( s of the
ystcnt itself tend to draw the rrtilit;try into po.ilies in
I ?,I gill Inn the or l,l , ni,ynr oil Ior nrh,r ers. tor oil( rlrt of , tI I it if llr
,tn?r it rlr,rl,,lnnrIt (,I [I I,e , rude) drtinrrl I. ,tgnihutL! a Irrr ,,trite
It AI' in unrrnt fools., i t I,rhsren Ssi$I wit 5' INNI
a major lIlly hits been established in prcyious (It,-
ctission. some. Itirther nIscryations about the causes
arid aonscyttcncc?s of military intcnclii on are clc amly
in Order, .?pc?cifi( ally. cs hat seems to bte the reason for
till. im resin' iticidenc ,? of direct military rule.' \\ IIi
are th'rc sit( It nt;rrked sari,rtions in the form and di-
rcrtion of the political role I,Ia\ed by Ilii' rnilitar\ in
dills r( nt aouniri; s.' .\rc ntilita?-y rc,,,inu's inhc r'ntly
;nty utter or i~orsc than cicihirl ,nuho,ir,tri:In
rrgirn'.'
The motive's which move. military men to direct a(--
tion in tin' political arena are usually contolcx. I'lle
mix varies according to time and Idace. but almost
always includes three distinct ;eras of concern--per-
son;tl. institutional. lend so(ictill. 'sontctirnes atn-
hitions. grievance s over p;n ;Ind promotion. or
casincss oycr polio irs or trends Ishich appear to
threaten the perquisites ;end power of the nu1itar~ es-
tablishment clearly preclontinate?. But in a gro\s irtg
ntrtnher of cases, these c onsidc?r,tu,,ns .cent to li ii,'
been strongly rcinforc'd, if not otcrshadosycd, by fear
that 'c onnrlti( or political ntisntanagcrncnt 1511.
threatening to Icad ihc? nation to the brink of disaster.
'I'll(- process of rtroderniivion has, in fact. in-
creasingly affected both military motive's ;tnd
cap: bilitics with respect to direct intersention in
political affairs. Proliferation of domestic missions
Ie.g., counterinsurgency. riot control. and cryic ac-
tions. corresponding changes in the curricula of ad-
yanced trtilit;try schools. and the inf1m,11(c of foreign
ideas 111(1 dcy'loprrtents have rotrtbined to increase.
the Level of soli:If aw;trcncss tsithiti the military es-
tahlislttnc?nts of many (ountrirs-and to generate' a
consensus that prescry:ttio11 of national security
demands prompt and energetic rffitrts to nods<
pressing ec onorrti(. '0)1111. and politic 11 probhcrrts.
Par;?liel dc~clopntcnt. however gradual, of tier
m,,nageriol skills and hcnc,nurati( resources has
Ii?ncfrcl to it)( rc?,tse the confidence of military Leaders. in
their 'uniyn' ability to annhzr? and cop' pith their
country's ills. Not surprisingly, the cut'rgencc Of this
null breed of soldicr-te, hnocrat has been a((orrt-
panied by a (Fstinc t trend u,ward: i I 1 rnilit,try in-
ie?r%cntions cchi(h lire institutional rather than
per- it) rt,rture. and (2) both longer oil ntoirfrr-
yu 'Ill inter hides of dircc t military rill'.
Nesrrthefess, no n;ttionaI litrry '
tahlishntc?nt no , tatter ilhal its size or degrre of
profc?ssin.diiatlot) is .1 monolithic institution. In
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fact, with few exceptions, each tends to reflect the
currents and divisions affecting the country at large.
Thus, while it is possible to catalog the conditions
which invite military intervention, the form and direc-
tion that such intervention takes, in any given case,
will depend on which military faction seizes the ini-
tiative and which domestic allies it chooses to court
or support.
Although the effectiveness of each military regime
must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, aggregate
data analysis suggests that, in the short to medium
term at least, it makes little difference per se whether
soldiers or civilians hold the reins of power. It seems
that military regimes tend to impose more restrictions
on political activity, achieve greater success in
promoting economic growth in very poor countries,
and do less to develcp primary education than their
authoritarian civilian counterparts, (Contrary to pop-
ular belief, non-military authoritarian regimes tend to
spend more on defense.) Apart from these findings,
the differences in overall economic and political per-
formance appear to be negligible."'
As a long-term proposition (i.e., anything over five
years), however, direct military rule has a propensity
to suffer from a number of potentially serious
weaknesses, including: (1) inadequate political in-
stitutionalization; (2) a lack of compensating
charismatic leadership; and (3) increasing fac-
tionalism within the military establishment itself. The
ill-fated Papadopoulos regime in Greece provides a
case in point.
But even though these profession-related short-
comings are in time likely to afflict any predominantly
military regime, there is an offsetting tendency for
civil-military distinctions to become blurred under
authoritarian rule. Most military regimes co-opt a
large number of civilians into key posts. Moreover,
soldier politicians are soon confronted with a number
of problems-including, ironically enough, the need
to insure continued subordination of the armed forces
to political authority-which both limit their options
and tend to have an erosive effect on their old in-
stitutional loyalties and ties. Franco Spain provides a
clear example of the civilianization of whit was ini-
tially a r,r!itary dictatorship.
'Based on unpublished papers presented at the 1974 Annual
;Meeting of the American Political Science Association.
THE SCENE IN SOUTHERN EUROPE
Not since the earliest phases of the Cold War has
the political future of the whole "soft underbelly" of
Europe seemed so uncertain. Authoritarian Spain and
Yugoslavia both face potentially serious succession
problems. Portuguese efforts to establish democratic
rule have already encountered formidable obstacles.
Although off to a promising start, Greek efforts to the
same end bode well to run into similar difficulties over
time. For its part, Italian democracy seems shakier
than ever. And given the cumulatively destabilizing
impact of recent events on Turkey's political scene, it
would scent wise not to bet too heavily on the
longevity of that country's latest experiment with
democracy.
Just how serious-the potential ramifications of such
instability are-including the degree and significance
of the "leftist threat" to NATO interests-must of
course, be determined through case-by-case analysis
in which due account is taken of all significant inter-
nal and external variables. No such ambitious under-
taking is attempted here. Rather, it is the purpose of
the brief country assessments in this section to under-
score the persistence of authoritarian traditions and
imperatives in Southern Europe and to indicate how
these are likely to influence the future course of events
in the countries concerned.
The Problems of Authoritarian Succession:
Spain and Yugoslavia
Franco has been political master of Spain since
1939, Tito of Yugoslavia since 1945. Both preside over
fragmented societies with strong authoritarian
traditions. Now in their eighties, both have
made-and have partially implemented-- elaborate
arrangements for the passage of political power to
their heirs. And both have blithely short-circuited
these arrangements whenever some key subordinate
or interest group seemed to step out of line.
Spain"
In some ways, Spanish political problems are the
easier to isolate and analyze. For one thing, despite
"'I'he brief Spanish country assessment presented here constitutes an
abridged and updated version of OPR's The Spanish Succession: Strains
in The, Pall-1'ranco Authoritarian Syslrn,, November 1974, That paper
was followed by a more extensive analysis of the Spanish scene in
OPR's Thr Polities of 1 inerrlainly: Spain Prepares for the Yost-1.lanen Era,
February 1975.
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troublesome regional frictions and dispariti'cs, Spain's
population is culturally and ethnically more homo-
geneous than Yugoslavia's. For another, Franco's
system of rule is conceptually simpler than'i'itoism. It
is neither revolutionary in nature nor burdened by an
elaborate guiding ideology. Contrary to Yugoslav
practice, it presupposes maintenance of relatively low
levels of popular political mobilization and con-
sciousness. Partly for these reasons, and partly
because the spectre of foreign pressures and interven-
tion has not-or at least not since 1950-loomed so
large in Madrid's domestic policy calculations, the
post-World War II evolution of authoritarian rule in
Spain has been far less erratic than in Yugoslavia.
For over 30 years, Franco has managed to (1) main-
tain the unswerving loyalty of the Spanish military es-
tablishment, (2) sustain and dominate a governing
coalition of basically conservative hr.t otherwise quite
disparate elites, (3) neutralize his most dangerous
domestic foes, and (4) retain the positive-if
passive-acceptance of the majority of his
countrymen. Moreover, although political inhibitions
born of memories of bloody civil war have faded,
Spain's strong economic performance during the
1960's and early 1970's has given more people a
genuine-if fragile-stake in Franco's system than
ever before.12
Nevertheless, Franco has failed to establish the
tried and trusted political institutions needed to
perpetuate his system once he has left the scene. Of all
the institutions he has created, only the cabinet has
developed any vitality. The rest have simply lain dor-
mant pending the succession or have been discredited
as compliant appendages of dictatorial rule.
In fact, despite Madrid's willingness to
countenan"e a few mildly liberalizing reforms,
Spanish political development has simply not kept
pace with the changes in social structure and outlook
generated by vigorous economic growth and increas-
''Despite substantial infusions of US aid during the 1950's, Spanish
economic growth had been impeded-and was ultimately halted
altogether-by highly autarchic policies born of early Fascist inspira-
tion and hardened by necessity during a decade of isolation. In 1959,
however, with Spanish per capita GNP threatening to hover indefinitely
below 8500, technocratic elements persuaded Franco to adopt a sweep-
ing and outward-looking program of economic reform,:Thc results were
dramatic. Spain quickly achieved (and, with the exception of a tem-
porary showdown in 1970-1971, has until recently maintained) one of
the highest growth rates in Europe. By the beginning of 1974, per capita
GNP had soared to 81,750.
ing exposure to foreign influences. As a result, Fran-
co's once finely tuned system has been thrown out of
kilter-as evidenced by mounting labor unrest, in-
creasing polarization of' the political scene, along
liberal and conservative lines, and renewed agitation
for Basque and Catalonian autonomy."
By and large, Franco's personal authority and
prestige have served to offset this growing imbalance.
But now, in a climate further unsettled both by
worldwide economic strains and by recent events in
Portugal, Spanish politics are threatening to reacquire
a praetorian character. And while Franco's system is
not yet beyond salvation, the ability of' his su'xessors
to halt its erosion is likely to be significantly impaired
by the complexity of the largely untested governmen-
tal structure they will inherit.
Not only will the title of Caudillo and the extraor-
dinary constitutional powers which render Franco
"responsible only to God and history" die with him,
but the checks and balances he has built into his
succession arrangements provide ample ammunition
for a multi-faceted power struggle once he is gone.
Theoretically, Franco's designee for future King,
37-year old Prince Juan Carlos de Borbon, will oc-
cupy the key positions-Chief of State, Generalissimo
of the Armed Forces, and Chief of the National
Movement (an organization which some years ago
superseded the Falange Espanola Tradicionalista as
Spain's sole legal political "party"). But the Prime
Minister will control the government machinery, and
either he or the minister concerned will have to
approve every decision taken by the King as Chief of
State. Moreover, although Juan Carlos will be legally
empowered to resolve disputes between the cabinet,
the Cortes (legislature), and the judiciary, Franco's
role of supreme arbiter will have passed elsewhere-to
the previously somnolent Council of the Realm,"
"The terms conservative and liberal take on distinctive meanings
when applied to Spanish politics. Far from simply evincing a cautious
attitude toward change, Spanish conservatives feel uncomfortable with
Franco's modest political reforms (aprrtora) and would resist, by force
if necessary, any significant shift in the balance of political power
toward populism. 't'hus, the whole political spectrum is skewed to
the right, and many Spaniards who might be classified as liberals
by outside observers would be considered centrists in a more
democratic society.
"'Ilse Council of the Realm has 17 members: 7 ex officio (the Presi-
dent of the Cbrtes, the senior prelate among the members of the
Cortex, the Senior military officer on active duty, the Chief of the
high General Staff, and the Presidents of the Supreme Court,
Council of State, and Institute of Sprain) and 10 elected from among
the groups represented in the Cortes.
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This last is a grave responsibility to place wl a
collegiale body composed of representatives of dis-
parate ,groups. In I'ac:t, given the growing rift between
liberal and conservative forces in Spain, Franco's
whole succession scheme could prove close to on-
workable. The projected diffusion of effective political
power is not only likely to widen existing cracks in
Spain's governing coalition, but initially, at least, it
promises to letul disproportionate advantage to the
political right wing.
'T'hus, despite the fact that ,Juan Carlos and Prime
Minister Carlos Arias--who is expected to retain his
ptest:nl post for at least a few months alter Franco's
departure--both favor further social and political
refornts, they may simply lack the clout to implement
controversial change. Moreover, should the two for
any reason come to an early parting of the ways,.Juan
Carlos could easily end up with a Prime Minister less
amenable to rrt'orm. ()f' tile half dozen men currently
considered to be leading contenders for the job, only
one, damsel Fraga Iribarnc, seems to be as interested
as the present Prime Minister in liberalizing the
system.
Much, of course, will depend on how Spain's prin-
cipal political actors interpret and execute their new
roles once Franco leaves the scene. But unless the in-
creasingly evident failure of Portugal's
recently-launched attempt at democratization greatly
discourages Spain's evermore numerous proponents
of' liberalizing change, any prolonged stalemate over
the pace of' reform will exacerbate the polarization of
Spanish society. In the absence of healthy political in-
stitutions, Franco's successors will then be hard
pressed to contain either inter-elite disputes or grow-
ing popular discontent. Most importantly, perhaps,
they will lack a strong and broadly based supportive
political party capable of co-opting moderate op-
position leaders and of giving their views some
representation in the (. rtes and top advisory councils.
(In their present configuration, neither the introverted
and elitist National Movement nor any of Spain's
newly-authorized and still embryonic "political
associations" are equipped for this role.) Currently
threatening economic problems could easily com-
pound these woes." And if' domestic turbulence
-"" Even under the best of conditions, Madrid might find it difficult to
satisfy popular appetites whetted by a decade of rising living standards.
As it is. Spain's economic prospects have recently been clouded by in-
flationary pressures, the increased cost of petroleum, and the general
deterioration ('I the economic picture in Europe. lie last has already
found reflection in shrinking earnings from Spain's important tourist in-
clustty and in a decline in ,job opportunities for-and hard currency
remittances front-nearly one million Spanish emigrant workers.
reaches serious proportions, one or another faction of
Spain's long quiescent military establishment can be
expected to emerge from the political shadows :iad
attempt to impose. its own solution.
In such an event, no duplication of' recent events in
Portugal would be likely-at least not over the next
several years. Although a few younger officers un-
cloubtedfy secretly sympathize with the goals and
behavior of their militant contemporaries in Lisbon,
the Spanish military establishment--untroubled by
I'rustrations horn of' seemingly pointless and endless
colonial wars-remains, on balance, fundamentally
loyal to Franco and his system. It is, however, divided
over how much political reform is desirable in the
post-Franco era. It is also divided over the question of
what political role the armed forces should play.
A small but growing liberal minority, incorporating
officers of' all ages and ranks, favors faster and more
mesutingful political and social reforms-an objective
these officers recognize might at some point oblige the
military to inject itself directly into the policy-snaking
process. At the other end of the spectrum, a somewhat
more outspoken group opposes any relaxation of
authoritarian rule and vigorously maintains that the
military should and must assume active responsibility
lot' Spain's political future. The rest of the Spanish of-
ficer corps, including a majority of its ambitious but
economically insecure junior members, would seem to
prefer to avoid a more active political role and would
probably support any regime its Madrid as long as it
seemed reasonably capable of maintaining order,
preserved the essential features of Franco's system,
and did not threaten military prerogatives.
But whatever their other differences, it is clear that
most Spanish officers agree that the military has the
right and duty to intervene in the event of a serious
and prolonged breakdown of domestic order. And
since the direction and duration of such intervention
would depend on which factional grouping seized the
initiative and the sources of its civilian support, a
relatively small shift in the current balance of forces
within the military establishment could significantly
affect Spanish political fortunes in the decade ahead.
All told, Spanish circumstances and traditions still
favor some form of authoritarian rule. But while
Spanish society has yet to develop the preconditions
for stable democracy, it has just clearly outgrown the
limits of the sort of rigid dictatorship that hardline
conservative elements might seek to impose. In any
event, the outlook is for a lengthy period of instability
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caused by contention not only between the liners for
and against liberalizing ch"Inge, but among Ihc
different power elements in I'ranco's succession
s'h'at' as well.
This potential for long terns instability is a matter
for legitimate concern for the West. At worst, chronic
domestic turbulence could in time give rise to a
radical dictatorship of' either the left or right -- even-
tualities which, each in its own way, would pose
serious problems for NATO. Short of this, the in-
security of its donu'stic position might prompt an
otherwise modern' and instinctively pro-Western
government in Madrid to adopt an assertive
nationalism which might prejudice U.S. interests with
respect to basing rights, trade promotion, private in-
vestment, and the whole issue of Gibraltar and the
Gibraltar Straits,
Yugoslavia
Spain's troubles pale beside those of Yugoslavia.
The latter's survival as a multinational state has, in
fact, been one of the minor miracles of our times. Ever
since 1918, when their country was established on the
ruins of the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires, the
Yugosla''s have been struggling to modernize their
economy, to protect themselves against the
hegemonistic, or irredentist aspirations of outside
powers, and most importantly, to forge a united
nation out of peoples previously separated and set
against each other by geography, historical circurn-
stance, and cultural influence. In none of these
endeavors, particularly the last, have they been wholly
successful.
Indeed, the havoc wrought by the deep-seated an-
tagonisms which divide Yugoslavia's constituent
nationalities has been formidable." TThey doomed
"Many of these antagonisms have their roots in the ages-old division
of the Balkans between the Latin Catholic \Vest and the Creek
Orthodox Past. ( )then grew out of the five centuries of't'urkish rule suf-
Icred by the forebears of the citizens of southern and central Yugoslavia
following the defeat of the Serbs at the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. Indeed,
despite the common Slavic origin of most of its citizens, Yugoslavia's
ethnic terrain is unquestionably the most varied and complex in
Europe.
- hive official languages are employed in the conduct of the country's
domestic and foreign affairs.
--A third of its people are Roman Catholics. Slightly more are of Ser-
bian Orthodox persuasion. One in eight is a Muslim.
-Approximately 40 percent of its 21 million inhabitants are Serbs, 22
percent are Croats, 9 percent are Slovenes, G percent are
Macedonians, 2.5 percent are Montenegrins, 6.5 percent are of Alba-
nian origin, and 3 percent are ethnically Hungarian. Bosnian
Muslims (about 8.5 percent) and numerous lesser nationality groups
make up the remainder.
l(rlgra le s initial experiment with (Icrtttrcrary, under-
ttt;tx'd subsequent efforts at centralized authoritari;ut
yule, and facilitated the easy victory scored by (;cr-
nutn invasion firers in curly 1941, A few nttrnllis lairr
Ihcy flitted into a bloody civil war which sornrtiturs
obscured an otherwise magnificent resist; awe effort,
look over 7(10,000 lives, and pawed the way for the cs-
tablishmcnt of it post-war St;tlinist-styli (:onumntist
reginu? under josip Bear, Tito. 'l'ode)', reinforced by
growing disparities in rcgiortal levels ('I well-bring,
Ihcse altagortistns still lie at the trait of most of
Yugoslavia's political and social problems --;and not a
few of the ccononric out's its well.
Faced with the need to develop wider domestic and
international support ill the wake of Yugoslavia's ex-
pulsion from the Soviet lilac, Tito cast aside Stalinist
practices in 195(1 and launched his country onto ;tat
uncharted course toward what might be termed
pluralistic socialism---a highly sophisticated variant of
authoritarian rule expressly tailored to local circum-
stances. Within limits, 'I'ito's answer to the cpucstion
of how best to deal with regional urges for greater
autonomy and other particularistic int^rest.s has been
to accomniodate theta. For example, he has made the
r'egular and active participation of a wide ver'i'ty of
regional organs, federal bodies, and special interest
groups (e.g., youth, labor, professional, and
ccononric) in the process of government an indispen-
sable feature of his political systems. I It' has vigorously
applied the principle of proportional ethnic represen-
tation to all key institutions, including, as far as
possible, the military establishment. ;\nd until
rcccntly, at least, he has presided over a gradual
decentralization of authority-not only to Yugo-
slavia's eight constituent republics and provinces.
but heyom(1 as well to the communes (npclirrrr.+
which now constitute the nation's basic socio-polit-
ical units.
AlthOUgh Yugoslavia's post-1950 evolution has
been troubled, it demonstrates that authoritarian rule
can be (I) very flexible and innovative and (2)
reasonably effective and popular in an extraordinarily
complex and turbulent environment. It also under-
scores many of' the systemic vulnerabilities of
authoritarianism, particularly those associated with
personalistic rule and the inevitable problems of
succession.
Tito's pragmatic innovations-including the in-
troduction of what has been termed, for lack of
precedent, "market socialisrn"-have made Yugoslav
society the most open and dynamic in Eastern
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Europe, But, as he recently learned to his dismay, too
much decentralization of authority and too much
politicization of'the citizenry can he dangerous in such
it potentially explosive environment. As Belgrade
rased its grip, ethnic rmnities and jealousies lr can
inextricably intertwined in a growing power struggle
between the proponents 01' further liberalization and
well-entrenched conservative elements.
Matters finally came to a head in late 1971. By
then, r.he power of federal authorities to develop and
enforce the controversial programs needed to stabilize
the nation's chronically troubled economy and to
reverse growing regional economic inequities had all
but evaporated. No longer held in check by fears of a
Czechoslovakia-style Soviet invasion, resurgent ethnic
rivalries were disrupting the work of almost all of the
country's top political bodies, This included the
23-nian Collective Presidency and 8-rnan Party Ex-
ecutive Bureau that Tito--determined to insure that
no one man or ethnic: group would dominate the
political scene after his departure-had recently es-
tablished as the key elements in his blueprint for
succession. The Croats were behaving in a particular-
ly obstreperous fashion. For its part, the League of
Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), long relegated to a
guiding rather than a commanding role, had
degenerated into something approaching a confedera-
tion of' nine virtually autonomous party organizations
(eight of them regionally-based, the ninth geared to
the military establishment). Ill short, Yugoslavia was
in the throes of its worst political crisis since Tito
came to power.
Tito had simply let too much authority slip away
from Belgrade. Like Franco, he had failed to establish
tried and trusted political institutions that could func-
tion effectively without his intercession-albeit his
failure on this score was attributable to too much
change and innovation rather than too little.
Moreover, he had misjudged in his belief that he could
tame maverick regional leaders by co-opting them
into the collective bodies destined to inherit his enor-
mous powers.
Tito had not, however, made the mistake of un-
derestimating the potential importance of the military
factor in Yugoslavia's domestic equation. In fact, he
had begun to revamp the country's traditionally aloof
military establishment and to draw it into the
mainstream of domestic politics as a unifying force
some three years before the crisis finally broke.
Although far from untouched by the centrifugal
forces affecting the society at large, the Yugoslav
military establishment (unlike the LCY) was still a
genuinely national institution in 1971. Moreover,
Yugoslavia's military leaders were not only apprehen-
sive about what they perceived as anarchical trends
but fearful that the fact that the country's
recently-established paramilitary defense forces had
been placed under local civilian control might presage
it potentially disastrous dec'ntralization of the regular
armed forces as well. Thus they ti ere, for the most
part, more than really to back any corrective action
that Tito Whose to take.
Confronted with the continuing inability of central
Party and government organs to rein in the blatantly
chauvinistic leadership of Croatia, 'i'ito's patience
finally ran out in December 1971. With the active and
explicit support of senior military leaders, he
short-circuited the political superstructure lie had
created and moved to set things straight in it manner
reminiscent of earlier times.
Although bloodless, the shake-up was Draconian
by post-war Yugoslav standards. It took nearly three
years for the dust to settle. When it (lid, hundreds of
functionaries throughout the country had lost their
jobs. Some ten percent of' those individuals who had
been carried on LCY membership rolls in 1971 had
been expelled or otherwise "selected out." The Party
itself had been recentralized, and its leading role had
at least in theory been restored. The nation's
paramilitary defense forces had been placed under
firm federal control. The military had been given a
greater voice in national policy-making councils, and
active duty generals had been assigned to two key
federal internal security posts. The cumbersome
Collective Presidency had been pared from twenty-
three to nine members. And most of Tito's revised
political ground rules had been formalized in new
Party statutes and a new constitution.
On balance, Titoism has emerged the stronger for
its ordeal. Although the changes that Tito has made
since 1971 have not altered the pluralistic-or even, in
many areas, the basically decentralized-nature of his
system, they have corrected or attenuated many of the
flaws and imbalances that had threatened to
overwhelm it before he even left the scene.
Hierarchical lines of authority and responsibility have
been restored and clarified. The nation's ideological
and ethnic extremists have at least temporarily been
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routed, Changes in electoral procedures have narrow-
ed direct (and potentially highly chauvinistic) popular
participation in the govern tile Ilia I process to the local
level. And most importantly, perhaps, the LCY seems
io be at least part way along the road toward resurrec-
tion as a national and relatively disciplined in-
stitution-without sacrifice of its original (and
basically healthy) nature as a broadly-based coalition
of differing interests.
'I'itt 's heirs will, in fact, start off in a somewhat
stronger position than Franco's. The legitimacy of
their positions--and of their system of rule-will be
!ess in doubt, the loyalty and political role of their
military colleagues less annbiguous.'' Moreover,
renewed uneasiness over Soviet intentions may at least
temporarily evoke a spirit of unity and cooperation
that is likely to be lacking in Madrid.
But despite these advantages, the political outlook
for post-'Tito Yugoslavia is even more uncertain than
that for post-Franco Spain. For one thing,
Yugoslavia's economic problems are more serious and
more sensitive to adverse global trends and
developments.'" Its ethnic rivalries promise to persist,
`Although it is difficult to judge just how successful Tito has been in
extending the loyalty of the military establishment beyond his person to
his system, Yugoslavia's military leaders appear to be satisfied with the
present situation. While they have willingly assumed a more con-
spicuous guardianship role, they have so far shown little sign of in-
dependent political ambitions. Thus, unless the LCY again succumbs
to ethnic or leadership rivalries, 'I'ito's successors are likely to encounter
little difficulty in subordinating Yugoslavia's armed forces to civilian
control. A comprehensive analysis of civil-military relations in
Yugoslavia is presented in OPR's The Poliliral Rule of the I'i(gsslnt
Military, March 1975.
'"Rising world prices and the economic slowdown in the West have
magnified Yugoslavia's chronic inflation, balance-of-payments, and un-
employment problems. Partly because of rising import prices-and
partly because of the huge wage increases secured by Yugoslavia's
politically powerful workers-the cost of living index climbed nearly 30
percent in 1974, compared to 20 percent in 1973. Shrinking export
markets, heavy dependence on high-priced Western raw materials, and
a decline in both tourism earnings and remittances from the country's
nearly 900,0O emigrant workers combined to yield a record year-end
current account deficit of around $700 million. At the same time, a
growing influx of workers returning home after losing thcirjobs abroad
(some 75,000 in 1974 alone) has driven the level of officially registered
unemployment to about 9 percent of the nonagricultural workforce for
the country as a whole-and to more than double that figure in some
traditionally backward regions. If the austerity program introduced by
Belgrade in late 1974 (which is already under fire from various
Republican capitals) fails to alleviate these problems before Tito passes
from the scene, his successors are likely to find it very difficult to impose
needed new sacrifices on recalcitrant regional and economic factions.
providing, inter a/ia, fertile ground for domestic and
foreign intrigue, its revamped political institutions are
still weakly rooted. And its overall governmental
system is enormously complex,
To complicate matters, Yugoslavia-like Spain -
Will experience a triple succession. Tito's role as 1-lead
of State will be assumed by the Collective Presidency,
with the title and functions of president of the
Republic rotating annually among its eight
regionally-based members. (Upon Tito's departure,
the ninth member-ex officio the president of the
LCY--will be ineligible to hold the lop governmental
job.) But preponderent power will pass to the LCY
where it will be shared jointly by Tito's successor as
Party President (as yet to be designated but quite
possibly Stane Dolanc who, as a Slovene, would be
acceptable to most other ethnic groups) and the
newly-renamed Executive Committee. The latter
body, recently expanded to 15 members and broad-
ened by the addition of a military representative,
is evidently intended to serve as the country's
supreme political watchdog and arbiter. Obviously,
the successful functioning of such a system in the
absence of it clearly dominant leader will depend upon
maintenance of a much higher degree of consensus
than has been attainable in the past.
All told, therefore, the room for mischance and mis-
calculation is great. At best, a lengthy period of con-
siderable instability appears inevitable. At worst,
deepening political crisis might result in the fragmen-
tation of Yugoslavia-with the attendant risk of
renewed East-West confrontation.'? However, given
the prospect that Yugoslavia's armed forces would
probably step in before domestic turmoil got com-
pletely out of hand, the latter contingency appears
relatively unlikely.
In one way or another, the Yugoslav succession will impact on
Washington's now muted adversary relationship to Moscow. The West
has a considerable stake in Yugoslavia's survival as a relatively cohesive
and fully independent state. For its part, the Kremlin has never recon-
ciled itself either to the loss of its one-time client or to Tito's seemingly
heretical domestic and foreign policies. The USSR's response to
developments in Belgrade is likely to continue to be largely reactive
(and, for it while, at least, relatively restrained). Nonetheless, the dis-
closure of Soviet links to the recent efforts of die-hard Yugoslav Stalinists
to form a rival underground Communist party demonstrates that
Moscow has left few stones unturned in its search for ways to improve
its ability to influence what happens in Yugoslavia once Tito departs
the scene. Under most circumstanct.a, then, the greater the difficulties
that 'I'ito's heirs encounter, the greater the temptation will be for the
Kremlin to meddle actively in Yugoslavia's internal affairs-and the
greater the chance of serious strains in East-West relations.
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In any event, the pressures (both internal and, quite
possibly, from iMoscow) oil '''ito's heirs to move
toward a more restrictive form of authoritarian rule
will undoubtedly be Strong. just how much tightening
up may actually ensue is open to question. But even if
' ul;oslavia's new leaders succeed in fending off these
pressures, it will probably be some time before they
feel secure enouth to risk a new round of political
liberalization. And the same defensive considerations
are likely to dictate retention of the essential features
(but not necessarily the flamboyancy) of Yugoslavia's
current foreign policy course.
Opening Pandora's Box: Portugal and Greece
With the collapse of the Gaetano and loannidis
regimes-the former from an audacious nudge ad-
ministered by a handful of disgrun'led_junior officers
in April 1974, the latter of its own weight some three
months later-Lisbon and Athens have set about the
difficult and potentially risky task of establishing
democratic rule. For reasons which wi;l be elaborated
below, Portuguese prospects for success are clearly the
poorer. But if past experience is any guide, the
chances that representative government will finally
take firm root on the rocky shores of the Aegean are
not so good either. Ever since they won their in-
dependence from Turkey in 1829, the Greeks have
been alternating between anarchical binges and
authoritarian cures. And there is little reason to
believe that the cycle has now been broken.
Portugal
Twentieth century authoritarianism emerged in
Portugal in much the same way that it did in
Spain-except that the Portuguese were spared
Spain's chaotic and bloody interregnum between
floundering military dictatorship and stable civilian
rule. Not that the military leaders who put an end to
Portugal's brief stab at democracy in 1926 proved any
more capable of coping with the problems associated
with modernizing change in a backward society than
the Spanish officers who had seized power in Madrid
some three years earlier. But Portugal's generals
found someone who was up to this task, a strong-will-
cd professor of economics named Antonio de Oliviera
Salazar, and they more or less gratefully shifted the
burden of rule to his shoulders before disaster struck.
Salazar, who was named Prime Minister in 1932,
fashioned his country into a corporatist, single-party,
authoritarian state-a solution compatible with its
prevailing circumstances and t,-aditions. Although
theoretically subordinate to the President of his Estado
.Novo (New State), he thoroughly dominated the Por-
tuguese political scene until incapacitated by a stroke
in 1968. Like Franco, lie brought his country political
stability and, initially at !east, economic advance.20
But unlike Franco, his strategy and tactics changed
little over time. As a result, his domestic institutions
and policies-and his approach to Portugal's colonial
problems-became increasingly anachronistic.
Salazar's successor as Prime Minister, Marcello
Gaetano, sought to rectify this situation. But he lacked
either the personal or constitutional authority to over-
come the opposition of President Americo Thomaz
(an admiral who had been Portugal's nominal t-Icad
of State since 1958) and other ultra-conservative
elements. 't'hus, far from serving their intended pur-
pose, Caetano's halting efforts at political and
economic reform and at introducing some flexibility
into Lisbon's colonial stance helped to surface
long-extant undercurrents of discontent within almost
all politically relevant sectors of Portuguese
society-including the military establishment.
Given what seemed to be the balance of forces in
Portugal in early 1974, Caetano's downfall would
have been less surprising had it been at the hands of
either ultra-conservatives or disillusioned moderates.
That it was not, that it was in fact engineered by a few
youthful proponents of radical societal reforms, il-
lustrates how critical a role a numerically small but
determined group of officers can play within a divided
and relatively apathetic military establishment.
Within months, what apparently began in mid-1973
as an extemporaneous secret conclave focused on
irksome professional grievances had developed into a
full-fledged conspiratorial organization-the Armed
Forces Movement (AFM)-dedicated to an early
political settlement of Portugal's colonial wars abroad
and to the establishment of "democratic" rule at
home.
'Salazar's conservative economic policies brought Portugal un-
precedented fiscal stability but only a modest, and in the end declining,
rate of growth. It has been said that in his fear that he might run the
economy onto the rocks, he ran it onto the sands instead. Although
Cactano did what he could to get things tooving again, Portugal's per
capita GNP in early 1974 ($1,140) was .kill the lowest in Western
Europe.
14
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
Relatively little is known about the internal
dynamics of' the AFM-either before or after the es-
sentially bloodless coup of April 1974. At the time, the
Movement probably numbered no more than two or
three hundred officers, a tiny fraction of the tri-service
officer corps. (However, most other officers readily
accepted the overthrow of the Caetano regime, and
apparently many of these have since been co-opted
into the AFM.) As is still the case today, the
organization's membership spanned the political
spectrum from moderates to radical leftists-with in-
dividuals of the latter persuasion in the definite
minority. But since the radicals had been the prime
movers behind the conspiracy, they emerged from the
coup with disproportionately strong representation in
the AFM's original top leadership council (the
Political Coordinating Commission).
Apart front the AFM's general and vaguely defined
commitment to democracy and socio-economic
reform, there was little initial consensus on longer
term objectives. Moreover, most of the country's new
leaders were political neophytes. One of their first
mistakes, perhaps, was establishing a definite 12-18
month timetable for the transition process-a step
which showed little appreciation of formidable
societal obstacles to stable and effective representative
government (e.g., strong authoritarian and patronal
traditions, the sharp dichotomy between the urban
and rural sectors of the population, and the absence of
a large middle class).
In any event, the determination of the
predominantly left-wing .\FM leadership to force a
hasty and indiscriminate dismantling of the old
order-and to dictate the shape of the new-augured
ill for any early and reasonably orderly passage to
democratic rule. (fin one hand, the radicals naive and
cavalier approach to political and societal change
sparked an unnecessarily sharp and destabilizing es-
calation of popular derci