THAI POLITICS IN TRANSITION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170027-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 1999
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: November 1, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

L. .1A
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by
25X1A9a
November 1975
Until quite recently, Thailand has been a remarkably stable
and peaceful developing nation in a region that has seen chaotic
change since the end of World War II. Like the other nations in
Southeast Asia, Thailand has been in an accelerating process of
transition, but it had escaped the disruptions that have plagued
the others. The cohesion of Thai society, a confident nationalism
unshaken by colonial rule, and a particular skill in blunting or
accommodating external threats have all contributed to easing the
adjustment to modernization -- an adjustment further facilitated by
rising prosperity and generally tolerable economic conditions.
But in 1973, internal and external strains severely
challenged the old order. Growing social and economic problems and
the sudden political awakening of thG Thai student community generated
strong pressures for a more open political system. External develop-
ments -- the implications of detente and the need for new international
accommodation and ties -- further highlighted the need for change.
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The regime's overreaction to student demonstrations In
October 1973 was its ultimate undoing. And as the loaders, Generals
Thanom and Praphat, went into exile, a civilian-run parliamentary
system struggled into being. This shift represented no crisp break
with the past, however; traditional interest groups remain powerful.
But it has signalled the advent of new forces on the edges of Thai
politics which seem bound eventually to demand a more aggressive
role in the political arena.
Thailand has entered a more uncertain period of transition.
It is in the process of abandoning the highly authoritarian system
that prevailed since World War II. Yet it is far from certain that
a more open, Western-style democratic system can be grafted onto the
traditional, hierarchic Thai society. Thai serenity and confidence
have been shaken by the confluence of several trends: the ebb of
American power and interest in the area has undermined the foundations
of Thailand's post-war foreign policy and raised the spectre of a
greater communist threat; the strains of growing economic problems;
the political impact of the erosion of traditional values and tolerances
by tiw influx of foreign (largely American) influence.
This paper, a distillation of a research study, "Thai Politics
in Transition," attempts to identify major elements of stability and
disequilibrium in Thailand today, and to suggest how these force will
affect Thailand's politics as well as its relations with the US.
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Factors for Stability
History, tradition, and the locus of real power all work
to moderate the pace of change and keep it quite peaceful.
A Traditional Polity - Politics in Thailand have been typical of
traditional societies -- authoritarian, elitist, personalized --
but largely free of many of the pressures that have generated
unrest in other developing rations. The pacific tenets of Buddhism,
the absence of colonial rule which might have bred radical dissent,
and the delayed impact of modernization all contributed to a stable
society, largely indifferent to the political leadership. The
military's long domination of the leadership has rarely been chal-
lenged -- its hold on power reinforced by the financial gains such
power has attracted. Civilian political forces have been fragmented
and undisciplined -- their efforts weakened by disunity, by their
often fractious and irresponsible behavior, and by implicit threats
from Thailand's Communist neighbors which semed to require a stronger
hand at the helm.
The Real power still lies with the Army - Despite its reduced poli-
tical role, its interests cannot yet be seriously challenged by any
civilian leader wishing to stay in office. For the moment, the Army is
willing to stay in the background. Military leaders have found they can
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prr,tect their interests through alliances within the system, a!rod have
been reassured, moreover, by this government's tough stand against
labor and student radicals. Though many in the military remain
skeptical, they appreciate the broad public identification w)1r the
new constitution and they are reluctant to be held directly;
responsible if parliamentary government fails.
The King is an important stabilizing factor in the Thai political
equation. His active role during and immediately after the fall of the
military regime enhanced his prestige, though he has since retreated
to a position more aloof from day-to-day politics. While the King had
long pushed for moderate reforms, a new constitution, and a return to
representative government, he has become disenchanted with the student
activists he once encouraged and is disturbed by the signs of instability
and incipient radicalism generated by the new political climate. None-
theless, he has the potential for effective intervention in an immediate,
short-term crisis and could again be valuable in defusing a dangerous
situation.
The new Prime Minister, Khukrit Pramot, is a moderate reformist In
an otherwise overwhelmingly conservative Cabinet. His power base is
limited, but his political skills and the absence of an alternative
as widely acceptable reinforces his position, and he has been able to
maneuver some progressive legislation past his colleagues and through
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the Assembly. Other Cabinet members, such as Defense Minister
Praman Adireksan, are clearly more interested in preserving the
traditional system that has served their own interests so weil.
Especially in foreign affairs, the civilian bureaucracy
now speaks with a stronger voice. Its long subordination to
military policy-makers is over, and it senses an opportunity to
seize the initiative and press for reform. In the Foreign Ministry,
an aggressive reformist element is arguing forcefully for a more
decisive break with past poIIc!es. Much of the d+'ive behind
Thai land's openings to China and more caut!ous approaches to North
Vietnam has come from this element which advocates a general loosen-
ing of ties to the US ;jnd the adopting of a more neutral foreign
policy. This group is not anti-American and desires the continuance
of close political ties with the US; but its members have concluded
that Thailand must come to terms with the new realities of detente
and the diminished American interest in the region.
This position has its challengers. As the shock of the
sudden Communist victories in Indo-China has worn off, the government
has begun to move in new directions more judiciously -- !ts caution
undoubtedly reinforced by the Cabinet's conservative complexion and
by the military's concern about diminished American military aid.
There nontheless appears to be a rough consensus within the government
that Thailand needs to broaden its diplomatic options.
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Disequilibrating Factors
The idea of structural pressure groups outside the official
bureaucracy is still alien to the Thai. But the rising level of
political consciousness has generated growing political activity
among students, labor, and farmers. Since the fall of the Thanom
regime, the more visible activists have grown increasingly leftist
and now form the core of the emerging radical movement in Thai
politics. While the protest movement has attracted the interest
of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), the party's long ideological
preoccupation with peasant insurgency has left the Thai communists In
the position of belatedly trying to associate with movements whose
direction they do not control and whose internal workings they do not
really understand. Nonetheless, increasing penetration undoubtedly
will be seen.
Student pressure has been diluted by factionalism and by
threats of retaliation from the rightists, but it can still coalesce
around popular issues and plays an influential, if Inconstant, role
in Thai politics. The students' effectiveness at any time, however,
depends on the degree of student unity and public support behind the
Issue at hand. Nationalistic feelings continue to be a strong factor
in student protests, and often translate into anti-American campaigns.
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As long as US military forces remain in Thailand, they are a natural
target for student protest. But strong and growing economic nationalism
is likely to pose even more nettlesome problems for any Thai government.
force. But union organization is in an infant stage, and the labor
movement simply has neither the size nor cohesion to be a maJcr power
broker nor even an effective political instrument for others to manipu-
late. Labor's resistance to such manipulation may not be easily shaken.
It is reinforced by the recent success of*wildcat strikes and no doubt
by the government's tough stand against the activities of radical labcr
leaders. Moreover, these radicals seen to threaten institutions the
workers still identify with -- the King, religion, the established
social order -- and offend the beliefs of people who still reflect their
rural origins. Serious economic hardship could undermine this attitude,
but as long as the government is reasonably responsive to labor's
demands, protest activity is likely to focus more on job-related, rather
than political, issues.
Signs of discontent among farmers -- the traditional bedrock
of the country's conservatism and stability and primary target of
communist organizers -- are more troubling to the government. The
insurgency along Thailand's borders has long been in Bangkok as little
more than a nuisance, but with communist victories in Indo-China there
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is more concern that the insurgency may spread and more sensitivity
to the beginnings of political organization among the farmers.
Problems generated by farmers' increasing awareness of their relative
poverty and neglect have not reached critical proportions, and with-
out the compelling pressure of a crisis, the government is unlikely
to take effective remedial action.
The Short-Term Outlook
At least for the moment, the new political system appears
to be shaking down, and there are good prospects for a period of
relative calm !and stability. Prime Minister Khukrit has emerged a
much stronger political leader than anticipated, and the earlier
sense of drift and fragility has begun to give way to an atmosphere
of greater confidence and direction. The incipient leftist movement
is out of public favor and somewhat cowed by threats of rightist
retaliation. Protest politics undoubtedly will continue but with
greater restraint than was seen in the heady months following the
military regime's demise. Moreover, unless conditions seriously
deteriorate, a military coup is unlikely. Prolonged and violent
unrest, a parliament hostile to the military's special interests,
or a dramatically increased threat from North Vietnam would increase
the chances of military intervention. But barring such pressures,
the military is more likely to continue to accept a back seat --
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deferred by the knowledge that a military coup would undoubtedly
provoke violence and bloodshed.
So far, there are no signs that a serious unraveling of
the traditional socio-political fabric has begun. Thailand remains
a deeply conservative society, and its problems are still within
manageable bounds. Despite the obvious pressures for change that
were growing in Thai society, the events of October 1973 were in many
ways a fluke and one that d-i-d not change the basic ingredients of
power in Thai political life. While new trends are discernible, Thai
society has demonstrated a remarkable resilience under pressure and an
ability to absorb new forces in a fashion that has modified their
disruptive impact. Some Thais impatient with the pace of change will
contribute to a growing radical element, but they are likely to remain
more of a nuisance than a serious threat for some years because they
lack a significant power base. Nonetheless, there is a general consensus
in Thailand that some adjustments must be made -- the clock cannot be
turned back --- and even the established elements of political power
must accept new attitudes and new restraints.
Longer-term Uncertainties
Despite good prospects for a period of relative political
stability, any prediction as to the longevity of civilian parliamentary
government is hazardous. The underlying principles of representative
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government remain alien to most Thai, and the in fitutions and
methods of democratic government will be difficu;t to preserve
over the long run when there is little basic commitment to the
conceptual underpinnings. There :s widespread skepticism that
democratic government can deal 0ifectively with Thailand's problems.
Many Thai look back with nostalgia on the placid and predictable
days under Marshall Sarit, reflecting a longing for an era when
Thailand's problems seemed simpler. As the complexities of Thailand's
problems grow, so will impatience with debate and protest; arguments
will be heard for firm, decisive and more authoritarian leadership.
Protest politics are an almost inevitable by-product of the
Thai system, which generally ignores a problem until dem..istrations
have created a crisis atmosphere. Nevertheless, they are a disruptive
factor in Tha;land's still fragile effort to develop representative
government. The political activists have aroused counter-action from
the right which threatens to accentuate political polarization, laying
the groundwork for a more dramatic and divisive impact on Thai politics.
The s;:iraling rate of crime and banditry in Thailand has contributed to
the public's growing aversion to the violence often attendant on protest
politics. And considering the still considerable skepticism In Thailand
that any democratic government can be effective, an unchecked growth
of violence -- be it criminal or political -- can only increase the
likelihood of a return to authoritarian rule.
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But not for a return to a narrowly-based military oligarchy.
Despite the obvious discomfort with the free-wheeling aspects of
Western democracy and the continuing force of an elitist/paternalist
outlook, the Thais cannot dismiss the inexorable pressure for a more
open system that is flexible enough to adjust to changing conditions.
Former military regimes justified their monopoly of power in teems of
national security -- an argument already less persuasive and one that
is likely to remain subordinate to the increasing emphasis on social
and economic reform. The days when a few generals could run the
country for personal profit have given way to more complicated demands
on the government that require the broader participation of civilian
technocrats in the decision-making process. The civilians within the
Thai elite have long considered themselves far more qualified to run
the government than the more narrowly-educated military. They resented
being shunted aside by Thanom and Prophat; they are enjoying their
greater influence, and they would resist the re-establishment of a
military dictatorship that denied them an effective role.
Economic problems may prove in time to be the principal
catalyst of more basic cnd disruptive changes in the Thai political
fabric, unless the government can effect some basic reforms to re-
distribute income more evenly. It wiH be difficult to make significant
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headway toward economic reform in face of the well-entrenched vested
interests of the Thai elite. Moreover, the government will attract
blame for problems generated by international economic ills beyond
its control. Urban-rural competition over food prices will no doubt
intensify with the farmers continuing to get the short end of it --
and the persistence of rural poverty, the gap between those conditions
and urban standards, and the farmers' growing awareness of being
neglected can only stimulate frustrations with the existing political
Thus, regardless of the formal structure of the government in
the years ahead, it will have to respond in some fashion to pressures
from the new elements that have entered the fringes of political activity.
Student and labor activists, and other reformist elements in business,
the intelligentsia and the new political parties have been energized by
the re-introduction of parliamentary government. While their influence
probably will remain marginal for a long time, they will resist fore-
closure and wilI be a continuing thorn in the government's side.
In sum, Thailand is something of a paradigm of a society in
transition. It cannot retreat to the old system of military rule which
proved unable to cope with the growing complexity of problems, yet the
conservative establishment that runs the government is not willing to
open up the political system and lose its perquisites. The coming
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years will see a major test of the basic cohesion of Thai society
and of Its traditional ability to adapt In the face of change.
Implications for the US
The US can no longer take Thailand for granted. The
reintroduction of a civilian government re(;Jires changes in methods
of doing business with the Thai because easy access to a few key
military leaders who could make quick decisi-ons relatively insulated
from political pr,ssures has given way to more tedious and often
frustrating approaches through lengthier bureaucratic channels.
Moreover a government more exposed to public scrutiny and obliged
to be more sensitive to public opinion (however narrowly represented
it may be in Thailand) will be less accommodating.
The bar=Ic shift in Thai foreign policy did not spring from
the collapse of military rule, but from Thai perceptions of a changing
international environment. While the reformists in the MFA are
impatient with the slow pace of Thailand's adjustment, the military
and -the conservative political leaders would prefer to move more
slowly and cautiously. Nevertheless the direction and goals of 'Thai
foreign policy are generally agreed upon. In view of those shared
perceptions of Thailand's vulnerability and needs, it seems likely
that any government in the near future, including another military
regime will demand more of a quid pro quo in its dealings with the US
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and be less willing t; place overwhelming reliance on a close
bilateral relationship.
In practical terms, this suggests a more Independent and
sometimes an adversary position in international forums, such as the
UN, as Thailand seeks to dissolve the image of client state and assume
a protective coloring more acceptable to the communist neighbors with
whom she must now coexist. Regional relations will take increasing
priority Moreover, with the diminished importance of the military
alliance, economic problems undoubtedly will become the prevalent
issues In Bangkok's relations with the US, especially in light of the
importance of foreign investment to Thailand's economic growth.
There is growing sentiment that the nation's resources
must be protected from excessive foreign exploitation -- a sentiment
not held exclusively by the left. Economic nationalism Is not likely
to assume extreme proportions, however, because ties between the
business community (particularly the banking community), the conservative
and moderate parties, and senior military establishment are intimate
if not incestuous, and their interests are bound to prevail over those
of the more vocal protest groups. A civilian regime bidding for
political support cannot escape some vulnerability to such protest
groups, however, and coupled with the nationalistic predilections of
the bureaucracy and the leadership, the Thai are sure to be more
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restrictive as to the terms and areas of future foreign investments,
even as they seek it.
The Independent direction Thai foreilgn policy now seems to
be taking could always veer, of course, if conditions changed. If,
for example, there were a danairous upswing in Thailand's parsistont
but still narrowly contained insurgency as the result of dramatically-
increased foreign support, the arguments for maintaining a more Intimate
alliance with the US would be more compelling. The military undoubtedly
would demand a more decisive role either within the constitutional
system or by casting it aside. Even under these circumstances, however,
if the American response were not reassuring, the Thai government -- be
it civilian or military, democratic or authoritarian -- would probably
begin to more earnestly seek accommodations with Hanoi and even closer
ties with other great powers.
This sort of threat does not appear likely to develop in the
near future, however. Hanoi's problems at home seem to be absorbing
most of its energies, and its diplomatic to;.e suggests some desire for
a cooling off period in foreign relations. Thai political developments
and the policies growing out of them are thus more likely to be governed
by domestic pressures than by threatening external exigencies; their
march toward more neutral ground is likely to be at a measurea pace
rather than a panicky rout.
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In sum, future Thai policy is highly likely to be more
Independent with occasional anti-US overtones, more nationalistic
and less accommodating to the US. Only a strong military threat
from its communist neighbors that was met by an eifective US response
would reverse this trend.
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