SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE ARAB WORLD MOROCCO: A CASE OF UNDIRECTED CHANGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 1999
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: June 1, 1975
• Content Type: RS

_tc PR-310
Social Trans ormation in the rab orld, Morocco: e
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Research Study
Social Transformation in the Arab World
Morocco: A Case of Undirected Change
OPR-310
June 1975
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Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 009438
Exempt from GenerA ueciassification Schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
?5B(2)
Automatically declassified on:
data Impossible to determine
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE OF POLITICAL RESEARCH
June 1975
MOROCCO: A CASE OF UNDIRECTED CHANGE
Part I of the Series
SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE ARAB WORLD
In the preparation of this study, the Office of Political Research con-
sulted other offices of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Depart-
ment of State. Their comments and suggestions were appreciated and
used, but no attempt at formal coordination was undertaken. Further
comments will be welcomed by the author, Code
143, x5492).
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FOREWORD
This study is the first in a series on social transformation in the Arab
world, undertaken through ease studies of selected Arab countries and
societies. The Office of Political Research begins this series with the aims
of identifying the factors which have inhibited or promoted change in
the Arab world and gauging the present abilities of those societies to re-
spond effectively to their needs and problems. The studies will also help
to determine the degree of likelihood that further change will come in
the form of stable, evolutionary development or through turbulence and
revolution.
The emphases of the country studies will vary, ranging from analyses
of elite groups and developing new classes to acsessments of the gaps
between national goals and actual accomplishments. Such variation is
dictated by the nature of the societies and by the availability of source
material which yields data useful for intelligence purposes. While the
series will lay the groundwork for comparisions of the Arab countries,
differences among them may be as revealing as their similarities.
Morocco was selected as the first of these country studies because
change is taking place there within the confines of the traditional order.
This study, in essence, shows: the slow adaptation of that order; the in-
teraction between education and other aspects G,f ..hange, particularly
the importance of qualitative educational reform; the emergence of the
bureaucracy as an instrument of change; and the social reper-
cussions?ai: well as the likely political effects?of these developments.
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CONTENTS
Page
Objectives and Findings of the Study
1
The Examination of Change
5
I. Introduction
5
II. The Absence of Systematic Direction
6
A. Causal Factoks
6
1. The Divisiveness of the Society 7
2. The Monarchy 10
a. Consolidation and Use of Power 10
b. Hassan's Leadership Style 11
3. Contenders for Power and Status 14
a. The Elite 14
b. The Military 15
c. The Political Parties 16
d. Labor 19
B. Indecision on Key Issues 20
1. Economic Planning 20
2. The Language of Education 21
III. The Dynamics of Change 22
A. Education as an Object and Agent of Change 22
B. The Emergence of the Professionals and Managers 25
IV. Evidence of Change 27
A. The Improved Performance in 27
1. The Economy 27
2. Land Reform 28
3. The Promotion Nationale Program 28
4. Coping with Unemployment and Urbanization 29
B. Social Trends 32
V. Implications for the Future 33
A. Further Social Change 33
B. Economic Determinants 34
C. Political Alternatives 36
1. The Status Quo 36
2. A "Semi-Liberal Regime" 36
3. A Coup 37
Chronology of Significant Events 39
III
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FIGURES
Page
Areas of Berber concentration (map)
8
Duration of Cabinet appointments (chart)
13
Political party developments (chart)
18
School enrollment (table)
23
Labor force by occupational cOegory (table)
26
Selected economic indicators (table)
27
Land distribution (table)
28
Work-days provided by the Promotion Nationale (table)
29
Growth of the cities (map)
'31
Government revenues and expenditures (chart)
'31
Iv
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OBJECTIVES AND FINDINGS OF THE STUDY
Since the two coup attempts of 1971-72, Western attention to
Morocco has focused on the likely staying power of King Hassan's
regime. Many observers have charged that the King's mode of
leadership contributed to the creation of a situation conducive to coups.
They have pointed out that he rules through manipulating and balanc-
ing political forces and interest groups and that he has not concentrated
his efforts on the social and economic betterment of his people.
Nonetheless, social and economic change for the better is underway in
Morocco. Examination of this change, under conditions of Hassan's style
of governing, thus serves as a case study of a development process lack-
ing in strong, top-level direction and uncomplicated by revolution. In
undertaking such an examination, this study is specifically directed
toward: 1) identifying the factors which have impeded more rapid
change, as measured in economic development and efforts to improve
the material conditions of the people and strengthen their participatory
rule; 2) locating?by such means as comparing census results?the areas
where change is occurring; and 3) gauging the likely effects of Hassan's
regime and of possible successor regimes on the future pace of change.
The approach to the examination of change is empirical, with no
attempt made to adhere to a particular model of development for-
mulated by social scientists. Instead, important sectors in which change
might take place?including the educational system, the economy, and
land reform?have been briefly surveyed and found to yield evidence of
improved ability to cope with national problems. These surveys have
also provided data on the pace of change, indicating that trends toward
professionalism and realism did not begin to emerge in the operations of
the Moroccan government until roughly 12 to 14 years after the country
won its independence in 1956.
The change which is taking place in Morocco reflects the emergence
of the technocrats, i.e., the professionals, managers, and technicians,
and the added authority given them by the King, who displays little in-
terest in domestic administration. With the technocrats in the
bureaucracy thus relatively free to design and implement development
programs. the economy has been achieving an average annual, growth
rate of about 7 percent since 1972, in contrast to the average of under 3
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percent of the early and mid-1960's. Distribution of land taken from
foreign owners is benefitting increasing numbers of previously landless
farmers. The bureaucracy's efforts have kept a high unemployment rate
from getting worse, at least in terms of percentage of the labor force.
And the educational system is slowly but systematically improving in
quality and turning out the trained specialists the development of the
nation requzws. Taken together, these upward trends give Morocco a
considerable potential for social transformation.
Change in Morocco does not imply the initiation of a comprehensive,
dynamic program for domestic betterment or a new style of leadership
on the part of Hassan, who continues to rule by an admit mix of force,
cajolery, and political manipulation. The King sets general guidelines
but gives little specific direction to development efforts.
This lack of direction, over the !ong term, may be beneficial to the
country. An undirected society is also an unregimented one. And for a
country controlled by an autocratic regime such as 1-itan's, Morocco
has some unusual features. Opposition political parties are functioning;
the major tru'le union has, with partial exceptions, successfully resisted
subordination to governmental authority; and a relatively free press
criticizes the regime. All operate within limits circumscribed by Hassan,
but segments of the population have acquired a political or group iden-
tity and have the freedom to articulate their demands. Should Hassan
eventually risk the dispersion of power, the political and other interest
groups might then be ready to share positions of trust and responsibility.
Over the long term, they could establish a government that offers
greater potential for future stability than the present system of one-man
rule.
Speculation on Hassan's staying power is not a major purpose of this
study The topic is treated, however, because the King's tenure on the
throne tiakes Morocco a test case in the efforts tr.: determine the extent
to which the developmental process necessarily entails political and
social disruption. The cdds?if they are set by the number of fallen
monarchies since World War ll?are against his continued reign.
Moreover, Morocco shares the problems of many nations whose leaders
have fallen and, in fact, of most developing countries: the population is
growing rapidly and gaps between city and countryside and between
rich and poor are wide.
Yet the fortunes of Hassan's regime have improved since the attempts
to topple him in 1971 and IC2. In the worldwide explosion of com-
modity prices, Morocco faces shortages but it has fared better than most
countries because it is the leading exporter of phosphates, which are
2
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used in the fertilizers essential to modern agriculture and whose price
quadrupled between 1972 and 1975. In world f fa rs, the closer align-
ment with the Arabs Hassan has sought, formalized by sending troops
into the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, has been domestically popular and is
paying off in terms of aid from the oil-rich states. Although Hassan has
ruled alone for most of his reign, and the two parliaments that were
elected were virtually powerless, he is again making overtures to the
politicians about their participation in the Cabinet, and he has talked
about holding elections.
3
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THE EXAMINATION OF CHANGE
I. INTRODUCTION
Change is easier to measure in Morocco than in
many countries, It is a curious fact of history that,
despite the nation's proximity to Lurope, continuity of
the traditional order prevails there as in no Arab land
outside the Arabian peninsula. The beginnings of
chwlge are thus more clearly apparent, and its slow
pace and limited scope simplify the following of its
course.
Officially the nation is called the Sharifian Empire
of Morocco, meaning that it is ruled by a SharifIan
family, i.e., one whose members claim descent from
the Prophet Muhammad. Hassan thus draws his
legitimacy from Islam, and he combines religious and
temporal authority. His Alaouite dynasty dates from
the 17th century, and the throne itself goes back to the
8th century. When the Ottomans held the rest of
North Africa and most of the Middle East in the
1600-1800's, the tribes within Morocco managed to
stave them off, using as a counterweight Spanish and
Portuguese influence in the coastal areas. The country
in consequence preserved its separateness and royal
succession.
The French in this century held Morocco I r almost
50 years (see chronology), but their occupatkn was far
shorter than the periods of foreign domination in most
Arab countries. Moreover, the French left the existing
social and political orders surprisingly intact, They
took the land they wanted but beyond that they did
not disturb the interests of the tribes, the merchant
famiiies, and the religious dignitaries; and they main-
tained the pretense of ruling through the Moroccan
menarch. Nor did the monarchy suffer from being
associated with the French. Mohammed V, Hassan's
father, supported the nationalist movement, which
had been organized by traditional elite groups. When
he was exiled by the French in 1953, he became the
rallying symbol for Moroccan independence. Then
resistance groups began to tie down troops which the
French could ill afford to spare because of their preoc-
cupation with Algeria. In the end, France capitulated,
restored Mohammed to the throne in 1955, and
granted Morocco's independence six months later. The
traditional order thus survived the colonial period
without the usual fate of being either disrupted by the
occupying power or discredited by association with it.
Another reason Morocco lends itself to a study of
change is the availability of material. The
society?with the exception of the royal establishment
and the military (and this latter exception dates only
from the wraps put on the army following the 1971-72
coup attempts)?has been more open and accessible to,
Western scholars and observers in the last two decades
than has that of almost any other Arab country, Social
scientists, historians, etc., have swarmed over Morocco,
studying the dichotomy so often posited between
"traditional- and "modern- societies and tending to
concentrate on the relationships among the tribes and
other family-oriental groups of the cid order. The
result is a rich body of literature on which to draw In
understanding the problems of effecting change in
Morocco,'
This literature has also contributed to a negative in-
terpretation of Moroccan events. Hassan's method of
playing off political leaders and important families
against one another has been rightly found to be a
hold-over from past centuries. The activities of e gov-
ernment he dominates have been variously desrxibed
as haphazard, hesitant, fanciful, and ineffective.'
Much criticism has focused on the government's poor
record in formulating and implementing economic
'Outstanding among the scholan who have explored thc tribal
components of Moroccan society are Ernest Gentler and David Ni.
Hart. Their findings are available in numerous articles and
monographs, two of which were incorporated in the recent collection
Arabs mid Berbers, ed. by Gaiter and Charles Micaud, D. C. Heath
and Company, Lexington, Mass., 1972. The culmination of these
and other studies, which emphasize the "segmented" nature of
traditional NIorocco, is John ?Vaterbury's The Commander of the
Faithful A Study of Segmented Politics, Columbia University Press,
N.Y., 1970. In his interpretative and perceptive histqry of the first
decade of Morocco's independence (1956-66), he analyzes the
political conduct of the elite as a manifestation of traditional
patterns of behavior. Even if the causal relationshir he hypothesizes
concerning behtivior is denied (and certainly the Moroccan elite
svould be the first to reject the concept that their actions are
anachronistic), the parallels he points betw..en the near and distant
past are ant argument for continuity in the society.
'See, for example. Charles Gallagher, The Moroccan Economy in
Perspective, American Universities Field Staff, 1966, and Rabat,
A-13, 6 March 1971,
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plans, on the cautious land-reform measures, and on
taxation practices that leav , most of the national in-
come in the hands of a small percentage of the people.
Morocco's development efforts have often been com-
pared unfp-vorably witii those of Tunisia, which ac-
complished more with fewer resources.
Preoccupation with top-level government activities
and with political ups-and-downs has obscured the
more fundamental developments in Morocco.
Fact-finding studies on the changes that are taking
place in the society, and in particular on the evoluiion
of modern professional classes, have been neglected.
Insufficient attention has been given to the
socio-economic effect of these technocrats and the in-
creased efficiency they are bringing to the
bureaucracy, thcugh there has been no fundamental
change in the nature or scope of palace operations.
A new look at Morocco, factoring in the trends
toward professionalism and improved bureaucratic
mance, is thus in order. It is called for by the ad-
. . . it is high time to do away
with the outdated image of an unstable and unserious
Morocco, an image which still haunts many of the
world's government offices, including some located in
Washington."'
IL THE ABSENCE OF SYSTEMATIC DIRECTION
A. Causal Factors
Morocco had a number of advantages when it
became an independent state in 1956. The struggle to
force the French to give up their protectorate had been
won with relative ease, and in the course of it the peo-
ple had demonstrated strong national feeling and an
ability to unite for a common cause. Political leaders
had emerged, and Molthmmed V was a popular head
of state.
Why did neither the King nor the political leaders
initiate a dynamic program of economic and social
reform and mobilize the nation for development ef-
forts? Why were such efforts allowed to lag? Morocco
is not one of the have-not nations. While one of the
most populous of the Arab states,4 it has far more
7 January 1975. 25X1A2g
'Morocco, with an estimated population of 17 million, follows
Egypt and the Sudan as the third most populous of the Arab
countries.
usable agricultural land than most of them. Once a net
exporter of grain, it could become one again if it
utilized new methods for increasing yields, and it has
other resources as well, notably phosphates. Yet the
economy stagnated, rural conditions worsened, slums
proliferated, and government efforts to cope with these
problems?or even to formulate them?were
half-hearted and vacillating. Economic policies con-
tinued to be?and still are?far more laissez faire than
those which most developing countries espouse,
although the public sector has expanded. In general,
projects for economic and social betterment before
about 1968 were often announced but rarely im-
plemented.
Top-level direction of development efforts is still
lacking. Official initiative on the part of the King's
Cabinet members, if any has been taken, has not been
recorded. The King sets the guidelines in a rhetorical
way, but he does not concentrate his energies on bring-
ing about his proclaimed goal of a modernized Mo-
rocco. He seeks to preserve fundamental patterns of the
present system, and he has neither enunciated an
ideology of reform nor instituted a program of planned
change. In this, he differs from the many national
leaders of North Africa and the Middle East who have
pushed for social change--although the implementa-
tion of their programs has varied widely and the type
of change desired has ranged from the "Cultural
Revolution" of Libya's Qaddafi?which took its name
from the Chinese and its inspiration from Islamic fun-
damentalism?to the "White Revolution" of the Iran-
ian Shah. It is with Iran that Morocco contrasts most
obviously. There change is being imposed from the
top, in the form of the Shah's revolution, while in
Morocco change is coming from below the high levels
of government.
ihe answer to the question of why top-level direc-
tion has been lacking in Morocco must be sought in a
combination of historic, political, and economic cir-
cumstances. The reasons are basically threefold:
6
an economic system
which derives much of its strength. from the control of
the elite over land and business and which is thus not
easily adaptable to the development process; and the
divisiveness of the society, both in pre-colonial times
and today. This divisiveness is characteristic of many
Arab countries. In Morocco it renders united action
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difficult and deters the dcvelopment of credible alter-
natives to the King's rule.
1. The Divisiveness of the Society
Morocco has no tradition of a strong ruler. The sul-
tans relied historically on the support of often con-
tending tribes and, though the country's independence
was thus maintained, internal conditions of near
anarchy prevailed. Before the establishment of the
French protectorate, the main division of the country
was between the bled al makhzen,6 or lands of govern-
ment, and the bled al siba, or lands of dissidence.
The latter was free of makhzen taxes and military
levies, and the tribes that composed it maintained
that status as long as they could repel the forces of
the sultan. Usually the makhzen comprised the
towns and the lowlands and the siba was a phe-
nomenon of the mountains and the desert, but the
distinction between the two was sharp neither in time
nor in geography.
The makhzen and the siba were bound together by
adherence to Sunni Islam and recognition of the
religious authority of the sultan. In Morocco the
designation of the ruler followed?and follows
today?a variation of Islamic tradition in that it
provides not for primogeniture but rather for selection
by religious dignitaries (the ulema), who were in fact
usually practical enough to accept the reigning
monarch's preference. Yet as the sultans' authority was
based on Islam, which was considered the sole source
of law and wisdom, most of them were either dis-
interested in or opposed to social change.
The rulers, in any case, had no more than a limited
capability to enforce an initiative or bring about
change, for they had no monopoly of coercive pow.m.
The support of the tribes that composed the maklaen
was always necessary to back up the rulers' small in-
dependent army. Thus each sultan constructed
alliances and maneuvered to keep any one tribal
grouping from becoming strong enough to challenge
him. When he was not successful, the result was a
change of dynasty?five of which preceded the
Alaouites' coming to power. Basically, the system the
rulers maintained was a balance-of-power
arrangement.
&Literally the word makhzen means storehouse in Arabic. Its
application to government points to the fact that the main purPose
of the administration of the sultan (the title used by Mohammed V's
predecessors) was the collection of taxes.
Within the tribes infinite numbers of smaller
balance-of-power arrangements prevailed. Recent
studies have refuted the historic simplification of the
tribal order in Morocco, finding that the control ac-
tually exercised by any group over its component parts
was a complex and changing matter.' Many of the
tribes consisted of heterogeneous clans who formed
alliances on the basis of pasturage rights, use of water,
or other benefits to be derived from the association.
Leadership often shifted according to the strength of
the family or clan, and in general it was exercised only
during feuds and wars.
Failure to understand the fragmentary nature of
this society has led on occasion to Western misjodg-
ment of its problems. The Arab-Berber antagonism,
for example, first stressed by the French at the time
of their protectorate to further their divide-and-rule
policies, continues to be overemphasized. The bases
for this concern are various. Estimates of the number
of Moroccans who speak a Berber dialect as a first
language range from 25 percent to almost 50 percent
of the population, and language is an important
dividing line in most societies. (Berbers were indig-
enous to the land and, as Arab immigration from
the Middle East was never great, the population
today consists essentially of the Arabized Berber
majority, i.e., those who adopted the Arabic language
and consider themselves Arabs, and the Berber
minority.) Moreover, many of those who speak a
Berber dialect live in mountainous areas and hold
to tribal ways. Perhaps because they thus resemble
the Kurds in some respects, Westerners have tended
to forecast separatist movements among them; and
the fact that the Moroccan government is today silent
on the Berber component of the population leads
to the suspicion that it is attempting to gloss over a
potentially, threatening situation.
The Berbers, however, have never displayed a strong
sense of solidarity among themselves. In Morocco they
are concentrated in areas which shade into one another
(see map), but language does not supply a bond.
Berber is not a written tongue and, according to most
investigators, it is divided in Morocco into three
separate dialects which are mutually intelligible only
with difficulty. For the most part, group intercom-
munication has been found to take place in Arabic.
Moreover, the range of interaction between Arabs and
aCellner and Hart, op. cit. See also CeIlner's "Tribalism and
Social Change in North Africa," French-Speaking Africa; The
Search for Identity, ed. by W. H. Lewis, Walker and Co., New
York, 1965.
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AREAS OF BERBER CONCENTRATION AND THE MAJOR DIALECTS SPOKEN
POW/
?
rilriftALTAr4
Tangier. -
:god
\
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Nadd?
ATLANTIC
L1=.?
Rabat
Casabiance
OCEAN
.Marrtakabi
004
Agadl? ?
SHLEUH
cj,/xc
ALGERIA
Irk! Aaiun
SPANISH SAHARA
Speakers of :
Tachelhit dialect
Tamazirt dialect
7,1..raa Zanatiya dialect
0 MILE/ 100
SOUSI Well-known Berber grouping
566061 8.76
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Berbers Is great. All cities arid towns contain both
Arabs and Berbers, arid intermarriage is not uncom-
mon.' In fact, King Flassan's principal wife within the
harem and also his mother come from families who re-
tain their Berber identity.
Ethnicity is, to be sure, one means of identity, but in
Moroce,:, there have been many other: of equal or
greater importance. Patterns for establishing social
cohesion, or even for determining friend or foe, were
historically complex and intricate, involving such
attributes as blood relationship, family origin,
residence, geographic proximity of other families, per-
sonal bonds between other family members, shared
trade or craft, and allegiance to a local saintly figure,
living or dead (one of the marabouts). Largely for this
reason, no drive for ethnic affirmation developed
among the Berbers; the society was too fragmented to
lend itself to such a movement.
The basic divisions of the society were not greatly
affected by the French occupation. Geographic faccors
inhibited penetration and left rurals areas?where over
80 percent of the people lived in the early I900's and
about 65 percent still do?largely untouched by
modern life. The tribes lost their power of military
resistance rind their administrative functions were
altered, but they continued to divide the country into
diverse social units, Moreover, some new dividing
lines were drawn by the French. They educated small
numbers in Western ways, thus effecting an overlay of
French culture and adding another dimension to the
gulf separating the urban elite from the masses. They
introduced the French-Arabic language dichotomy,
which troubles the nation to this day (see below, under
the Language of Education), and they created the
nucleus of a modern economy, which had the results of
further separating town from countryside and of es-
tablishing another division among the members of the
Moroccan elite.
Traditionally the Moroccan elite was composed of
vr.Falthy merchants, regional chieftains, religious
dignitaries, and those who had illustrious ancestry
or had been favored by the monarch. Educated
members of this group were historically concentrated
in Fs, long a center of Islamic learning and the
pace-setter in Moroccan culture. They held the initial
7According to a survey made in 1960 in the city of Sefrou (whose
population then was slightly over 20,000), one out of eight marriages
was mixed Arab-Berber. See Lawrence Rosen, "The Social and
Conceptual Framework of Arab-Berber Relations in Central Mo-
rocco," Arabs and Bthers, op. cit., pp. 155-174.
9
edge in acceding to privileged pesitions in the market
economy opened up by the French, and they have
managed to retain them, largely because independent
Morocco has held to laissez-faire economic policies.
For some members of the elite, the source of power
thus shifted from its traditional base to the more
modern one of monetary wealth, and they educated
their sons in France. For others, however, such was not
the case.
The divisions in the elite became manifest during
the independence struggle when its members formed
the nationalist movement. Leadership was in the
hands of the Istiqlal party, which was conservative and
religious in origin. Its founders were intellectuals in Fes
who had come together in the 1930's, under the
leadership of the religious scholar Allal al-Fassi, to
promote the reform of Islam. As the group gradually
became a party espousing nationalist goals, its
membership came to include younger,Western-
educated partisans of a liberal bent. It was sup-
ported by rural lenders and tribal chiefs, who formed
the Army of Liberation to fight the French in the
countryside, and also by members of the urban
resistance, who looked to labor leaders for their direct
guidance and thus bestowed upon them, in terms of
authority, a semi-elite status.
The solidarity this movement displayed during the
independence struggle was the old Moroccan ability to
unite at time of crisis and against a common foe. It was
unity lacking in concepts of nationhood and of the
principles of peacetime leadership, which include
acceptance of subordinate roles and of guidance and
direction. Once independence was won, rural leaders
in particular began to assert separatist tendencies. In
Tifilalt they openly defied authority, and in the Rif
mountains they rebelled. Their aims were not
autonomy. Instead, their sentiments seemed to derive
from the traditional tribal opposition to central con-
trol. They objected mainly to centrally appointed of-
ficials, especially those associated with the old-guard
of the Istiqlal, who came to serve in their areas as
judges and administrators.
Regional animosities played a part in this opposition
to the Istiqlal. The dominant position of party
members from the prestigious families of Fes was
resented by the rest of the country. As the livelihood of
these families often depended on commerce or real es-
tate, they were called the Fassi bourgeoisie, and that
term has become much used to apply to the upper
levels of the whole of the Moroccan business corn-
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triunity, centered though it now is in Casablanca and
Rabat, Connections with Fes may be remote or even
non-existent; the appellation connotes membership in
what is considered to be the clique at the apex of
Moroccan society,
Concepts of Fassi domination persist largely because
regional identities remain strong throughout the
society. Inhabitants of the Rif mountains, for example,
refer to themselves as the Riffi, suggesting in-
dividualism and independence. Even many long-time
city dwellers retain a pride in their regional back-
ground; and some?such as the Berber migrants to
Casablanca from the Sous River valley?form loosely
knit, mutual-help groups to assist one rtnother in
business. Through such means, for example, the Sousi
have triiablishecl a near monopoly of the retail !rocery
trade in Casablanca and in other Moroccan cities as
well.
Voting patterns illustrate these regional divisions of
the society. Although elections have been too few and
too closely controlled by the government to supply
much information, those held for parliament in 1963
and for the Casablanca Chamber of Commerce and
Industry throughout the mid-1960's yield some data.
They were surprising in that Casablanca businessmen
and tradesmen supported a party avowedly socialist
and revolutionary, the National Union of Popular
Forces (UNFP), as opposed to the more conservative
and better established Istiqlal. Plainly many of the
tradesmen, particularly the Sousi, were voting not for
the UNFP but against the Istiqlal because it was
associated with the Fassi bourgeoisie. Party doctrines
were less relevant than the commercial and cultural
rivalries
Subsequent UNFP attempts to transfer the party's
success tc, the home territory of the Sousi, however, did
not succeed. Politicians sought out in particular
members of the Ammiln tribe, who had helped them
in Casablanca, but they found that clan and village
rivalries within that tribe were too strong to permit
unity at the polls.8
To a greater extent than in many societies, this
prevalence of regional, tribal, and family identities in
Morocco limits loyalties to wider groups. Increased
communication and urbanization are of zourse break-
ing down old barriers, and there is a trend toward the
?This account of local politics is drawn In part from a biography of
one of the Sousi merchants: John Waterbury's North for the Trade,
University of California Press, Berkeley, 1972.
development of national consciousness. Yet suspicion
and distrust, bred of past divisiveness, continue to be
characteristic of the culture.
2. The Monarchy
a. Consolidation and Usa of Power
Consolidation of monarchical control was a slow
process in Morocco. Mohammed V returned from exile
as the symbol of Moroccan independence, but the
political elite had attained it; and for the first three
years after independence the King shared power with
the politicians. Allal al-Fassi of the Istiqlal was the
itn (leader) of the independence movement, and his
party members asserted their leadership. They com-
promised with the King by forming Cabinets which
contained some independents but which were
dominated by the Istiglal, and their aim was to es-
tablish a constitutional monarchy and hold parliamen-
tary elections, The King, instead of working through
the Istiglal to build a strong party, sought to weaken it
by encouraging a rural-based party, the Popular
Movement.
With this move Mohammed set the pattern for the
divide-and-rule policies to which his son continues to
adhere. Perhaps because of this traditionalist
background, Mohammed did not view a political par-
ty as an instrument to refashion the society. He did not
want to be subservient to the Istiqlal, and he did not
try to dominate it?as he might have succeeded in
doing. Like the sultans of old, who arbitrated among
the tribes and manipulated them to gain support, he
saw his role as that of moderator or arbiter' among
contending forces; and he worked to prevent any
group from becoming strong enough to exercise power
in its own right. At the same time, he attempted to re-
main aloof from politics and to act as a spiritual
patriarch rather than as a directing force, He was an
admired king but net a strong one.
The monarchy, in the end, won the levers of power
almost by default. Two occurrences over which
Mohammed himself had little control were decisive.
Fi;?, the Istiqi failed to establish dominance over
the army. The stage was set when the Army of
Liberation, which was largely a guerrilla force, de-
nounced the party's appeal to join the French-trained
?Hassan also refers to himself as an arbiter (see Le Maroc en
Marche, The Ministry of Information, Rabat. 1965, p. 206). and
the word is much used to describe the role of Moroccan monarchs.
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officers in a national army. Later the guerrilla
groups responded to the King, and for some years the
army was under the dual leadership of an 'saglal
Minister of Defense and Hassan, then a young prince,
as Chief of Staff. Not until the Rif rebellion in
1958-59?when Hassan led the army in putting
down tribal insurrection and protest ?did he take ac-
tual control, and the Istiqhd, then weakened by inter-
nal divisions, surrendered the Defense Ministry.
The second event which gave the King his power
was the schism ln the Istiglal. Although he had abetted
factionalism, the party basically broke of its own
weight. The younger, more forward-looking members
opposed the conservative orientation of their elders
and they formed the National Union of Popular Forces
in 1959, Thereafter the King did not have to bargain
with a strong party. He held the right to appoint and
dismiss his ministers, who were responsible solely to
him.
Hassan has retained this right throughout most of
his reign. For a brief period after 1961, however, when
he came to the throne?without the prestige of his
father?he allowed the politicians increased leverage,
acquiescing in their demands for a constitution and a
parliament. Elections were held in 1963, but no single
party won a majority and the assembly bogged down
in ineffectual debates. It was disbanded by Hassan, in
the wake of serious riots in Casablanca in 1965, on
charges that it paralyzed government action.
The second elections Hassan permitted were in
1970. They were aimed at providing a facade of
parliamentary rule and at demonstrating that he had
matters well in hand. Candidates were not allowed to
run under party labels, and most of the parties
boycotted the election. The rubber-stamp assembly of
independents that resulted was dissolved after the 1971
COUP attempt.
For most of the time, Hassan has thus ruled alone.
And he has emphasized and refined the
divide-and-rule technique of his father, allowing
groups overtly opposed to him to continue to exist and
consulting with them on occasion. He has not allowed
any of them to become a directing force, or even any
single person to dominate, say, economic affairs.
Instead, he has weakened all who sought such
authority. At the same time he has not sought to be a
reformer himself.
b. Hassan's Leadership Style
Hassan is a unique combination of the traditional
and the modern monarch. His household is shrouded
in mystery, and his wives are not seen by Westerners,
He dons a white jellaba and rides a white horse to
religious observances,w and he moves his court to his
numerous palaces throughout the country in an aura
of privilege arid majesty perhaps expected by the mass
of his countrymen, whose religious leader he is. He is
also a graduate of Bordeaux University. He confers
with politicians and labor leaders. He holds press con-
ferences and fends reporters' questions in the Western
mariner. And he is a golf enthusiast, although his devo-
tion to the game has diminished (or at least has been
less publicized) since the attempts on his life in 1971
and 1972 inclined him to pay more attention to "the
business of kingship.''
His
ma or accmnp is unents lave ieen in the ancient art of
statecraft. While actually close to the West, and
benefitting from its aid, he preserved the nominal non-
alignment of his country between East and West, and
he worked successfully to improve its standing in the
Arab world when events behooved him to do so. Ile
has found the tackling of domestic problems less con-
genial than his traditional role as guardian of the
national integrity; arid on these issues he has
procrastinated, arbitrating among the interests of both
traditional and new elite groups, the politicians, urban
labor, and the army. Basically his rule combines
manipulation, cajolery, and force.
The techniques of manipulation, of divide-
and rule, that Hassan employs are dictated not
by necessity but by choice, for lie could be tougher
if he wanted to be, The security forces under Col.
Ahmed Dlimi are efficient, and they demonstrated
their competency most recently in protecting
visiting dignitaries during the October 1974
Arab summit meeting in Rabat. Hassan's style of
leadership is, in part, adherence to the old modes of
behavior which perhaps come naturally to a Moroccan
king, but there arc practical reasons behind it as well.
Certain aspects of the manipulation technique, such as
consultation with political parties, Hassan has found
?Since the 1971-72 attempts on his life. he has not appearrd
publicly on horseback, presumably for security reasons.
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useful in attempts to promote his image as an
enlightened young monarch, worthy in particular of
US aid, Finally, his dealings with some groups overtly
oppom,d to him?such as the Union Marocaine dr
Travail (UMT), the most importani labor union in the
country?have served the cause of maintaining
stability.
The UM'I' and sonic of the parties are probably
useful in restraining or tempering the demands other
groups in the society might make On the King. In the
mid-1960's when the UMI was stronger than it is now
I [assail may even have seen it as a counterpoise to the
army, Today its critical press, joined with that of the
UN FP and other liberal parties, undoubtedly reminds
such entrepreneurial organizations as the Chambers of
Commerce and Industry of the other pressure groups in
the society which must be mollified.
Press criticism is sometimes focused on the King.
(The Istiglal papers, for example, told Hassan the
1971-72 coup attempts were his own fault.) Such op-
position, however, may serve Hassan well; it is, in a
sen(', a harmless outlet for voicing discontont which
might otherwise be concentrated on overthrowing him.
The criticism is, in any case, circumscribed, Opposi-
tion groups know the limits of the King's tolerance.
and when they overstep it their papers are confiscated
and their organizations suppressed.
The repressive measures of the regime, however, are
sporadic. UNIT stalwarts are imprisoned, then
released, and allowed to resume their previous political
roles. Student demonstrations are broken up, but their
extremist, anti-monarchical union was only period-
ically intoned before 1972, and demands are being
voiced for the lifting of the current proscription. In-
justices, such as preventive detention, are well pub-
licized, and Moroccans do aot keep silent for fear of
reprisals. Hassan plainly wants to keep his opponents
weak, but he does not want to eliminate them. Ile
thus gave the parties an opportunity to hold congresses
and strengthen their organizations in 1974, when he
made overtures to them about their participation in
government. The apparent aim is to entice them into a
coalititut Cabinet which would prepare for electitms,
In be held on his terms.
Individually, a number of important party leaders
have held Cabinet posts at various times since 1 965 .
Mien parliament was disbanded; but they have had
only the authority the King chose to give them and
they have acted without party ties. Individuals
without political affiliation, drawn mainly from the
12
elite, constitute Ilassan's favorite clientele and his im-
mediate entourage,
Often (lie King rovards his supporters by mulling
her to posts in goveromIlMit, many af which continue
to be direct or indirect sources of profit in the form of
concessions, licenses, authorization, etc. Sonic of these
appointments are to the Cabinet, tual because it has
been used in this way its members have not played an
effective directing role,
1 ItISSIIII hits not permitted consolidation of control
on the part of his ministers, or even the routtnization of
ministerial functions, Thus the frequency and fq)-
parently capricious nature of his Cabinet reshuffles
have become legend. Of the approximately 230
Cabinet 'appointments made since independence,"
almost half have lasted only about a year and man),
for six months or under (see chart). Only those respon-
sible for the King's safety, such as Maj. Cen.
tvlolutunned ()takir, the long-time Interior Minister
and then 1)efense Minister who turrecl traitor in 1972,
find those holding portfolios of lesser concern, such as
Public Health, have been permitted long tenure in
their posts. Changes have been most frequent in the
mittistries dealing with economic affairs. ;Ind un-
doubtedly the King has used them as an inwortant
part of what John Waterbury calls his "patronage
system," '2 i.e., showing royal favor and manipu-
lating access to various kinds of prebends and kid:-
backs. '"
'The number eafftifft he precisely &shooed because of the
ihr in)rtfidlin and tincrttainty Li% to
11 11111111 'MOW tIOIMOIt111111IN JO' 11'1'14
"11'fileriniry. Thr (:ornnuitarr u/ihe Faithful, n
"Mitch Iliac been ..411(1 shaitit onnintion In NI woven, the
11111',111011iii %%Mild Ilf. cciii (Or at Irml ivainha IwIlt.r) if Ihr king
lakr ringrin fin?.isisri.% Ili eliminate It (:ctl.ilnk It rlicic (tom
liar laaccuct tic el. cc burr alsolact atac hind of &camp-tat tccorti lac loyal
t? il.krIc I,, irtialitr a fur, In liar ?klierr
lienclit%ic tl,,., .111111111g Iii NtOlikIt? i.E rifidO(T. Officials from thrir
nitim,ing gaac miliarial claim% for torilltor air toattatitotc Art
1)"1111"1 vmtir lii tion?qjnitliar (4.44i-titan% rffrtic
tottoptiaao. porticalhatIc hi de%i?Inning unirtici Some, his fact, Ihicr
drowd liii torroption pottootrc national Into:ration, uataital for.
motion, anti atfotinIcltatic-r rfficirocy (Ser N401,1,11,1 1.cf.i.
"Fmnniint I)r%1-10nnictit thrmigh Iturraticr.dic?
Afitcrit urn fichar omit St-fru/tit, VII. Nmembrt 1961. and ) S 5', r.
.1 .atrsijitiou, .1111(1 Decrlopiornt A Com?Ilrorfit Aivak 'ha.
AM. tO Of, 1.1,h its al St fro( r iirtfru pliar 144,7 1 Ns, mull
11.111 OI,Ide !Or N.fmn4-1?? Yet .11 liar caslur Him% r%itIrsim ac tint calf ?
Iskirtit I,, Iwouurt thr nnIginr.it th.if ..nrrunfInti fi.st bern i4 Icitultator
to iirculoptortat fflotIc Soffor it to asia 111.41. clrcrattr hatchet
itorasiiti, !Aril I, I1.1o..111 in 1471, wriliption tritwint aictof,troc.
ptialcalalc OK/racingliar ta tticion of liar popolatv laniard king anti
Kocrtnownt
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DURATION OF CAOINET APPOINTMENTS, 1957-74
(Approximately 230 eppoIntments made to Cablne0
0 months and under
Appointees who hold Oilleo
0 months tot yesr
JJ 24 months
Ind over
40%
18 to 24 months
Name, 8.70
lila 18 months
Percentages do not add to WO because of mundina.
As it naturally behooves the Xing to bestow his favor
rather widely, his Cabinet reshuffles?and other ap-
pointments too?have come to resemble a game of
musical rht,tlrs, %%Ali some members of the government
moving InPl-. post to post, then p,rhaps dropped for
years, ;111(1 rehabilitated in another go-round. Fess' of
the prominent men disappear completely from the
ranks oh Moroccan officialdom, for put-dosslis are
seldom permanent. Ilachir Bel Abbe% Taarji, for e,.?
ample, \dui %vas named Minister of Justice in a 1971
Cabinet, bad held no official post since die early
19(10's, ss ben he had served as Minister of Labor
Sometimes die Rabid rumor mill tries to supply a
reason for a temporary ecli(,se. Tilos 1)riss Slaititi left
the government fithloss ing the 1971 v,i*nip attempt. :If trt
C.ItallVt-It'Vt'l pOstS, iiiiiI rumors that lie
bad liven either implicated in or offended b) the cor?
ruption that had been disclosed hi connection
%%Ali the cunt) In 147.1 wav rehabilitated and
named permanent representative to the
Nation%
A place in the Cabinet 1. probably best assured Its
marrsing into the rov family, for both prime
Minister .hinted Mittati and former Foreign Minister
Mohammed Clierkatiiii Aft' Illittited to ilavkaii.% sisters
lint tics to the monesrd families arr also helpful 'fu-
ss& of the present Foreign %finistrr?Almird !Amid, is
Itathia Sebti, ss hose family Matte it for 1 flair in
Casablancarral (-stale% anti his predecessor but (hr sob,
Ahmed Talbi lienhinia, is ...atirrIed to the daughter of
Morocco's svealthiest businessman iind financier,
Mohammed high/mold,
Ilk/tildes and the jousting for position often pil
family against 1110111), in the royal court, and intrigue
and rumors abound. As the King Is Infltienceil by this
goy,ip, the atmosphere Is often such that efficient func-
tioning al the top-level of the Inireaucritc), is simply
smothered, The dismissal of Prime Minister Moham-
med flenhima in liffi() took place under such condi-
tions, !tumors to the effect that be had pocketed
money on public works contracts were circulated by,
among others, All lienjelloim, who thought that
had been instrumental in his losing the
Justice MinistrY post. A relative of lienjellotin was at
that time the I)irector General of the !loyal (;abinet,
sylio controls access to die King. As it result, Ilenbitita
was for months cut off from contact with Hassan and
thus lost his capacity to act long before his final
ouster,
Disputes or disagreements but the Cabinet center on
t?omprlition for die King's favor or attention and
rarely have ideological content. No minister has been
knossn to argot. policy with the King or to sly no to
Decisions emanate from I lassan, and If lily of his
asst, ',ales figure in the process of making flies, ;;;;-;
has ..1)1 been identified. Those closest to hint over the
years have been his sectirity men: first. Nliaj. Gen.
Ntoliammed thifkir. until be turned against the King
iii 1972, and now Col. Ahmed svlio has
acceded. in large measure, ()ufkir's rude but not to
his ministerial posts. The degree of influence or
authority they have had, !losses er, is qiirstionable.
The King matte tivcrs lo (awl misrule in his rn
!mirage ss liii lir 1 hulks is gaining, too much pins er, and
there is some suspicion lir 111.1y 1141% n beers acting to iiii?
(kola atithorits??thus perhaps prompting
the coup attempt
I1,1%%.iti is iinssilliuig to share pil?? rt. tin' tr?Illt is
thrift and indirection at the top unless lit? feels obliged
to act Ili% prrMilt.11 irlditiatilM% and the demand% oti
his lime thus figure in the satiation to fact. the
criticism made of him his air long-time opposition
leader nos% in role. \toliammed itasri, has some truth
in it tie vscels in .itials 'Mg This
% hint from being thorouglils familiar ss oh ob.
comlition% and from producing vomit! and
solutions to problems "Ii
;MA CR
trt
sincerr
"i. 1*.If 0 :I I rlott.at% 1,)71 RH% 1..ititi.stimi
CPYRGHT
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3. Contenders for Power and Status
Tim task of the King in winning and holding
poNical control has been simplified by the nature of
tI e gnmps operatIngitt Moroccan society: sonw have
limited alms, and those ambitious for real power reveal
I nherent flaws at crucial MM.% These ell rneterlstles
are apitarent in each of the following:
cs. The Elite
The Kir.g is the patron and the protector of the elite.
Landlords, merchants. and businessmen look to hlm to
protect them from expropriation, natioualization, and
land reform, and lw does so. Although taxation In
Minorco has bec(ntle increasingly pro), essiye, tin in-
heritance tax has been instituted; and so far only
Inreign-owned estates have been taken over filr dis-
tribution to poor farmers. This is not to say that great
fortunes, in the Western sense, litiVe been amassed, hist
only that the interests of the fairly well-to-do have
I een looked after.
In part because of this protection, the elite is still
basically drawn from among dune who had mi lney.
and education at the time of independence. hotlines
who were prominent then and in pre-colonial
days?stsell as the Benjellouns. the Balminis, the
Boutalebs, the Ouazzanis, and the Debbaghs?con-
thole to play important roles, with their members
represented in all facets of official and commercial
life it Entry into the elite is not and never has been
dosed, however, and its nntni)rn air gtowing as
appointments are increasingly made on the basis of
ci onpetence instead of family connection and us op,
port unit it's for making money are opening up,
Acconling to an estimate made by john ?Vaterintry,"
the elite in the decade after Independence numbered
only about 1,000 nirn: 100 army officers, 730
high-ranking government officials and rural notables
and administrators; 130 prominent politicians and lot-
ion leaders, and 100 others. including businessmen
and rdigious dignitaries (the rairma)." In the past 10
hr I ,iii h Iw.iii In kreP mruttit ul Important lamilim at alratt
the torn rrf the century Sc,' Aniltr Adam, Catablanra Euia no la
itato.fornhanim dr ha 'twirl.- Afattxttifir OH roma, 1 dr roeurdrro.
crute- N.rtinnai de Ia Recherche Scientafirine. Pans.
Itoor
161.hr Cwattantder the Vatittftd, oSli
"the inliKaar, !twain traittilitir the urakett dement nf the ehlr
Thew uomlinur In he 1-crit it gird ii, the trn familt.. lanatnet. Ia
"filet Otrogliorn petpulAt tuppod,
14
years, the elite Itas probably doubled in flit', Its it has
come to include far more entwpreneurs, working
either In private business or In the government-
conlndled sector of the economy, and also jut 11111 IIC at
educators and Journalists.
The elite thus includes the King's malts constituency
1111(1 also die main opposition to him," Both groups are
affected by Ilassan's manipulative techniques, for
those outside the immediate government coterie are os
vulnerahle 0 OW Cabinet ministers to royal put-downs
and rehabilitations. Ahmad Bettkirane, a Casablanca
businmman and director oi die pro-UNIT paper Maroc-
Informations in the mid-1900's, wa, without an influ-
ential position for vvrral years after his newspaper
WaS SIISMIded; but then he was suddenly !UMW)
to a post in the government-controlled sector of the
economy. Often these rehabilitations are connected
with Ow King's political concerns of Ihir moment. In
late 197.1 he was interested In reviving the UNIT Its
part of the restoration of political life, and a number of
t he party's stillWath. WII0 had been Of rested tin charges
of anti-government plotting. Were felt aced front
prison. 'Eltry Ito:hided Omar Benlellotm, an old-time
UNIT revolutionary and former editor of the party's
newspaper.
Economic reprisals an' another means by which the
King makes his power felt. Government contracts can
I e directed away (non offending bosinessmeti, aml
personal favors can be revoked For example, villas
used by the Moroccan elder statesman and former
Prime Minister Ahmed Balafrej were taken over by the
government in 1972 after his son Anis, a young
engineer, had been charged with (and was later
sentenced for) alleged nivolvement in revolutionary
schemes." Granting the right to use property or land is
rwc way the King shows his pleasure. but often the
grant is temporary and it may be withdrawn for no lip-
feilMItl. When that happens the erowhilr
red pleat ha % no recoulM, for he It has pa.
t icipat ed in the spoils system.
These ups-and-downs in Moroccan society are cer-
tainly sufficient to give rise to personal insecurity.
They may lead as well to what Waterbury calls
-alliance-Imilding- among the elite"?a tendency to
t,br. (Frank 14.i tin, The Bole of the Intrlhgentsla in
Alikkrfauaton The (..se of Afonrcco. Urthrri!ty at Train Ph 1)
clittertatinn, I 7 It riamistrt the -oppontitin hich hargaint
for pth &Kr% c It the gin tumult no'rrn? art about RIO men-Oren
"CS.311, 017(17, 27 Jith 11)72
"Op s1l.0 75
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hedge. kis hy forming vontireflons svilli
business intrtysls and lies %Yid, members of govern-
filen! c. IIiit III(' 114111111RP 11'%WlIngII(Mr.% 110'4111111
10/111111"1 11141111P
Ilikr111111 Mr' ?Vily 111 iutIiIiti1101'
etidfrt promoting one's liderests, and il is a method
much vitip'-led in Morocco hittilly llrc 4,1101 rtriiil
411111 1.11111111elcitll (1111111111111111,..
1111101All'11 liv Illr' 111111111111111% Cif Ahmed Ilttlithri.
Ille 1141)1011011 gmcrtittir /41 4)1110441 Ind ftillirr 411 Illr
yoting "revolutionary sYris raised Ity tin mirk
Mohammed (;11essolls, \s,1141.4, 1i,,iils 111111Irc%
1111111(11' sl lIrr 1111:11011111.1111r411 (1)1111?111 $1/111 1VIllitf? Mt)
1121% \CRT(' a1. 11114111V, iL1i4lIlrJ 111:11114'll
11011 !MUG. 1.1.11141.4' 111CM1141% llf'141
1.11411 1114' Navigollmi
( 'ottipaity and Vh.e Cos emir ill the Haul; of Morocco
and 411(1 Illi%1` %COT(' 417, ?.11111MC?ii(Itlit, 41110 111%611011N
ltlaffird Ntoliattimed %slime posts have In-
Ilii' litiative Ministry.
(glen famils lies (loss partisan lines 'Ulm% III,.
portant offluial of Illy I %1I, AltdrIkrim
II"' "1 !wa(1 eif Ihr pahace?stipported ( ;ow
%Motional and Democratic l'optilar Most-mild.
,11)414'l1(illii k114111l1. m441 thr 14,44144-1?111?I2it1. iif
\1 I lot ailed lioncetta, 1.'. Iii, lirails Ihr
. 111V VIICC1i. 1111 1 1Ir 41111111ly Ill
chIll iillrf.11-1.11iuM111In. ?1,111411 all", 3.11 ill ?IlitlAII)
1114 per ?c 11111 tallier became of their corm and timi?
ple?its They ;ire striking largely !treatise the elite is
4.111.111 ill %ite, .11111 1113tly It.. 111rIllbet%
4111(111111 TIltiiill.:11?111 Ilir tIppyr Irtric (if tim %twirl
Prl,411131 C1111,11,11 the edges ill
isolitital differences and Min the sense of itleologival
uttrintillment, riliaps promoting .4 trittlenev to or..
tfitirsce III the status tpio If this is the case. it Inas be :4
1,141414 III the reltittante to OA(' Ilia rim% pat tr)
litrk., for twig') r14...isj4)44% 4444 fitiittrr. .45 1.11111
11411011. 01111 III 11r1.isr, iii tic to effect AI 1111Ill?
diCtriblIti()11 (11 to pursue des-elop,
mew goals,
b. The Military
Aftlly and air forcr elemen(s hare tried twice lo
king down Hassan and take control. In July 1971 a
g;ittip iii Itigh?rartkini,! officers Intl 1,5(X) cadets of the
I oncommissioned of ficerl' %dux), in art attack or) thr
palace at tikhiraf. %% herr the King. his senior ads isers.
and the diplomatic corps Were celebrating his
15
1)1411.,4144s. Jti:1 1.1 ti14)11111: 1400, 441r 144tcr IinI tttr I lit
kly44,1 11444%. 11 till. lloving 727 that ssos bringing king
home loan halite. All evidem r
king 111:111, Mai 011_ N1t1112011111t11
( bait, this attempted trio( ifle
The specific motives of tlit. whets?of thr 40o111nm
Iii %chid; they %souk, have soilir.lit to mos(' the cittoil/%,
had flies succeeded never Iv, limos ry Ii,' of.
ers invoked in the rather medic( rssfol conp either
Virle :11111111V, llir *dully 100 prictmc 1.(111111 iliitii,g
1)411414-4, 4I4 1.', ('(4't'Sl'lilll'Ii 1.11414)
llirtrAlur )1111kit 111 11:11.4- (41111-
,11111rd 11114f1
111:11111 utrt ()ttlri%
'1 11r r?lr.144:41iii4it1. 114414114r1.t. III 114411
llor% 11,11 llr{ 11111111. MU thing abotit the poten-
tials of dir officers Iii (144(111(1. (though it
mo. indl(atisr) %lot.' significant is die In t
thy% (lid 'nit 11.1vt? Akin- IIIpm?rt thr 1.414111 414 ciuiiu
0(1%;1111,10. ;it III?fil :1.4111). 1:14444 4)1 110:4
1.41r1r mid limitirNAffirti trpt/rtrilk
tratIcil 141 Ilit? molt ittlruipt: cc 4114 frAr .44141 trrpitlAllmt.
4o1114444104 144, t 44411) Ir.4410: ??411' ItwIllirr(c
the elite (()nt. of them. Anialurn 11:stiltnnn. %sac
ill 1.11-1
11.;?,..nt indit.11111 aftrt Iliv 1971 altrww.I pinnting
nnt Itn? 11.11.t f.ni.t% tin ii.iol granted die traitors, flit.s
had pariii ipated ill the spoils ss stem
1.011,0". oserlap kisser,' die chit- and
the of wer corps of almost 2oxi command, flir
appro?iniatels t1hl,000?111.in armed flours 1 are
sit:tido-ant 4.)41r fit lhr ItiglirAr ranking offteres. lirig
( Alideldmii ScIfitilAj. %%1111 cc .1% !WWII Insp.-rio( of
Inlantrs iii 1975 .11111 %Olt) 14:-%4414-41 Illr (.1)444 14grtil
cc Int 14 (4)114:141 itt tlir 197:1 .11.1hisrarli
through Ihe tii,i1ol,ir Ill 1115 cislcr, 1(4 lir influctili,i1
1.111111 1 of 1 halm ()uiattani. a prominent Loss,' %slat
has 'wen associated ssith seseral partirs and
held .4 titindser lu (:altinct posts, and also 1.111.11ffid
sk.111. all 1111141/L011 elthiplylirlIf 115% lirr lit
Tangier Through Sclootii's to% it marriage into the
iimisellham hinds, he is related to Mr-ssatitid (:logner.
.4 fotmet Caltmet minister ssho ssas among the carl
Istitilal leaders
'1'11r most important %High- 111.1 II ill Or
1111111:11!. ?and peal:Wk. v.1111 1111'
It) time con:Ors?is the wcurits 1)1inti,
His e.,:er presents an intelligent sotmng man 4,11
((fir .1.1,4) has liren amaringly successf til
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e410141411111g, sl smog:lotion with tlsittsiii god alto
firs to 111r elite 1)liftil martird the titter of General
Srfrioul't wily tool flint moves In high political and
commetrial rircIrt addition, hit teal rotate (.411144;4
hose lafinglst 111,11 drop to the Tail family, impottant
III trttilr otatistfactuting and ()flirt lottiortty; ?I
Now Its hit ffild-10';, 1/11mi has fl hit catert
forht ern the army and policy (fowl, hot Iiis meteoric
tit,' wag ill (lie 10101 ticlrosry well lover been con.
fir( trd with hit offering Idiots-4f op In I at g
tf-opegoot in ihr holt trial for the kidnaping, and
minder of the Moony:in oppotiliffis. leaflet, !strIsdi Bets
Barka " ifs 1470 lir writ opp;srently whittling anus at
the arlIsisrits. of hit Irost, Grrirtal ()tair. lot lir %vat
flowed to head the StIfile NntIHtltlie. whilst, Wat
tell1M ell Itylt11 the intioliclion (Nair.% N1initIty 5)1
Intrtiot 11 ??.10,0 ()011(if fell. Mini tom; begot) ftPIgkr
hit plifur ifs the I.:itsg't faVnt
TSIgeillet ttith, Ihr 'remits terYitrt. Ihr military
re-emerging at the instrument allt1 !Ile I%IJIptsIt (SI
the palace. followin s lajr)r softer 1971-72 coop
attempt% At thol IIe Ilsitton f-ottigford thr
isrokr if) 'mitt op, and ttripiwil them of their otto
monition. lett the% altaill hit life Yet he wefts)
tts hr sour risme thr potrofs cii the military lir it pet?
tellmslitibly fist Ilsr modernirotion IttOgrAtil
4011 i) wc1.itsg thy rgillitallytIl hit officers want. despite
Illy fit hilistelf inherent in Ilse kollship smI thr
mcd fort,)
In Ilse ffirofitittsr. thr comitotition of the mmy c011.,
!snort tis hofsgr It it no lotiget the prellsonifoodls
Itcrlsrr, flair f waled by the French Standoff!), of the
Ilor ri Rcitlo Academyill!strifort r beim raketi.
w ids the troth of fos wins; Ow hoter szlocated forhaf)
And Afol) %sadist Tie% with the elite ofc undoubted!),
wrokrf.ing, morcos rt. for the %OW, fit the prettigimo
fomilirt teem ill Isp snore oltrocted to gos eminent and
1)11010-so dos!, It) the militort
The formalise esperirrort of the )(stinger officers
differ, from tlogr of their elders !staffs of the hitter
g,tew isp doting the intlepristlencr Ottiggle The former
?err Niinth, durum the 191-so's and remember 1 hr
"I Root 11: (soros) II ?1,, isi74
nisi fisis tsss.*, tiLif ti)s- t 0-ti, fith.0tra G-0.-041 (Mika, ii40.40
rt fmril 1.1 r II tAiittr isis,, wn41 '0.1,4 an?hrist Is trLillitni
4. 4 utvi via/Aril bq tonlyht tit, It
nt t. .1.itt.1 Ittal Ofinf ttus Ittirtnittrifilt
"NifIli$ 51,111K Iltfhll$C1111.1$ bast' brell 4144114 It; Instant ();1(14
3g.Is5I+1 ka,c
p-cull 1(511 ditsent of that lime The lieutenant% and
the captains vscfr iff crtill114115. atIlllttl in 19t3), when
litotes, dettionutallotri us Rutile/us and wodieo
tesultril In srvrtal hundred dead and Ird to the tlivuilit,
nun of parliament ',idle itijotte,ation it available now
on the ttolitical attitude.% of 11;( otilitaty, hut many of
II* viiinget members nuts well %s SIC the distatidat don
of the oppolition ion% and illIllallet1(T the
flow pair of f !wow' in the (moths.
A (imp it alwast pottible Morocco but. if if
happent. it doffs not fief rttatily mean new difectiors flu
thr 00111t1' 1 W0 liatic fat tort thous' doubt firkin de
iittny's ahilit.; to play the deschitimental tale lwurt
!Ilan I Iacci,41) cit with the tiocett toilitaty tpgitort have
had It) tflIlle 'the liftt it tilt' cow,
mon it) 111411% de% eloping IsalllItirs, (II dtak*ItIg tut! time
Illilitat? Its +staff the trt usli s errs icrt he second it this'
pact gittnt Jilt it'll of Iltr rt cisIfLI %%1111 the I- troth
independence, 1hr Motocf at) attllV
141Itir frOttlime fighters, Init limit of its officers hail
terrised their training,. tanic, and haute espetient-r. till
der the Firtich nag, basins; terse(' mainlY in Inds).
china .!Nottir of them. toll) at Crtirtal SeItimaj. site
'till SItI l il, 'Mint' base relitell, the
siftrt,rffef ft (4 !brit sstinuitilcsti siliIuPtt elltriV linget
off
t, terittirs sit VW es000,1 ism sitiii comer% Aim) iii.
Isetfted from thr Multi 41.11$11111 ((it Ow
tionstrtrit in leflitt coupes ond contempt for irs?iirg-.41
nwilamis terrotril is, EMI ilstsmKIT fur 1711 it'eT thsrjls 11;j1
(1)tp:. in NM. 144(10+ the prritigr ist Iroderdsip it) Ow ill.
tlepelislt cite ttrujrJc. anti it' ifisos:c Isot not berm in).
poised Iss thr Infite tevellI attiscialion %% if hi time
:rots-wise mrottort of IIoon.% Kos-MI MI-1d No)
oftionre flamed its the aftertnoth of
011111) II111% 1111Iikell'. and %it lmu! It ofl utlity?Ii;..?11
regime 'ss sunlit %orris- be Mute tfiltr?the 01411
11Ie eltld tills, ? 9.1.?1.,e?af %al Ill
pro)iding dorction for tile cisimtrs
c. The Political Parties
The N% (ad -p.trty.- it. ill o sr:or, inapproptiatr for
the nati-ott's political organizations became the raison
&etre of potties in nowt countricy it to competr for
power thrmigh elections. and those in Slotomo have
liad no foroningful chance to do so lot 12 years Yet
16
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(mr t
11,1011.4 111,41' 4343' tilltm111,12'11. 21 111111111(4 1141 4c 3 kill%
Ill 11113 1 11o4u4 3( 3.111v111. 411141 11434 (II, t'Aril 1114).
41/13 141111 11111111'11A ?I 114` 11111111 141113W1 1111 1lli4 ill
11111 11i I1; 1111. 34344 t 44;111 11 11 111111111,4 111 Ow pA;
lit ; 11341114 ;Rid ;%1011 1 441114111 111411u4t11(t;t1 p4t;Itilytufq
Ill litRifrti mit lir 131111 1331 433 1111114 443)31
1%,1/1 III) WOW St 11111$,111/1441111: 111 1111' 111,
11111ili1 .11 i43lt,4111/111i11114 111114 I11.14 c3i1i11
nig !h,,3) Ill lU 3 $11)0141'0-4 114,1if njr? ;1(f. Mihtt
434 311:111(31 4)4 14(4
Ill \ fiff,f 213) 111111111 1, 1114- 11111124114111 /11 111, 4141
111114 32444)';IF, 11,11 I ;It al Iraqi 41 timr Aftri ill
dry; mIt Ir,;; Alt tiiiitifIr lII21Ilt1 1114111?11)11l1-
411111- 1I)131141!4311% 144I(,4 110011 1-1110 Ws'. I 431 if 4424411111
11$ lily 11- *441 34 (1,1f1'4 Il) .0111 eplil(. %%hid)
Itt-rt; %,,,i?;;;II; I; ;?;;I ;it; 111)4 14111431 11)Ilrft1)(1' t.
I '14144 ,4-4j, 0,41 211111
42411.41 30,41nr, Anil II 1454444 m)j,,,r; 11,341
.11111 11,r mekti 1114( jgclif if
4 31324414 ?t h ?lit ,:f hit
,...11111 I /111111.1tit/4t4 ,if (.431111,41 111 1iipti)/ 1414 it; III,
\t,t1I;
Ill NItiltril 44 1 2331' 44 111 3114?,33IiT.311;;Its IH-Rr
I!41r1I ;to; 1,1; i1114 .4 4 ;mid* 3,1 it,IIIII;;;tvil
''11141 143444 111r 141111111 41, /11
rmittu4s 1,8114-4 ttle.tr lit trflr, I rill, 1114 i1i11114
111,141 III 14(44(44 4)44- /1/444.41,314 ..1 i1,.- 41.114111,
43r8ur 1I4 44114-1. Ow trmrtit,irt TA1
01114 Ihr? 211111 1114 h1r1 111 Iir,111
$%1 thr thRtlirttt; 1.4(111 .41 (AI; 111,41intr. 'If thrif
13-.131tr3 1.111i 131r-4 1,41 1111,0(1
1111.11/(1t .1110 .e1ely(441 1,1,4
r.111111)
1 fit t ?r.4t; if raitfrinr. Ili, 10441 it t fill
Pti4,41,1% if1lt1Ic1-11 r.4114. Inif 111E4 ri14i!lf4341.I 41 41,42.
I. .4f r?trttl 114231 zi%rt ./11 ,4414,.; III 41,4111111; 442
`3133till I .111 141111111t I 11, 14.114 4 11.14 104111r11 (1111111114444T-
1.1101% IllflI4'.11 Ihr MACH- III ill, ;1;1,411i1ti; ti.itnr?
:441in itufriwinfrnty? 4141 Int Ilir
.iiii.n.iffutir inifrivrtiffrin, tft+14:4:Ir 1111' 44.141'
Mr_ fi ,iiip?r,at it rt iff7c.lin,
wrinfierAiii) fnim int.? v11;1114,11 in PattiIII An rt.
fitnAlrif 2(M),(0011%tr11tI.4Ii% thr p,n1A 31 MI clifitl
Khniptt? t.4Ihrt than .11) 3141.4443,4.4131.44 1.4-413.4441 0411144.4
111( 14131111(4m Villjk I fw (1411.
4,11 1)?1,111.4 1 111n31.411 11 4, -11131 ctifintIng 1 1.14443?) (414 1)311
tAttig. Most- 1411111111 at t134?) ((If .442(1.41 .1/4.-tIrtmrtit..thr
%f!34 a. I Rtli- 111;1*s; 441,1
111:11 it :117
17
112111 ik 111434r 3 4111111111.11113' 14 114-11 411.1thr4A14 44-110 3334
444111 3ffifil.34;310 3 micri., c111?11 414 Ilic I 11111111112wcy III
/1111114 (4)111 11)1' W1114114 14 OW
.1;111113:1 1142 11i11111!1111:111,1 111111 i; App.urtil 114 Ript;ci-
littt; II; \littitt "+ 11111104 P!'11111i111! 211111
itt
Illf 1114' 110111:11 /if ifir ,Nt
; tine iktii r)f 1hr P44-t1'111 1111111g11:11 -Arm %%hid) ticr:
I rum iitid 13111if iii 131111111. 31111))110411341(11)) AIM it)
.1114111
Nhic itic7) ott- 3)111tItir. Ihr if-mil-It. Mid Vit ru
Ill 3.11113.411343j15 111 J1lltil iluir iii .:1)%c1ilinc8l 11144
1,0-11 :1in% num, privinn lIlt thy
11.1114 it ill &Wry, 81 114- 14144: 11111!'
4.3131 41.1112431.11 13(114 NW 4I.t asti dirtl hi I4I 41)111 44234
41)1411 dud 114 1111' 111111i, 1112< III .11 211111 111114:11-10%
4-
\( II-1111111,11 1141111 111.1 1114 611 11111111 4 lir Might 31)4341,
Ill ftmitintm till Ictifitd 1111.3 eimmthitig frtctid.diiiit 23
7)4.34.1 I1M! \ %%Mild 111,11111ht; %%id/ft 11)1 ofir-Afft trtintlt
11,1,1titm 1111111 it: lvdrirtchip
I Iv IU,41111; 131 t, fly 11311 ritIrtitrd
ill '0,3/34 444 IL, II'IR tri1t1;;-111; 1111 442t1144:4-3 rfr.
Ill' til III Ow 11.34 1,1-3-11 in l!ir
illj4 r I 3,14)431.0 (.111 1W,4) r1 114 3gim-
it?;sli"t1 0 00, ?1,!,.)of ,?,24 .itt,,,3114 111)114.114:111 .34
4144 147.4,,no,41. 41.,14.3414 tiro r 04471. kilt
1113/111.4'4 Ill 41114 1/113! 44,44- !Litilust it! ilir Itivtr-t ota.
IIJ ( (1141,11 491431)1114 ,14,1 11,4411,1. ;.11
if .111utt 11.34; III 111111)11W 44111C 411111' )1)11 pcntIrtl; 4-243411
.444 III tIijt 'Rid III IA!, itftw;
\lJill' I r 44114411 31,4 4-1.14(41 14.4411 ?1,11! 1314144-
f11.11 111 1114- I 14441-41 tr.d
11011 flt ini11,11 /141,0,1111 I .1111114:
rul4111$111% 114-1111$,,, 1,11j, C/44 rtillortil, :1 1 41111/1111r1 I
1 1itii1i114 ,31111 11.114- 44, 11.11, 14,14 11-,,J) ditrtrti. 11131
till (4.311% 11,4 11.1t.44ord 132 1114. .11111
V.1,4114111 ?11.111,1r 1' 1! 1.1144 M11144(42 14,411111 hi 1474
still; tfir 11,414,0 (.14 )11111 133f tuttly. fIr 1.3110 1't1i,,,t3 Ill
14-11141.3t f "11 It 1143 4(110 ?rj)..it,dr; 11.411%
113u3431 It1 I,J144 .111/1 II11/111-1 11_144 1411121 1114-if 1.114111 443(5
141111, 11 1114 11 1,111.11114 44 1111 14141 I \ I I'n 444244 44-il4u41ntf
/11 ( .41.1111.111i .1 .11111 1...1.11 1,7(1 ly% Ow I A1 I Ir.itirt 1,311.
424101 Itcn '4 11411k
)1114t, ills ;1111.404111 34-1.4131 12,4741-
hr \fmrIttritt, wictri,dh 1
It? till' )%)71 III cotintrt
.4%.43 Ittlkil.d. it 4)3144 (11%:(14-il 431111 !yin
f4'"11". 64114) 141 11111:1 rt%rtitialk ilintrt?ati.ir On 'lir
.444' incrting. Art pc1114(1
"f 141" 111411th \r?Cf 111 414111114.1114`r III `411,1114V11. 141
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Gr_Critt
1043
POLITICAL PARTY DEVELOPMENTS
U ii an
(0.04.wn,ttrytv
10f,9
1070
1072
044
?
1
1
r,,,, .114,4st.rva
11?4
/Nfli el P,1. ,t
ImpooftP 4P
NotabAst
r?toeffol.:
(Mit In
0?0?10."
r.r,l,t 0.40p.opo
jun
Ormottor
Clootootool Petty
(rpti
'reel lat the (Wont, al
Ca.thfoornol Inthire,ott
ODIC)
Crft01.14.111 8.4
Dir..tvet.c rtrOto
idovartom
1
woo' Covekleftes utilr Pilot
18
1
MP
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DECIICT
part because the UN II' drew off potential supporters,
they tire prIlltips hoping to fare better under the new
1101111' Party of Progress and Socialism. And In the
meantime new parties, sucli as the !Abend Progressive
Part y organized by ( A4)11)611(1) busioessmen,
Proliferate. 011e of them, Itif-brised Action Party,
Mile)) appeared to offer the potential of bringing rural
poops into politics, Is already rent by dissension
among its founders.
Notie of the parties, for over H decade. has ;dile
to mobilize NufficIrlit support to back up the demands it
makes on thr King. They have only the power 1 lassit?
chooses to give them, but 'r hey remain hopeful still of a
meaningful role While reluctant to perpetuate the
status quo. they responded to the overtures he began to
make In them In 197,1 about participation In the
governmort, arid they any willing to open a dialogue
with him, apparently on the grounds that they have
nothing to lose On the issue of reviving the claim to
the Spanish Sahara, which the King is using '11 114rt I')
heal divisions, the parties have rallied around him, and
their leaders undertook missions to explain the
Ninrticemi position to foreign governments.
The r'sfrIII of the parties' popular appeal is
questionable. Some of them, including the UNIT.
.velcomed I la \%itti't (ircitiOn (I) pliftpliiV
lary 1"111.111)11% beyond 1975 became it will allow them
(flue to iiuuijtl ILp their strength. Party organizations in
the corintr)side are vestigial or non-existent, end urban
membership has fallen during the years without eke-
;loos.
III Sir's% of 1116( past rSprilellCr. IllaIly pOlitkally
ass ar' NIMotTalls are piOhably SkeptiCal of the vague-
ly socialist goals that most of the parties proclaim. intl
thry probably doubt that repartition of the national
wealth or similar moves would benefit them directly.
The programs of the parties ore not specific, offering
Iii) strategies for Orr betterment of !simmer). Although
III the long term the performance of the politicians
might improve. especial's' as thr generation gap in the
pa:tie: narrows in the next I() to 15 years, at this stage
the parties do not have the capacity to act as a catalyst
for popular discontent or as a viable force for
progressive change. They are fighting defensively
against a strong regime and also among themselves.
d. Labor
The largest and most important trade union in
Morocco. the 1.1MT, flas not sought a directing role, Its
19
lorig?tline leader, Mahlon') Ben Seddik, IS closely tied
to the UNIT, and union members probably constitute
the backbone of dial party, but Ilse UMT Is not for-
mally affiliated with it. ?Vhile Ben Seddik talks is
radical political line and Is prominent in lotermitional
labor affairs, he has, for the most part, confined UNIT
actions to those that bring direct benefits to the
workers.
Unlike labor unions in most developing countries,
which are ancillary instruments of control under the
authorities, the tIMT exists its a separate entity with a
base its urban labor. It hits, with partial exceptions,
resisted subordination to governmental authority and
preserved 11s orgimizational integrity. It has also
accepted ii limited role and conceotrated its activity oll
?Inead-and-butter" trade unionism. For this MISCH', It
Ilas as II 'MIMI. ESTII though UNIT
strength has dwindled, hugely because of un-
employment, to about half the 6()0,(XX) members it
claimed in the mid -1960's, the union has and uses the
right to strike. having organized an average of fie strikes
01 walk-outs a year between 1970 and 1973, with an
mutual losS of nmghly 80,000 mirk-clays. Thoniphout
the past decade, the union bas won for its members
benefits disproportionate to the general economic
situation. Sometimes it has blocked such measures as
cuts in the work-sverk, which might have helped the
grivernment to share lobs and ease the unemployment
situation.
%V.hy (foes Hassan permit the contimwd existence of
a disciplined poss.vr group that is not under hi5 control?
The answer lies in the fact that the UNIT is essentially
middle class. Union members, for the most part, have
steady jobs and see themselves far better off than many
around them. They thus share the King's interest in
maintaining stability. Moreover, the (INIT.% local af-
filiates have inobably experienced the tough actions
taken by provincial governors?many of whom were in
the past seconded foun the or labor
militants, arid the union as it whole sees reason to fear
a military takeover of the government.
1 lassao's regime harasses the UNIT and punishes its
sometimes overly zealous criticism of him. (Ben Seddik
was imprisoned most recently for anti-govermnent
speeches made during the disturbances after the 1967
Arab-Israeli war, but there was mane suspicion then
that the regime bacl taken action to help him refurbish
his revolutionary image and improve his standing with
the more militant factions of his union,) For the most
part, however. the UNIT manages not to offend the
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King, perhaps 115 II result Of the negotiations 13en Sed-
(Ilk has in the past vonducted with him, both p('rsonal-
!), and through intermediaries, The operations ()I the
union are thus circumscribed; it avoids association
with student disorders 1111d its strikes rarely have
politival overtones, III short, the UM'!' knows the limits
of its power, und it knows that efforts to acquire more
would be met with force,
B. Indecision on Key Issues
The existence of the various lunver blocs and/or
pressure groups in Moroccan society has deterred the
kind of decisive action that would have meant
overriding established interests and tightening govern-
ment authority. Hassan, with his propensity for ar-
hitrating among contending forces, has attempted to
appease them when convenient to do so; and he has
been disinclined by temperament to make hard
decisions on developmental matters. The result has
LI Va cii la t lug a ppronh to domestic problems and
an emphasis on the public relations aspects of issues
and pu)jects, These characteristics have lwen apparent
Iii tin. government's economic planning and in its
approach to education,
1. Economic Planning
The hindaniental defects in Morocco's early
development efforts were best defined by a survey
teat!) of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
.Development (IBM)) in 196.1-66.25 While recognizing
that the decline in the econorny2? (hiring the first
decade of independence reflected the departure of
large numbers of French settlers and the resultant out-
flow of capital. the mission stressed as an important
contributing factor the faulty planning machinery that
had been established. This machinery, the mission
found, was cumbersome with regard to decision-
making and virtually nonexistent for purposes of
implementation.
Morocco's planning mechanism was devised soon
after independence by the politicians then serving in
the government. It was the Superior Planning Council,
"The Economic Development of Morocco, published for 113111)
by the Joh n% I lOpkillti University Press, Halt inion', Md., 1966.
"In the first decade of Independence, Morocco's national output
grew by an annual average of only 1.6 percent and thus declined on
a per capita basis.
20
composed of all the members of a large Cabinet and
iii 1k' other representatives; three speaking for
agriculture and selected by the Union of Moroccan
Agriculture, which Is essentially a pressure group of the
big landowners; three for labor, named by the UMT;
and three for business, selected by the Chambers of
Commerce and Industry.
The design of this council was aimed largely at
placating diverse views and interests. Its deliberations
wsulted in the 1960-64 plan, which divided its
emphasis between agriculture and industry and tried
to give something to everyone. The high level of public
investment that it called for (14 percent of the gross
domestic product), while never fully achieved, was suf-
ficient to bring on inflation, balance of payments
deficits, and declining foreign exchange reserves, The
economy was growing at a rate of under 3 percent a
year instead of the projected 6 percent, and the plan
was simply abandoned about 1963,
By the tnicl-1960'; iassan had succeeded in under-
cutting the authority of the politicians, and respon-
sibijity for economic planning fell more directly on
him. Ile did not improve the planning mechanism.
Instead of sharpening the focus of the council which
had drawn up the 1960-64 plan, he increased its size.
Ile renamed it the Superior Council for National
Development and Planning, and he included in its
membership the governors and other officials of the 19
provinces and the 2 prefectures into which the country
was then divided. Planning efforts, still little more
than vague suggestions for public investment, reflected
the King's preoccupation with political objectives. Aid
to small farmers was sacrificed to more impressive proj-
ects, such as dam construction, which were usually
announced with considerable fanfare. Most of the
dams, moreover, were in areas where they benefitted
the already relatively prosperous modern sector of
agriculture and the influential landowners.
As the 1965-67 plan was allegedly prepared under
the personal direction of the King, members of the
Superior Council may well have feared that fun-
damental criticism would be considered an affront.
Goals were again unrealistic, although spending had
been reduced to conserve remaining foreign exchange,
and a drought had further lowered the rate of
economic growth. This plan fared no better than the
earlier effort, and the greatest lags were in the priority
sectors, with spending on agriculture amounting tc,
only two-thirds of the planned investment.
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In none of these efforts was any kind of a coordi-
nating or supervisory authority empowered to over-
see plan fulfillment." Some agencies, such as the
Division for Economic Coordination, were established
but not used, and provincial governors complained
on occasion that they had not been informed of proj-
ects that were underway in their areas.28 IBRD, at one
point, threatened to suspend its assistance because of
the Moroccans' poor administration."
Foreign aid did little to dispel the economic stagna-
tion. In the early and mid-1960's Morocco was receiv-
ing roughly $150 million a year from over 20 countries
and several international agencies. These resources,
however, ?vere dissipated in a multitude of projects,
many of which had only token effect. Donor nations
complained that they were given no clear-cut plan of
priorities or requirements.'tm Although the economy,
with its emphasis on the impressive, long-gestation
projects, was gradually providing the means for future
improvement, indecision and lack of direction con-
tinued to characterize its management until the late
1960's.
2. The Language of Education
Similar indecisiveness is apparent in Morocco's
failure to define the aims of national education. The
dispute, when the nation won its independence,
centered on the Arabization of the educational system,
'17The comparisons often made between Tunisia and Morocco,
to the detriment of the latter, are instructive in connection with
economic planning. Bourguiba too had problems of overcoming
vested interests when he came to power. He did not begin to em-
phasize economic planning until he had established the control
of the Neo-Destour Party (now the 1Destourian Socialist l'arty)
throughout the country, replacing locally elected officials with
centrally appointed ones. The party, working through such means
as its agricultund and commercial cooperatives, then implemented
the changes sought by the planners. The government thus came
to dominate most aspects of the economy, and Ahmed Ben Salah
was a virtual economic czar. (See Douglas Ashford, Morocco
Tunisia; Politics and Planning, Syracuse University Press, N.Y.,
1965.) 'rime, however, has not been kind to these comparisons.
Despite early successes in achieving its goals, the Tunisian system
has not proved more efficacious than the more haphazard Mo-
roccan approach. Dissension in the Tunsian countryside and de-
clining agricultural output led to abandonment of collectiviza-
tion policies and decentralization of control. The 1969-72 plan
was abandoned, and Ben Salah is in exile in Paris.
"Ashford, op. cit., p, 35.
291NR, Research Memorandum RAF-18, 8 August 1968.
391abat, A-06, 22 January 1971.
and it pitted those who wanted education to promote
the traditional culture against those who wanted
priority given to social reform and therefore urged
technical education and a flexible approach to the
language issue. The former, urging instant Arabization
of the curricula, tended to slight reality: the system
Morocco had inherited upon independence was almost
entirely French, and teachers and textbooks in Arabic
were few in number. The opponents of Arabization
favored working toward a bilingual system and main-
tained that practical possibilities must determine
doctrine.
Two national conferences were held on education,
one in 1964 and one in 1970, attended by educators,
members of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry,
and regional representatives. The 1964 conference
rejected the principle of bilingualism. A more vacil-
lating approach was taken in the 1970 meeting, which
gave greater weight to the problems inherent in Arab-
ization.
The King catered to various interests on the matter,
Despite the decision of the 1964 conference, he ap-
pointed Mohammed Benhima as Education Minister
and supported him in the retention of French as the
primary teaching language. In 1967, however, in an
apparent overture to the traditionalist old-guard of the
Istiglal, Benhima was replaced by Abdelhadi
Boutaleb, a graduate of the Islamic Qarawiyin
University and a proponent of rapid Arabization. For a
while, it was a formal requirermnt that all primary in-
struction be in Arabic, despite the fact that most secon-
dary school subjects were taught in French.
In practice, Arabic was taught where there were
teachers and books and ignored where programs could
not be changed. Given no clear mandate, the
professional educators attempted to show progress
toward Arabization to satisfy political demands. At the
same time; they tried to avoid interference from public
groups, continued to employ French teachers because
qualified Moroccans were very few in number, and
worked toward the retention of French in secondary
schools.
A workable system has gradurilly evolved. Arabic is
taught in the first several years of primary school,
French is then introduced as a subject, and on the
secondary level students are given the choice of a
monolingual (Arabic or French) or a bilingual
program. The system, in fact, is similar to one Tunisia
adlopted in the late 1950's and Morocco denounced at
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the time as a denial of the Arab heritage. Arablzation of
the entire system remains the official goal, but it is a
very distant one. Bilingualism is encouraged through-
out the school system, anci government publications
point with pride to the increasing numbers of bi-
lingual st udents.
III. THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE
The disinclination or inability of other institutions
and forces in the society to guide development efforts
produced a vacuum which is gradually being filled by
the bureaucracy and, to a lesser extent, by the business
community. The Actions of both groups are having the
effect of propelling the nation along the path of
change. As they are essentially task-oriented, the first
result of their efforts is increased efficiency in the ad-
ministration of the country, but social repercussions
are becoming evident.
TWO factors underlie this development. First, such
matters as the language of education have been slowly
dropping from the arena of public debate, and the
elaboration and implementation of various policies
and projects have been increasingly left to the
specialists concerned with them, Second, these
specialists work not as individuals but rather as cogs of
organizations or institutions. As such, they are winning
the confidence of the King. For example, the civil serv-
ants who drew up .the 1971i-77 development plan and
gave form and meaning to Hassan's vague suggestions
concerning the public good pose no .competition to
him and no challenge to his style of leadership, and he
accordingly endorses their proposals.
The prerequisite for tlx coufse the bureaucrats and
the -,ntrepreneurs have been pursuing has been the
evolution of an educational system responsive to the
needs of the nation and of a corps of trained and ex-
perienced personnel. Deficiencies in both education
and experience were great when Morocco became in-
dependent, and they are being overcome only gradual-
ly. Yet as the educational system improves and as com-
petency increases throughout the society, other aspects
of change are going forward. The Moroccan case thus
illustrates . the potency of education and its in-
."r-relationship with other aspects and phases of the
cumulative process of change. ? ?
a'For example, The Organization and Evolution of Modern
Morocco, The Ministry of Information, Rabat, 1973, p. 283, reports
that the percentage of students receiving "bilingual diplomas" rose
from 37 percent of the total in 1.965 to 78 percent in 1971.
A. Education as an Object and Agent of
Change
As an object of change, education has been treated
haphazardly, i.e,, it has not been consistently shaped
in accord with a plan designed to meet national needs.
At the time of independence, the goal of Arabization
was combined with the aim of rapid expansion of the
system. Based understandably on emotional and
cultural concerns, these twin goals resulted in a con-
siderable lowering of academic standards. They
slighted the needs for trained manpower and ignored
the lesson that national development correlates more
closely with higher education than with the numbers
educated.
Emphasis in educational programs did not begin to
shift until the 1968-72 plan was formulated. That plan
began the gradual diversion of resources away from
primary education and toward the forms of more
direct assistance in meeting manpower needs; e.g.,
secondary schooling and, in particular, vocational
training. Even then the allocation for secondary
schools was low and, in fact, did not reach 40 percent
of the educational budget until 1973. The number of
vocational programs, however, was increased at the
end of the 1960's and scholarship preference was given
to scientifically and technically specialized students.
To formalize the -now look" in education the Ministry
for Higher, Secondary, and Technical Education and
Cadre Training was established in 1968.
Despite this slow evolution of a more practical
educational doctrine, the Moroccan system's short-
comings are still manifold. It remains an uneasy mix of
secular and religious, public and private. and Arab
and French elements. About 12% of all primary
students?and 28% of the 530,000 pupils in rural
areas?in the 1971/72 school years were attending
Koranic schools, Although these schools were placed
under the Ministry of Education in 1968 and increased
weight in the curriculum has been given to reading
and writing, the emphasis continues to be on mem-
orizing religious texts. The best schools are still
the private ones, and they are attended by about 10%
of all students, These pupils are, of course, from the
families of the well-to-do, and the vehools that they
prefer are those operated by the French University and
Cu;tural Mission (Mission universitaire et culturelle
francaise?MUCF).
Most children in Morocco still do not attend school.
Of the approximately 3.2 million between the ages of 8
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and 14, at the time of the hist census in 1971, only 42%
were in school. Of that total, slightly over 68% were
boys and almost 70% lived in urban areas. The percent-
age of the 3-14 year-olds attending school rose to 44%
in 1973/74, thus barely keeping up with the popula-
tion increase,
The Moroccan school system provides for five years
of primary education; one year of so-called secondary
observation, which is devoted largely to iriisive
study of French; and six years of secondary school.
divided into two three-year cycles. The first of these
cycles provides general academic studies, and the sec-
ond offers the option of continuing academic courses
(Arabic or modurn letters, experimental science,
economics, and mathematics) or undertaking
agricultural, industrial, commercial, or hold training.
Higher education is provided mainly by the
Mohammed V University in Rabat, which has
branches in Casablanca, Fes, Marrakech, and
Tetouan, and whose total enrollment was just under
18,000 in 1972/73. Advanced studies are also pursued
at the Islamic Qarawiyin University in Fes, where only
about 800 students art enrolled, arid at various
specialized institutions.
The quality of Moroccan education remains poor.
Many graduates of primary schools are little more than
functionally literate (only about a third of them pass
the examination required for continuance of their
studies), and few of the secondary school students
qualify for a diploma. The ripper Secondary School
Certificate (referred to as the baccalaurcat) has been
awarded to somewhat fewer than 5,000 a year in the
1970's and the Technical Diploma to only about 1,000,
Attrition rates at all levels are high. Shortage of
instructors is a ma;or obstacle to progress, and only an
estimated 30% of those teaching have completed the
regular three-year course at one of the teacher-training
institutes. Many teachers circumvent the supposed
requirements by working as assistants or trainees. In
secondary education, where recent efforts have been
made to upgrade the level of instruction, about half
the teachers are foreign, Most of them French.
Education is nonetheless having a significant im-
pact on Moroccan society; it is an important agent of
change. The reasons for this are threefold: great
numbers have been educated; a stress on higher educa-
tion ? has emerged and an educated elite, still com-
posed largely of those schooled abroad, has been in-
creasing in. numbers and ? slowly gaining authority in
many fields, including teaching and the administra-
tion of education,
In the monumental task of providing basic learning
to a rapidly increasing population the Moroccan
achievement in less than two decades of independence
should not In' underestimated, During their protec-
torate, the French had disciairaged even the concept of
mass education, and ninny of the Moroccans at that
time saw schooling largely as a medium for
perpetuating Islamic values, When the protectorate
ended, only about 400,000 were attending schools of
any kind, most of them religious. Some 300 to 400
svent to school each year in France, but It has been
reported that only 100 of those educated in Morocco
held the baccalaureat . Against this background,
Moroccan gains are impressive, By the 1960/61 school
year, students numbered almost one million and
roughly one-tenth of them were in secondary school.
The literacy rate at that tiine had reached 17% of those
over 5 years of age, and it had grown to 24% when the
1971 census was taken.
The momentum in primary edtica;'-?:1 began to slow
about the mid-1960's, probably reflecting a public
realization that a few years of schooling provided no
panacea and a concomitant decline in parental desire
to send their children to school. Subsequently, public
expent.',--:,!e on primary education declined as a
Proportion of the budget, and in the past decade
enrollment in the lower schools has increased at an an-
nual average rate of about 40,000 (see (able), in con-
trast to yearly increases of over 100,000 in the late
1950's, i.e., from 230,000 in 1955 to 735,000 in 1960.
As the expansion of primary schooling slowed, enroll-
ment in secondary schools and in institutions of higher
learning more than doubled, and the ratio of primary
to secondary students has fallen from six to one to un-
der four to one.
School Enrollment
Institutions of
School Year
Primary
Secondary
Higher Learning
1964/65
1,105,182
176,957
e9000
1968/69
1,135,865
287,438
11,911
1969/70
1,142,810
293,193
12,770
1970/71
1,175,227
328,880
16,009
1971/72
1,231,936
313,414
17,025
1972/73
1,275,857
334,952
21,829
1973/74
1,337,931
361,636
*Statistics not available.
Sources: Annuaire Statistique du Maroc. Direction de Is Statisti-
que, Rabat; La Situation Economique du Maroc. Secretariat d'Etat
ati Plan, Rabat; and the Organi:ation and Evolution of Modern
Morocco, op. cit.
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From the secondary school students, a rote Of 41141(41
Is Slowly developing, Although students
have proved tell:child to pursue the technical
programs, efforts have been made to upgrade the
courses rind the number eel students receiving, some
vocational training Iii l't 'Hilary schools Is How
e (Highly 20?,7, of total enrollment, ()tilers subsequently
rect Ivo, training at such special schools as the ItuiIuit
Centel for Professional Training, which offers instruc
lion in industrial arts and office work and which rt'-
(hurt's for ridinksion two or three years of secondary
school, The grossing numbers of those technically
trained is (widener, of a more poictical approach to
education, brought on by the serious unemployment
among the unskilled and the concomitant demand for
skilled workers. At higher levels of education too,
scientific and other specialized studies are gaining on
the old-time favorites of Ikerature and law, At
Mohammed V thilversitY enrollment iii the faculties
of science, medicine, and engineering tripled between
1967/68 and 1971;72. to reach .3,500 In the latter year,
whereas the faculties of law, letters, and sociology did
not quite double in size. Enrollment in those studies
was nonetheless three times the number of those pur-
suing a scientific discipline, so that the predilections 111
St Ca WMt said to conform with the
prefenlices of the authrtrities,
The third reason education is significant as lin
agent of change ill Morocco stems, in a sense. from
negative action on the part of the government: it did
far less than most newly independent countries to cur-
tail the influence of the former colonizer, In educatioe
the French imprint has meant that, while the (vinlit.
of Moroccan schooling is poor, there is a small core of
the truly well educated. These include the some (3.0(X)
secondary school students who attend the
French-ooeraied !stlit:E institutions. Many of this
group an. ,!livit among the approximately 5,000 who
abroad each year for higher education,
Most of those who have studied abroad return
loom,. Among Montcrati stodents, iiicontrast to those
of many countries, no particular "brain-drain" is rvi?
dent, The reason they return is presumably related to
their social origin: most are from the wel!-to-do
families and, though they may be critical of Ilassan's
regime, they probably see for themselves a secure, and
perhaps promising, future in Morocco."
"The return of the 4'50al hundred students recent. each sear
gosernment scholarships ha ands. abroad Is es ItIent4iPPPI I'
problematic In most caws, parents are requited to pint a bond,
%filch Is returned ss hen 11w student (-vanes Inane
A% education has worked as an agent of change, It
has been increasingly an object of c1444tr. !Intl Is.
SlIalwrl to satisfy rervtiremeols for trained manpower,
Thus th:- emphasis oil higher education and MI
vocational training that began to emerge irt the hit.,
1960's is being strengthened, Throughout the years
middle?level educators hove pressed for these
developments, and those trained abroad hove been In
the front ranks of tile movemen(. 1)Ivisioris In dip
ministries of education have been beaded by such
graduate% of the Sorhootte 41S Nacer ril-Fazzi and
Ahmed Salmi, who in the early 1960's argued against
Arabi/intim and urged that the educational system la,
adapted to enable the young Nforoccan to earn a liv-
ing and "to have a wide opening into the modern
world."'" Many of these di visit elders are cecmlliglY
better qualified for their Jobs than are the utioisters,
AbdrIkritti I tahiti,. who %rived recently as !%.finister of
Higher Education, for example, went no higher than
secondary school.
Our movement in Mild: these middle?level persoll?
nel have liven itistrintirtibil is the establishment of
%pedal schools to meet labor market needs Most of
diem?such as the School of Mines and the I lascon II
Institute of Agronomy?ate operated by the govern-
ment but they are not integral parts of the school
system. The most prestigious of these institutes is the
Nloroccrin School of Administration Organiled to
traiti itersormel for the Moroccan civil service, it offers
a duce-year program for official% who hove lord four or
more sears of grivernment 'i sic.' Enrollment averages
only about 1.-.50, but the program is reportedly of high
quaI ity.
These special schools, iii some measure, substitute
Ion a revamping of die rroilar sorsti implynirntittlim
of comprehensive change requites decisions from the
top, and on this level the (muse is still unsteadv. The
forwent reorganization of the educational ministries
(the higher tsortfolio, for example, has
appeared and reappeared ill the Cabinet. sometimes
cr Int In fled v. 1111 vocal Irma 1 training and sometimes not)
and the shifting of ministers &fro. the development of
consistent and firm leadership Yet increasing tin whets
of profr.sionals are working in the educational field,
and their sometimes improsised solutions to prublerm
give evidence that they a rr working to rued national
nerds.
tie l'rr?rnin:oott thm yurnquennut- ?lintars 4.1 hluta?
tint, 1);(st, quoted In I %%Alia+++ /,.Irtinigml, rttobirms (4 Neer AA; et
a. ithrfloci Ness Visrk. 196-1. p
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nt cm- t
13, The Emergence of the Profetsionols and
the Managers
Al ttpper ;ma tliiiltlfr irvrl% Iiir Nbiriti ?
grovertiriirlif H inerittrunicy is and Ike
Initerinctiacv as a whole it irim Ir4titlgs tlIltjrt1 III
tall/mid criteria went, 'mid
training It it billowing sill intim:lard intIttittirill
Oh( ling change thriniglinirt the 41,11,0.
%Viten 11tirepern became indrilerident lit
government %tat %ever+ limited iii ttliiit if t tiiiII tin
by Illy mialify and Humbert imi it% tisil tertrintt
40,000 overrintroit half ril thr
total, tvere lirld bv Frenchmen, 'Alio nett, ditirmitted
Nbirricvati imificialt arid hail herr' Ili:credited ltefilir fid.ls Illy I.:MI*111aq: :lac tIlt I (alb Anal rat itcl ata!rittt
(h" inil)!Iv lutrrlater hint, there wrie._.acciiiiliint lii iii time \litiiatra ut halr,jn, tadmia ion.); it(
III) 14 1111 earls' 'lime Mumbler- -1,000 .1lie ;aim ca mid aaaattlial:Itr !lir 8Itala VII thr tt'at, in r
(jliHIiIlrd?littim-i-ati% ()%rt 11-r %rift., 1hr %florite? Ilijilithrirs 11111+1411'ml 11.)f-u mi1111% 1 licit
t'i/iini in! thy %%-%tril% 143% Ivry,' iii (fit !brit kilt: arid 1lir stats i, stiaju Ii tfirs 1.;Itr%
littgr path. suitI lit- rad,: 11170t iiir tiimihrt ut mit auir nuImmith rw,tr irtipqatatit than 11% fltr tal
riftplatIcrc, rtiukti% r teacher'. tAiis chits,, 111 pririni,111tT. 41 a,trtin1W1)l, fly!
about S.000
1hr% au- %iiIita11% Itar nmtaIs trptcsrlitatisrs it) am 01511
ntifai I tt Olt 11ir it/till:dim) lit" dr-T.1re ),1 rbrit
tlItt t III al!fra IUIrdr% r1,11111,111 jttjrt ts and
pr;1:11lt ttipir,,rl it dif fit milt ftp detr1111111r, k.11
tratilli: flillutu 14 fir Iltru, to! el% r Mal training bar
their jn.tae !lir frirrnm,Kt 4 haat', (rat that pataltattr
Odra' 44 tittatl sat krillta.,. taa hi( 11 tiller,.
114-rbur .1)41,4 It ..11.1 Iii ;rilministratisr llatairt It II) 1471
Altattal !if Oar Ailrtt+Iim;i1ef% "411) r,thil
11.;41 rep,-tIrdk :Mended Ike kruidt,4 t.4.lualif a'
I titsttf-? i!! ;4.3- 1,a; 14-it rte./um/1f 4111P,Pp: the
T.?et (flinta and ri Cart rf 'Marla Itat:14
I hit al if it in f lir ( al.inrf rain. u)f) in flre
rintrirrit-..artrnIlr.1 srt.fra thr
it tio 1.- liar r%141111:11.--1l lira% Nur-. At thr
1111441-rt% tif jiili% n.iit .4 hIt prr,
toit.11 t.N% Mt/ ?1.t/r/l. And Allitattfalt pcf afflict flat OW
f1,11k ft' atrititrarata r I sr-fl thr rttfliti;41 plait-94)41r
I atting' tt tr Cififf e ("written der l'horplintr
%%.1% a irriptentlt trantietred .titirl Iltr it1
cad%
4t41 ()Isr tat at; r.itt% allartlatt? St at \Iiikatmitrfi
I Atilt Wall. Malt IttlaltlIfIrall .1111:1111-1rt hat tt
it
tftifttffitirirtaa !h.' 0( abet hat nig headed the ,arrirtr
Natimitik 'sante 1,..ssrs et. time ()C.:I' churl-tot hitt
ttr.-tmi ka11r4m.1,11m.iii5, a forrner Cabinet
inirmittre :irei suet-mho in tnril,irate niArtagernent
Salt-Vrit .taftr 011141:14.1tr ilTer tritt:i% hat 111-111
it
"flattal. A !Nimemtws 19'4';
.-p am! it
petariiim I In twit Ifilit thr ptm !dm 11
!Wilt% stir: 11ii s%r-rr riiss thril
siirtnIirr% ii( thur alammflhitr 1,1111115. r hid% diosatil
triati?ir: Ikteiiti lin -outsold% At mitr-fl Ini
II11111S IA1111 latatIC Sr% rttti ()flirt raaN f.t?
'mac it Ow !Haw 'all at high ranking nth( r-rt Cr( miffed
(Waal Ilif atal111 Mill tiuuuIal.nimn,IIt Ilir Nr.art twit, Kiri, rt.
tinrt liat r 11;ida 1).1( Li:tumid Iii Ihe triditatt 14 ii the
jinch r IIE;'. hint et r, 11AttAii iiipnirded 1.1 ttrva
Katt rtImtc. 41111 miry had at Crc mivji FitI lain if r
1,1/1"1//),1 MITA haiti Irrrt) nfli)
titian. MI ;v.. Mhos. nut halt !iris, anil muir tSt ai pd. afr,
1:41% S yr Hie% Stiff' Itlilitytd III 11%61 1,i+1011,
right fif dirtii 14 inv. micro t
S1111thrigrc JuTSitt. 111:1i111% tl:r middle les rls, litil
persimilel an. lieutrining int rriAtinitit
available, and tland.init and ref-nutriment criteria iirr
thing acciit(h.tigly. AdtAnurifIrlit 0111114J, rime ratilit it
In) longer timistial, arri a fess sitting Pa 1)1.'4 rait--mull
titlii,lasts Ircrut ssork,
Mg hi es...mimic planning situp 1961) ;Ind st as named
Secret:Iry tat Stale fit, Planning in 197,1?atr. (nit liar
IIIcI Ornr. dttainmg ministerial %talon Illy ssit.-rn as at
st 114111. 111/0/1/1/e1 It/ Lill iiiiminittratite
(-haw-c tit jr-nit arid malfr.st,i1), 114% r Iris
fr,INIIrla ill ecif% 11,401-4411?, pet fill r it kim
writing vi ithi rtimerirricr, and the bureaucrat t. at it
becntriri intlittilinnaliird, it 'Rid( firm' 4..4*(i31 crimp:
lug. wt.% Moir, for thr intio.initt41 at defined mfr in an
ituthrl% It,
fmmrnt
The diangiriv, td the pun incial got crinitt it
rine rif the tionftuant ,4 4; !lett I 1, lir
" A timril RalaIrri %I bis.1114 -141 4,tvi at TA..,!,..1 Irt
IN?titlat liartry ma, irstr1,41 Coat ',atilt
Pim, Pis p 1:1
2,1 .1144,1 M4a,at an i..srrtwtr>11, rtt t I..' 2(
nil htfte in the nitlilatt ...N.ahlt 4,1a It," ratarnItrt 4110,tittit.tle
ta 1:1)(Zkr 1b.- .44. or it., tt-tt I, Nit a tta-t.tt t?11 41,T1 1,1
afielltlittI., Ir pot" itti,f111,1mtlItttl. It-tlf 1 P.r Iaa hri 4./a tart
f fir gris,.1.- wttt7)ati4lit wit Itri tf,ainr,1 laft.tatral hat r tat441411
ataiml thr rta-tat hat( .4 Mr lc .1 art it, it i tm hatir Ishii ft tatti?
!rata% tat ttat Lair ttutrjatutatal" In Mint &trial-tar fititItattrt
SECRET
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rC;r1
40110(4 I,* hit management fit,. Atirme ufbrtt. A ?Vret
t.ettnati liatiLiII c,71). N. hi, I, an I 47-I aye Fri In
I inatit e olan! ff5 ptftfltif r itartinorlitt/r fiblitliftgift,ft
fill/rtt 1,41114:4Iti *011 c4-ttr 1,;+44ri 11
'trot ,Thiffn /quitidonett,mpati?
be tt'it, tt \1.s1/111 Of) Irt 111),*; ts4lt atr
ttill Oh ;4 betrigit ribic Mitt?). thug 111rV qtr. Irt
thr Mitt! raft !kr ti it1111 1,1 Ott 84 C1/-111-1111 AM/ rlitr
1411)11)r4 I brit ilitrirefe. 11,,,r4rArt. (by ct trrm Its
r111r1 1111 tt,. priftri film n1 then. Attfl flir4
enr r?itirtnr that the rlite it telt it fr haoginc
S,rt 1?1 40;41r 1,1 rlanning. *I piety IA1,11
11111fle $.4 tIrrirr trictilii4r 4,1
hon;1111i; t Atnititt inrAtit, fot rlattIplr?. has
c4t149 lc At) fittlifilltijefe* - - I Al
Irril);4144 tehei ting Int Oh ti. ial i?nti?
(I;;;fmt Its a frrntr. Off-1r trthtItyt tAtt 'epic:rift sftition
Iretttern the traditional and the ttooletn and atgit?
111r1t1 fr,4 I art/trial 11 fit
flr?floptnent 'it a lar.frtuft fff \Iffhammrfl V 1- ft:
tilt tali,. (tjtjij th 11rg:11111r 418111111?sl
1411g1134"1 111 tradition, nowle1ni7atitni it at tttnillithef;
of ill) lett f rot 8% 111-1, if it attics tint ht Ilir elite and
of heti 8141i4litt let tittltifin tIii.t nut 41.444 rtliiralril
talrntell ifie,filifr "1 he InstrAin ;'t iti,netheIrte
Ibrivifiling r . ;Mt ilr%f;irlf Itt the inn-tett: sit
tbr trailitinn41 elite. in part Itek ante foreign ethicalinn
hat t ;fatir.eff the tsipt iwtt pf t.nne anti ill part lost alltr
cyllIrtt 11A1r ttlitrli ft,,t11 mart i
At the hAirkgrntitich sat ;114-?
Moir tlit rel.-, the tit il tett pr it mote 4 111%-411 1i4-11 111111r
4111=i;i11;li1--11 1.1.411,8 141111 1711'1,- frpfitrfflall8r thr
natinn
ThilwgInnit the 11,Inilatilin ;;44 A %4,1)44r, I hr iltt trace
It) the Humbert nI th,nr ontlkint in the Inufe??ifiln Atiti
hnliling julti att44t ills ',Haden) rininnin it
I is siespon %Lanny% i%er 1,4111r I Iktv,ren the
trtitin of I 111,0 and the 1111r 1.4krri in DeveinIwt Itt7I,
"flat.!, I ai,rt,a?,. I Ito," It17?.
(11.111 (41.1144. It) wr I .'i .I,oai a11 5.45ff., 11110111148r a frit141,
.4 iti.tatk.0 .i111 '81.111r1411,Intl the inte41111,1,4pI thr
nurrrtnrnt in thr tonotti inffo atm that thr attistitnn ha. Irv.
liuditti at trprurintinrn
"Altar, Alit Petal. Tnulurtton tTnIfiftiefus/uotton 1.4* Ca. au
Arriaitfatof r ffs ?11.1-iff Airlittr in if trinalW
I 444 IC Criitreith S.f lun'ain. 1970, p 17
28
.t.,1 r P1(1, t/4, ? atroli.w41 ( *tocin4t
f
r 144 r?-?,4 nit{ 4.. surnfti*--14-1?w
4,.'s
1g.i..41 ?,}t?t
41e., ,har.-4m torA ualetv 4
1.446-e pe.,-,n41
/111.10*-t f t a. ? 111,4
*11..4 S4f 5-5
*,11,1"14#1i11.11,,,/,' 141w,,r4
?4, or
C!'...P iSi71
1 W7. ft%
CI 4 fit
to.z
7-4
7 in;
Ut
VII fat
*14,1 0.11,1.114 tlf ?iiff??14 put.u,inau ry.eutti 4,4 ON.
10,...,0.. )4:1 It IV ? 1,11 ',M., i 1?1.1.4 as* stir.!
C.14.r*.t.vr,
(ZetvflgeOr ov 1 10 4.,
proareat ,b1 tit .11,111.11 4. (..0?10 1,0% 1 VA
1hr fr,?( tlrlit,rct ut thIFZU rr I hf, Vs-
r11,11"/11i1141/8 Si lit r- Firm,h4cumr ;tral.flatif) fit trAl II
Alunit it) thr 141 let 1,41, /,/ g111111-41 21111,1i f'111
(4 the 1,4 al papi11,41)0111. 11, hit 1) 1151 then al.,nit Ii -I
I he I p?rt( rta ilit te.;4tr. Its the !Abut bit( r (if
Innr fir As ptufrulutlAii Anti trshrnt iant it dm:
triAti%ril 1114111-14181" ll) ultftimtmltr fr4mt f glijEbh AI) gd.
141.011X) ofrtr holding twit inht in 1471
rt, lbr t)litlibrtt elf rlorlilli% rt. 11141tArtt, WWI
utkrtt hafl alinfrA
The inn-firma' perinfl thin inetriat a natiffn mak.
inc cairn in the tfr%rfilittlrtlf sisti iltilitAtilitt e,f its
!pupa,' tr-sutitt. $t. 41451 the 1i:we elf thew Ariwact
i 1iAt5 Attrttibirti lit iilr
1111r1114tiutiAl 1-1111tI (POI: Itignifirant
hatir.r fl t%iw.III rtnj.h,n went 4%Iiiinucti 1,8 at
ter:Wen-it Aftet !INA. lictvirrn that tifilr anti
1473 rrnplintnent in kith mainitartisting And in
trnirrs me% In prirrnt
,r ir.1183,11 it, the 141,4* low.e. :11/
thr agi- of 11 lot itot latag (tIrml Itnin that trinits
in ..ontr trpioti itilIct Itum gitrn lieu, tn %%hitt] thr
nom1.1 of I how. touter 15 hat ,t-en thrvItiairdt,tmattr thy data cww.
1841/11,1, tit (Nr 1971 /41.41 Ailitalk t.rati tr,m.unt ttplirtrninnelate
Our., flu-num"( all% Atli" r Man% Itrtua 11 it., in Ia. t untk, awl
118:4118 4,18 aft Iltlikaul attlii% i. tweltrol %%bolsi-ft-11,4 int-holed it, tlio
otatittivt A figure .4 ;arm 5 laftrfl on VS and UN cs.
titnalri, is Itt,hahll a /mar tralittic t-Imintitoxsit 11),n4. %totting 14
torking Ho in 11111111(Vil
"1,41. S \I 71 52, 11 !if tatch 1974
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Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170025-2
QPi tiFy
IV. r_VIDt.lhiCt C't CIIAt4Get
A. The Improved rad osentInt irt?
7. Th. tsonomr
I hr- er-owetot hat doing 10 tlet t;ttee, 11?. 101c
tai(4) 101,1,' Iter lircling. hat clin?
iniirtf, ti12711 10trico ft cin4tnEc1l itieli% 0111011c
1/101116 hiEh lot el 0101 contirfitint etill ;104 tvtlif Rtf
ryt kls