RESEARCH STUDY THE CEMA-EC RELATIONSHIP: THE EAST AND WEST EUROPEANS FRUSTRATE SOVIET DESIGNS

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170002-7
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
C
Document Page Count: 
23
Document Creation Date: 
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date: 
March 25, 1999
Sequence Number: 
2
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 1, 1975
Content Type: 
RS
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170002-7.pdf1.67 MB
Body: 
~h~ ~~-M~~=~L-.~~~-~rat~~onsni .V ~ P'R ~ ~~ 8 a~d~=W.e t~a~uro~e. Fru~s: Sc~v ~D;~s~~r~s ~ O Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000600~70042 R~~~h sway THE CE1VlA-EC RELATIONSHIP: The Fart and Wert Euro~ean~' Frustrate Sm~iet Deri~n~r OPR 108 March 1975 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170002-7 ~oPr N ?_ 19 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170002-7 NATIONAL SECUf~ITY INFORMATION Unautho(~ized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions cra.~ur.d br odoeesr Ex.mpt Irom O.n.ral Dalaullrcatlon Sch.dul. of l.O. ilb~Z, .x.m tion cal.pory~ 4 sell' Automotieally d.c aurfi.d oni daN lmpoaYbl. to dd.rmin. Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170002-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170002-7 CONFIDENTIAL THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICE Oi= POLITICAL RESEA-tCH THE CEMA-EC RELATIONSHIP: THE EAST AND WEST EUROPEANS FRUSTRATE SOVIET DESIGNS Pa~;u I~OIiEW01tl) ............................................ iii SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS .. . ...................... 1 'I'IlE DISCUSSION ? .................... ? ...... , ......... , 3 IN'I'fiODUC'1'IUN ......................... . ...... . ... . . . 3 L SE'C'I'INC'1'tll? S'I'ACI? IN'I'lll: 1~J(i0's ...... . ........ . . 3 A. Diverging Interests in CEMA ...................... 4 R. Frustrating a Community Approach .............. ? .. 4 Il. I:N7'I:It DE1'I?,N'1'I~.. .............................. .. 5 A. Iicthinking the Approach to the EC .................. S t;. Expanding CEMA's External Role ................... (i C. Eastrrn and Wcstcrn F.uropc licgin to React ......... , i III. A CEMA-E~; LINK PROPOSED ...................... 8 A. Soviet Motivations ............................... $ IV. hOCUS ON TILE FORM OF C1:MA-EC 'I'II?5 .......... 9 A. Differing Perspectives Within CEMA ................ 9 l3. East European Resistance Emerges ........... ? ...... 10 C. The Soviets Push fvr a CEMA-EC Link .............. 11 D. Wcstcrn Europe Joins tftc licsistance ................ 12 V. THE SOV1E1'S LOSE TFIE INITIATIVE ... ? .......... 12 A. Soviet Troubles Mount ............................ 13 R. A Second Bid for aCEMA-l'.C Link ................. 13 C. A New Impasse Emerges .......................... 13 D. An Abortive First Official Meeting ................. 14 VI. PROSPECTS ....................................... l5 SOURCE C11'ATIONS ........................ ? ....... ? ? ? ? l8 FIGURES IMPORTS OF THE CEMA COUNTRIES FfiOM THE EC STATES (table) ................................ 3 NOTE: !n the preparation of this study, the O(flce of Politird Research consulted olhei offices of the Central Intelli};ence Agency. Their comments and su~l;cstions e~en+ upprcciuted, but no fornml attempt at roordinution was undertaken. Further comments s~?ill Ix wclcY!mcd by the author. - (code 143, extension 56Hi3). Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :ICIA-RDP86T00608R000600170002-7 CONFIDENTIA! Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170002-7 CONFIDENTIAL THE CEMA-EC RELATIONSHIP: THE EAST AND WEST EUROPEANS FRUSTRATE SOVIET DESIGNS In early February the first formal mcctini; between CEMA* and the EC** took place in Moscow. Although loni; in the -~.akini;, this mcetini; accomplished very little, primarily because the CEMA side was unwill- ing to discuss substantive issues. In consequence, the East Gioc is not appreciably closer than before to defining its intentions toward the Community and toward the establishment of a new framework for the conduct of East-West economic relations. Although the development of new links between Europe's ta~o ma- jor economic groupings might appear to be inevitable in the present context of East-West relations, what form and scope such contacts should take raises complex political and economic issues, Major differences un these issues have emerged between the USSR and the East European states, which have in turn had a significant influence on West European policies. This paper examines the nature of these issues and discusses the factors working, for and against, a closer CEMA-EC relationship in the future. The paper has a different focus but is complementary to the recent- ly issued OPR Study, "The Prospects for European Unity: The View from Moscow" (OPR-105, December 1974, SECRET/NFD/NDA/CD',' which concentrates on the perceptions of the various ; nstitutional am individual contributors to Soviet policy regarding the European Corri munity. 'CEMA ('I'hc Council for Economic Mutual Assistance) was established in 14)?19 as u regional ernnoniic organization of the IiSSR and most of the East L'uropcnn states-Albanlu, Iiulgccriu, l;zcchoslovukiu, Hungo,r;~, I'ulmul, and fiomnnia. Albanlu dropped out in the curly lII'.~0's, and Iscut Ccrmany, Mongolia and Cuba becr~uic mcnd>crs hr IcJ50, 14Hi2, and 1972 respectivc!y. 1'ar purposes of thb paper Mongolia and Cuba can Iw ignored, ?`AI(hough (he initials EEC, standing for European Economic Community, arc still commonly used unrl arc technically arrrect when mFerring to the curly years of the organiwtlon, the Community now prefers to drop the word Ermomlc from its title in recognition of Its broudencYl functluns cmd aspirations. For the sake of consistency, the initials EC will Ire used throughout this paper. iii Approved For Release 2001/081C~It~FlD9P86T00608R000600170002-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170002-7 CQNFIDENTIAL C[~,MA has exercised little authority over the external cconoinic relations of its members and has had few outside contacts. Unly iii re- cent years has CEMA, under Soviet instigation, turned its uttcntiou toward the question of its relations with the EC. Mosco:v's interest in this question had two sources; (1) recognition that the Community haul become an irnporlunt cog iii European economics and politics, and (2) its concern to insure Bloc cohesion us it pursued detente and the c~xpuu- sion of East-West economic relations. Moscow, therefore, sought ways both to come to grips with the EC reality itself and to control the lust L"uropcuns' relations with it. The Soviets came to sec the establishment of relations betwec:: CEMA and the EC us a partial answer to both re- quirements, and brought growing pressure on the East I~,uropcans to agree to coordination of Blrc economic policy toward the West and to in.crcusc CEMA's external role and authority. By 19^2 the Soviets had decided to move toward establishing a direct CEMA-EC link,~~~-~? T3rezhnev called for the establishment of "businesslike" relations betwec;n the two organisations. But when it came to the question of what for,n contacts between CI?MA and the EC should take, Soviet-East European differs-noes soon emerged. Four East European countries in particular--Hungary, Poland, Romania, and East Germany-have subsequently resisted the establishme~zt of a CEMA-F,C link which would restrict their ability to develop relations with the Community bilaterally. They have come t~ accept CEMA as a point of contact with the Community through which their collective voice might be used to help facilitate the development of bilateral economic relations and to minimize any adverse impact of ver levels, It dl(I out do w- before sollcllln~; h;ust I:urupccut views runrerning both the Invltutlon to Urtull and (:h,MA?1?(: rcluliuns lu {;encrul~t~-u reflcetlnn of the Impact of Hurt h:urul>euu rescrvnllons expressed ensiles. '1'lutl the Hurt h;uropeun reaction war still very wary, and that tills war curs~ veyed to the I;C: us suggested by the fact that while striving lu Intruducc the CCI' IH prinripl(' by January f)7,5, the 1:(; dl(I nut give the ,S'oviets (t new opporlunl- ly !u push tltruugh a cuunterwtilhtg rule leer Ch.MA? The (;ummuul!y n'frui-ted from tltreutening crunornlc sunctlunr against those who did not ttckuuwledge the CCI',* and postponed any real response to the CEMA Invitation to the Cununission President. In the fuse of this Contnm-tity effort effectively to separate Inh?oductlcm uF the CCP from the question of u (;I:Mr1-I;C link, the 5ovlet stance latrdcncd, Un ut Icust one occasion lust full the Soviets threatened u hreukdo~~n in bilateral cci~numic relations should the Curnmunily Insist on introducing flu' CCI'through the Comrnission.~'' 'I'hcy rnudc crude attempts to negofiute extensions of bilateral trade ugrcentrnts with LC members, purticulurly hrunce and Ccrnutny-which were resisted and effectively sidetntcked into' ncgo- tiutions over relatively innocuous supplerncntury ruopcrution ugrecntcnts. The Soviets, in addition, refused to accept the proposed male! agreement offcre'd them by the Cornmissio(t us u first step toward intrnductiurt of the CCP. Most c?~f the I:ust ~ uropeuns joined in this resistance '~ to the iutroductio(t of the CCP. Except for Romania, which bud already estr.blishcd a relationship with the 25X1 C 25X1 C 25X1 C Such rerlsfunce ruuld only rclnforcc CouunuHlly wurlne.rs of slgnlflcuul (;1?MA?I;(.; cuulucls and (~~ler- rnlne Sovlct arguments fur rlnvtglhcning (:I:MA's aulhurlty (o enter into them. Neccnt cvlc!e~rre HI~ l,usl, I?uropc'(-tt ruuccrn el?fccllvely nutkes this point; in dls? cusslug their h:(; pruhlents with iu lute Ueeentbcr, the I Iun[;ur uns strc~ ~ ?, ':;"ir ester fur };renter future uulununty In trru!r :? :?,.,: ~. . pressed their concern that :''(; pnlicler ((nut iS, ?n. lruductlctn of the CCI') would It~rce fiu~ ('I:MA states into a canuncm position lu lrudic:h with the C;arn- nutnlly. 'They urged Instead "ut must" a (.:I:MA?1~,C umhrc'lla ugn'enu'ul, under which (:IsMA and I?C rnembcrs could c'cnttinuc to cYmchtct tn-dc bilutcrully.~" The expression of these I tun ruricut views, which were pntmpll)' relayed to the NATO urn- hussudurs In 13udupesl, re eels out only the depth of ?ust 1?urupcun cc-nrcrn which still exists, but u wllllu[;uess to risk Soviet ire by IobbyiHg against Western policies seen us serving Suvict interests and arguing in favor of urrtutgcnu'nts which will minirnizc Suvict control over I:ust?~4'est rcortumie relations, Soviet forties In n'sisting the CCP undoubtedly reflected a large ntcusum ul? frustration over the ron- linued I:C unwillingncrs to n'cognirc Cf;MA us un cyuuL 'I'bis nun-rcc?ugnition presents a serious obsturle to any renewed utternpt to enhance CEMA's role u- spokcsnuu- for its rne!nhers? 13y helping to foreshdl stren>;lhening of Soviet control over (:astern Europe it cviden;ly rcinfurc?cd Soviet reluctuncr to -nakc, or Jo pcrntil the I?ust l;uropeurts to make, any nerve toward bilateral folks with the Conunissiun concerning the CCi'. D. An Abortive first Official Meeting Commission when it received trade preferences, As this new irnpussc crncrgcd and the prospects for C[;MA's East I:uropcun nternbers also refused to exploiting the l:(,"s introduction of the CCP to accept this model agreement. 'I'bis rejection un_ strengthen control over CEtiL1 faded, the Soviets duu!)tcdly received Soviet encouragement, but with uppcarcci to become Icss enthusiastic about pursuing the prospect that their economic access to the Corn- CI:MA-I?C relations ut the substantive level. Shortly nuutity would be preserved intact for the near future, befnrc the first forrnul meeting of CI;MA and EC the East Isuropcuns weer probably not rcluctunt to join rcprrscntatlvc'r in curly hrbruury, a leading Suvict the Soviets in strongly resisting introduction of the c'couon;i.,i ..:pressed very modest hopes fns its results CCP. 'I'nrnurlh?, Hurst bilutcrul tnulc u};n?cnuvrts bchvicen CF.~1A crnuarl;~ ctnd some joint research emerging during the first stage and the I?(: nu?rnlx?r stuh?+expircd in Junuury (#~ 5 and should in theory (>f CEMA-EC Coopcration.35 This suggested that the have been rephuti?d by Hess- ugn'enu?nts ncgotiutcd wills the Cont. Soviets were becoming morn CAUt10Ur ilbUUt tI1C CXMnt mission, 'I'hen? aus never any exix'c?tutian in Cumnumity circ?Ics. of CI;MA-I;C contact, and that they might again he hosvcver. Ilud cxislint; truck urnurKcnu'nts would Ix? n'pudiatirl or that wry I?(: level uarrrds would be reached by the first of the ??wrr, ,- reassessing their upproac'h to the Community through arse-~rur extension of a few blhacrul u{~recnu'nts bus Ircen Ix?nnitted, but (;I;MA, 'I'hcrc was In fort ttcnv grctwittg Concern wltltitl in nor t c?:rses Irudc al;rcrnu'nts hove cxpinYt and the so?culled the' ConltillrrlOrl that the prOpOSt'd r11CCting b('tN?('ett auhnrunurrrs Community Iwlicy, which in effect rnulnhrins the xfafus 1'udevev and Ortoll ryas valued for "polltieal Atld Up- yrru fu trade n?IuHnns Is behrl; applied. tical" reasons, i.c., tv give recognition to (;Ef~1A, and envtsuna'd merely un exchange of information 14 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170002-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170002-7 CONFIDENTIAL rather than to uchlrve suhslunllve proi;ress,~10-a vlrw probably drrlyrd In port front the trcutnteut bt Sovlcl propaganda of (;h.MA's uchicvrntent of observer status at the UN lust full, 'I'hr trip la Moscow ul' rut 1':C drlrgutlnn far lhr In- Illul tnrrting couflrnuxl that CEMA was not prrparrd la dlscuss suhstuntlve Issues, The rnceling wrist very badly, with nu real progress un any issue being uchlev- rd and no rontnntnlgt~~ bring ugrrrd upon, '1'hr (;I~,Mr1 rrpusrntutivrs wrrc churacterfred us stuhboru, secrrtlvc, and poorly prrpurcd to discuss anything of subsluncr, !brit only Intrust being In urrcutl.~ing n visit by Cumrnission President Ortoli hr Moscow.~17 The (;I;MA positi~rn ut this first rnceting appears to hove rrflrctcd un iutpassc within the orgunizutiorr, Nrithcr the bust nor the Wrst t?uropcuns of course wrrc willing to take uh prospective spheres of coopcru- tion which could upprcchtbly stungthen CI:MA's bond in Eust !:uropcun foreign cconnrnic policy. 'I'hc ?C rrportcdly wonted hr folk, rather, about things like stundurdizu~ion urtd cnvinmmentul protection, and is:~rlwps c:vcntuully about statistical exchange and energy policies. I3ul even rnt th~+se topics the CEMA representatives wrrc unwilling to open ncgotiutions, 'I'bis suggests that bccuusc they were unable to strengthen CI~,MA's ut~ihurity over I:ustern I?urupc, the Soviets bud refused to srutction any ncgotiutions which would prcrvidc opporhutitics for contact and cooperation to develop bchvecn CL?MA and I?C; members. "l'he Community' representatives apparently Houle things more difficult for the CIsMA delegation by forc- ing the issue of their respective organizations' corn- prtrncc. '1'hc F.C delegation insisted that mutual recognition of each other's represcntational puwrrs-meaning, on CEMA's part, recognition of the Commission's authority to introduce the CCP-was a prerequisite to progress toward cooperation. This, in turn, it was argued, was essential before Ortoli would have anything to folk about in Moscow, If main- htincd, this EC stance mruns that the Commission's right to repuscnt Cornrnunity members in negotiating new trade agreements must be accepted by CEMA before any further real progress on CEMA-EC contact can be mode and the Ortoli visit brought off. Com- munity disappointment in this first meeting has in fact Icd to incrcusrd suspicions of Soviet ;ntentiors and of the utility of a trip to Moscow by Ortoli, I3y taking this position, the EC has confronted the Soviets with tough decisions. Unless the Soviets reverse their recent hard stand on the CCP by acknowledging lhr Cununlsslon's nulhurlly uud art prepared to nrgoUutr un substuntivr Issues In prrpuraliun far un Urtolf-I~udcyrv nu~rting, corttinucd stulrnutlr upprurs likely, (~or the Sovlrts nnw to tukr thrsr steps would upprnr lu rrquirr rithrr a nutJor brruktl~rough on lhr qursliou r-f increusfug (;I~,MA's uuthorlly or Sovlct rrrxurninution aF the rule of Cl?Mr1 and of CI?MA-h,C contort in fulurr I~;ust-West relations, I~ollowing the urrrliug, nrvcrlhclcss, the Soviets hour appeared optimistic about fuUtrc CEMA-I~,C contacts. Ignoring rrulity, they have puhllrly In- trrprrted the nrrrtlnt; its a success, and a Ieucling 1'ruvclu conuncntator, Yury %hukuv, bus even pudirtrd a trlp by Urtali to Moscow "wllhin the next few numths,"~'" '1'hc cxntstruction of this facade of up- tlrttisnt helps Ur krrp Soviet uptlons open: if a pro- longed iorpussc develops and Urtali cannot br prr- suuded to canrc to Moscow the Cornnuutih? can br blunted fur interrupting a promising rliolagur, yet at the same lime, this approach can serve to court err minimize any cuncrssions muds to get hire there, It also rcFlects the Soviet uttituclc that mrctings, visits and drrlaratiuns arc wortltwhilc in their awn right, bccuusc turn if they du nut accomplish unythiug of substance, they at Icast prevent backsliding and thereby help to make detente "irrcvcrsible." Just as far Western participants ut the CSC;I?, in the near term these Soviet tactics will provide a severe test For the I?C caul its mernhers of their . ummitment to a continuing dialogue, their ability to resist unilateral concessions, and, incrcasingh~, their patience. It now appears that CEMA-IsC rrlutions will drvclop along more modest lines than some hoped, and others feared, a couple of years ago, and that their establishment is unlikely to precipitate any significant changes in the conduct of Lusk-West economic or political r-ffuirs in the foreseeable fulurr. Eastern Europe will generally lze happy if CEMA-EC relations amain pro fornut, rnorc a by-product than u shaper of East-West economic relations. 1'hc clement of tacit collaboration in resisting Soviet designs which has evolved bchvecn the Community and Eust European rnernbers of CEMA should continue to provide uFor- midahlr harrier to any breakthrough on the closely in- tcrrelated questions of CEMA-EC tics and a more authoritative external role for CEMA. Although willing to sec CEMA-EC contacts develop cautiously, the EC and its members are not likely to be more forthcoming us long as East European rescr- 15 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170002-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170002-7 CONFID-:NTIAI vutiuns rcuurin undhnlnished and CI:MA's rnembcrs resist so udunuurtly the uppllculicm of the CCP. Reccul experience argues that the Eust Europeans will con- tinue to Flnd a receptive audience for their complaints among EC members should the Soviets step up pressure upon them to grunt CEMA a significant In- rreuse in control over thc~lr external policies, and that the Conununity is likely to prove unreceptive to the Soviets' more ambitious ideas concerning CEMA-EC relations In such spheres us numetury and Inveshnent policy should they be revived. Now prooccupicd with much morn pressing problems than the CCP, the Com- munity In Fuct appears relieved to huvc uchicved Its nominal introduction with u minirnurn of fanfare or squabbling among LC members and, while insisting on the Commission's right to introduce the CCP, to be Icss inclined to stress its authority in bloc-to-bloc dealings. Even if EC members eventually agree to the in- troduction of u more cornprchensivc CCP toward the E ust than one would presently anticipate, this will provide little economic impetus for the development of un equivalent common policy by CEMA. The in- stitutions t;nd trading practices in the hvo halves of Europe rcrnuin so different that-us GA'I'T experience with :gust European applicants bus shown-there is lit- tle real hu;is for negotiation over mutual concessions concerning trade barriers. Until operable tariffs or other means of trade control Icss subject to menipulu- tion by control planners arc introduced by CEMA, it will remain very difficult for it to offer the Community un effective quid pro qua for commercial concessions. The EC Commission, therefore, will in all probability apply the CCP essentially unilaterally for the foreseeable future. A major intangible at the moment, however, is whether dre rapid shift in the economic balance between the USSR and Euston Europe over the past year or so will l;e exploited effectively by the Soviets to break East European resistance to an enlrunccment of CEMA's authority and to a bloc-tc:-bloc upprouch to the Community. The Soviets are the primary supplier of East European row material and fuel requirements, notably oil. Until this year, changes in world market prices had relatively little impact on Soviet-East Euro- pean trade because of long-term contractual arrangements and the way prices have been set in CEMA. But prices in Soviet-East European trade are no~v rising, and closer Soviet-East European economic tics can be anticipated, which will be reflected in greater Eust European debt to, investment in, and trade and cooperation with, the USSR. Because of their gn:ut stoke in East European stability, the Soviets will be very reluctant to provoke cries of expluitution ur to accept the pulitlcul risks which would uccornpuny economic hardship In Euston Europe, But the present situation does greatly enhance Soviet economic bargaining power which can be turned to political ends if Moscow abases to do so. At u minimum, the re- cent strengthening of the Soviets' economic position bus probably reinforced their fading that fn the future Bloc economic policy can be coordinated mare effec- tively behind the scenes ut state and, especially, ut P~r- ty levels-even without a morn direct rule for CEMA. The Suvict decision on how to pursue the CEMA-EC Zink will of course turn or, much more than tactical amsidcrutions of relative economic strength within CEMA. '1'hc idea of such a link was put forward in IcJ72. If ut that time the momentum toward detente was grouter than ut present, it was in port because expectations of progress toward u new economic order in I?uropc and expanded Lust-West economic relations were strongc- The Soviet willingness to accept the Community us un economic bloc in return for acknowledgement of CEMA's authority in Euston Europe could be seen as the econorrric co:mtcrpurt to the political settlement then being sought in Ccntrul Europe. I~or the Soviets the situation bus now changed rnurkcdly. 'I'hc threat of the Community has diminished, at Icust For the near future, us u result of Western political and economic disarray, and the broader Soviet political objectives in Central Europe huvc been largely uchicved. In assessing their upprouch to the LC the Soviets face much the same question us on Basket III ut the CSCE (freedom of rnovcrnent for individuals and ideas) and on emigration; ore the potential gains, which arc now lurl;cly economic, worth the political risks? In these cir- cumstunccs, ugood case can now be mode in Moscow for moving very cautiously in developing uCEMA-EC link which in the absence of greater authority for CEMA may offer less proac?ect for increasing Soviet control over Eastern L'urope th~a:, for allowing East and West Europeans to develop contacts undermining that control I~nrstrutcd in their efforts to exploit the establish- ment of CEMA-EC ties and -;he introduction of the CCP to strengthen CEMA, the soviets are likely to be happy to see these tics develop gradually, while reap- ing maximum political and propaganda advantage fror.~ future contacts. They probably will also continue to resist the introduction of the CCI', seeking instead to 16 CONFIDENTIAL. Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170002-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170002-7 CONFIDENTIAL steer passing issues of conuncrciul policy into bllutcrul ur quasi-offlciul channels, 'I'hs approach would now appear to offer significant advantages to the Soviets, because to the extent that they continue to push for u "floc approach to the expansion of Lust-West economic relations, In the absence of firmly established c:ontml by CLMA the Lust European and EC states wdl boll) hove greater incentive and opportunity to steer ncgoliutions toward intcrnutfonul forums in which the roles of CLMA and the USSR can be minimired? lay advocating a scpurutiou of the problcrn of expanding Lull-West economic relations into its com- ponents-truck barriers, monetary arrangements, credit policies, etc,-the roles of already involved orguniiutions, such us GA'I"1' and the Economic Corn- rnisk)n for Europe (ECL), could be enhanced and roles for other internutionul orgunlxutions, such us the IMh and the ULCU, could eventually be found, In- dications of just such reasoning hove recently appeared In Ilungury, where CA'I"I' has been cited us the preferred forum for trtde negotiations with the EC,7D and in Romania, an 1MF member, which recently in- dicated its interest in achieving observer status in the OECD,*1? If the Community can maintain the cxx)r- dinuted approach to the Eust developed for t:)c CSCE 'Recrnl signs u(Sovict interest in purticiputiug in some huhion ut the upcrnning, CA'I-1'-sixtnsurecl ruuncl of nntltilutcntl trucle negotiations nary In port n?flrcl o desire to monitor the Iutst l;umpctut?s uctivitlcs Iherr-esi>t?clully their anaac?Is a?Ilh the Cornnuntlty, The GCI:, which btu Itmg been involved in promoting [sttst?~'Vest ecrnutrnic mlatlons, is defe~rDtg un esuntlaullon of Its current programs txnJiug the rndcrnne of tht? CtiCl4, sv61c?h It unticiputrs-(xrrhaps hw optimistically-will help to shuix? its fuhm? rolc,~t and now guinhtg credence through the introduction of the CC: P, and can carefully uurlure Its incipient caor- dinution of foreign economic policy with Lustcrrt I~uropc, it night be possible to be+gin to shift ncgotlutlons to these intcrnutlonul forurns? !3y druwint; the Cl?MA states into the Inlernutionul cconornlc system, this could eventually help make It possible for discussions to focus on nu)re fundamental economic barrier:; to tut expansion of Lust-West economic rclutiona, such us bilutcrulisrn and non-convcrtibllity. All of this remains anathema to present Soviet leaders, '1'hcir rather abrupt rejection of any involvc- nuatl in intcrnutionul rnonctury negotiations, noted at the time the approach to the LC was first being prepared, and their continued reluctance to think ulont; such lines reflect un awareness of the oppor- tunitias tills involvement wc)uld provide for subtle sub- version ar Soviet control and a revival of reformist sen- linunt h) I:ustern Europe, '1'hc Sovicls hove consi~tent- lyshown their umvlllingncss to risk either devcloprnent in formulating plans for detente, This helps explain why lncir post-CSCL concept of economic relations in Europe remains so undeveloped, foiling so fur to proceed beyond ittc notion of a few grandiose pu_t- Europcan projects and to offer any tangii)Ic in- stitutiurrul innovations, Yct, until there is u lessening of Soviet rigidity on the form of future East-West economic relations and on the extent of bloc control necessary over them, it is unlikely that either Eastern L~arope or Community members will become more grilling to sec the CLM A-EC link now finally being es- htblished assume u significant role in N)c shaping of these relations, 17 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170002-7 CONFIDEN'flAl Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170002-7 25X1 A2g L'Eaprrsyn, Rome, 23 February 1075. ^ 3bSeptcruber 14174, CONPIUI;N'17~15X1A2g 22 Uctubcr Ifl74, Lou. 25X1A2g 2O Dcrcm ber I fl74, CON F1 V I.N?rln L25X 1 A2 g ~I(i Junuury 1075, CUNFIDI;N'I'IAI? 25X1A2g _ '~.'-2 Junuury 1075, CONFIDEN'1'IAL25X1A2g ~7 Febnurry 1075, CONFIUGN1'IA1.. 25X1A2g 'fl April '"Yur}' %hukov, Icudin~ Pruudu commentator, interview in ~CUNFIDEN'I'IA1,. ~ IS November 1074, LOU; unc 1073, tinnl,~nsdusa~~l Sscrnle. September 1071, 1973. CUNT :DEN'PIA1,. 19FC Cortunission Deputy Secretory Cencrul Klaus Meyer in remarks to newsmen, RFE Special/Dybvfk, Brussels, ti June 1073; T/re !'hmncial T(mes, 0 June 107ti; and The Economfsf, 15 June 1073. Hcxsr2`fVycrsA,2g 24 Junuury 1975, CONFIDIsNTIAQ.5X1A2g ' (i February 1075, Lou. 25X1A2g 18 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170002-7 rl'rnurln, 8 June IDfiO, yl'AI', from Wuryuw, 21)cecmbcr Ifl7l ~"'I'ho 1'rospecly fur I~,un>peun Unity, , ?" op. cll. '1'ruudn, IN Mary 1073; Isucalllln, 14) Muy 1073. ? lurortf of C1iAlri AcNulllcs In 11)7?? Mnscuw 14)73. ?Jonuthuu Slcclo, 'I'hc Cuardlun, 2K Murclr 1972; unrl Neal Ascherson, '1'hc Obserurr, 0 April 14)72. In a preys conference lu Culnr on (i Aprll If)72, C:cuuscscu sand that he way "not uwarrc" of auq~ dccislon cunccruha4; finks with the I:C. ? HI' I: Speclul Uyhvick, Luxcmbuurk, 27 Mary 1072. 25X1A2g 25X1A 7r titutemont to I~Innlsh Hudl~r and 'l'V ut the end of September, quuletl In HI' I'. Sli/3i, 0 OcGrber 1073, cUNrID1.NV'IA1., 25X1A2g - coNrll)I"sN'I'IAL,, 25X1A2g LOU, "'II 25X1A2g "N. Inoxcudscv, (:undidulc CC urcrnbcr uud Oircchrr of the Moscow lustitulc of World 1?conomics curd Intcnuatirnul flelullons, ul the October Intenurtionul Conference in Vurnu ([iulgurlu); ex- tnrcts fnnn his report reprinted in lc A4nnde, 18 November 1072, ?Chcrmun Cvishiuul, Vice President of tlrc Stutc Conuulltec for Srlenre uud 'I'echnulogy in the Drench Quarterly 1'rcuvcs. CONKID[;N'I'IAL. rrTAS5, 2fi April Ifl72. r~0, Chukuncv, No. 13, September 14)72, 2G September 1973, CUNFIDI:N'I'IAI,; uud firer 1073, CONI~IDI:N'1'IAI., 7?~ &1 September 1073, UNCLASSIFiI'd~X1A2g sT lil~ Is Special/Vonduykc, linrsscls, I March 1fl74. 25 November 1773, CORIFII)IiN'1'IAL; UNCLASSIFIED. ~~I(i Muy Ifl74, UNCLASSII~IGD. 'OHude 1'rnuo cditor(aa!, 1N Jamc Ifl74. 'rJcri Fllidek in/,loot Sfran~, Nu. IG, Autiust 14)74, and Rurlc Pruuo, If) December 1074. rs 1?ust European sources cited by Michael Parks in the 1)nlllnrurc a tiun, 17 Jauuurry 1073. ? 1?Sovlet economic officers in liehnule, 1073, LUU. 25X1A2g r rPAt the 27th CEMA (,~runcil session in I