HOW HANOI, PEKING, AND MOSCOW VIEW THE NEW SITUATION IN SOUTHWEST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000600160003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 60
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: July 15, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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How Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow View the
New Situation in Southeast Asia
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15 wly 1975
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The end of the war in Indo-China introduces a period of
uncertainty and transition in Southeast Asia. Buoyed by victory,
North Vietnam's leaders will inevitably move to establish their
country as a power to be reckoned with in the region; the pace
and tactics they adopt will be major determinants of the relative
tranquility of Indo-China and Thailand. There will be some tension
and intermittent squabbling -- not only among Hanoi and its nervous
neighbors, but among Hanoi and its wart;.!!- allies, China and the
USSR. Divergent national interests are emerging as each seeks
to exploit to its own advantage the diminution of American in-
fluence in the region.
Over the next two or three years, however, practical res-
traints will temper the chances of destabilizing developments
arising from the greater manifestation of Sino-Soviet rivalry in
Southeast Asia, serials friction between Hanoi and either of
* This memorandum has been prepared within the CIA; it was
written by the Office of Political Research of the Directorate
of Intelligence (DDI). It consists of an overview, and an
Pu,nex containing three more detailed papers on certain aspects
of the subject written by three different analysts. The
Overview has been coordinated with and concurred in by all
offices of t
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her wartime patrons, or the possibility of Ienoi adopting an
aggressive course of hehavior toward her neighbors. Hanoi,
Peking, and Moscow will be limited in their capacity tr, project
influence in the region by the nationalistic sensitivities
of the Southeast Asian states and by the priorities of other
goals. Both Moscow and Peking in their rivalry with each other
will continue to be concerned with maintaining good ?..?elations
with Hanoi, if only to prevent the other from gaining any
major advantage. Although the potential for tension between
Peking and Hanoi is high, both probably will try not to allow
their differences to get out of hand.
The follow;.ng paragraphs offer our best judgments on the
interplay of these various factors and on the probable course of
events in Southeast Asia over the next two or three years.
THE FUTURE OF THE COMMUNIST ALLIANCE
The enormous tasks of :"construction and development in
the north, and the consolidation of power and socio-economic adjust-
rr6.nts Hanoi will wish to introduce in South Vietnam, will absorb
most of North Vietnam's attention and resources for the next few
1?ars. We believe that much of the energy Hanoi has left over
will be devoted to the problems of Laos and Cambodia -- problems
which will be important to the interplay of forces among Hanoi,
Peking, and Moscow, but will impinge far less directly on the
stability of other parts of Southeast A;>ic,. This does not mean
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that the North Vietnamese cannot give modest amounts of material
or even advisory support to the Thai insurgents, but it will
limit the scope of Hanoi's actions in Southeast Asia.
In line with this basically inward orientation, the principal
thrust of North Vietnam's efforts toward non-communist Southeast
Asia and the non-communist world in general will be actively to
broaden its diplomatic and economic ties with these areas. Hanoi
will want to reduce itz, dependence on Moscow and Peking to the
extent possible in meeting its needs for foreign economic assis-
tance. While such aid will perforce continue tc come largely
from the USSR Lind China, North Vietnam will do its best to widen
its range of suppliers. In the meantime, the Vietnamese leaders
will maintain the careful balance betwer.n Moscow and Peking which
has served them so well in the past. The USSR and China are
likely to have even less leverage over Hanoi's policies in the
future than they have had in the past.
Hanoi's relations with Peking in particular will probably
show increasing strain. The two powers are essentially rivals
for political influence in the region. They will have competing
objectives in their relationships with Thailand -- both with the
government in Bangkok and with the Thai insurgents in the country-
side. They also have conflicting claims to several islands (the
Paracels and the Spratleys) in the South China Sea, and the
possibility of off-shore oil will only exacerbate this contentious
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i t >uQ. CaDrtxtr-i t Will l ,n-~:.hrr tn., jr,r Ur?, Of r iv:tl ry t,~twncn
itrkitxl ,rvl li;ttr,i, tltxl'tlyitrl itvl r~ont_rilydt_itr'l to ttu- t_rnmiin in
tt,cir trlat irf'ln if, a hie toffy of r~nnfl ic't and nt.lmnic' prrjlwiirr?.
In Cont..tat,t, it,rrcxrw han no nim11at r'onrl ictc with ll ? , -r-... ~-r .. .. rat
efforts to (Jr ive a t,?nrirJr lm-tio-rn !Ianoi aryl i'c'ti' irri.
i tOST-iv1l~ I UIX)-CB 1411/1%
''atn?t Lao rX)1iCir!'? It 1r'artt tl}r next two or ftn 11r'arr=,
will be heavily in! l unnccr9 by Nan,:. i'atrlnt Lao r. i ^txk-nc''
t,n Hanoi's up!x rt and advice in r:o entrenched that thrrc
is little likelihood of it being r,ucc --:,-fully challenjea either
internally or by external competitors.
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China in o potential counterweight to VioAnartenc influence
in Laon, but probably will not challcnge Hanoi at the central
level. it will continue an interer.,t in North and Northwent
Laos, an r, limited buffer :.one along ita border and ponviibie
,_ntfy rKtint to Thailand and fturtra. Peking han deferred to
tfanoi'r; patron:::'fit, of the f'athrlt fK1o there in no rearton to expect
a r;igniffcant chnrgle in thin; arrangv,,rFant in the near futuree.
Cami"lia offerr, quite a difr'erent picture. The hyper-nationalism
of the Khz er cocTr tnti;t le:aderr, will contributte to very contentious,
Kel.,lionn with U,' Virtnan ;e, and will offer China a such larger
rein nn a counterweight to Vi-tnlnlere pres.;nurc. The prrfifh:cto for
?_entinu_rini1 ctisi-xrter.. with Vietnam are high. Both the contested
delineation of their ccxmun border, conflicting claimu to the
contincr+tnl s-:el! In the Golf_ of 11,ailand, and ethnic animosities
will NO the flames. ft~~aclerr. on both sidee have _ndicated a
ciecire to k(--p the rquabbl ing within bounds, but the corn ition
and policier, of the Can* dian government are still very uncertain
and offer few Clues to ics future behavior.
China clearly has entree through its early support of Sihanouk
and it, cubzequent t!cc :with the Khmer communist leaders. More-
crve?., China can offer material and technical aid and, with the
port of Korrpr.ag Som (Sihanoukville) now in corr>rr?inist hands, need
not use Vietnamese transport facilities to move its aid. Peking
will prefer to avoid assuming an adversary position against Hanoi,
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but China's support will nonetheless permit the Cambodians to
remain largely independent of Hanoi's leverage, and Cambodia is
likely to become a point of friction in Peking's relations with
Hanoi.
Moscow's influence will remain marginal in both Laos and
Cambodia. The Soviet reluctance to break with Lion Nol will make
the development of cordial relations with the new regime very
difficult -- a problem illustrated by the unceremonious departure
of the USSR's mission from Phnom Penh. The recent Soviet approach
to Sihanouk with offers of aid -- however fruitless -- will un-
doubtedly be followed up with persistent efforts to re-establish
a presence in the country, if only to prevent China from enjoying
a clear field. Soviet efforts probably will produce little political
return; the Khmer communists clearly Fee Peking as a more useful
counterweight against Vietnauase pressure. But as the Ca,rbodian
regime shakes down and begins to open its windows to the world,
the Soviets -- with their noses pressed to the pane -- will be
back, not enjoying much influence but greatly exciting Chinese
con%_x:rns.
In Laos, Moscow's limited influence in the past was derived
largely from its role as one of the sponsors of the coalition
government. But it is increasingly doubtful that even a weak
facade of coalition government will survive Souvanna Phouma, and
its passing will mean the further diminution of the already limited
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Soviet role. Soviet relations with the Pathet Lao were never
close and the current efforts to improve them are not likely to
meet with any significant success.
BEYOND INDO-CHINA
Although the Southeast Asian region at large will be the
scene of jockeying for influence by the Chinese, Soviets, and
Vietnamese, none seems inclined to raise tensions recklessly.
Our best estimate is that Peking, Moscow, and Hanoi have all con-
cluded that improved relations with the established governments
of the countries will pay greater dividends in the near term
than support for revolutionary activity against them. However,
Peking and Hanoi will. not totally abandon the latter course. For
their part, the ASEAN nations will try to adjust to the changing
power balance in the region by improving relations with the communist
powers. The growing inclination toward neutrality in non-communist
Southeast Asia will probably be accelerated. But such adjustments
are likely to be cautious, with no dramatic shifts in political
alignments.
The USSR will be less able than its rivals to capitalize on
the new atmosphere in the area, which in am event has a low
priority in Soviet interests. With Moscow's attention largely
focused elsewhere, there is little chance that in the near future
the Soviets w..ll seek or gain any significant military or strategic
position in the area. The USSR will continue its efforts to ex-
tend and improve its relations as a counter to Chinese power.
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Concurrent with these efforts will be accompanying warnings of
the threat of Chinese-inspired subversion and insurgency and, no
doubt, the periodic advocacy of an Asian collective security pact.
This counsel Frill fall largely on deaf ears. The Soviet Union
is still looked upon with great suspicion -- an image not likely
to dissipate soon.
For China, a heavy influence in Southeast Asia is very important,
but Peking continues to see the US presence as a useful counterweight
to the USSR. This is their overriding concern, and Peking thus is
unlikely to press for a further diminution of the American role.
Peking, in turn, is seen in some of the region's capitals as a
potential counterweight to pressure from Hanoi, While the Chinese
favor a restrained Vietnamese foreign policy, however, they will
try to avoid antagonizing Hanoi by assuming too blatantly a compet-
itive posture.
North Vietnam's behavior will be carefully watched by the
ASEAN countries. Hanoi will find them willing to develop more
normal relations but apprehensive about Hanoi's intentions --
specifically, whether they embrace ambitions of further territorial
hegemony or a commitment to supporting revolution beyond Indo-China's
borders.
Developments in Thailand will be regarded elsewhere as a key
indicator of Hanoi's (as well. as China's) intentions. Thailand's
border with Laos allows the easy support of the insurgents in the
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north and northeast. But an increase in support to the insurgents
from either North Vietnam or China -- sufficient to endanger the
non-communist government of Thailand -- does not seem to be in
the cards. Hanoi is not likely to choose this road unless it feels
utterly frustrated in its diplomatic relations. The insurgency's
limited capacity for growth and general affiliation with the PRC
make this an unlikely option for Hanoi to pursue. Moreover, such
a course would risk reversing Thailand's drift toward a more neutral
and compromising position.
In sum, Southeast Asia will be the scene of much maneuvering
for ad"antage among Peking, Moscow, and Hanoi, in which tensions and
acrimony will frequently surface. But the internal and ether pre-
occupations of all the parties and the desire and will of the
local regimes to maintain their independence argue against any
any power gaining a significantly ascendent position. Judgments must
be tentative. The abrupt end of the war caught everyone off guard,
and, undoubtedly, options and policies have not yet been clearly
determined. In any case, the communist states of the area can be
expected to join the more radical foes of the US in international
gatherings. Their prickly, hypersensitive leaders will seek to
demonstrate their divergence from US positions on nationalistic,
ideological, and economic grounds. Most of these problems, however,
are likely to be, irritants rather than major dangers.
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This Annex presents three more detailed papers, written
by three different authors from the Soviet, Chinese and North
Vietnamese viewpoints, on the subject of future communist
policies and interests in Southeast Asia. The three papers
are largely consistent with each other and with the Overview
though not in every detail. Each is of value, 'iowever, in
illuminating the complex relationships of the communist powers
in Southeast Asia from a slightly different perspective.
The three papers, and their authors, are --
-- The View from Hanoi, by
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-- Peking's Policy in Post-War Indochina, by
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-- Soviet Poli in Southeast Asia, by
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llanci'n victory in :;ouch Vietnam has brought Into focus new
policy objectives that will modify Ito relationshipo With its two
principal wartime allieu, the Soviet Union and China. The rnoi
oisvi.ouu charge in the diminished requirement for massive military
assistance, but the end of the war also giver,llanoi the opportunity
to break out of the relative diplomatic isolation imposed by the
war and to ploy a broader and more Independent role in international
affairs. Soviet and Chinese aid never gave its donors much leverage
over DRV policy, due to their rivalry for llanoi':.s favor which the
Vietnamese leaders skillfully exploited. Nonetheless, l'anoi was
never comfortable with the potential for leverage that its over-
whelming dependence suggested and is determined to reduce it by
substantially broadening its political and economic contacts.
The intense nationalism of llanoi'st leaders raises the poten-
tial for friction not only in its relations in the region but in
its dealings with its -)Id allies, most particularly with the PRC.
There are already signs of such friction in the current embroglin
over territorial claims in the Spratlc,' and Paracel Islands. llanoi's
criticism of the PRC's occupation of the Paracels not only reflects
Vietnam's drive to establish its national prerogatives, but the
basic ethnic distrust and animosity long felt tow;:-d the Chinese
but submerged for practical reasons during the Indo-China conflict.
This underlying tension in the,,,r relations can be expected to
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r,urface ix?!'icxliral1y, p.lrtic iflarly when Ilanoi smsj ctr, t..ne c.llife '
of maneuvcrItvi to contain it.o influence in t.hn r-;ion.
Hanoi.'n pique? at real or inwrlinn(l short-ccrmingr, in ,;(rriet
political and material r,ul?)K)rt harm cam-."d occar,ional r;.r.aino, but
despite the overwhelming ptejx rxlerance of 5'rr4iet aid, the Vivtnattrnr'
have always nren Moscow an a more distant, and t_hur, lcnn threatrnin%
influence --- one that war: hirghly useful in balancirti) china's inf lurrice
1.x01 not a rer_ iour; comxaetitor with Vietnam's; rr. tional intor'nt.s.
Moscow is also apparently en;joyinrl the benefits of g1onrrour, nup)or.t
that preceded the final r.tan' of the war at a time when i'ek inst, al-
though equally forthcorninn with aid, rrlxxrteclly w,- counr;el ing
restraint and ccxrproc'ircc.
Gratitude in a transitory phenocrnon, however, End Hanoi's,
po at-war S;oajrn will shape! its future relations, with t-~oth Mor;cva
and Peking. There initial objectives include the rrehuildinn and
developrent of a war-da;r.-gcd ecan(xrj, the reunification of earth
and suuth, Hanoi's projection of its lcadcrr.:hip in !rx)o-china, and
the establishment of Vietnam'n leoitirr.acy in the diplomatic arena.
Reconstruction and 'eunif ication are Hanoi.'s er for ity noalr; and
will ahr,orr) most c'_ the country's energies, and resources. These
priorities do not preclude an active foreihn policy, althounh this
preoccupation should influence its tactics. Buoyed by the euphoria
of victory and a sense- of manenttrn, Hanoi clearly is in a mood to
amplify its influence. This mood nerd not manifest itself in
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military action, bul should -- for the next two or three years at
(runt. -- be projected in political and economic: terms. Indications
are r_still. tentative. The rapidity of the nouth'n collapse took
Hanoi by nurprise, and u:sdoubtet_Ily there in still .-,ome debate and
groping going on in the leaclernhip councilr.
14 h t-N 1 t' I CAT I ON
Although reunification is the primary goal of the North
Vietnai t;e. leadership, it probably will not tx pursued precipitously.
The PI?C its emergirvj as a separate administration in the south that
will have separate diplomatic status and representation in inter-
national bodies and may hold "elections" to legitimize the communist
tzke-over. But there is no question that this political division
is an artificl; l one that ofi.ern little opl),ortunity for the de-
velopment of separatist tcnde,:ci