LAW OF THE SEA COUNTRY STUDY BOLIVIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000600110006-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 64
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 1999
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: May 1, 1975
• Content Type: STUDY

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Nv I%vrvl~n Uls~,went
~.aw of the Sea Country Study
Bo~i~/ia
GCR lOS 75-9
Mop 1975
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorizod Dis:losuro Suh~oct to Criminal Sanctlom
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Nu l~urcrl~,n Ul.-~,~~crn
'i'hn Law of tltn Sna Cow~try Studiot3 aro prepared 1:o support
the NSC Interagency Tank I'orcn on the Law oil the Sna. Thn
countries to bn includod in t-he creriea am selected on L?hn
banicr of priorities nuggetited by the Chairman of tho Tank
I'o rcn .
L?:ach study has two parts. Part I itr. an antialysis of the
primary geographic, economic, and political. factor:f that
might influn_nce the cour~try'ts law of the nea policy, ttrn
public and private expressions of that policy, and a brief
biography of the key personalities inwlved. Part II provides
basic data and information bearing on law of tht+ nea mattcrn.
Thin study was prepared by the Office of Geographic
and Cartographic iterearc}i. aiographic t+upport was provided by
the Central aefemnce Service. The study wan coordinated
within the Directorate of Intelligence and with the D~part-
ment of St.3te. Commcntt: and c~uestionn may be directed to the
IBS Country Studiet: Working Group, Code 143, L?'xtent;ion ZZ57.
C+C3C: F I fst"7it 2 R
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CONTENTS
Part I - Law of the Sea Analysis
Summary .. .... .... .. ............................. 1
Factors Influencing LOS~Policy ........................... 2
Law of the Sea Policy .... ......... .............. 3
Key Policy Makers LOS Negotiators and Advisers .......... 8
Qiographic Sketches ...................................... 12
Part II - Qackground Information
aasic Data ... ... .. ...... ... 16
Membership in~Organizations Related~to~LOS~Interests ..~ ~ 17
Action on Significant UN Resolutions ..................... 18
ANNEX
UN LOS draft articles submitted by aolivia
Maps: Regional map
Theoretical Division of the World Seabed
COC4 F' I UF.`2vT I A L
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Nu I~n-v~l~u I)fvscrrr
BOLIVIA
Part I -- Law of the Sea Analysis
A. SUP1MARY (U)
Bolivia's chief concern, as a
developing landlocked country, is to
obtain free and non-discriminatory
access to the sea and seabed.
Bolivia's belief that tie ocean
and its riches are the "connnon
heritage of mankind" is apparent
in most of its statements on the
deep seabed and in its concept of
a "regional economic zone."
Although Bolivia has no marine fishing industry or fleet,
it hopes to 'obtain rights to participate in the area beyond
the territorial sea on a preferential basis. Recent efforts
have been directed toward obtaining agreement on the formation
of a 200-mile-wide* "reyional economic zone" with all neighboring
states -- coastal and landlocked -- participating equally.
Noping to gain maximum benefits from the international area,
Bolivia would like to see the creation of a strong international
authority that would be able to grant licenses or con tracts to
states and private enterprises for the exploratican and exploitation
of seabed mineral rosources in the international area. Bolivia
does Trot support the concept of coastal state consent for scientific
research conducted in the area of national jl,rrisdici;on beyond
the territorial sea; instead, it favors prior notification by
the researcher to the coastal and neighboring landlocked states.
The issues Bolivia has addressed in LOS negotiations revolve
around one central theme -- the rights of landlo1,rced states,
Bolivia supports a 12-mile territorial sea and a 200-mile economic
zone. Although Bolivia has not taken a formal p?~sition on the
straits issue, it can reasonably be expected to s;~pport free
transit in international straits.
? 1)i::t.~rnrrs an~i arras G'rrou~7haut tlri . :tuck/ arc? ,ira rautir.~l
ttSlc~:: unless s~c>cit~rcl athnnrf .c?.
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B. FACTORS INFLUL"NCING LOS POLICY (U)
Special GeograUhic Features
Bolivia, South America's fifth largest country, has several
geographical drawbacks. It is landlocked -- by Peru and Chile
on the west, B~~azil on the north and east, and Paraguay and
Argentina on tt',~ south -- and has few ro~~d ui? rail ties with
its neighbors and no direct inland wat~rw~~y links with either
the Pacific or the Atlantic. This inaccessibility rnAkes Bolivia
one c:i' Latin America's poorest nations despite its 4yeaith of
mineral deposits. Since becomi;~g independent in 1825 it has
been a buffer among states, possibly excepting Paraguay, which
are stronger both economically and militarily.
Fiaving lost its Pacific seacoast to Chile in the War of the
pacific (1879-1880 , Bolivia depends on its neighbors' continued
good will or at least legal conformance for limited access
to ~rhe sea. Most of Bolivia's foreign trade is carried on
through Pacific coast seaports in both Chile and Peru. Bilateral
agreeu?%nts with Chile allow Bolivia the use of Arica and Antofagast:~
but Bolivia has long disliked the to rnls which, in some cases,
gr~~,nt rights it cannot exercise, (aolivia continues to press
for its own sovereign port -- preferably Arica, which handles
approximately 70~, of all foreign trade and is near La Paz,
the corlunercial and industrial center.
Poli~ical anri Economic Factors
The Bolivian military pla.~s a dominant role in government
and is the only unified force capable of providing the order
necessary for economic Qrogr~ss. Since Bolivia views access
to the sea as prerequisite to economic development, its key
foreign-policy ob,jectiv^ is to regain an outlet to the Pacific.
Relations with Chile have been strained since the Treaty of
1944 which ceded Bolivia's Pacific territory to Chile and
consigned Bolivia to landlocked status. In 19x;2 Bolivia broke
relations in a dispuLG over Chile's use of Lauca River waters
and demanded total sea access as fair compensation. The Act
~f Charana, which restored ties in early 1975, referred only
in general to Bolivia's landlocked statUS Gut Bolivia was
gratified that Ctlile, during negotiations, admitted that Bolivia's
lack of sea access was a problem.
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Bolivia iias long received U.S. economic .yid but at the
same time resented U.S, pcwer. The United States has been its
chief dor~r of foreign assistance and ~chis aid, in the 1950's,
was the greatest per capita to any Latin American country.
Bolivian officials stress the U.S, "obligation" to give their
nation massive economic aid and support its efforts to regain
a Pacific seacoast.
With an estimated per capita GNP of only $230, Bolivia is
one. of Latin America's least ~~a~reloped countries. Over half
the labor force works the land. but most Bolivian acreage is
not being fa n>ed and foodstuffs as well as consumer goods and
capital equipment must be imported.
Qolivia is the Western Hemisphere's leading tin producer
and its other minerals include significant potential for petroleum
and natural gas output. because mineral products make up almost
95;6 of all exports -- with tin the cornerstone of the economy
and the major source of foreign exchange -- Bolivia is extremely
sensitive to world fluctuations in mineral prices.
C. LAW OF THE SEA POLICY
Landlocked Status (U)
Bolivia's overriding objective in LOS negotiations is free
access to the sea, which it considers its most urgent national
problem. Its relentless pressure on this issue Iras both economic
and psychological roots deriving from its landlocked status
since the 1 oss of its Paci fi c territory to Chi 1 e i ~~ 1884.
Bolivian LOS de"legates stress that the right to free access
should be not merely a courtesy or an arbitrary concession
from coastal states but guaranteed by international law. They
often point out that free transit to and from the sea v~ould
not jeopardize transit-state sovereignty.
Bolivia early viewed LOS negotiations irr terms of its awn
interests and joined forces with other l+~ndiocked and geocirapl~-
~cal',y disadvantaged states. It his become a relatively vocal,
though not belligerent, spokesman for that group with regard
to free access to the sea and seabed, rights of free transit,
revenue sharing, an international deep seabed authority, and
an international dispute settlement forum (see Annex 1).
In ~4ay 1974, Bolivia and other developing landlocked countries
issued the Kampala Declaration (see Annex 2) affirming that free
and unrestricted access to the sea should be one of the basic
rights recognized by international law and calling on transit
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states to respect and facilitate the exercise of this right
by geographically disadvantaged countries. Bolivia deplores
the fact that, under existing laws, landlocked countries are
at the mercy of transit states if the latter choose no~l: to
comply with bi~ateral ayreements granting free access to the
sea.
Bolivia's sea outlet goal will continue to be a key factor
in dealing with other nations until some equitable solution
is reached. Bolivia has sought and received recognition of
its unique problems from Venezuela, Plexico and other Latin
Rmerican countries.
Territorial Seas. and Straits (C)
Originally opposed to extension of the territorial sea
beyond 3 miles, Bolivia now favors a 12-mile territorial sea
and cosponsored draft articles to that effect at Caracas in
July 1974 (see Annex 3). It conditions its support, however,
on the rights inherent in a territorial sea not being exercised
by the coastal state in such a way as to cut geographically
disadvantaged states off from the sea. Bolivia also claims
that its acceptance of an extended territorial sea means ceding,
without reparation, its rights to an area traditionally considered
high seas. Bolivia thus insists that the rights of landlocked
states in the territorial sea and in areas beyond it should
equal those accorded other states.
The straits issue has not been formally addressed. Wowever,
Bolivia might well favor the mariti~e powers' pc~sition on
unimpeded passage throuyh international straits in ret~lrn for
support of the landlocked states' desires for equal and non-
discriminatory access to the sea.
Coastal State Jurisdiction Beyond the Territorial Sea (C)
Bolivia's main objective for the area beyond the territorial
sea is to see the landlocked states' rights ar,d u~~ique problems
recognized. Over the years its position on the economic zone
has changed along with its own needs and interests and, recently,
with the likelihood that a 200-mile econor-,ic zone under coastal-
state control would be adopted.
To benefit from as wide an international area as possible,
Bolivia at first backed a narrow zone extending only to 40
miles or to the 200-meter isobath. At the UN Seabed Committee
in mid-1973 Bolivia said landlocked developing states' support
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for any exclusive zone would hinge on their being allou;2d to
explore and exploit the zone's resources on ea,ua1 terms with
coastal states (see Annex 4).
At Caracas in 1974 Bolivia claimed, like Peru, that their
natural riches that have been carried to the sea for millions
of years should be returned. So great are the needs of ~. tpxt. i lea art r3 ~ lnt.}tSnp
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