SIGNIFICANCE OF SOVIET ACQUISITION OF WESTERN TECHNOLOGY (Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000600020018-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 72
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2003
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: January 1, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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SIGNII'ICANCE OI' SOVIET ACQUISITION OF
' WESTERN TECIj:NOLOGY
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Principal Analyst:
Contributions from:
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I'1'L?'M ~k 1, I'ARA . (b )
rovic;t Expeci?.ations from Western Technology
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7'}~c clecli.ning productivity of capital and the very slow
gro~?~L?h of: labor productivity have reduced economic gorwth
to levels which the Soviet leadership considers too low.
'1'o help spur technical progress the Soviets are importing
Wc~sL?ern i;echnolocty and equipment and concluding technical
cooperation agreements with Western firms and governments.
Soviet. leaders believe that importing foreign technology
will provide production capacity in a much shorter time, and
at less expense than it would take to develop the technology
in the domestic applied R#+D sector.
'J'}1e Soviets have had numerous disappointments with
tVestern technology and equipment. Machinery from tidestern
firms has freaucntly failed to mesh well with existing
Soviet equipment, with other foreign equipment, or with
Sov9.et inputs into a production process. In part, this
interface problems is a natural one. The Soviet applied
It&U sector, however, takes an inordinate length of time to
solve problems of?~ompatibility within the civilian economy.
The Kama Truck Plant is being furnished with the most
modern equipment, but the interface problem is being
complicated by Soviet bureaucratic inefficiencies and seriecy,
and completion of the complex will be?delayed by several
years. ror much the same reasons, the fiat-equipped plant
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at Tol'y~tti became operational 2 years behind schedule.
A color TV plant, bought in 1968 is operating at only a
fraction of its rated capacity in part because of iinpropc'r
operating procedures and poor maintenance. There are
many other examples.
With all these problems, the Soviets believe that
imports of Western ecuipment and technology have made,
are making, and will make important contributions to the
level of their technology and are therefore willing to pay
substantial sums of foreign exchange to acquire Western
equipment and technology. The Fiat plant has expanded
automobile production suustantially and in less time than
+~he Soviets themselves could have done it. The rapid.
expansion of Soviet production of intermediate products
for plastics and synthetic fibers could not hive been
accomplished without Western technology and equipment. It
is estimated that Western equipment to produce ar~.MOnia
ordered since 1969 caill furnish at least half of the increase
in annual output ~ of: ammonia during 197.1-75 and perhaps t~cao-
thir~s. of t;ze increase to be achieved in 1976-80.
Soviet imports of foreign technology have enabled the
Soviets to upgrade the technological levels of the motor
vehicle and chemical industries as we3.1 as other sectors.
Moscow is acquiring invaluable know-how and experience for
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iL?s engineers and technicians i:rai.ned to use Western
cyuil~mc~t~t and processes . Based on such experience and on
licenses acquired from the West, the Soviets are abl.c i:o .
devr.l.op their own designs acid processes. Soviet imports
of foici.cJn technology probably will also raise technologica].
levels in key areas such as cornputcr~, e~.ectronics and
oi.l.field exploral:ion, among of}ier~.
{Tat i.s most important is that the Soviet R&D
establishment itself cannot provide the equipment, technology,
and kno~~~-how that the leadership believes is required to
achieve planned goals. There is thus no real alternative
to Western s~:ppli.ers. The proof of this is in the value of
contracts concluded with Western suppliers in recent years.
}~:nown Soviet orders for Western plant and equipment have
increased from $1.G billion in 1972 to more than $4 billion
in 1974. Moreover, billions of dollars worth of Western
equipment and technology are now being negotiated for pu~~:chase
during the ::~.ext five-year plan featuring equipment for t;lie
metallurgical and petrochemical industries, oil and gas
i:xploration, transmission and refining, earthmoving equipment,
nuclear power plants and others.
The Soviets are also continuing to sign technical
cooperation agreements with Western firms. They have concluded
more than 30 with US firms alonc.suggesting that the number
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of agrc:cn-ents wi;.h firms S.n the entire developed West is
well. over a hundred. Such agreements generally ~~all in
areas.o~ technology in which the Sova.ets are mast interested --
computers, semiconductors, chemicals, oil and gas, etc.
Moreover, the Soviets have concluded agrecmenL-s covering
the same technology with several farms -- ? redundancy
designed to maximize the acquisition of information and
know--how.
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~2};. Trade Activities in Technology
In its efforts to obtain foreign technology and
equipment, the USSR has increased its purchases in the
West substantially. Soviet orders for Western equipment
rose from $1.~ billion in 1972 to $4~1 uillion in 1974.
In addition, Moscow ordered $2.h billion in large-diameter
pipe for natural gas transmission in 1974. Soviet orders
for equipment in 1974 were concentrated in the fields of
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chemicals and petrolchemicals,'mining and construction,
oil and gas, and motor vehicle manufacturing. Orders for
Western electronics also increased considerably in 1974.
West~Cermany, France, Japan and the United States are the
main suppliers of machinery and equipment to the USSR.
In 1975-80 ASoscow will probably continue to depend
heavily on the West for technology and equipment. Based on
current negotiations and estimates of import capacity,
Soviet equipment purchases may reach an average of $5 billion
annually in the next five years.
Current negotiations and general agreements already
reached indicate that the Soviets will be importing equipment
for an iron ore reduction complex from West Germany;
chemical plants from Italy; ar: aluminum complex from France,
and for timber, coal, and oil projects from Japan. Current
negotiations also suggest that the USSR will rely heavily
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on the West in other areas: the building of a second gas
pipeline from the Orenburg fields; a major paper/pulp
complex in Siberia; an oil refinery in the Soviet Far East;
the B11M railroad, ~a.id a number of hotels. Moscow may
also turn to the West for wide-bodied aircraft, complete
plants for consumer goods, food procbssiny plants, nuclear
power plants, a.nd other plants, equipment and technology.
Finally, the sig,iing of agreements i:o,dcvelop Siberian gas
reserves, specifically the North Star and Yakutsk projects,
could require $7 billion in Western equipment. .
The cY~ief constraints on Soviet imports of Western
equipment and technology are Western export controls on
certain multiple-use (as well as strategic) equipment and
technology; Soviet import capacity, and Soviet. ability to
assimilate advanced Western technology. Export controls
have been relaxed in recent years and only the most
sophisticated technology and equipment are now denied to
the Soviets,.e.g., very powerful computers, semiconductor
production equipment, and similar items largely in the .
electronics category. It is assumed that Western controls
will be further relaxed at the current COCOM List Review,
and export controls will be even less of a constraining
factor in the future.
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Until 1974 Soviet import capacity was an important:.
constraint. Sncreased Soviet imports of Western capital.
goods led to an increase in debt to the West because of.
Soviet inability to generate sufficient ,export earnings
to keep pace with import demand. But the'sharp rise in
prices far oil, raw materials and gold in 1973 and 1974
has substantially increased Soviet export capability and
consequently import capacity.
Assa,mi]-:tion of Western equipment and technology
continues to be a pxoblem area for the USS12, but over time
may ease somewhat as Soviet engineers and technicians gain
experience with Western equipment. T9uch will depend on
how the Soviets deal with the problems that currently
inhibit the diffusion and use of both domestic and foreign
technology.
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~~21~ (5) Impact of Technology Transfer on Soviet Economy
Soviet imports of 6Vestern plant and machinery through 1980
are not expected to provide dramatic boosts to the economic
growth rate. I'irst~ the volume of machinery imports will
be small relative to total domestic investment iii the US5R.
Even if machinery and equipment imports grow to the estimated
$5 billion per year during 1975-80 and all are directed to
industry, the growth of industrial investment will increase
by only about one-half of one percent per year. Moreover,
the uli:imate impact on economic growth depends capon the
use to which the resources freed by Western imports is
put. These resources could be allocated to investment,
defen.?e, or consumption. Base~.i on Moscow's announced policy
to pay more attention to the consumer, a substantial share of the
additional resources will probably be used to produce consumer
goods, reducing the effect on economic growth.
Nevertheless, the technology transfer should help
overcome bottlenecks now threateninct future growth. Siberian
development, for example, is essential for maintaining an
adequate flow cf raw materials to industry. The Soviets
have admitted that Western tec}lnology and equipment are
needed for petroleum exploration and drilliny~, particularly
in permafrost areas and offshore. The lack of this equipment
is contributing to the current slow rate of discovery whicY~
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could result in decliniJ oil production in 1979-II2. The
Soviets are also becoming increasingly dependent upon
Western equipment -- pipe, compressors, and valves --- for
extracting and delivering natural gas.
The acquisition of Western technology could also break
the production bottleneck in the computex? and semiconductor
industries and allow a more concentrated use of native
R&D resources. The introduction of modern computers,
peripheral equipment and know-haw would be felt throughout
the economy, both in 'civilian and military sectors. Soviet
access to a reliable supply of Western semiconductors could
speed Soviet: development of complex electronic systems and
instrumentation for advanced weapons.,~~
Western technology should also contribute to raising
living standards, avowed by the leadership to be the
primary goal of the current five-year plan (1971-75). The
Soviet program to expand and modernize the automobile and
truck industry has included purchases of about $2 billion
of Western machinery 'and equipment. The large amount of
fertilizer equipment and plants bought from the West will
also benefit the consumer. by increasing grain supplies in
support of Brezhnev's livestock program.
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~(?.b (6) Impact oL- Technology Transfer on Increasing
Sovlet Ue}~enclciice on the west
In aggregative terms, Soviet depr~ndence on the West is
insignificant. In trade with the West Soviet exports (or.
imports) currently represent little. more than 1~ of GNP.
If imports increased, say, 15??s annual~.y over the next five
?years and GNP grew at about 5~ (about the same as in the
last five years), the share would still be less than 2a
in the trillion dollar Soviet economy of 1980.
But Soviet trade with the West is very specialised.
Imports, particularly of capital goods, have been of
considerable importance to those sectors of the economy which
the Soviets have made great efforts to upgrade technologically,
e.g., the chemical and petroc}iemical industries arc: the
motor ve}Zicle manufacturing sector. Such imports, together
with imports of Western grain and other goods, have increased
the importance of the West in Soviet foreign trade. Looked
at in the perspective of two decades, continuing Soviet
efforts to obtain Western equipment., technology and other.
products are, in fact, leading the USSR to a greater dependence
on the West. The West now accounts for 31b of Soviet foreign
trade, up from 15~ some 20 years ago.
Although it is doubtful that the Soviets will subscribe
to the idea of a so-called international division ~f labor
for many years to come -- they have even resisted it for
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themselves in CrM~1 -- the kinds of transact:ions it; is
becoming more involved in may very well increase Soviet
dependence on t}ic West. For example, in the gas-for-pipe
deals with firms in Western Europe, the USSR has agreed to
deliver natural gas for periods of 20-30 y^ars. Long-term
Soviet supply commitments to the Wcst`Lare;also involve
aluminum, wood, and chemicals. The same type of arrangements
' apply to the props: ed muli:ibi:Lii.on dollar projects calling
for US and Japanese development of Soviet foss9.l fuel
resources.
The traditional Soviet policy goal of self-sufficiency
is dead even if it has not been given a decent burial. This
does not mean that the Soviets are now ready to espouse the
princa.ple of comparative advantage. What it does mean is
that without imports of Western equipment, technology, and
capital the Soviet ?eadership is aware that its plans for
upgrading Soviet industry and exploiting untapped Siberian
resources would stand little chance of being fulfilled for
many years to come.
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~~2b. (7) Fact of Technology Transfer on Increasing
~Sov-ic:Yt Dependence o l.urope and Japan on
' i:he Soviets .
'!'}ie USSR as a market or a supplier traditionally ws
been or marginal importance to the major Soviet trading
partners in the West -- West Germany, France, Italy, the
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Uk, Japan and the United States. The share of the USSR
in the exports or imports of any of these countries is less
than 2~ and some cases even less than 1?s. In terms of the
dependence of these countries on the Soviet market for
machinery and equipment, the percentages are not substantially
different. Based on projected Soviet imports of machinery
and equipment ~l:i~r~~o-rt-~~~ from the West the USSR could account
for as much as 30 or 4~ or the iachinery and equipment
exports of some of the Western countries by 1980.
Moscow has frequently cited the importance of Soviet
orders in helping the West through the recession, and, in
fact, the recession has been a factor in the recent willingness
of Italy and the UK to advance large lines of long-term
credit at subsidized rates. But mcst Western EuroX~ean
countries as well as Japan traditionally have sought to expand
exports to the USSR; the major limitation has been Soviet
demand, iiz part dictated by foreign exchange availabilities.
These same constraints will limit the importance of the Soviet
market in the fut~ire.
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? Soviet orders are expected to be heavily concentrated
in a few sectors, however,' and may prove a major stimulus
to manufacturers of chemical equipment, large-diameter steel
pipe, and heavy construction equiprent. For example, much
of Europe's production of large-diameter steel pipe in the
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rest of the 1970s is earmarked for Soviet oil and gas lines;
Mannesmann of West Germany is building a special plant to
fill Soviet pipe orders. Several other large European firms,
including Krupp of West Germany-and .Creusoi:-Loixe of France,
sell more than lOQ of their output to the Soviets.
Ii. is also unlikely that Western Europe and Japan will
become dependent upon the USSk for supplies of raw materials
during 1975-80. Although natural gas deliveries to Western
Europe will increase rapidly -- to 22 billion cubic meter s
or more annually by 1980 -- Soviet supplies will still
account for less than 100 of the total projected consumption
of natural gas by the EC at the end of this decade. Soviet
deliveries of coal and timber to Japan will incre~-se
substantially, but will also represE?nt only a small share of
total Japanese imports of these raw materials in 1980.
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~p3b. Problems in Assimilating Foreign Technology
Machinery purchased from Western firms frequently
fails~to mesh well with existing Soviet equipment, wii~h
other foreign equipment or? with Soviet inputs into a production
process. In part, this interface problem is a natural one.
The Soviet applied R&D sector, however, takes an inordinate
length of time to solve problems of compatibility within
the civilian ecc.?~omy. In the, case of 'the mammoth Kama
Truck Plant, Western engineers and managers estimate that
several years will be nece~~?ry to interface all of the
foreign equipment: into an integrated operation. The USSR.
is making integration even more difficult by limiting Western
suppliers' visits to the site and by withholding from them
useful drawings of the existing buildings in which the
foreign equipment is to be installed.
Another Soviet policy that makes assimilation slow and
difficult is the importing of equipment that is too advanced'
for rapid assimilation given existing levels of Soviet
technological development. This overreaching is especially
evident in the comuuter field. Co::or TV production provides
another example. In 1968, the USSR purchased from a US
firm a complete package of very advanced, automated machinery
and technology for the fabrication of shadow masks for color
television tubes. By the end~of 1971, despite a year's
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fraction of its rated capacity and is a major bottleneck in
Soviet production of color TV. The USSR has not~v decided on
turnkey purchases from the US of equipment and technology
to achieve large-scale production of color TV tubes.
Soviet assimilation of foreign technology also h_~s been
hampered by the loea quality of the labor force which often
purchase price. This line is now .operating at only
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training in the US for Soviet technicians, the equipment
still was not operational aid in fact: had suffered severe
damage through improper operating procedures and poor
maintenance. T~ius, the Soviets were forced to procure
additional technical assistance and parts to restore the 1 ine
to its original?condition at a cost greater than the original
fails to master unfamiliar and complex foreign machinery.
The FIAT-equipped passenger car plant at Tol'yatti k,eca~i 360/195.
The largest models commercially
available from these countries approach but do not match .
the overall capabilities of the IB:~i 370/168 which has a
processing data rate (PDR) of more than 250 million bits
per second (mbs)* These models are offered by the United
Kingdom, West 'Germany, and Japan. All four countries have
ann~unce3 during thN past year new lines o~ computers to be
competitive with the IBM 370 series. Most of these new models
are scheduled for delivery later t~lis year and next year, but
the firms may not be ~~ble to produce them in quantity in this
time period.
The processing data rate dyes not accurately reflect the
power and performance of many computers in today's market,
but currently is, the-only recognized measure of computer
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't'here are Iio firms in Japan ,er Western Europe that:
currently deliver high capacity magnetic disc drives
or disc packs comparable with the must advanced US types
now available, but both the .Frelich (CIT) and the Japanese
(Fujitsu, Hitachi, and Nippon Electric) appear close to
producing at least limited quantities of such drives and
packs -- perhaps in the next year or so.
No foreign manufacturer offers magnetic tape units
with recording densities as high as those of the most
advanced US models. Recent brochures for new Japanese
(Fujitsu-Hitachi) computer models refer to a tape unit to
be available with these models whirti matches the density
of U5 units, but there is i1o information available on the
status of such a development .?
State-of-the-Art -- USSR
Ire the USSR as in the US, digital computer developments
of the early 1950s were largely aimed at solving scientific
and engineering problems, in many cases, defense related.
In the late 1950s computers were used increasingly for
military needs but their considera'~le potential for civil
uses, including business data proc.~ssing, was recognized and
begun in the US, but in the USSR virtually all production
Inodel computers were for scientific and engineering problem
solving into the late 1960s. Since 1967 data
processing has received growing emphasis, but it will
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be well ini:o the 1970s before the Soviets are 1a.kely to
have the kinds of. equipment, software, and experience which
now play a significant role in US military as well as
civil data processing applications.
The USSR is cvcll behind the US in the quality,
performance, and number of computers for general purpose
uses. Sovi.ct openly-announced general purpose computer
hardware including central processing units, internal and
peripheral storage, and input/output devices are
approximately equivalent to some US 1965-G6 models. Ccmputer
maintenance, software, training support and documentation
in the USS12 lags somewhat more than the hardware. Although
the USSR is close to the US in the comprehension of advanced
computer theory and is only a year or so behind in
experimental work, it has yet to translate basic R&D
achievements into high quality and quantity production.
In general, small-? to medium-scale models based on
discrete transistor circuits dominate the USSR's general
purpose computer inventory. The ?oviets are judged to have
made a limited number of computers specifically for classified
uses which may be four t.~ five times more powerful than
their biggest openly announced model, the BESM-6 (PDR = 20-25
mbs).
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' The IilOSt publicized current computer development
program in the USSR i:; aimed at using integr.aced circuits
tc~ build the Ryacl series of computers copied from the IBb1
360 series The Ryad series is
being devclop~d in cooperation with other CEMI1 countries
and it is to include a complete line of
compatible peripheral equipment that are to be standard
models in all the .~untries involved. Plans for 1970-75
announced for the Soviet Ryad computers appear to have
slipped at least 2 years. Two models, the R-20 and R-30
corresponding to the IBh1 360/30 ar~d 360/~i0 nnclels,* respectively, are
reported in production, but only significant numbers of
t}le smaller model, i.e. 200-300, are claimed to have been
made. Production of the R-50 -- comparable to the IBD1 360/65
(PDR = 29 mbs) -- before 1977 is doubtful and a larger
planned model, the R-60, does not yet appear to exist even
in prototype.
Designs copied from IBM and other US companies also
are being used in the~ASVT computers recently introduced
into production and intended for t~se in industrial planning
and control. The largest of the ASVT models, the M-4030
corresponds to the IBM 360/50 (PDR =9.3 mbs) and smaller
models, the M-5000, NI-6000, and M-400-- based on US
-hc 6 30 has a PDR of 1.1 mbs and the 360/40 has a
PDR of 3 mbs.
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rninicompuLei- designs -- are now beginning to appear.
Peripheral. devices in the Ryad series also are used with
the ASVT cornpu~ers..
Until very recently the USSR has neglected mini-
computers of the types that have been used in large
quantities in the US since 1967-68. Lags in minicomputer
developments deprived the USSR of important assets for
establishing teleprocessing systems and computer networks.
Some experiments on microprocessing have been reported
but no Soviet off-the-shelf types for a wide range of
iiidustria]. and. possibly military uses have been revealed.
There have been a number. of fragmentary reports on
special computer devclopmen~L?s for classified areas. Some
of these were general purpose types but most have been
specialized. In some cases the Soviet designers appear to have
experimented with advanced or novel logical design concepts
which probably would be too expensive for use in quantity
civil products. Also some of these classified projects used
components and ci.rcui?t techniques which had been revealed
in literature but wliicl-~ have never appeared in openly
announced computers. To date, Soviet weapons system
developers have tended toward designs ghat can be satisfied
with less sophisticated computers than are used in US systems.
Soviet uses of computers in military logistics, communications
and command and control appiicaiions similar to US civil
' e
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data processing uses still appear to be in early or
experimental stages. 't'his lag may be due to a lack of
enough gencr.al purpose computers and related equipment in
the USSR comparable wiL-h the civil products used by the
US military.
The Soviets have continuing :serious deficiencies in
most types of peri.phcral devices needed to make effective
use of their computers. Punch card and tape devices
probably are adequate though below Western standards, but
good line printers have not been available. Magnetic
disc units comparable with mid-1960 US vintage are claimed
in production but goad disc packs sti_11 are a problem.
Magnetic tape units have improved but supplies of good
quality tapes are inadequate. Magnetic disc units and tape
units from Bulgaria have been used with both Ryad and ASVT
computers. Smart terminals and interactive graphic
display tern finals are not yet readily available for general
use and good communication channel interface devices also
are lacking.
The Soviets have a small ruml.;er of centers with very
strong capabilities for software and computer language
research but until now machine language programming has
predominated. This will change markedly as the Ryad type
computers with their broad range of software copied from
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Il3M become available. As more and more general users,
who are not computer specialists obt~lin computers, use
of higher level language progranuniiig wiJ.l become essential.
Soviet lags in supplying good integrated circuits
and other advanced components has been an obvious constraint
on their ability to supply largo numbers of modern computers
to general users. Tltese lacks also constrain computer
developments by specialists who do not have sufficient
priority t~ get scarce components. The Soviets are able
to duce fair quality ferrite cores and plated caires for
memories, but they leave been an successful in assembling
quantities of core memories using the very small diameter
cores. The Soviets appear committed to the use of ferrite
cores for main memories for the next few years. They are
doing research on semiconductor memories similar to those
of modern US computers, but for a few more years they are
not likely to produce adequate supplies of suitable
semiconductors without foreign assistance.
Soviet ?attempts to Acquire Westerr? Computer Technology
During the past year the USSR. has continued efforts to
acquire large computer systems and computer technology in the
West. Efforts are concentrated mainly in the United States,
bttt there is activity in Western Europe and Japan as well.
The Soviet Union is pressing for. comprehensive de~~s that
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include technology, equipment., and training. 1t is also
See},incJ cornp~~ter peripherals and components. The Soviets
appear willing to purchase in large quantities only if
production technology is included. Finally, the Soviets
seem bent on exploiting bilateral S&T agreements wii.h the
US government and with US firms to gain technical advice
in problem areas of both hardware and software. The
Soviets want information'at a level of detail that would
constitute a technology transfer.
Specifically, the Soviets want the following:
a Computers for high priority, non-military
applications cv}zere requirements for sp^~d
and capacity exceed the capabilities of
domestically produced computers; for
example, for management of the Kama Truck
foundry; for research
applications 'such as high energy physics
and for global weather forecasting. These
deals involve very large, time-shared
systems, with all system analysis, soft-
ware and training provided.
? Know-how to produce high capacity magnetic
disc drives and related disc packs;
technology for other peripherals and
supplies, such as high-speed printers and
s Turn-key facilities to produce computer
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components such as integrated circuits for
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? Licensing for the production of- .,,~... -
computers; these will be used to
implement Soviet plans for industrial
automation, and to set up teleprocessing
systems .
As the Soviets become more committed to modern large-
scale computer applications they will be less able to
satisfy their needs from domestic sources, and will need
to acquire hardware and software rrom the West, or forego
their demands.
Potential Economic Impact of Computer Sales
to the USSR
The Soviet Union is pursuing along-range plan for an
integrated nation-wide network of computers for management
and planning, and for the wide use of computers in the
direct control of production processes . The sxtent to which
Western technology can aid in these goals depends on the
form and amount of the assistance provided,
Sales of discrete subsystems are beneficial to the
USSR only to the extent that they can be incorporated into
domestically produced.computer systems without Western
assistance. That capability has not: been demonstrated.
Such sales can provide the Soviets with limited design
and manufacturing information, but not in sufficient detail
to permit the item to be reproduced.
Acquisition of large quantities of Western perip~ierals or
corciponents together hitb. Lechnic.:1 aid for their
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incorporation with Savi~. parts could help solve the current
~4~~1FOS~ncs~~OS~O~~~i~.~D~~~~~~~`R~~s~~~~t~t~6 but
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the Soviets have shown little enthusiasm for importing
larn~ quantities of peripherals or parts under any conditioizs,
as they are reluctant to become dependent on Western supplies.
The potential impact of sale of discrete computer
systems is proportional to the volume of such sales. A
large number of ~destern computers, even with minimal
support, could have significant benefits especially for
the management of large industrial complexes, and probably
also for planning. However, as.with subsystems, the Soviets
seem unwilling to import large nun.bers?of computers because
it would force dependence on the~~tiest for spare parts. A
small number of discrete Western systems would be of some
benefit to tl~e Uo~R, but the .benefits would be restricted
to a specific installation and would have little effect on
the economy,.generally.
Sales of computer systems with full installation and
maintenance support could yield substantial extractable
benefits in the area of software and systems analysis.
For example, training and experience included in the proposed
sale of the Kama computer system will contribute to the
development of a cadre of Soviet specialists capable of
training other specialists. Moreover, trained specialists
wi?.1 be able to apply their skills to~the development of .
similar nati~~~e software systems.
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?~ The sale or licensing of manufacturing technology
would bc~ of enormous beneL?it to the USSR; it would permit
the USSR to produce modern, highly reliable third-generation
computers and to produce them efficiently. Current
Soviet models are techno].o7ically inferior ~~o Western
models and are produced. inefficiently and at?:. high cost. Sv.ch
sales would not necessarily improve computer utilization,
wrioh probably would require further assistance in the
form of prograii~nling, systems analysis, and maintenance training.
Cooperative or joint ventures are pos5~ble in the area
of R&ll applications, support, manufacturing technology, or
some combination of these. A truly comprehensive _~greement
along 1-.hese lines including provision for follow-on technology
would provide the greatest benefit to the USSR. St would
allow the Soviets t~ develop an advanced native manufacturing
and utilization capability, while allowing them to keep up
with the latest developments in .the West. The current
computer gap would bo decreased significantly, although some
gap probably would persist as long as major innovations
continue to occur in the West.
Pote~itial Military Impact
Military benefits from computer technology can be
divided, with some overlap, into two categories. The first
category includes the use of general purpose compu~:er.s
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either in military R&U problem solva.ng or in connection
with communications and command and control. The second
category inclGdes the use of computers, usually special
purpose, as integral parts of weapon systems.
Direct diversion of a small num~er.of imported high
performance L'ree World computers to support military R&D
developments undoubtedly would be of some benefit to Soviet
military projects. Realization of these benefit, however,
would be hindered by the need for reprogranuning of on-going
problems and by the jeopardy to security of classified
Soviet projects due to needs for spare parts and maintenance
support.
The systems analysis, software, training, and
experience gained through the acquisition of Western computer
systems for civil uses f~robably would provicle the greatest
potential benefits to Soviet military capabilities. Systems
much as those being acquired for airline reservations,
Kama River Truck Plant, and Intourist reservations require
that the Western supplier provide the Soviets a great deal
of support in the above areas. This knowledge and
experience can then be transferrer to the development of
their own advanced military systems which have many
functional similarities to the c~.vil systems obtained from
the West. The Soviet military intends to use Ryad series
cQinputing equipment, which uses designs for US general
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purpose computers, fo.r military appl9.c~~i~ions similar. to
the civil applications for whioh i:hey are now trying to
.acqu5.re Western computer systems.
With respect to specialized computers for use in weapon
systems, the Soviets a:i?e most like,.Ly to make important
gains from their determined effort to acquire Western
production know-how and production equipment. Although
they may have used some imported components in special
purpose :military computers, particularly in experimental
or prototype stages of developments, their main emphasis is
on capability to meet deployed system needs from domestic ,
sources. Cooperative R&D programs with Western companies
also could made significant contributions to Soviet
capabilities for developing specialized military computers
for signal processing and for uses requiring untended,
long-term reliable operation
Some of the cooperative programs also call for
construction of facilities for producing advanced computer
peripheral devices and components. This type of technology
would contrib~~{.:e to the Soviet bass for supplying a wide
variety of military computer needs.
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Civilian/Trade I>romoti.on Technology
Soviet Agricultural Technology
Te chno loq~ Gad
Agriculture is the most technologically backcaard sector
in the Soviet economy, lagging far behind that of the US.
As a result, the Soviet farm worker produces only 11 ~ of the
output of his U5 counterpart, applie$ only ~18~ of the
fertilizer allocated to US crops, and uses much less machinery
per acre than in the US. Only 80~; of the potato and sugar
beet crops and about one-third of the cotton crop are
harvested mechanically. Specialized machines such as
carrot harvesters, tea pie}:ers, and grape pickers have been
used experimentally, but the level of mechanization in
vegetable and fruit growing remains low. Little mechanization
is used in Soviet livestock production. Only about 5 0 of
the poultry in the USSR is raised on fully--mechanized
operations, and almost 60a of the milking in the socialized
sector is still done manually.
Soviet Interest in t9estern 't'echnology
Soviet leaders no~?~ are stressing farm modernization and
are soliciting Western help. Under the 1973 US-USSR 1lgree-
ment on Agricultural Cooperation the Soviets proposed tech-
nological exchanges in genetics, selection, and seed pro-
duction of grains and soybeans; fe~~ding of farm animals
and the design of large livestock complexes; optimal applica-
tion of chemical fertilizers, perfection of technology and
systems of machinery for crop cultivation and harvest;
techniques of land reclamation.
Since the early 19 30s, when US firms were instrumental
in designing and equipping the first Soviet tractor plants
at Kharkov ar,d Volgograd, the Soviets have looked to the
US for assistance in the area of f srm machinery. The Ninth
Five-Year Plan caas expressly desig.zed to upgrade tractor
quality and performance and 'co bring tractor design and
technology closer to that in the Nest today. Plan directives
call for delivery to agriculture of 1,700,000 tractors that
will be more po~verful, durable, and faster.
For years, the Soviets have favored tracklaying over
wheeled tractors. They nova recognize that the tracklaying
type is not as versatile as the c?~hecled type in agricultural
applications. Consequently, thoy face the tremendous task
of not only meeting their overall _cquirements for large
numbers of additional tractors but of replacing most of the
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L-rack.laying tractors ~vith wheeled types, and of replacing
low-po~.aered wheeled tractors with more powerful machines.
To tha.s end tl~e Soviets are actively in contact with i)S
marluf:acttirers
1. In late 1973 they approached a large US diesel
engine corporation to obtain 450 horsepower engines for
use in agricultural tractors. 'they appear to want to buy
the technology so they can produce: the engines themselves.
2. In November 1974 they provided specifications to
a US manufacturer for a proposed 500 horsepower wheeled
tractor, possibly to be designed and manufactured with US
assistance. Such a machine is needed for pulling heavier
implements at higher speeds.
3. They have expressed interest to US firms in a
4-w}le~l-drive, 170 horsepower-range tractor featuring hydro-
static transmission. Such a tractor crould supplement the
the 1G5-horsepower 4-c?~heel drive tractor currently in pro-
duction at IChar}:ov.
Since 1972 the USSR has purchased sevel-al thousand
tractors from t}ic US and Japan, but these ha ?e been con-
str?.iction-type, tracY.laying machires for indu~~trial projects
such as pipelaying and open-pit mining. Little interest
has been sho~?Jn in purchasing large numbers of Western-made
tractors for use on Soviet farms. Trade disc?ussions have
typically centered on technical cooperation, participation
in Soviet manufacturing facilities, licensing ~;greements,
and construction of turnkey plants.
Feedlots
reed is the important factor in animal husbandry.
Its mechanization in general acid ~~roperly coordinated
mechanization in particular is a close runner up for large
scale operations. During 1971-75 the Soviets were to deliver
6.5 billion rubles worth of mac}iiiiery and equipment for
the mechanization of animal husbandry and "feed procurement."
According to officials of the Soviet Ministry of agriculture,
the USSR plans to build over 1000 cattle feedlots in the ne:ct
5 years. These wil? be located in the Ukraine and in.
Soviet Central Asia where extensive irrigation projects are
under construction. In 1.973 the Soviets contracted ~;~ith a
US firm, Ceres Internatio~tal, for the construction of 3
feedlots : a 30 , 000 head facility near ~:rasnodar, and 20 , 000
head faciliiies near Volgodonsk ~n3 Tbilisi. ~?7hile Ceres
is providing only equipment for the Krasnodar. and Tbilisi
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feedlot, L?hc Volgodonsk facility is a turnY.ey operation.
'1'he latter went into full opcr.ation in 1974, and Soviet
officials. have been very pleased with the progress achi.cved
so far. 'i'he feedlots provide groin storage f:acili.tes, a geed
mill, trucks for transportation, fcedyard equipment, and
the farming equipment to grow and harvest the needed focd-
stuffs locally.
The Soviet goal of constructing more than 1000 feed-
lots in 5 years appears tremendously optimistic. Although
the Ministry of Ag7:iculture has apparently received ample
funding for this program, the Soviets lack sufficient techni-
cal and a;lministrative understanding of the operation of
large scale cattle feedlots to enable them to accomplish
such an extensive program. Their knowledge of
animal nutrition is entirely inadequate for such a program,
and the side of their operations will necessarily be limited
by the unavailability of tree small process control computers
which are utilized in the US to control the apportionment
of feed rations and other such operations. Amore likely
achievement. ~~~ould be the construction of 200 to 300 smaller
feedlots on t:he larger state farms each with the capability
to feed perhaps 2,000 'co 3,000 head.
Feed Production Plants
One of the most important shor.tco::~ings of the Sc.viet .
cattle feed industry is inadequate processing and distri-
bution. The short growing season which prevails in the USSR
makes early harvesting imperative, and the roughage that
results is utilized in a green, unconcentrated state that has
a very high water content. This not only increases the
amount of. feed an animal requires, but it also reduces the
nutritive value of that received. Thus, weight gain is
rather slow in tr.e average Soviet cattle hard. The second
deficiency is that the bulky, unp~:ocessed feed cannot be
shipped the long distances from wriere much of it is grocan
to t;~e areas where it. is needed, rind while feed may be
abundant in the one area it can be in short supply in another.
In May 1974 the USSR requested US quotations for 1975
delivery on 5 complete plants for the producticn of a urea-
based animal feed. In September the request was reemphasized
and increased to 20 plants. Each plant caill contain 5
extruders and associated storage bins to provide a produc-
tion capacity of 1.4 metric .tons of protein concentrate per
Hour. The extruders combine grain, urea, and bentonite
pre-mix into an minima]' feed which can contain as high as 85
percent protein equivalent for ruminant animals. The
process is under High temperature which permits the nitrogen
from urea to be~ combined in the starch of the grains.
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This eliminates many of: the problems assaciatc~cl with urea
feeding. 'i'hc USSR wa?11 have to irnpor_t b~ntonite pre--mix
from the US because the only known deposits oL? sodium
bentonite ~~re located iJl t4yom:.ng and hloJltana. The total
price for the feed plants, technical assistance, and 2 years
of spare parts will probably exceed $4 mi~.lion.
High level emphasis is also being placed on acquiring
a manure recycling process developed by Ceres International.
The Soviets have repeatedly asked for bids on different
sized facilities , and are very interested in a recent
proposal submitted by the US company. This would call for
tt~e establishment of a plant utilizing the company's
process for recycling manure into cattle feed in conjunction
with an appropriately sized feedlot. In addition, US
equipment for cutting, drying, and cubing alfalfa and other
roughages :aoulcl be provided. Rou.~hage could thus be
thoroughly' processed and cubed so that, it could be easily
shipped throughout the USSR and scored for as much as 2
years. Only US companies make equipment in this field on
the scale in wtli.cti the Soviets are interested. Ceres has
obtained exclusive 10-year dealerships in the USSR from
several other US compaJiies for the sale of silage and roughage
processing equipment. Tti?~o million dollars worti-I of this
US equipment was exhibited, ?at Soviet request, in PZoscow
in 19 74 and purchased afterwards by the Soviets . Included
was a $700,000 dehydration plant.
Alfalfa harvesters and Processing Plants
In October 1974 the Soviet P?Zinister of Machine Building
for Animal Husbandry and Forage Production, I:. N. Belyak,
indicated to a US company that the USSR wants to purc:'rlase
the license and one complete nl.ant for the production of
a US-made alfalfa harvester, ~?~ith an overall plan to build
1100 har_vestcrs. Belyak was also interested in alfalfa
processing plants. He said that .he USSR has a need for
350 of ttzese plants but caoulcl set :le for 1~0-200. Initially
he would l~.ke tc buy about 15 pla:zts -- one for each Republic --
and acquire the licensing rights ~o build the rest. Ttie
plants come in 3, 5, and 10 metric-tons-per-hour capacities,
but the Soviets are only ?interested i.n the largest si::c.
The Soviet requirement is for a machine that will dry a rata
product from 78-80 percent humidity to 10-16 percent humidity at
10 tons per hour, with loss of carotene no more than 10 percent
at drying and 5 percent at pressing. Belyak preferred a
65mm-sized pellet, but when advised t~Ylat this is not a
practical size to produce fie accepted 10, 15, 25, an c? 3G,:un
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pellet dies. 1.'ellets o~ these sizes will give the Soviets
the capacity to feed poultry, hogs, and cattle. The
interest in a 65mm pallet indicates ci~cy. arc more interested
in feeding cattle than smaller livestock.
'i'he Soviets have scheduled the development of this
project over a 5-year period with a final goal of complete
Soviet independence in this area. I3elya}c stated that when
his t4inistry completes the preparation of. a comprehensive
schedule in late 1974 a forma? contract will be signed with
the US companies involved. The overall cost of the licenses,
engineering and technical expertise for the alfalfa
harvesters, and the plants for processing and alfalfa into
pellets would probably be betcaeen $GO and $70 million.
Silo Construction
At the beginning of 1971, there were only 123,000
silos in the USSR wiich a maximum capacity of 22-23 million
metric tons of processed silage. The amount of silage and
cured hay produced in the USSR in 1970, ho~?~ever, was 1G0
million metric tons. Thus, 85 percent of the country's
silage: was inefficiently stored. I?-luck- of it is simply
piled by the roadside or put into barns and sheds where it
soon rots. Almost one-third of state-procured silage was
estimated as being spoiled in 197(1 and more than half of
its feed value lost. Storage imp;:ovement, then, offers a
tremendous potential for reducing feed shortages which the
Soviets have only recently begun to emphasize.
In 1969 the Soviets signed a $2 million contract with
Besser Corporation of P-lidland, P~iichigan for the delivery of
5 complete automatic plants for the manufacture of concrete
blocks for si1:o construction. Early in the negotiations.
the Soviets insisted?that Besser provide them not only with
plant machinery but with full technology (an on-the-scene
specialist) for silo construction. The' contract specifies,
however, that the Soviets are not to manufacture the machinery
nor transfer the technology to th:~rd parties. Soviet officials
stated that after the performance of the initial plants have
been evaluated they may purchase additional Besser plants.
Besser estimates they will need at least 25 plants nationwide.
Another US firm reached an ?agreement with the Soviets
in 1972 to supply metal accessary parts for concrete silos.
The firm is selling a number of machines to fabricate the
accessories and also the ]:now-hotir. The Soviets should be
easily able to m~~ufacLUre the machinery ~-uid accessories in
the future.
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}?r.r.til.izer
~,It is difficult,to exaggerate the importance ot?
fcrti.li zCr to agriculture. Of the numerous ways of in-
creasing crop yialds' (fertilizer, improved variei:ies,
irrigation, pesticides, farrn macha.nery) fertilizer is
probably the most important and financially rewarding.
V7ithin the Soviet Union it is playing an incrcasi.ngly
important role, particularly as a method of raising grain
yields. Far exmaple, during the five-year period ending
in 1975 more than 50 percent of tl~e planned in
grain production, i.e., an average of ].8-20 mi~.lion tons
per year, was based on larger amounts of fertilizer..
The Soviet Union has made~definit~ progress in supplyinc;
the?agricu].tural sector with fertilizer. The total availability
of fertilizer was increased more than nine times betcaeen
1950 and 1971. In 1977. the Sovi~.~ts produced over 66 nu.llian
tans of fertilizer, almost- as much as the US. IIut acreage
i~z the USSR is 70 percent greater than in the US and 66
million tons does not begin. tc meet Soviet needs. Moreover,
the qua]_ity of Soviet fertilizer is poor, single nutrient
materials predominate, and phosphate fertilizers are in
chronically short sup-aly. Other shortcomings in the industry
include delays in new construction, poor operating efficiency
at existing plants, and transport~ition and storage problems.
To alleviate some of these problems the USSR since
the mid-1960's has purchased from foreign countries fer-
tilizer production equipment, including complete plants for
production of multinutrient fertilizer and key inter-
rnediates, such as ammonia. In 1973 Occidental Petroleum
Corporation signed a 20-year barter deal with the USS R
worth $8 billion for the construction of eight ammonia and
two urea plants in the USSR. The barter portion of the
arrangement provides for the exchange o~ ammonia and urea
rroduced in the ne~a plants plus Soviet potash for U5
phosphoric acid.
The agreement provides several specific advantages to
the USSR:
1. Soviet industry will acquire modern tech-
nology for the production of ammonia, the basic
ingredient of all synthetic nitrogen fertilizer.
2. The expansion of urea production will allow
for increase in its use as a feed supplement for
cattle and thereby have a sic1nificant impact on the
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3. Imports of US superl~hosphoric acid will help
reduce the: short?ac~es of phosphate fez~tila.zer. At
? least half of the arable land in the USSR is deficient
in phosphorus and larger ~upp].ies are expected to
increase crop yields, raise protein content, and speed
the ripening of: grain. The latter is an important
consideration in rc~Jions that have a short gro~oing
season.
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The priority now accorded fertilizer production by
the Soviets is likely to continue into the 1980s. Domestic
production of fertilizer is certain to increase greatly
during those years; hocaever, persistent Soviet problems
suggest continuing ini:erest in 1Vestern fertilizer production
equipment ranging from additional plants for the production
of ra~?r material, such as anunonia, to granulzting and
packaging machinery.
Pesticides
Soviet agriculture also needs assistance in developing
pesticides. Losses from insects, ~?lecds, and plant diseases
may be as high as 30 percent of potential yields. This
is l~irgcly attributab]_e to the fact that because of a
shortage of pesticides oa~1y about half of the total sown
area is being treated. Also, with the exception of cotton
and certain other industrial crops which receive special
attention, the rate of application for those crop~~ that
are treated is necessarily less intensive than tY~at
recon~nlended in the ~4est. Supplies of pesticides continue
to fall shorn of requirements despite increased production
over the past decade. Tn 1970 the USSR reportedly met its
needs for insecticides and fungicides by only 60 percent,
and for herbicides by only 50 percent. Prospects are poor
for filling this :Jap between supply and demand in the next
5 to 10 years.
Although the major types of ~~esticides are manufactured
in the USSR, the variety of products available to agriculture
is very limited. Only 150 basic pesticide chemicals are
produced in the USSR compared to 900 in the US. One reason
is the Soviet attitude toward toxic preparations which has
limited the nur:,ber of pesticides available at any one time
and slowed the introduction of new compounds into Soviet-
agriculture. Their stringent interpretation of toxicity,
in relation. to the environment, .has resulted in the phasing
o.iit of ce .ain ~:~ c~~ly toxic compounds in favor of less
toxic type. This attitude iinits sales of both pesticides
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and mailuf:actUl-ing plants to the USSR, and aggravates the
problems caused by a high level of crop losses and pesticide
shortages.
~1'he structui-c of Soviet purchases of pesticides from
the West has changed in the last few years from large
quantities of for.?mulated pesticides to supplement domestic
production to smaller but increasing amounts of more expen-
sive, highly active ingredients for formulation in the USSR.
In the same vein Teclimashimport* has expressed an interest
in purchasing US licenses and technology for the construction
of a chemical pesticide plant capable of producing at least
1500 tons of a particular .fungicide per year. The Soviets
have also requested a US firm to quote on a turn-key chemical
plant that could produce 5000 tons per year of a trade-name
pesticide, plus the training of the Soviet personnel required
to operate the plant. Another US Firm attempting to sell
a nematocide to the Soviets is resigned to the fact that
if a sale is negotiated they will 'be selling the technology,
not the product.
. The pattern is clear. Iiowevcr, despite their obvious
preference f:or purciiasirg a manufacturing plant rather
than a ready-mixed product it does not appear that the
Soviets ar_e attempting to become self sufficient in pesti--
ciclc production any time soon. On the contrary, it ~?roulcl
be to their advantage to continue to purchase the new
compounds, and/or the technology for their production,
developed through more advanced Western research in this
area. In support of this line of reasoning a major Soviet
study on pesticides, initiated following a period in which
their pesticide production quintupled, taas to determine,
among other things, which pesticides would be produced in
the USSR and which would be purchased abroad.
The present limited variety and knocan pesticide
shortage in the USSR almost assures that the Soviets will
be looking to the US and other Western countries for the
advance3 technological help they need, at least until 1980
and probably beyond. To date, however, although several
negotiations have been reported, no contracts with US firms
for pesticide technology are kno~,m to, have been signed.
Land :~nprovement
Agriculture is possible in one-third of the USSR, but
only abou!: 10 percent is cultivated because the rest lies
in 'areas w:.thout sufficient rainfall. Thus the problem of
developing agriculture i~n the USSR depends on the recla-
mation of land and especially on, irrigation. Drainage, a
* ~ The Soviet, agency,,,#or?mac,~iinorv_ imports;
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less expensive method of: reclamation, has had considerably
less emphasis during the course of the five-year plans.
Hut both irrigation and drainage are no~?~ being brought to
the fore because of lack of alternative opportunities for
a major expansion of cropland.
Primary water sources are da~;uzed reservoirs , rivers ,
aid irrigation ditches. The Soviets have developed an
excellent canal system to channel snow melt and rain from
the mountains into the desert regions. The major dra~aback
to their system is insufficient reservoirs and inadequate
distribution systems on the farms. In fact, the USSR has
a poor record in maintaining drainage and irrigation systems
in operating conditions. For example, in the past the covered
and tiled drainage systems which a.re scheduled to expand
rap.iclly and to account for more than half of 'toi:al drained
acreage in 1975, have been built with inferior file that
collapsed under the caeight of heavy farm machinery. In
irrigated areas about two-fifths of the land is subject to
salinization to some degree. Annual washings carried out
in rotation to lower salinity remain partially ineffective
because of disrepaired and tmcleanec~. collection and drainage
net~oorks. As a result of these and other nrobleTr.a , the
rate of retirement of reclaimed l~uzd from production 'ryas been
high enough in the past to nullify the sizeable acreage
added annually.
The Soviets now have some 30 million acres under
irrigation, compared to 50 million in the US. Five million
acres are under sprinkler systems , about half of which are
central pivot systems manufactured in the USSR under license
from a Nebraska firm, Valmont Industries. The Soviets paid
Valmont $300,000 for its technology several years ago,
and have visited the US plant at least twice since then to
review production techniques. They nova want to negotiate
(1) a licensing agreement on anew add-on system that irri-
gates the corners of a field not covered by the circular
pivot system, and (2) the technol?~gy for a plant to gal-
vanize the steel pipe required fo.c these systems.
The USSR is caorking on a plan up to the year 1990 to
irrigate an additional 50 million acres. In 1974 the
Soviets spent more th~-~n 5 billion rubles on capital
investment for melioration and irrigation; in the next
15-18 years 150 billion rubles will be required to reach
their land reclamation goals. T11?~ USSR Taould like to
fjdlfi].l its goals by Utlll.?.lllg only Soviet resources and
equipment, but the sca,].e of work and technology required
is too great. Consequently they have turned to the
Morrison-Knudsen Company, a US engineering firri with a good
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international reputation, for help. The Soviets have
requested the US firm to submit proposals on a pumping
plant, excavation caork for diversion of water from the
Ob River to the Caspian Sea area, canal lining techniques,
joint].ess pipe, trickler irrigation, and ionic desalination
plants. They are also interested i.n full automation of
the irrigation systems themselves. IL? D9.orrison-Knudsen's
participation is acceptable to the Soviets and if negotiations
on credits in the US are carried out successfully, the US
company will be asked to contribute at increasing technical
levels .
Crop and Livestock Improvement
The development of high-yield, non-lodging varieties
of grain with drought and disease resistance is the major
objective of Soviet plant br~:eders. Interest in improved
varieties of grain has been stimulated by problems encountered
in z?ecent years. There has been a decline in protein and
gluten content, alzd hence in suitability for milling and baking.
At the same time, yields of forage crops have stagnated,
placing the burden of supporting the ~::pandingli~.~estoc}c
program un feed grains. '1'o help achieve their breeding
goals, tiZe Soviets have solicited germ plasm from US agricul-
tural e;:periment stations and US commercial firms. Quantities
of wheat and corn seed have already been purchased and the
Soviets obviously plan to purchase additional seed of US
varieties of these and other crops, viz. soybeans, sorghum,
and alfalfa. In fact they are believed to be close to a
major decision to invest $10 to $12 million in US corn and
sorghum germ plasm, technical assistance in a breeding
program, and seed processing plnnts. The use of US germ
plasm in their breeding programs may increase Soviet yields
of corn and sorgrutn by at least 2U percent.
Feed supplies and an enlightE~ned approach to genetic
progress are ~.:he two biggest prob:~_ems the Soviets face ~?~ith
respect to livestock production. The USSR needs to re-
structure its livestock breeds, especially cattle. Soviet
agriculturists are only beginning to realize the advantages
in feed conversion efficiency and cost reduction which
specializec? breeds and improved technology offer. They
also reaJ.ize that genetic improvement of their livestock
is necessary before they can reach the quality standards
achieved in the US. To narro~v this gap the Soviets are
importing some US breedi.ncr cattle. They believe that US
and Canadian ca~:ti~e ~d?r.~.~?r;tyre adaptable to the Soviet climate
than those of ti?+estern Furope_ .They !lave also dismissed
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the breeds of Argentina and Australia as not being the
.type animals they require. Besa.dcs US beef and dairy
cattle, swine and goats also have been added in recent
years to the existing foreign breeds in Soviet herds.
All will be used in a long-range, (10-15 years) program of
crossbreeding and selection. In addition to these
purchases the Soviets have a number pf agreements with
US cattle industry organizations whereby they receive
livestock technology and methodology to assist them in
their breeding programs.
The majority of the cattle in the Soviet Union are
dual purpose (milk-beef) animals in which productivuiva-
is generally very low. Their quality is roughly eq
lent to that of poor-grade Holstein in the US. ~ They .
suffer severe inbreeding problems and are susceptible to
all the common livestock diseases. The high quality US
and Canadian beef cattle imported in 1971/72 are being
used with these dual purpose cattle in a program of
crossbreeding and selection. Crossbreeding is an .
effective way of improving quality in spite of past
mistakes. ~ Tile Soviets ~?~ill probably continue to import
bulls from the US in support of this breeding program.
They are' also interested in importing semen from US
Holstein bulls. Actually an artificial insemination program
using frozen semen from superior sires is amore rational
approach to the vast crossbreedin~~ program necessary to ?
solve the Soviets chronic meat shortage. The Soviets claim
ti-at by the end of 1980 artificial insemination is to be
extended to the entire livestock program.
Tiie Soviets are also interested in improving pork and
poultry production with US assistance. In their program
to increase meat production, in fact, poultry has top
priority, followed by swine, and .:hen cattle. Although the
Soviets have made impressive advances in poultry breeding
in recent years, their birds are -still poor feed converters.
They have expressed interest in psrchasing large numbers of
US hybrid chicks, and last Fall t'~e Soviet Embassy requested
preliminary US bids on technical assistance in dairy cattlo ,
pigs, sheep, and poultry: ,
Impact of Western Technolo
The transfer of Western agricultural machinery and
technology to .the USSR will have a small impact on agricultural
growL?h. Tzrt ??~rmva t .o ; imports will 1i}:ely remain small
compared with -the size o~ the Soviet t'~gri.s,-altural sector.
More importantly, Soviet agriculture's lag has resulted
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largely from a myriad of organizational and incentive
proglcros, and poor cli.maL?e, as well as inadequate technology.
'1'he :.peed of. agricultural devcl.opmetit through 1980 will
clcpend more on improva.ng the efficiency of existing resources
in agricu].ttire than on acquiring Western technology. The
only area where P7estcrn technology is 19.kcly to have a
significant impact is in mineral fertilizer. Fertilizer
shortages have been a major retardant in grain yields, and
Western chemical equipraent cvill li}:ely be crucial to Soviet
plans to double application rates during the next five
years. IIowever, the impact again will depend upon the
ability of farmers to use efficiently the additional
fertilizer, which they have failed to do in the past.
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