(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000500240010-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 2, 2003
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: January 1, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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INTflO1)UC'J'ION
Moscu;r i:, coir.;,tittci to providing Yndias with the hulk n,'
military rcltti nri1ent it needs to remain the domin"nt? Military
power on' t:ho : tab-continent, and at tc:rii;s India can afford.
W1hi.le t1a ;lr;;+ has Leon unwilling or unclblc to meet some Indian
military requirement:., India has adecjvatc: forci qn exchange to
procure thr. ,o items in the P7e:;t. India also has the capability
to produce much of its own military equipment.
In 1 J!ghani.stan, Moscow will provide all necessary milit.c.ry
equipment fc:,r normal replacement and modernization of the array
and air force at concccsionarY terms. s Afghanistan's im~aart.~ ' cif
..
military ec;ui.pment: are much smaller than either. India or pa]: i.stan.
Moreover, ).J'.ghani.st.an's armed forces, even with an influx of
equipment beyond the scope of rc cent years, would pose l.itt:ic
threat: to Pakistan because of their small size, low-1eve:l of
training and suspect reliability.
Pakistan will continue to receive the core of its army,
n-Ivy and air force equi pmei:t from Chi.nar, mostly as grant aid, but
still will. have to compote in the arms market for the sophii t:icat:.cci
and costly items Poking cannot provide. Arab aid will probably
enable Islamabad to continue to obtain modern rreahans systems.
froit non-Chinese sources despite clwincla.i.ng foreign exchange
resr..rvcs. But even if Pakistan receives considerably more
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foreiq aid than is currci,tly antic;ipatc:v, iL.., i i].itcuy
i.mpo.r.tr, probabi,- wi.!.:'. remain at roughly 0110-h 1, thocc Of
India, whose armed forces are much ].argcr.
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xndia
Inds.. n military i"1^Ortz from the UCSR, ;aa jc1: sup)i~.ie.1:
probably will increase in 1975-76
expected conclusion of oovict-?Indian negotiations covering major
naval combaL?arLt:s, jet fight-Ors and Asi'i aircraft will add to this-
increase (able 2). Large Czech and Polish deals have also been
concluded. Diminishing military procurement. of major
;tie aeons
system i from the West may Compensate for the Cornrnunist increase,
but a steady flow of spare parts and materials for India';
military production projects will continue.
In addition to the rurchase abroad. of military equipment:,
Indian dei'enso inciustrie: will conti.llue to turn out 7 wide. ~7Ra"?.c?tv
of small arras, artillery, ammunition, and support equipment.
Major items produced include the MIG-2:L jet fighter and !:TOLL
air-to- ai.r mi .~,si.le under Soviet liccnse; the SS-21 anti-tank
missile and. Alouct Le III and SA-31.5 helicopters under french
license; and Leander-elms: frigates, Vij :yenta tanks, Cnat fighter:-',
and ))5-798 transports unc]r_?r British liconse.
In the post-?3.976 time-frame, India will have to find a
replacement for its Canberra bomber fleet. Moscow has offered
the TU-16 and TU-22, and in the absence of a suitable P,e stern
canci.id.a1-Lc, New Del.hi. may settle for one of thee. `i'he Vikrant,
7ndi.a'., aircraft carrier, no ]onccr be a credible naval
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Appr
thrr'fli; wi'i:hoiL a now Cft;11C:j:tiL?on of car.:ier-born;: aircraft.
This roquyrcmcnt -1i-,ay gc unfilled. Moscow and have no
suitabio al.rrraf-t and the price tang on the, British Harrier is
prohibitive. India is looking for modern suhrm4 nes and both
l?rancc and S!wrcclen axro potc:nti.al suppli.m s. The Soviet T-G2 is
the most likely candidate fog: the next gonerati.on of Indian
main battle tanks, although local production could fulfill a
large parr. t. of this requircrnca:~t.
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 IPt71::Lr,t an
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Appro
Chii will uorL?il,u,. to cup
,ply th? bull: of P kict;tn's
army, navy, and air for^c equipment.
nut the vrtlue.
of Pakistan's defense ps:ocuremrnt from Prance may exceed that
from China ovc:r the ne-v'- few years duo to t-ho high cost of the
sopIi ticvtcc~ w:~~~p;,,nry
under: nogoLiation
'in& local c efense production projects
The local defense production projects are dependent on
Arab financing which may alrettldy bc: ar?rangcd, but even so Pakistan
does not have the resources to undertake all the 1 ojocts unuc?r
consi.dc.r.L?ttic?an. Any significant output from these projects t;fia.].
be at lerxcft sovrral. yc'c;rs of:C. iJ 1vy reliccnco on French
and tcchnicul. support-.would continue through the 1.970s. Pakister
currc:r,t ly manufacttJ.ro:: small arms and atrnni.mi.tlon and assc:mblcs
Cobra anti--t :nk miss.ics under Getman License; and rlouet:tc III
bcli.copter.:-l u;.,-1cr Pronch .license, but. has failed to ac:hir?ve com-
plete self?-"tlfficiency oven in t;icsc efforts.
1'n the po rL--i97G time-franc, Pakist:ian w- U.1 ncccl. to rc:piacc
its T-59 tar.-):s, probably with the next generation of Chincsc tank:::.
Is].i.I1labad will want to correct its deficiencies in transport ail--
craft, expecia11y light transports, and anti-aircraft arti.].ier.y.
Chin: will. fulfill f.orle of the 1at:tcr r:equircment but has nothinr,;
compcirabic to the ::;r-.lf- propellcd 'ZSU--23-4 in both the Indian and
Afghan :i.nvcnt.orics. Nor is China likely to be able to supply
Tc; lctn:~7J,;:c.1 wilt-.11 a 1.11c.d iuln or high a.lt.i t.udc surf- ec -to-.a i. r. lris::ilc
('01111') to k.he Inc1i i n and Afghan SA--2,,, -.
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1'~ f cI ;?t.'t t t t. r tJ
' fic rr
.
Mo: ~o~~ is uT:,,.,;; "?, to c+~nti:~~:C: w tc . ~.ro~ lc I'.Uu' .,,,~.t
at -rift; unpm-iceclentc+u rote of the 1a5t t~':o
year... Dc].ivorict in 1973 and 1974 wore more than douh1c the
usual love]. ord r:ew and sophisticated tanks, ATT~:;,
and einti-?t:tnk nlisr:i.].c!s wer.c intr.ocluccd.. Although I;ahul ha:;
ma': to a mode ft effort at clivera;ifiratio*I by seeking training
and pos.sib1y some c:gui.pmeni. from Indi.;.% and Egypt, Moscc:~;, ;gill
con':inuo to l:ho Kah:ul.'s piedort.nar:t military supplier. A,!V,,}'. n
has only a minimal capacity for production of small aria;., vrtd
ei`p].osi,vus and. there (1 'Q no known pl iv-, for c::pn nsi.ra1.
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Cii;f, tail :
Cut--tang rg 1`: __tary Sub r y r~+-ooi ?nts
:: i.l].ion
US $
Sup lior
Vca].tac. Se].ccted Tyric:s c,:: 1? uipin
cnt
USSR
40, Tnnks, 7 PC:;, artillery, S
arms
mall
USS11
67 !i7?-8 hciicopters, tank tr
ln j7C~1:tLi`f'
USS11
30 Tanks
Czech
2 10??12 L?-29 Jet 'I:1:ai.n rs
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