THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000500230009-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 9, 2005
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: March 1, 1975
• Content Type: RP

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The South Vietnamese Air Force
Secret
ER RP 75.9
March 1975
CO No 33
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THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE
1. The. South Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) has grown dramatically since
1970 in both numpower and aircraft. The number of' personnel has increased from
36,000 to 62,000, while the inventory of' aircral't has grown from 400 to 1,500.
Despite the numerical growth, nearly one-hall' of VNAF personnel have not reached
satisfactory proficiency levels, and many aircraft types are experiencing low combat
ready rates because of' aging and shortages of' spare parts. The Vietnamese were
trying to alleviate these problems through an aggressive training program, but recent
reduction in US assistance levels have undercut these efforts. VNAF will be doing
well simply to maintain the status quo during fiscal year 1975.
2. An assessment of VNAF's operational capabilities - although also
recently degraded by reduced funding - indicates that VNAF has adequately
supported South Vietnamese (SVN) combat forces thus far in the post-cease-fire
period. It could not, however, meet SVN's tactical and logistic requirements during
a Communist general offensive. This judgment is based on a comparison between
the; level of air support provided by both VNAF and the US Air Force to SVN
ground combat units during the initial phase of' the 1972 Communist Offensive
(April-June) and present VNAF capabilities. At current combat ready rates, we
estimate that attack aircraft are capable of' flying only 601%% of the monthly average
of close air support and interdiction sorties flown by the US Air Force and the
VNAF in April-June 1972. Fixed-wing transports and helicopters are estimated to
be capable of transporting 45% and 60%o, respectively, of the average monthly
tonnage transported to SVN combat units by the US Air Force and the VNAF
during April-June 1972.
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3. This publication provides a general description of the status, organization,
and disposition of' (lie VNAF, as well as a discussion of its training, logistic, and
combat capabilities.
OrganizaIica and Disposition
4. Command and control of the VNAl is exercised by President Thieu,
as Commander in Chief', through the .Joint General Staff (.ICS) and the four military
region (MR) commanders (see Figure I). VNAF is not officially represented within
President
Ministry of National Defense
Joint General Staff
Military Region VNAF Commander
Commanders (4)
Air Headquarters Air Air Air
Divisions (6) Staff Operations Technical Training
Command Logistics Command
Command
the .JGS, but its senior officers serve as advisers to the JGS. Similarly, the air
division commanders advise their respective ARVN commanders in the use of air
assets and respond to the MIZ commander's air support requests. The MIZ
commander controls all air assets within his region, while interregion deployments
of' aircraft must be approved by the JGS.
5. This command and control structure inhibits the flexibility in the use
of' VNAF air assets. For example, in the event of' a Communist offensive, any
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redcploy;ncnt of aircraft among various MRS would regtnr' Saigon's approval --
a costly (Islay to the Sunlit Vietnamese in a rapidly changing Combat sitnaliort.
h. VNAU's organization comprises five major Components, including six air
divisions with 58 squadrons (see Figure 2) -- an Air Operations ('otlllltan(I, an Air
't'echnical Logistics ('otninand (A'I'L('), an Air Training Center, and a headquarters
staff. Fach division has at least two tactical wings complenuenle(I by a nutinlenaiice
VNAF AIR ORDER OF BATTLE Figure 2
Air Divisions (6)
Tactical Wings (15)
Squadrons (58)
Fighter (17)
'T'ransport (2)
Ifclicepter (25)
Liaison (9)
Gunship (I )
Reconnaissance (3)
Special Mission (1)
1st Air Divisio,i
(Da Dang)
2d and 6th Air Divisions
(Nha Trang, Phan Rang,
3d and 5(h .'s r Divisions
(Bien floc, Tan Son Nhut)
4th Air Division
(Can rho)
I'leiku, Phu Cat)
Tactical
Tactical Wings (4)
Tactical Wings (5)
Tactical
Wings (3)
Squadrons (14)
Squadrons(21)
Wings (3)
Squadrons (12)
Fighter (5)
Fighter (5)
Squadrons (II)
Fighter (4)
Helicopter (6)
Transport (2)
Fighter (3)
Helicopter (6)
Liaison (3)
Helicopter (7)
Helicopter (6)
Liaison (2)
Liaison (2)
Liaison (2)
Gunship (1)
Reconnaissance (3)
Sped..! Mission (1)
and supply winand a g base support wing. The Air Operations Command, wider
the supervision of the JGS, manages the daily utilization of aircraft, including the
number of flying hours and type of mission requested b}' the MR commanders.
Management of aircraft supplies, equipment, maintenance, and repair is the
responsibility of the ATLC. The Air Training Center is tasked with implementing
an effective training program for all VNAF personnel. Finally, the VNAF
headquarters staff monitors plans and programs and performs other administrative
functions such as processing personnel and financial records.
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7. Since 1970 the number of assigned VNAF military personnel has
increased from 36,000 to 62,000 and is 95% of the cm-rent authorized level of'
65,000. There are 38,000 personnel - including 3,200 pilots - assigned to the
six air divisions, about 7,000 to the three support commands, 4,000 to the
headquarters staff, and 13,000 in basic training (see Table 1), Despite an
augmentation of 26,000 personnel since 1970, a high percentage of VNAF
personnel -- about one-half -- ;ire in basic or on-the-job training. In addition to
military personnel, there are about 700 VNAF civilian personnel who fill both
clerical and technict:l positions.
Assigned Strength of VNAF Military Personnel
Total 62,000
Air divisions (6) 38,000
Air Operations Command 1,000
Air 'technical Logistics Command 5,000
Air Training Center 1,000
Headquarters staff' 4,000
Basic training 13,000
Inventory and Deployment of Aircraft
8. VNAF's six air divisions have an aircraft inventory (possessed)1 of about
1,500, compared with 400 in 1970, comprising fighters, fixed-wing transports,
helicopters, and special-mission aircraft used for reconnaissance, liaison, and
training. Nearly 1,100 of the aircraft, with 62`%% combat ready,2 fall in three major
categories: fighters, fixed-wing transports, and helicopters. Fighter aircraft (F-5 and
A-37) provide air interdiction and close air suppo~t missions for ground forces
and a minimum air -lefense capability. Fixed-wing transports, prinnrily the C-130,
constitute South Vietnam's logistic lifeline between Saigon and the four military
1. To account for the total number and types of airc.aft, the United States and the SVN have categorized
them according to authorized, assigned, possessed, and combat ready. The number authorized is the maximum
number of aircraft allowed. The number of assigned aircraft includes aircraft in VNAF units which are located
inside as well as outside South Vietnam. The number of possessed aircraft reflects the total in-country inventory
of aircraft and includes those aircraft which are combat ready, down for maintenance, and in storage. The
combat ready categor includes all aircraft combat missions.
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regions and transport large amounts of troops, anumulitikll, and other supplies.
VNAF helicopters (UH-1 and CH-47) offer the MR commander tactical flexibility
and permit. him to resupply combat units in remote areas.
9. On a countrywide basis, fighters and helicopters are deployed about
equally between the northern military regions (MRs I and 2) and the southern
ones (MRs 3 and 4). (For the inventory and deployment of these aircraft by
military region, see Table 2.) The largest portion (42'/,) of fighters, however, is
Inventory and Deployment of fighters, Fixed-Wing Transports,
and Helicopters in South Vietnam as of 21 December 1974
Fighters i
Fixed-Wing
Transports2
Hclicop(ers3
Number
Number
Number
Possessed
Percent
Possessed
Percent
Possessed
Percent
Total
339
100
60
100
663
100
MR 1
64
19
....
....
137
21
MR 2
80
23
....
....
217
33
MR 3
142
42
60
100
208
31
MR 4
53
16
....
....
101
15
1. Including A-37, F5A/130", and grounded A-I aircraft.
2. Including C-I 30 and grounded C-7 aircraft.
3. Including UlI-I and CI-I47 aircraft.
deployed in MR 3. Helicopters are more evenly distributed among the military
regions to support the movement of troops and cargo. In contrast, all fixed-wing
transports are located in MR 3 be,,-;- , it is the principal logistic distribution center.
Both helicopters and transports dL. r SUpplies to 16 major aerial resupply sites
in South '.'ietnam (see the map).
Logistics
10. The ATLC at Bien Hoa Airbase is the primary receiving and requisitioning
center for all VNAF logistic support. The command is responsible for the effective
operation of aircraft repair and rebuilding shops, depot-level overhaul of aircraft,
and movement and coordination of logistic support material.
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Anne
Barbara
Prn,,?~ ?In.n I nu
ow
w.~
Deo Nlai Van -,' --Nguyen Trai
'Oai Loc
South Vietnam Air Resupply Points
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11. Manning levels at the A'I'L.(' have increased significantly over the past
year. A large portion of these personnel, however, have not reached acceptable
proficiency levels and continue to attend I'ornial schools and perform on-the-job
training. Furthermore, manning levels for both officers and NCOs are about 50%
of authorized levels, resulting in critical personnel vacancies in toll and middle
management echelons.
12. In addition to personnel problems, A'I'L.(' operations arc being hampered
by the poor physical condition of aircraft, particularly the ('-130 transports and
CI 1-47 helicopters. These aircraft have been experiencing low combat ready rates
because of corrosion, shortages of spare parts, and insufficient maintenance and
repair space. To offset some of them problems, a limited number of ('-I30
transports and helicopters are scheduled to he reconditioned.
13. Although progress has occurred in moving VNAF toward logistic
self'-sufficiency (some US contractor support was phased out as the Vietnamese
became more proficient), VNA'.' continues to he heavily dependent on US training
and technical support. Prior to the reduction if. the military aid, about 1,700 US
civilian contractor personnel were employed by firms such as Lear Siegler, Inc.,
General Electric, and Parsons, The US personnel performed Iiigbly technical
maintenance and r::pair functions on all types of aircraft and assisted the South
Vietnamese through on-the-job training programs.
14. The cutback in US military aid during FY 1975 will exacerbate VNAF
logistic and training problems (see paragraphs 15-17). Under the new budget the
authorized number of US contract personnel was reduced from 1,700 to 400 --
a reduction VNAF cannot readily absorb. In this environment. VNAF will he doing
well simply to maintain the slams quo.
Training
15. For the pasi several years, VNAF has concentrated on developing a stung
manpower position to accommodate the rapid increase in aircraft inventories and
to replace the eventual loss of skilled US manpower. Most of the formal in-country
training is conducted at the VNAF Air Training Center at Nha Trang Airhase in
MiZ 2, where seven schools have an annual training capacity of 5,500 personnel
(only 3,000 are currently in training). Their programs include instruction in major
aviation courses, including communications and electronics, crew and aerial gunnery,
and pilot training. In addition, line divisions and wings plan and implement their
own training programs on a regular basis.
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i 6. VNAF's accelerated tr;,ining program is emphasizing pilot proficiency and
efficient supply management. Present pilot training Facilities provide for about 60
pilots to be trained annually. Unlike its North Vietnamese counterpart. VNAF has
had no all-weather or aerial combat experience. Consequently, pilots now receive
training in aerial combat tactics with the new F-5E. Training programs also have
bee-l developed to increase the number of skilled supply managers needed to operate
VNAF supply facilities located throughout the country. About 1,000 personnel
are currently in such training.
17. US contractors also train VNAF personnel and serve as a vital supplement
to the above proaranls. They provide training programs to improve VNAF
proficiency in transportation, maintenance, and the management of munitions and
fuels at VNAF bases and depots. During the first half of 1974. about 6,500
personnel actually completed training. Moreover. some VNAF personnel about
1.300 -- are selected each year to attend schools in the United States. Many of
the students are pilots who receive specialized training in key subjects, including
new equipment and weapons systems and aerial combat tactics. The overall VNAF
in-country training objective for 1975, prior to the military aid cutbacks. was to
train about 10.000 personnel. This goal. however, is being revised because of
inadequate support.
Operations
18. Reduced military aid has also had an impact on VNAF operations. During
August 1974 the ARVN Joint General S`aff grounded 224 aircraft consisting of
training. reconnaissance. liaison. gunships. light fixed-wing transports (C-7), and all
A-1 fighters. In addition. the aggregate number of flying hours was revised
downward from 670.000 during FY 1974 to 340.000 during FY 1975. This
reduction in grosss capabilities was subsequently noted in most areas of VNAF
operations. For example, total fighter sorties in the period September through
November dropped 50170 below the monthly average in the cease-fire period.
Although these cutbacks are severe. VNAF has performed reasonably well during
the past few months. albeit at a time when grouni combat activity was either
at a relatively low level or confined to a few areas.
19. During the cease-fire period. there has been a!n average of 310 fighter
aircraft in VNAF's inventory. For the most part. 235 aircraft (76"~) have been
combat ready and have averaged 4.000 total sorties a month. Of the total sorties.
3.000 tactical sorties -- i.e.. air interdiction and close air support - have been flown
per month. or an average of 13 sorties per combat ready aircraft. In comparison.
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during the initial phases oI' the Communists' 1972 offensive (April-.lure), ! 20 (75%)
of VNAF's inventory of' fighters were combat ready, and these aircraft averaged
4,000 tactical sorties a month -- a rate of' 33 sorties per aircraft. The overall
monthly average for US and VNAF fighter aircraft during the same period was
about 12,000 tactical sorties.
20. Owing to improvements in the VNAF logistic system and continued US
assistance, we estimate that VNAF at FY 1974 support levels was capable of'surging
to at least an average of' 30 tactical sorties per rircral't for a minimum of' 30 (lays.
We now believe, however, that this is the absolute maximum level which VNAF
could maintain, and then I'm only a short period. At this rate, fighter aircraft3
would be capable of' flying 7,000 tactical sorties per month, or roughly 60r/, of'
the combined US and VNAF monthly average (luring the April-June 1972 period,
21. For the past year or so, VNAF transport aircraft (C-130 and C-7) met
most SVN troop and logistic requirements throughout the country. Since the
cease-fire, they have transporte(I an average of' 5,000 tons a month in troops and
cargo, compared with a combined US and VNAF monthly average of' 18,000 tons
during April through June 1)72 (see Table 3).
Combat Performance Indicators of VNAF Fixed-Wing
Transports and Helicopters
Thousand Tons per Month
Transports
Surge
Capability
8.0
Post-
Cease-Fire
5.0
Apr-Jun 1972
18.01
C-7
3.0
1.02
N.A.
C-130
5.0
4.0
N.A.
Helicopters
13.0
7.0
9.0
CH-47
5.0
2.0
2.0
Ul-I-1
8.0
5.0
7.0
1. Including US and VNAI transport aircraft.
Through August 1974.
There are 60 transport aircraft -- C-7 and C-130 - in VNAF's inventory;
of the C-130s, 13 (52%) are combat ready. If current combat ready rates are
maintained and the C-7s made operational, we estimate that VNAF fixed-wing
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transport3 could surge to an average of 8,000 tons in troops and cargo (3,000
for the C-7 and 5,000 for the C-130) for a Illirlilllum of 30 days, or only about
45'/0 of' the US and VNAF April-June 1972 level.4 Thus, additional assistance in
terms of personnel and transport aircraft would be required to support SVN combat
forces during a Communist offensive.
23. The helicopter is a highly effective tactical and logistic asset for the MR
commander, providing mobility and a timely resupply capability during combat
operations. VNAF's inventory of 663 helicopters comprises 475 combat ready
aircraft -- 451 UI-I-Is and 24 C1-1-47s -- which could be used to transport troops
and cargo. About 146 UII-Is, however, are assigned to medical evacuation,
command and control, and gunship missions. This leaves a total of' 329 helicopters
(305 UH-ls and 24 CI-1-47s) to perform regular combat missions.
24. VNAF's helicopter combat performance since the cease-fire has been
satisfactory, averaging 45,000 total sorties a month. The combat related sorties,
about 25,000, have carried an average of 7,000 tons a month in troops and cargo,
compared with VNAF's April-June 1972 average of 9,000. Another 10,000 to
12,000 tons a month, however, were lifted by US helicopters in support of' SVN
troops during the same 1972 period, yielding a combined US and VNAF monthly
average of' about 21,000 tons. At current combat ready rates of' about 60'I-, we
estimate that VNAF helicopters could surge for 30 days to an average of 13,000
tons in troops and cargo, or ol,iy about 60%% of the Aprii-June 1972 US and VNAF
monthly average.
25. Although we conclude that VNAF could not meet the air requirements
generated by an all-out Communist offensive, it can support heavy combat activity
for a short duration within each of the military regions. This was shown in the
Communist attacks in 1974 around Ben Cat and Bien I-Ioa in MR 3 and areas
surrounding Da Nang and Hue in MR 1.
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