FOREIGN TRADE DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000500150001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Foreign Trade Developments
Secret
ER FTD 75.1
July 1975
Copy N2 464
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Foreign Trade Developments has been created to provide economic intelligence
in support of tht, Multilateral 'tirade Negotiations. It emphasizes the analysis of
important trade trends and issues, particularly those pertinent to US efforts at
the M'I'N, and provides policyrnakers with up-to-date information on trade
developments.
This first issue is meant to inform readers on current, tonics, stimulate
suggestions for articles in subsequent issues, and generate comments on the format.
Foreign Trade Developments is prepared by the Office of t:conomic Research
(ClA/Ol.ER), but contributions are accepted from
outside the CIA. Comments and queries may be
OER, Multilateral Trade Negotiations Task Force,
other components within or
t
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Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .
Progress at the MTN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Faltering World 'Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
OECD Trade Plcdgc: A Progress Repo; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I I
The Grain Rcsetvc issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Trend in World Trade Volurne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Developed Countries: Trends in Export and Import Prices . . . . . . . . . . G
Developed Countries: Trends in Export and Import Volume . . . . . . . . . 9
Appendixes
A. GAIT Membership and MTN Participants
B. Calendar of MTN and Major Related Trade Meeting
C. Statistical Tables and Charts
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FOREIGN TRADE DEVELOPMENTS
Serious Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) began early in 1975 in the
midst of the most pronounced global recession since World War II. Protectionist
pressures have intensified as the result of shexply rising unemployment rates. The
volume of world trade has plummeted even more deeply than real GNP, with trade
in early 1975 declining to mid-I973 levels. Because of the pervasiveness of the
recession, countries like West Germany and Japan have not been able to depend
on the expansion of exports to help them out of an economic slump, as had been
the case in previous postwar downturns. The trade slump, which began in the
developed world, has now spread to tliv~ LDCs, forcing them to cut back on imports.
This has aggravated existing trade difficulties and has slowed LDC development
efforts. Finally, the quadrupling of international oil prices since mid-1973 has
proved an enormously disruptive clement in the trade picture, involving swings
of tens of billions of dollars in the wealth of nations.
Despite these problems, few countries have introduced major new import
barriers or attempted to stimulate large increases in exports through discriminatory
measures. This attitude reflects the moral suasion of the OECD Trade Pledge --
renewed in May - and the strong apprehensions among policymakers about a
spiraling trade war. In addition, with imports of most industrial countries falling
faster than exports, the need to take corrective measures to overcome deficits has
diminished. The governments of a few countries, nonetheless, have introduced trade
restraints when they believed they had no other alternative, and a number of
countries have introduced subtle and limited trade measures in response to domestic
pressures.
Progress at the MTN so far has not been seriously impeded by the poor
economic clin-ate. Little more than the resolution of procedural questions could
have been expected during the first six months of negotiations. Many of the
negotiating subgroups have now established initial guidelines for discussions. The
question of how the MTN deliberations fit in with discussicns under way at the
OECD, the International Wheat Conference, and other international forums has
also been partly resolved. Most threatening to the progress of negotiations has been
the difference !between the United States and the EC over agricultural matters.
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In recent weeks, new procedural issues have been raised. Many European
governments have indicated a growing concern about thv: handling of LU'C demands
in the MTN, especially now that a number of new consumer/producer conferences
on raw materials and energy problems are to be held. In addition, Paris and Rome
have again raised the problem of how to integrate discussions of international
monetary reform with the trade negotiations.
The most difficult debates lie ahead. Discussions on major substantive issues
are unlikely to bey;in until at least this all, after the United States completes the
public hear'non required by the Trade Act of 1974. The gloomy economic
atmosphere will become more of an obstacle as the M'I'N moves into substantive
matters. Even if recovery begins in late 1975, worldwide unemployment rates will
drop only slightly at best, and international trade will remain in the doldrums
at least through this year and probably into 1976.
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PROGNESS AT THE MTN
The Multilateral Trade Negotiations (M'I'N) -- sponsored by (;A'1-1' and
participated in by 73 of 102 full or de facto GATT members and 17 non-GATT
countries -- are beginning to move f'roni procedural issues into the negotiating phase.
At its February meeting, the Trade Negotiations Committee (i'NC) established six
groups to conduct detailed talks on tariffs, non-tariff measures, sectors, safeguards,
agriculture, and tropical products. All of these groups have met at least once, and
the groups dealing with non-tariff measures and agriculture have set up subgroups
to deal with specific items of interest.
As expected, agriculture has proved the most contentious issue thus far. The
primary difficulty centers around the handling of the agricultural talks. The FC
originally wanted all agricultural negotiations conducted in the agriculture group,
while the United States wanted agricultural issues integrated into the overall
structure of the discussions. An accord was reached in early May when the E'C
acknowledged that agricultural questions could be taken up in other groups in
return for US agreement to negotiations in the agriculture group. The agriculture
group also established negotiating subgroups for grains, treat, and dairy products.
Fundamental differences remain, however, and agreements with the Community
on agricultural questions in forums other than the agriculture group will be difficult
to achieve. In addition, the I:C has shown no indication of being willing to discuss
variable levies, which its members use to restrict agricultural imports.
In contrast, discussions on certain non-tariff measures are going well. The
subgroup on quantitative restrictions has agreed on procedures for bilateral or
multilateral consultations between countries maintaining restrictions and countries
having it trade interest in these restrictions. In addition, the subgroup on product
standards has agreed to Fu=se its work on the draft GATT standards code. A broad
concensus has emerge(! favoring early conclusion of a binding code.
The tariff discussions are moving toward substantive issues. At its last meeting,
the tariff group considered it general approach to the negotiations that would take
account of LDC interests and would improve Generalized System of Preferences
(GSI') schemes. Several delegations have tabled specific tariff reduction formulae,
ranging from linear reduction proposals to harmonization proposals, which would
provide larger cuts of high tariffs. These formulae, along with developed/less
developed country issues, exemptions, and timing of cuts will be taken i:;. later
this -non ,,'h.
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The tropical products group has established a mechanism for the Ll)Cs to
submit request lists to the developed countries for products to be liberalized on
a priority basis. Some agre,:ment.s should be reached before yearend, as the
developed countries are anxious to avoid a confrontation with the Ll)Ca,
particularly during the early stages of the negotiations. A problem could arise if
tie LDCs include many temperate-zone products (such as tobacco and grains) in
their request lists.
Progress has been slower in the safeguards and sector groups. Various studies
are under way, with little substantive progress to show so far.
Some participants want to reach early agreements in the M'I'N. They believe
that rapid progress in selected areas is needed to give impetus to the talks as a
whole. Furthermore, substantive agreements could be used to counteract rising
protectionist pressures growing out of the current world economic situation. The
EC and Japan, however, are less enthusiastic about seeking agreement on a
"mini-package" in early 1976. The EC opposes a specific target date because failure
to meet a deadline would have disruptive consequences, and time pressures could
lead to lower quality negotiations. The Japanese, for their part, stress the difficulty
of achieving balance on concessions in a series of limited agreements.
The volume of world trade turned down in late 1974 and dropped sharply in
the first quarter of 1975 as the recession took its toll. In the second quarter the
decline probably continued, although at a reduced rate. Trade activity has fallen to
the level of mid-1973, in the largest and most pervasive slide since the early I950s.
The economic downturn hit most markets simultaneously.
Even when economic growth does revive, the initizl impact on trade will be
blunted. The slight recovery in domestic demand in the major developed countries
that is expected for the remainder of 1975 can be partly met from existing
inventories. A notice~tbie pickup in foreign sales is improbable before 1976.
This outlook does not augur well for substantial progress in the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations over the short-term. Many negotiators are struggling against
domestic pressures for industry protection. Th:.y can also see that, until demand
picks up, export growth in one country will mean an export decline for another
country. Each negotiator is going to be careful not to weaken his country's
competitive position.
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Trade Trends Trend in World Trado Volume
World trade volume
declined at annual rates of No INDEXi 1y 0 - e0a
in the last quarter of 1974 and
21% in the following 250
quarter--the steepest six-
month drop in recent decades.
This slump was all the more
striking; because it followed L75
eight quarters of unusually
rapid growth. From the third
quarter of' 1972 to the third
quarter of 1974, the volume 200
of' trade grew at an annual rate
of 14`%, compared with the
Ko average of the preceding
12 years. The pace slackened 175
only a little in the first nine
months of' 1974 despite the
c.;onotnic slowdown; volume
continued to expand because 150
speculative buying was fed by
fears of' shortages, expecta-
tions of still-higher prices, and
hopes for an early resurgence 125
of'economic activity.
This anomalous growth
of trade in the first three guar- loo L . , f l I I I , I , , , I I , , . I
ters set the stage for the sharp 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 75
reversal in succeeding guar- 506531 115
tors. With economic activity contracting, firms in many industrial countries built up
excessive inventories of both raw materials and finished goods. The stock overhang
considerably worsened the world trade slump, once it came.
Increases in export prices of the major developed countries, which had hit
annual rates of 40'%o or more in early 1974, have slowed considerably with the
dwindling of trade volume. Prices of many raw materials have fallen sharply since
mid-1974, when the speculative fever began to fade. Moreover, the quadrupling of
oil costs had hkrgely worked its way through the price structure by late 1974.
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DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: Trends in Export and Import Prices
Percont Chanlfo from Procodin0 Qunrtor, Sonsonnlly Adjusted
Imports
/ 11.7 Composite
7.0 0.0 ri.l
' 3.7
1.7 1.9 1.0
I II III IV I
1974 1975
9.0 10.4 11,1 10.1
9,3
6.0 9.5 t
3.8 4.1 4.7
I II III IV I
1974 1975
10.3
Italy
15.0
2,0 11.7 11.7
Japan 17.3 United Kingdom
6.0 7.1
4,0 3.7 5.3
7.9
0.0
2.1 2.9
5.7 5.4 5.2
2.8 36. I 2.4
15.5
United States West Germany
6.6 6.7 6,2
3.4 3.2
1.0
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Although the pass-I:hrough of' reductions in commodity prices took time and many
workers won large wage increases, the rise in export prices in the Big Seven subsided
to annual rates of' 16% in fourth quarter 1974 and 8%, in first quarter 1975.
The continued rise in prices more than offset the decline icy volume in late
1974, pushing the value of world trade to a new high. In the fourth quarter, world
exports reached an annual rate of $900 billion, up 6% from the preceding quarter
and an extraordinary 56`% 1'roin the 1973 average. In first quarter 1975, when
prices increased less than volume fell, the value of trade dropped below an annual
rate of $800 billion.
Developed Countries
The deepening recession in major developed countries is the primary reason
for the recent fall-off in trade. The Big Seven - Canada, France, Italy, Japan,
the United Kingdom, United States, and West Germany - account for nearly half
of world trade. Their combined import volume declined at a 28% annual rate in
first quarter 1975, as economic activity continued its downward course and as
businesses began to draw heavily on their huge inventories instead of buying more
goods.
First-quarter export volume also declined for five of the major countries,
notably West Germany (34% annual rate) and Japan (26%). Exports by the Big
Seven to one another fell at a 25% annual rate, while exports to non-oil LDCs
stagnated for the first time in many years. The drop for the seven countries as
a group was held to a 16% annual rate as the result of gains in sales to OPEC
and Communist nations.
Because import demand fell off more than foreign sales and because terms
of trade improved, the overall trade balance of the Big Seven brightened
considerably in early 1975. Their trade account showed a $7.9 billion surplus in
January-March, compared with a $0.9 billion surplus in fourth quarter 1974 and
a $1.6 billion deficit in the third. Only the United Kingdom and Canada were
in the red. These trends continued in April and May of 1975.
The United States experienced a $2.6 billion swing in its trade account
in the first quarter, to a $2.1 billion surplus, as imports fell 8% and
exports held steady. The trend continued in April-May, when the trade
account showed a $1.6 billion surplus.
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In France, the trade balance shifted in the first quarter from a $600
million deficit to a $400 million surplus. An export drive boosted sales
by $1.3 billion, while slack domestic demand held the rise in imports
to $300 million. The improvement continued in April-May, when France
had an $800 million surplus.
Japan's trade surplus g,.cw slightly, to $2.0 billion, in the first quarter.
Exports declined by 8% and imports by 10%x. A $1.2 billion surplus was
chalked up in April-May.
In West Germany, the quartcriy surplus continued at $5.6 billion in early
1975, with both imports and exports falling sharply.
Italy had its first trade surplus in more than two years - albeit only
$10 million - in January-March. Reduced demand for raw materials
slowed imports, while exports held up well.
Britain's first-quarter trade deficit reached only $1.6 billion, compared
with $3.4 billion in the preceding period. Exports were surprisingly
strong; indeed the United Kingdom was the only country to boost export
volume. Although export volume slumped in April-May, a similar drop
in import volume and an improvement in the terms of trade held the
deficit to $700 million.
Canada moved against the trend in the first quarter; its trade deficit
deepened to $600 million, from $400 million in the preceding period.
Trade of the smaller industrial countries has fared much better than for the
Big Seven. In the first quarter of 1975, exports of the smaller OECD members
increased 5% in value, compared with for the Big Seven. Imports, which
fell in the Big Seven, increased by 3% in these smaller countries. Sweden's trade
was the most dynamic, showing increases of 10% in exports and 16% in imports.
The combined trade deficit of the smaller industrial countries narrowed to
$4 billion, down from $5 billion in the fourth quarter of last year. Australia and
Belgium/Luxembourg accounted for most of this improvement.
The export volume of OPEC members dropped by 11% in the first quarter
because of falling demand for oil and a reduction in the bulging inventories of
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DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: Trends in Export and Import Voirjmo
Porcent Chnngo from Prncodln0 Ounrtor, Sonsonnlly Adlustod
5.4
3.0 Composite A,4, Canada
Expnrrs
1.1
Imports -0.7
-2,2
I 11 III
1974
1
1975
4.9
-6.3
0.0 Franco 1974 1975
11 Iv I
0.4
-2.7-3.0 -3.11 -5.6
-3.5 -3.3 -,4 4,2
IV -.5.4-53
-7.0
3.3
-1.4 -2.7 -2.2 -1.8
k. 1
4.0
22 22
1.3 F,' 1.2 F' ? 1.3 t 1
-0.7 -0.5 Cr:=7:1
-1.6
-4,4
-5.8
West Germany
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0.3
/.5
Italy
Japan United Kingdom
-4.9
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the international companies, Meanwhile, imports continued to rise, although at a
more moderate pace Ihan in 1974. The (WI;(' trade surplus for the quarter fell
by $5 billion, to an estimated $13-1/2 billion.
Other Less Developed Countries
Scattered data suggest that the volume of exports by non-oil LI)Cs has been
declining at an accelerating rate in recent months. Sales of raw materials and such
light manufactures as textiles and electronics have dropped sharply. Imports, which
continued to climb through late 1974, probably have flattened out this year because
of weakening demand and balance-of-payments problems. The combined trade
deficit of non-oil LDCs jumped from about $6 billion in the third quarter of 1974
to an estimated $8-1/2 billion in the first quarter of 1975.
Even though the soft world market for raw materials depressed exports by
Communist countries in early 1975, their demand for foreign goods - especially
machinery and equipment - continued to rise. To finance a widening trade gap,
these countries are drawing on accumulated hard currency earnings and additional
credits.
We expect world trade to be sluggish in the second half of 1975 and in early
1976. The six major foreign countries can expect little economic growth through
the end of this year; recovery thereafter probably will be slower than from other
post-World War 11 recessions. Furthermore, many firms will draw down inventories
of foreign goods rather than step up their purchases in the initial stages of recovery.
Inflation and payments problems are still inhibiting government expansionary
action in France, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Italy. Bonn and Tokyo also
are moving cautiously despite foreign and domestic pressures to reflate. Reaiistically
or not, most governments appear to be waiting for others - particularly the United
States - to initiate expansionary measures that will prod their recovery.
OPEC and Communist countries are the only markets fairly sure to expand
in coming months. In 1975, OPEC imports are expected to grow by one-third
in volume and one-half in value. The import volume of Communist countries will
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rise moderately. Because these nations account fur only ahont 15% of world
imports, (lie expected Incicilse ill their imports will have only a small effect im
the level of world trade. 25X1
OECD TRADE PLEDGE: A PROGRESS REPORT
At the ministerial meeting in May, OF( l) Countries pledged for another year
to refrain from taking artificial measures to improve current account balances at
the expense of other nations. The negotiations leading up to the signing were
characterized by much wrangling over the obligations and recent actions of member
countries. The British, in particular, took the occasion to assail countries with
payments surpluses ror not refiating enough to sustain international trade.
Agreement nonetheie:;a was possible because most governments are acutely aware
of the dangers of a trade war. Discriminatory measures to improve trade balances
probably will continue to be taken only as a last resort.
Since April 1974, several governments have taken steps - reluctantly - to
control imports or expand exports. These moves were moderate, considering the
change in trade balances that followed the huge price increase for oil. Of the 24
countries that signed the pledge in May 1974, only Italy, Iceland, and Finland
have taken broad measures to correct payments problems; and Italy and Iceland
acted a few weeks before signing the pledge. Rome responded to rapid deterioration
in the balance of payments by "Wring 50X, six-month deposits on nearly half
of imports. This restriction was gradually reduced in scope and then removed on
31 March 1975. iccland required 2517o three-month deposits on about 60% of its
imports. The restriction was lifted at the end of 1974. In March 1975, Helsinki
imposed a deposit requirement of 151% to 30'I% on about half of all imports. This
scheme is scheduled to remain in effect fog one "car.
Other countries have taken more limited measures to hold down imports.
Australia Concerned about the evaporation of the trade surplus, Canberra
has introduced higher tariffs or quotas on 20 classes of goods since
December 1974. Products affected include steel sheets, footwear,
clothing, and appliances. Imports of the controlled items amounted to
$1 billion, or 9% of total imports, in 1974. Action on other categories
of imports stir is under consideration.
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turkey' In Febrrtaty, Ankaua limited itrtports Roar the United Kingdom
in response to I,o-ndoll's cur) on imports of 'T'urkish cotton yarn.
Franey In late March 1975, Paris banned the import of inexpensive Italian
wines to protect the domestic industry, The ban was lifted throe weeks
later, when the Ia' granted the French a $t-U million subsidy to turn
their excess wine into industrial alcohol.
New Zealand The government recently announced that the number of
licenses granted for imports of automobiles, textiles, tires, and glassware
will he reduced, starting I July. Italance-ol'-payments difficulties forced
Wellington to borrow from the IMF last year.
Canada Ottawa has just informed the United States that it plans to
shift to fixed quotas to slow imports of US eggs and turkeys instead
of intposinl! restrictions only when domestic prices fall below target.
Import monitoring also has picked trp. To cite lust a few examples, London.
Tokyo, and Ottawa are closely watching imports of textiles and various other
products; Canberra is carefully checking imports of selected products not on its
current list of controlled items; and the LU Commission is keeping a running record
of imports of steel and several consumer goods. Not a trade restriction in itself',
import monitoring is often used to encourage exporters to agree to "voluntary
restraints" in place of formal controls.
Countries that have enacted import restrictions defend their moves by asserting
that the actions were taken in response to domestic problems. As justification,
they cite GATT rules - specifically Article 19, which permits import restrictions
to protect domestic industries or to help correct balance-of-payments difficulties.
In addition, a number of countries have tried to improve trade balances or
accommodate influential domestic groups by stimulating exports, directly or
indirectly.
France In early 1975, Paris increased its credit subsidy for
export-oriented investment by 75%. This measure could assist more than
$2 billion worth of investment by small and medium-sized firms.
United Kingdom In March, London introduced an insurance scheme that
will help to keep exporters' planned profits from being eaten tip by cost
increases. Exporters selling on credit will be reimbursed for 85% of cost
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increases that average more than H y"'(1, bill less than 2(Y/% annually over
the period of' the export contract. ('ash sales are protected for r!O% of
losses, and the upper limit on cost increases is 25`10. Contracts must extend
over at lr:! two years and be valued at more than $4.7 million. London
estimates that (lie scheme will ever about 5'y,% of exhorts. The government
will also provide about $235 million in investment funds to
export-oriented industries.
Sivlizwland In April the Swiss National Dank persuaded commercial
banks to provide prel'erentis;I export credit for the watch, textile, and
shoe industries.
Euanpean Community On I June the I:(' Commission began subsidizing
chicken exports to selected markets.
Prospects for the Second Year
The OECD pledge probably will be honored at least as well in its second
year as in the first. In general, governments should be tinder less pressure titan
before to improve trade balances through broad restrictive actions. Portugal, an
exception, refused to sign the trade pledge this year. A few days later, Liston
introduced import surtaxes ranging as high as 30';(, on a wide variety of goods.
Although broad restrictions on impot is should be less in evidence during the
second year of the pledge, various governments no doubt will continue to appease
powerful domestic interests through selective import restraints or subtle means of
export promotion. Japan is considering measures designed to promote exports of
machinery and equipment to LDCs. Under the program, Tokyo would allow
exporters a 25% tax break on exports of investment goods valued at more then
$30 million. In addition, Tokyo and Ottawa are tinder pressure from business
interests to adept a British-style insurance scheme to give exporters some protection
against increases in domestic costs. 25X1
Recent world food shortages and precariously low grain stocks have led to
demands for an international grain reserve system. Governments differ sharply on
the use of such reserves, their location, their financing, the mechanism for release,
and the quantity and kinds of grains to be included.
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At the UN World food ('onl'erence (WI'(') in (tome last November, general
resolutions were passed calling Ior:
? Voluntary adoption of national policies to iuaintaha a minimum world
level of basic food stocks.
? An improved system for gathering and disseminating inl'orniation on the
world P- situation.
? Expansion and coordination of assistance to developing countries so that
they could participate more effectively in the system.
The United States initiated efforts to develop a reserve agreement in the
11-nmember International Wheat Council (IWC), which represents major grain
exporters and importers - including the USSR. The IWC working group took up
discussions it. February and May on reserves; another meeting is scheduled for
July. The European Community (EC) was uncooperative at the February and May
meetingn, contending that any reserve scheme must include price stabilization and
that these should he agreed upon only in the MTN. The IEEC did agree to discuss
the concept of reserves under the IWC. but only if discussions on grain proceed
simultaneously in the MTN Agricultural Group at Geneva. No decision has been
reached on how to integrate the results of the MTN and IWC negotiations.
The procedural debate has been temporarily capered over by having the grain
reserves issue discussed in all three interested organizations - the FAO, the IWC,
and the grains subgroup established under the Agriculture Group of the MTN.
While the debate has been moving forward on procedural issues, most of the
principal participants have been re-examining their substantive views on
international grain reserves and firming up their negotiating positions.
The preliminary US proposal, set forward at the February IWC meetings, calls
for developing an international reserve of up to 60 million tons of grains (including
rice and feedgrains) not counting pipeline or working stocks. This global target -
the size of which is still under discussion - would be divided into national stocks
to be held by participating countries and to be managed according to agreed
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procedures. Food aid scheduled under existing or future agrrentensss would Ilot
be included. No part of Ile reserve would he designated Ior "emergency" use;
r.ingenunl.
instead, a priority Taint fur additional food aid could he part of any III
Grain would he released or accumulated during any one year depending on the
volume change in world grain output as projected in November of that year. 'thus,
price would not trigger changes in the size oI' the reserve, Although, eegel,% ppar!bus,
prices would he more s:;rhlc under a reserve system, that is not the staled objective
of the LIS Proposal. The agreetneut would include specific reserve targets for all
participants, guidelines for achieving these targets and I'or release and replenishment
of reserves, and a system of information exchange and consultation among all
participants.
The European Communiti,
The I?C favors a national system of grain reserves. 't'hrough the (tn'I"I'
Secretariat, the ('o;nmission has said dual, while it does not intend to liberalize
its grain trading system, it is willing to assume responsibility for "comparatively
large" grain reserves. The Commission believes that prices must he used to trigger
changes in stocks and has also insisted that any concessions in this area must he
made in the M'I'N. So far, the EC has presented a united front on this issue. The
French are calling the shots and the others have not presented dissenting views.
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Secret
Less Developed C otinlrles
In general, the LI)C's support building international grain reserves, including
wheat, rice, and coarse grains. They want the UN and FAO to assume leadership.
Individual LUCs exhibit a variety of attitudes, however, on how large reserves should
be and how they should be built and operated.
Bangladesh formally proposed establisliint; a World Food Security Council
under the UN General Assembly and a (non-financial) World Food Bank
to maintain emergency and food aid reserves at strategic points.
Alerico also formally proposed to the WFC in Rome that a separate new
world food bank be created, with all members contributing what they
can. The new organ would be administered democratically by a council
representing developed and less developed countries.
Brazil prefers that reserves be used strictly for emergencies and spot to
control price. Brazilian leaders are afraid that politics may influence the
management of any new reserves management.
Israel plans to support, in principle, measures to establish world food
reserves and an international food security agreement but is not able
to contribute to it.
Pakistan, as a deficit country, says it cannot afford to set aside part of
its wheat production for reserves so long as it is a net importer.
Venezuela supports the idea of a food reserve but does not favor creating
new food organizations.
Zaire, which also does not want new institutions, is ready to support
ad hoc initiatives to get coordinated action on food problems.
16
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JULIIII
The USSR unexpectedly surm-unced at the beginning of the May IW(' meeting
that it favored negotiating a new 1970 wheat agreement to include price and stock
provisions. In effect, this counters (IS efforts to eliminate price as a (rigger and
also undercuts the I:(' attempt to deny the IW(' a role in a stock system and
place it solely under MTN. The USSR does not participate in tine MTN. Soviet
officials had been only observers at the February IWC wetting. Moscow has also
intficaled that it wanted (lie UN to handle reserves, although it preferred commodity
agreements, slate owi?ctl reserves, and price stability.
The People's Republic of China is not represented in any of the forums. Peking
refused an invitation to the London meeting and expressed doubt that a reasonable
food reserve system could be devised. Besides the problem of infringement on
national sovereignty, the Chinese see problems with financing (lie reserves and with
the power that a reserve system would give food exporters over tile market.
International Organizations
Even before the IWC, the FAO Secretariat had estimated that a "safe" world
carryover of all types of grains would be 230 million tons, including working stocks
and food aid requirements. The FAO Director General proposed that the
composition and location of the stocks he determined by governments during
regular intergovernmental consultation. For the UN to deal with emergencies, lie
recommended a reserve containing 500,000 tons of cereals and other foods be
created and maintained by developed countries, with a portion prelocated in areas
of need. Ile also proposed that donor countries agree to long-term food aid --
at least 10 million tons annually arranged three years in advance, with an agreed
share channeled through the World Food Program. The FAO plan is vague on the
role that price would play -- nations holding reserves are to make "supplies available
for export at reasonable terms" in periods of acute shortage.
The UN Trade and Development Organization (UNCTAD) at its meeting in
Geneva in February emphasized the urgent need to build buffer stocks of at least
20 major raw materials. UNCTAD proposes that 36 million tons of wheat and
rice should be held in stockpiles. Financing of the stocks should be through a
common fund supported by both exporting and importing countries. The schemes
would operate like international commodity arrangements, with special
consideration given to protecting the developing countries. Two more UNCTAD
meetings are planned for this year on commodity issues, and grain reserves are
likely to be discussed.
17
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Secret
Uespile common 1ealures in the various proposals, ncgoliatinlt, a u-tiilled
agreement suitable to all will be most difficult. The United States, for example,
seems isolated on its proposal that the Irigger mechanism for accumulating reserves
not be linked to price. Most countries view price stabilization as a primary goal.
US proposals to collect and exchange information on a global basis also met with
serious objection front many countries. The adoption o1' the I:(' proposal to discuss
grain reserves in the M'I'N could result in a long delay in implementing t, scheme
and will place an additional obstacle in the way of attempts to resolve US-I:C
differences over hov. to negotiate agricultural trade at the MTN. Although the
FAO plan is liked by many observers, the organization is handicapped by the lack
of Soviet and Chinese membership, its cumbersome deliberating procedures, and
the diverse aims of the numerous FAO members.
In sum, a US-I:(' compromise is likely to I'otm the nucleus for any general
agreement. Other countries and organizations have diverse stands on the issue.
Nonetheless, other important countries, with the exception of the USSR and China,
will likely accept whatever plan the United States and the I:C agree upon, so long
as price is an input. The USSR and China almost certainly will not participate
in any tightly controlled international reserve plan.
18
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le
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
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Secret
International Tin Agreement
Members of the International Tin Council on 20 June reached a compromise
on the key issue of financing buffer stocks and signed an agreement replacing the
present 5-year pact on 1 July 1976. Under the new agreement, the compulsory
buffer sock contribution of producer countries remains at 20,000 tons - about
10% of world consumption. If additional stockpiling is needed to support prices,
the consumer members will be asked to finance the purchase of up to 20,000
tons more. Consumers previously were under no oblintion contribute, although
the Netherlands and France did so voluntarily. 25X1
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OPEC Current Account Balance in 1975
OPEC states had an estimated current account surplus of $10 billio in the
first quarter of 1975. Tile surplus is expected to remain at $10 billion in the
second quarter and then edge up in the third and fourth quarters. For the full
year, the countries should have a surplus of $45 billion, compared with $71 billion
in 1974. Since lags in actual oil receipts will not be significant in 1975, the OPEC
investable surplus also is expected to amount to $45 billion, down from $58 billion
last year. By the end of 1975, the foreign reserves of OPEC countries probably
will exceed $1 10 billion.
OPEC Current Account
1974
Projected
1975
Preliminary
1st Qtr 1975
Trade balance
Exports (f
o
b
)
84.3
5-,.g
16.
.
.
.
Oil
119.8
110.9
3
26
3
Non-oil
113.9
103.81
.
24.6
Im
orts
f
59
7.1
1
7
p
(
.o.b.)
Net services and private tra
f
35.5
54.0
.
12.6
ns
ers
Frei
ht
d
-9.3
-9.1
-2
2
g
an
insurance
-4.3
-6
5
.
Investment income
.
-1.5
Other
4.1
7.7
1.7
Grants
-9.1
-10.3
-2.4
Current
4.2
-2.6
5
-1
account balance
Adju
t
f
70.8
45.2
.
1
s
ment
or lags in oil receipts
Investable surplus
-12.7
Ne .
1.3
1.3
58.1
45.2
11.3
1. If oil prices arc raised in the fourth
crease significantly until 1976. quarter, the value of exports will go up but payments will not in-
.
2. Including military items.
We estimate that OPEC export earnings will slip by 7% in 1975, mainly because
the global recession has reduced the demand for oil. At the same time, import
expenditures are expected to rise by 52%, compared with the 73% gain in 1974.
This slowdown is fully attributable to the easing in inflation; growth in import
vol
i
ume
s projected to continue at about 35% annually.
22
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APPENDIX A
GATT MEMBERSHIP AND MTN PARTICIPANTS
1. GATT Members
A. Contracting Parties to the GATT (83)
Argentina
*Guyana
Pakistan
Australia
Haiti
Peru
Austria
Hungary
Poland
Bangladesh
Iceland
Portugal
*Barbados
India
*Rhodesia
Belgium
Indonesia
Romania
BrIzil
Ireland
*Rwanda
Burma
Israel
Senegal
*Burundi
Italy
*Sierra Lone
*Cameroon
Ivory Coast
Singapore
Canada
Jamaica
South Africa
*Central African Republic
Japan
Spain
*Chad
Kenya
Sri Lanka
Chiie
Korea,
Sweden
Congo
Republic of
Switzerland
Cuba
*Kuwait
Tanzania
*Cyprus
Luxembourg
Togo
Czechoslovakia
Madagascar
Trinidad and Tobago
Dahomey
Malawi
Turkey
Denmark
Malaysia
Uganda
Dominican Republic
*Malta
United Kingdom
Egypt
*Mauritania
United States
Finland
Mauritius
*Upper Volta
France
Netherlands
Uruguay
Gabon
Now Zealand
Yugoslavia
*Gambia
Nicaragua
Zaire
Germany, Federal Republic of *Niger
Ghana Nigeria
Greece Norway
B. Acceded provisionally (countries which, while accepting GATT membership, do not
apply all the provisions of GATT) (2)
Philippines Tunisia
C. De facto Members (countries which apply the GATT rules but are not formal
members of the Agreement) (17)
Algeria
*Grenada
Swaziland
*Bahamas
*Khmer Republic
*Tonga
*Bahrein
*Lesotho
*United Arab Emirates
Botswana
*Maldives
*Yemen, People's
*Equatorial Guinea
*Mali
Democratic Republic of
*Fiji
*Qatar
Zambia
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11. Non?GATTCountries Participating in (lie MTN (17)
Bolivia
Bulgaria
Colombia
Costa Rica
Ecuador
El Salvador
Ethiopia
Guatemala
Honduras
Iran
Iraq
Mexico
Panama
Sudan
Thr.iland
Vr nezuela
Vietnam
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7.8 July 1975
(Geneva)
9 July 1975
(Geneva)
15 July 1975
(Geneva)
28.30 July 1975
(London)
20 October 1975
(Geneva)
MTN: Tariffs Group
MTN; Agriculture Group
MTN: Trade Negotiations
Committee (TNC)
International Wheat Council
(IWC); Preparatory Group
MTN: Tropical Products
Group
The'I'ariffa (Troup will continue discus-
sions on it tariff-cutting formula
and other technical aspects of the
negotiations.
The Agriculture Group will review pro-
gress made In three subgroups and con-
sider establishing additional subgroups.
The TNC will review the work of the
uegotiat!ng groups and establish nego-
tiating guidelines for the next few
months.
Members will hold the third round of
talks on an international grain re-
serve scheme.
The Tropical Products Group will con-
sider requests from LDCs for the in.
elusion of particular products in the
negotiations.
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World Trade
Developed Countries: Direction of Trade
Developed Countries: Trade by Major Commodity Groups
Developed Countries: Exports to OPEC
Market Shares of OPEC Imports, 1974
Value of Foreign Trade
Volume of Foreign Trade
Foreign Trade Prices in US S
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IIIIIIon US 16
1965 1974) 1971 1972 6973 197.1
Export% (f.ll.I).)
World .................... . . INS 31.1 351 418 579 HIII
United States ............. 2H .13 44 50 71 1111
Cnaada .................. H 17 is 21 2)4 33
Jllpnu .................... 11 111 24 211 37 fib
I:ur';pt'nn Community ..... 16.5 113 IN 1555 212 2711
United Kingdom ........ II 11) 22 24 :11 39
Franc(.e ................. 10 IN 21 27 37 411
West (lrrmnny'.......... is :11 :311 ?17 69 H1)
Italy ................... 7 1:3 15 11) 22 30
Other developed........... 2' 31 31) 416 111 83
Lens developod............ :Ill 51 11'2 73 109 220
OPEC ................. 10 16 22 211 34 120
Other .................. 25 :114 413 ?18 75 1116
7.1
Communist ............... 22 :11 36 ?1' 59
World ...................... Ilit) 331) :367 -132 581) 857
United Stales ............. 2:3 -12 48 59 71 16H
Canada .................. 11 1.1 17 20 25 35
Jnpnn .................... H Ill 20 2.1 :39 (12
European Community..... 61) 117 130 155 246 2113
United Kingdom ........ 16 22 2.1 29 39 55
France ................. IO 19 21 27 :3H 5:3
West (4ernunv.......... is 30 34 40 55 69
Italy ............ ...... 7 15 16 11) 2H 41
Other developed........... 30 ?16 50 56 71) 106
Lens developed ............ :17 57 6.1 72 117 167
OPEC ................. 6 10 11 1:3 IH .10
Other .................. 30 47 53 58 71) 127
Communist ............... 24 36 3H 46 61 85
Because of rounding, components Inny not add to the totals shown.
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 Ilr?lrlnpvii ('oualNrn; IIIr,'cII1111 of'It .Is
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I:tpnllrToo (Ln.h.) Impnlll 1'rnal (r.l.f.)
(llhrr Illhcr
MNJnr Ilrrrl? (1(hrr ('nnl? Major Ile1r1. tllhrr 1'nm?
wflrldI lbllnIf$rM aped 111'1:1' 1,111'11 nnudal l1'orld I'll unlrlrs uIll. d 111'1:1' 1111'1 nnmla(
I U'i
I?I Oil , 7)11 111,11711 :1,19111 I,1,1) 7211 ,1,115!1 11, 1511 2,17:1 I .111111 '7,111) ..',11
II (11. _'7,%411: 11,7111 , 137 1 ,1 11, 74.1 7411 2'i ,1140 1:1,'7111 1,77, :1,111:1 11,11,11 21,1
:Ill lilt. 2:1,3117 111 3,11111 1,'7)111 11,1111 1411 19,217 1:1,057 1,1)71 I, 1711 7, 1711 I I
till Qtr 27,135 12,711:1 1,72) 7,1129 Is:) 19:1.15 11,7111 :1,11:1:1 I, 147 7,110 171
1117:1
lo Qtr 1)11 11, 11)1 1,414 2, 1,25 7, 172 111$ 211,2711 I2,M47 1,551 1,757 .7,717 1))11
VIII IIII II
1117
Ill, :117 1,11111 11711 711J I 11114 ,77, 1:1,11:11 1,:1))0 1,7211 :1,701) :1,1,11 1153
2dOil 1:1,711 bill, 2,1111:) 1,151 1,11211 1)2"1 Ill. i':fr 71,1:1:1 I,H111 I,11a.4 1,11:111 N117
:1.1 (tr. 11,1)7 I 51112 !,1110 I , I,3 ,,III I 1121 1.11, 17-1 1,524 I,.419 1,7:17 :1,.'771; 502
IIhQI 111,:112 7,21,1 2,:111) 1,4111 5 ,)1511 1,117 1,,734 1,7111 1,55)1 .1,311 2,11114 $21
11175
Iel Of I. . !)90 1 91411 1 , 7112 I , H7 1 :1, 0111 1 ,:)1111 1 1, 1)) 1,2117 1 ,7115 ?115 1, 1)11 777
... .... ...... 12,, '
W-t Ih'rmaur
11171
Iel Qtr ... .... ....... 111,135 7,11)1) $,71:1 71111 2,1133 1,11111 17,117) ,,:"111 7,INi_' 1,597 1,11115 11:17
2d(11r........ .....,.., 22,91:1 5,51(1 11,:1)111 dill 2,172 1,1111 17,112, 11,221 11,7111) 2,1:1 I, 117, $12
3d(11r ................. 21,:199 7.350 9,:l))6 10711 -,:1'1:1 1500 17,121 5,1111 11,I10 2,1$1 2,))33 5211
It l (Itr ......... ...... 21,21)11 7,7:14 11),1:11) I,I.75 2, 2,71111 I5,$II 11,:171 7,211 2,152 2,1117 11111
11177
1st Q .................. 21,51 t 19,111111
I'm two,
11171
1st (11r ................. 11), 102 1,721 1,1!11 551 1,4Ill 1211 12,17$ 5,21111 3,3311 1,711, 1,.,111 :111
2d(jtr. .. II,MI8 5,11l1 1.1174 list I,.157 1:12 1:1,111;1 :1,0111 2,11111 1,11.111 :171
3d (1Ir ................. 111,1103 1,511) :1,5,9 751) 111115 1114 12,97$ ,,31$ :1,2111 2,251 1,101:) IIIO
Its lilt ................ 12,711 5,170 1,11.1 (Hi:) I511'2 5:11 520 :1,1),11 :1,1129 2,37:1 1,724 131
11175
1st Qtr ................. 1:1, 1111 .... .... .... ... I I, 1711
I' nli wI I\ I I I i11111111
1117 1
1st QIr.... 4,1911 1 :1,1)23 101 1,259 22117 12,175 I,111 1,0711 1,71112 1,711,; 395
2d Qlr . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1(1,1112 3,11611 1,7111 11115 1,1111 259 11,5113 4,$01) 1,111)11 2,2217 2,310 172
3d (Itr ................. 111,11115 1,11311 1,2$I) 7113 1,11$2 :1111 13,715 1,7111 1,111)1 I,$111 1,224 172
Its tifr ............ I)), 1111 :1,(1411 I,11(12 7911 1,117:1 :1:17 11,117 I,Ml))) 1,$5:1 2,11111) 1.507 ,117
11175
Ist lilt ................. 111,711:1 3,107 1.21111 1176 2,1:19 :11111 13,9711 1,11:11) 11 2 711 1,21')1 :357
Italy
107)
1.st (Itr ................. 1''715 1,112$ 1,11'111 I10 $11 :11:1 11,275 1,121, 1,725 I, 8119 1,1131) 1$7
2,11 j 7.25S :I, Ito 1,1)22 .1211 1,1)11:1 $113 111,37)1 1,711$ 1,7511 2,3$)) 1,101 I1$
141 QIr ................. 5,'222 :1,11110 2,121 1195 I,_20$ 11)11 1)1,922 3,1151 I,SI, 2,)132 1,1111 5,1
4th Qtr ................ H?7211 :1,1151) 2,01, 7!11 1,582 1711 111,,0 1 4.,:111 1,!1'41 2,352 1,179 17$
11)75
1st Qtr ................. 5,1193 .... 11,11:11 .... .... .... ....
('stlodo
11)71
1st Qtr ................. 7,1110 (1,1117 1)12 81 411 Its 7,1111 5,9412 337 152 3911 fill
2d Qtr ................. 5, 11)1 7,11!1 521 11) 1 ,5)12 21$ $,1111 11,1112 IIli list slit 51;
.1d (11r ................. 8,' 13 11,1152 7111 171 7112 219 5,211$ 11,500 17)1 111)1 535 1111
415 Qlr ................ 14,751 7,27)1 571 155 5111 125 11,2$I 7,1'23 ,51 7:11 ,117 lit;
11)7,1
let Qtr ................. 7, 1114 .... .... .... .... ... 7,113,
Other O('E I
11)71
1st Qtr ................. 30,1147 111,331 9,5311 IIIII) 2,771 1,4170 :1:1, 1111 111,111$ 8,1173 2, 55, .775 1
241 (Itr ................. 31{,11(1 15.03$ 1)1,1111:) 1.11$) 3,603 1,711!1 4171!1 22,707 1)1.511 1,333 2,15I; 1,11711
3d Qtr. . . . . - ........ 31,1211 ($,277 11,71)1 1,1711 3,3311 1,75$ 37,975 21,831 11,522 2,1:10 2.3611 1.521;
'It5 Qtr ................ 38.362 211,157 11.25'2 1,$51 1,111$ 1,7111 411,112:1 23,231 10,1151 I,:1111 2,1151 2,1)75
'I'otnl OECD
11171
tat Qtr ................. 1111,0101 51,7:0 32,331 5,141 18,720 5,035 1'25,$!17 511,1142 24,257 111.01111 17,621 4,2511
2d Qtr ................. 135,115(1 112,655 :17,721 6,65:i 2'2,522 6,072 151,503 70,716 3'2,131 22,7111 21,1211 1 ,1171
3d Qtr ................. 131,61)5 511,201 35,1154 7,7:30 2'2,073 6,350 115,1181 (17,011 311,553 20,1IN1 20,951 5,151)
?III. Qtr ................ 1411,760 (11,11511 31),655 51,7(1!) 21,778 7,71111 152,255 71,517 31,1(12 20,5111 2)1,51)1 5?5.111
Because of thr exclusion of "unspecified" bade, components may not add to the totals shown. Data tire unadjusted.
s Excluding Gabon.
29
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 Machinery Other Machinery Other
Raw and Mann- Raw and Mana-
Total Food Materials Fuels Equipment factures Total Food Materials Fuels Equipment factures
Total of seven countries
1974
1st qtr .....................
83,059
8,551
7,520
3.240
31.763
33,955
92,451
12.30.5
11.407
20.:319
75,399
3:'.02I
2d Qtr .....................
99,516
8,736
8,354
4,53S
37.040
4J,S7S
I09,S44
13.427
13.345
26.659
21.332
3.7.04
3d Qtr .....................
97,569
8,482
7,394
4,672
35.077
41,944
107,106
12.265
12.474
27.610
19.139
3.5.61
4th Qtr ....................
108,398
9,862
S,04S
4,933
11,660
43.593
111,632
14,273
11,534
25.201
21.457
35.54.-
Total ......................
390,572
35,632
31,316
17,352
145,539
160.703
421,033
52,270
49,054
102.519
50.327
136,53'_
United States
1974
lss Qtr .....................
22,761
3,569
3,232
4S4
S.626
6.550
22,659
2.946
1.536
5.110
6.0_'3
7.0 4
2d Qtr .....................
25.2190
3,653
3,431
813
9.722
7,701
27,656
3.012
I.926
7.151
6.972
5. 59.5
3d Qtr .....................
23,367
3,373
2,555
976
8.969
7,494
25.527
2.745
1.937
7.602
6,463
9.757
4th Qtr ....................
27,135
4,345
3,193
1,166
10,SSI
7.550
29,32S
2,>,70
1.S42
7,463
6,607
10.546
Total ......................
98,553
15,241
12,381
3,439
3S,197
29,:.'93
103.230
11.576
7.261
27.356
26.063
3.5.972
1975
Ist Qtr .....................
27,164
4,588
3,124
1.094
7,945
10,410
26,279
2.36.5
1.622
7.290
6.165
5.631
Japan
1974
lst Qtr .....................
10,317
203
245
28
4.999
4,540
13.934
1.757
3..x56
4.570
1.047
2.644
2d Qtr .....................
13.741
200
2S2
35
6,496
6,7215
16,776
2,177
4.025
6,462
1.121
2.955
3d Qtr .....................
14,971
217
327
74
6,496
7.857
15.472
1.573
3.526
6,5.5.5
1.c s
2.512
4th Qtr ....................
16,542
230
344
116
7.436
8,416
15.733
2,335
3.302
7.10.1
1.144
1.x7,2
Total ......................
55,571
852
1.198
252
25,427
27.S42
61,920
5.172
14.441
24.992
4.31;
9.9'%7
1975
Ist Qtr .....................
12,956
77
225
79
6,04S
6,557
14,429
2.24S
3.033
6.377
1.0.36
1.71.3
West Germany
1974
I
20,138
802
644
653
8,694
9.345
13.074
2.005
1.903
2.917
2.IS0
5.06 6
2d Qtr .....................
22,813
S22
752
744
9,716
10,779
17.925
2,440
2,300
3.410
2.546
5.92,
3d Qtr .....................
21,988
799
700
935
S,S26
10,S2S
17,424
2,049
2.165
3.515
2.252
7.413
4th Qtr ....................
24,209
869
689
S46
10,736
11,069
IS.S44
2.546
2.235
3.505
2.440
7..59-2
Total ......................
89.148
3,292
2,785
3,07S
37,972
42,021
69.267
9.043
5.627
13.3.50
10.245
25.1-4143
1975
Jan ........................
7,341
339
230
313
3,144
3,315
5,749
79S
729
1.006
573
2.341
Approved For Release 2008/11/13: CIA-RDP86T00608R000500150001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/11/13: CIA-RDP86T00608R000500150001-1
France
1974
lst Qtr .....................
10,402
1,905
679
267
2,720
4.S2s
12.155
1.i1
1.27-3
2.327
2.323
5. ?
2d Qtr .....................
I1,84S
1.569
774
356
3,186
5.663
13.954
1,187
1.473
2.945
2.733
.3 -628
3d Qtr .. ..................
10,903
1,750
601
293
2.941
5,315
12,578
1,030
1.313
3.214
2.36.-
4.931
4th Qtr. . ..................
12,744
1,9:30
681
293
3,775
6.062
13.520
1.33.5
1.307
3.321
2.62r
,-229
Total ......................
45,897
7,45S
2,736
1.209
I2.625
21,S70
52,520
4.673
5.367
11.507
10.1-31
_'x.521
1975
Jan ........................
4,123
595
230
114
1.305
1.879
4.510
484
477
93
774
2.6s2
United Kingdom
1974
1st Qtr .....................
3,186
537
352
320
3,000
3.977
12.175
1,965
1.324
2.356
2.106
3-421
2d Qtr .....................
10,102
615
3SS
500
3,594
5,005
14,503
2,256
1.614
3.039
2.393
.5.199
3d Qtr .....................
10,005
659
31S
-194
3,629
4,905
13.715
2.191
1.53.3
2.661
2.212
5.016
lth Qtr ....................
10,491
684
298
-191
3,990
5,02S
14,117
2,410
1.479
2,881
2.4.31
4.5 6
Total ......................
38,7S4
2,496
1.356
1,S03
14,212
IS.917
54.510
5,536
6.0.5.3
10.937
9.163
19.;01
1975
1st Qtr ........ ............
10,793
781
331
351
4.439
4,561
13,S79
2.442
1.325
2.615
2-591
4.9c)3
Italy
1974
1st Qtr .....................
6,245
455
S99
380
1 , 750
2.661
9,275
1.931
1.420
2.130
1. 2:29
2.374
2d Qtr .....................
7,258
561
941
657
2.197
2.902
10,376
1.704
1,588
2,708
1.317
3.4-)59
3d Qtr .....................
8,222
659
1,082
723
2,324
-3,434
10.S22
1,716
1.497
3.130
1.319
3.1(;:)
4th Qtr ....................
8,526
7-l'
1,051
64.5
2.155
3,633
10,504
1,943
1.251
2.929
1.359
3..-.32
Total ......................
30,251
2,417
3,973
2,505
5.726
12,630
40,977
7,294
5.786
10.1,97
3.235
1I.735
1975
1st Qtr .....................
8,083
...
....
....
....
....
9.031
....
....
---
----
Canada
1974
Ist Qtr ..... ...............
7,010
775
1,469
1,008
1,974
1.784
7,146
544
363
609
3.404)
2.250
2d Qtr .....................
8,494
1,016
1,816
1,433
2.129
2.100
8.614
651
419
944
3.945
2.6.'-
3d Qtr .....................
8,113
1,025
1,811
1,277
1,592
2,103
8.268
65S
381
933
3.490
2 5:6
4th Qtr ....................
8,751
1,062
1,792
1.376
2.384
2.137
9.281
S04
385
994
4.295
222.,4JlO
Total ......................
32,368
3,878
6,888
5,095
5,379
8,125
33.309
2.656
1.549
3,450
1.5.137
i(.45'
1975
Jan-Feb ....................
4,997
607
95S
943
I.296
1.193
5;620
434
249
752
2.472
2.714
Approved For Release 2008/11/13: CIA-RDP86T00608R000500150001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/11/13: CIA-RDP86T00608R000500150001-1
Developed Counlrlr8: I;rpnrlw In OPEC I
luld Saudi
Algeria Fruudor In done8la Iran Irlul Kuwall Libya Nigeria Qnlnr Arnbin Venrzueln 'l olol
I II11'il Slides
1971.,,...,.,. :115.1 :125.13 5:0.3 1,731.2 29.1.8 268.5 1311.1 2811.4 223.(1 8:35.1 1 ,768,1 6,653.7
Inl Qlr...... 85.1 511,5 121 .2 2.:10.0 :111, 1 35,8 21.1 :61.2 11.7 111H, 1 337.11 1 , 158,9
2d (Itr...... 6i.1 82.11 111).2 315.7 3:),1 111,1 :11 .,s 81.7 42.?1 211.1 151{.0 1,52:1.11
3d Qtr...... 61.3 8.1,8 132, 1 151,5 100.5 4.1.7 313,1) 82.7 161.3 2'211.2 105.1 1,71111.8
4th Qt( ..... 1)8,3 !111,5 1511.5 7(10.1 III .N 711,0 50.5 8(1.2 07.2 25:3.1 597,8 2,'270.3
I'175
Inl (Ili ....... 12.1.7 110.3 1511,1) 715.1 8I).1 71.5 74.2 1113.11 11111,11 27.1.1 537.1 '2.,125.0
,Ialuul
1117.1.,..?..... 15.1.5 11:1.1, I,?152.3 1,014.3 ?173.4 279.3 23.1.2 285.0 2(17.6 677.1 39K,8 5,2'90.6
1st. QIr...... 2(1.7 1.1.3 258.8 1111,3 2.1.1 ?111,5 111.8 :3:1, 1 :15.7 1111,5 115,11 71(1.7
2d (Itr...... 31.7 2(1.7 359.2 2111,1) 87??1 68.0 511,1 56,0 17.2 1.13.1 88.11 1,182.3
3d Qtr...... 35.1 :33.8 3811,?1 287.11 1.15.1 711.3 05,11 83.6 55,8 181.3 101,3 I, 153.I
41,11 Qtr..... 131.6 45.11 1.18.11 :912.0 216,8 85.5 11:3,0 112.1) (18,)) 250.5 1.13.11 18110.5
11175
Is) Qlr...... (13.7 38.8 13(1.8 :3112.2 194.0 73.5 70.5 III 11 1111.11 272.5 1)5.6 1,873,8
West Germany
1971 .......... 482.3 82.3 32-1.3 11,140.43 373.5 1611.13 4112.4 3.16.0 324. ?1 285.9 331.11 .1, 253.13
let Qtr., .... 42.8 1.1.7 (1)1.2 21:1.2 28.0 29,11 78.2 (i1 .?1 85, 1 ?(7.0 62,3 7118.5
2d Qtr...... 1)12.7 1)1, 1 83.2 258.6 18.2 ?12.1 102.11 70.3 77.5 67. 5 81,5 11111,7
3d Qt.r...... 13:3.7 29,?1 8(1.2 288.5 72,2 3+1.15 1()11,(1 01.3 115.1 711.7 87.8 1 .079. 1
4th Qlr..... 1603.1 22.1 88.7 380,(1 225.1 51.8 11:1.2 123.11 1)6.7 (11.7 1(11,4 I,A.5.5. .1
11175
Jan....,,... 51.11 8.0 28.7 1)0,(1 82.6 15.8 13,1 :33.?1 11.8 21.11 23.5 ?117.3
France
1974 .......... 1,296.5 18.4 1(13.9 257. ?1 214.3 63.9 :162.5 175.0 207.1 120.1 111.0 2.960A
Int Qtr...... 212.:3 .1.5 22.:) III.)) 10.5 11.1 82.1 25.3 51.5 21.1 :1(1.2 115:1.4
2d Qtr ...... 277. ?1 ?1.5 33.13 57.0 5)1.8 17.4 87.0 32.11 1:3.1 317.2 .11 .:3 1181.2
3d Qlr...... 357.1) ?1.7 111.3 (14,13 ?111,7 12.(1 89.3 15.8 ?17.7 31.8 32.11 7511.3
?Ith Qtr..... .151.9 4.7 20.0 81 .3 6.1.3 22.8 101.1 71 .3 112.1 3' .0 37.5 4113.1
11)75
,Ian......... 182.1) I.8 7.2 28.?) 26.0 4.8 ?12.3 35.9 21.8 II.?I 8.8 37.1.9
Feb......... 1(311.?1 1.11 12.9 ?11.5 27.5 12.4 36.2 44.3 16.2 12.5 1)1.7 3711.2
United Kingdom
197.1.......... 128.9 31.9 11)9.5 628.9 1.13.0 139.6 147.2 522.4 311.3 282.3 117.6 2,562.6
Ist Qtr...... 20.1 6. 1 23.4 92.1 25.(1 20.9 27.7 1)8.8 68.8 21.9 1(11.4
2d Qtr ...... 28.5 5.:3 25. it 1.18.7 25.6 28.5 37.4 1 17 .5 87.4 73. 7 27.1 9)11.7
3d Qtr ...... .11.8 8.1 :31.6 171).1 ?13.3 ?111,1) 40.3 135.5 71.1) 72.2 35.4 703.1
4th Qtr... , . 32.2 12.1 21),5 208.7 ?18.5 ?16,3 11.8 1711.13 80.2 83.1) 33.3 7110. 1
1975
Ist Qtr...... .15.7 10.0 44.6 235.3 01.7 46.1) 5(1.1 21.1.9 1116.3 8(16 35.7 1)7(1. 1
I t'tly'
!17.1.......... 325.4 25.7 57.9 282.2 95.9 65.5 854.3 131.0 234.6 133.4 211.3 2,117.2
1st (Itr...... 51.0 ?1.0 8.2 48.11 15.5 1).8 1511.1 21.1) ?11.4 22.8 31.11 IIO.)
2d Qtr. . . . . . 130.6 3.8 10.0 58.5 21.8 11.2 11)2.11 23.1) 53.8 38. I 15.11 52(1.2
3d Qtr...... 1)1),3 6.6 1-':3.:3 1)1.2 21.1 17.2 233.(3 34.?1 7:3.0 :35.1 55.1 (31)5.!1
40h Qtr ..... 114.5 8.3 113.4 8.1.5 34.5 27 3 272.6 51 .7 (1(1.0 37.?) 78.?1 7111.11
11175
.Sun......... 27.?1 :3.6 5.11 :31,4 113,6 ?1.8 88.2 17.5 17.2 11.)) 15.11 210.5
Feb......... :ill. 1) 3.3 15.6 24.0 17.3 11.0 1)3.1 24.4 1)1.8 18.11 22.7 2611.?1
Canada
197.1.......... 155.5 11.8 55.1 64.1 18.0 5.0 6.0 19.9 27.1 18.3 166.1 5.17.6
I4t (Itr...... 11,11 2.0 7.0 9.7 1.1 1.0 0.4 3.1 8.0 3.7 :30,8 8.1.4
2d Qtr...... 10.4 :3.3 10.7 12.0 2.6 1.0 0.5 3.0 7.0 1.1 37.1 10.1.3
3d Qtr ...... 77.6 2.0 17.1 13.1 5.3 1.1 2.5 6.6 11.3 :3.4 35.1) 170.9
4th Qtr..... 44.1) 4.6 1.1.4 28.7 1),0 2.0 2.6 7.2 6.1 7.1 5(1.?1 188.0
1475
Jan......... 21.1 2.1 7.7 13.2 0.5 0.?1 0.?1 3.3 2.1 1.3 17.4 72.8
Feb......... 7.5 1.5 5.8 1.5 7.7 0.5 (1.7 2.7 0.2 1.3 21.2 53.6
Approved For Release 2008/11/13: CIA-RDP86T00608R000500150001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/11/13: CIA-RDP86T00608R000500150001-1
Market Shores of OPEC Imports
1'97.1
Total
West
United
Other
(Billion
US $)
Total
United
States
Japan
Cer-
many
France
king-
door
Italy
Canada
Uevcl-
oped
Non-
OCCI)
'total OI'E(' 1 .............
35.5
70
7
2
13
17
Algeria .................
:1.7
77
1)
I
II
II
Feu nlor ................
0 R
7n
:t
1
to
1.1
Indonesia ........... ...
3.R
IW
'
t
12
111
Iran ...................
7.2
71
1
I
II
Is
Int.1 ...................
2.6
112
I
1
13
25
Kuwait ................
I.S
51
-I
Negl.
12
:17
Libya ..................
3.I
69
25
Negl.
11;
IS
Nigeria .................
2.7
00
5
1
13
21
Qatar and l'A E.........
1.7
00
1.1
2
111
Saudi Arabia............
3.11
115
9
I
12
Venezuela ..............
.1.5
70
5
.1
5
Approved For Release 2008/11/13: CIA-RDP86T00608R000500150001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/11/13: CIA-RDP86T00608R000500150001-1
VALUE OF FOREIGN TRADE
BILLION US$, soesouelly adjusted
%VIIIAIII ANNIIAI
I%I19I MIINIII Nrn nil 6111IWI If IIAII Ann:l I:IIMINAIIVI IM111111N II!l it
I:L,u Vr
hnm
Mdl~nn 1'nrinul 1 Mnn It" I yul 11111, 11114 fL,na.
II9X I Mnnln I ul~n I ndm 7
I 1 ~ I~
It 146 '.11 1111 114 141611 111 (1111 1411,
111.11 1 141 lit
May 75 i
Aal,m. 1.704
! 10
May 15
Ad,nn
15 110 1
10315 I
United Kingdom
/00
9fi 1 3114 11!170 11
-900 745 -1.545
]Dale off 1..o.0. fsport and import plots an based on /ive,month weiglUd moving II
JAvenge lot bbst J months eompand frila evaige /ar previous J months.
Approved For Release 2008/11/13: CIA-RDP86T00608R000500150001-1
 49
Approved For Release 2008/11/13: CIA-RDP86T00608R000500150001-1
AVIIIAIII ANNIIAI
61111W111 IMII !IIHI:1 C(IMIII AIM IMII IIIIN 1199)
Approved For Release 2008/11/13: CIA-RDP86T00608R000500150001-1
1'r1unl AVIIIA(II ANNIIAI
IAlf fiT MIIHfII (,hrngr GROWTH IIAII NINCI C11101111 AIM IMII IINN 1195)
loon
M.Ilmn 'nrnun A Mnnl!n 1 Yrrr 11111, 19 14
Clunpr
U!i5 I l hh 1.601 I riLn
May 75
Ilelenre
May 75
Bdence
May 75
oiNnu
134
7:1,171
3,877
1973 1974 ;j 1975
?Om e> f.o.b. (sped end imperl plots fit bard on livr-month wNpbnd moving evrrggis.
?Averepe for heel 3 months tanrper.d Wilk ?vengr for previous J months.
 Approved For Release 2008/11/13: CIA-RDP86T00608R000500150001-1
VOLUIVIE OF FOREIGN TRADE1 INDEX: 1070100, soosonolly odjustod
260
200
Unltud Status
I,ri~rnr AVI IIAIII ANNIIAI
(MIST MUNIII I,In fI111WIll NAZI SINCI
ono.
Ihrvmns
MilllII
I MnnIIi,
1111,,7
1
dnr
I
4
u
Apr 1!r
I.1J I
I II II
!I 11
Apl I
1n~~
Apr 15
1393
13
26 9
N'1
Al" 1S
11" 4
711 t
1U7,
i Id ,'
11UU
5N
24 3
99
1 1)
1,
Japan
1972
l fsporl and import plots an Aued on five-month weighted mo,
2Averege for la/eel 3 months compered with evaage for previc
Approved For Release 2008/11/13: CIA-RDP86T00608R000500150001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/11/13: CIA-RDP86T00608R000500150001-1
I'xnanil AVLIIAGI ANNIIAI
1AtF I MIINIII, IllwnOu IlIIhIWI ll IlAIt !;ma
Mo,u III I ndixi 7 I. uxr
24.3
all
200
Ifsport and import plots are based on five month wDIghted moving averages.
2A verege for latest 9 months compered with avenge for previous 3 months.
Approved For Release 2008/11/13: CIA-RDP86T00608R000500150001-1
hxnnnl AVI IIAGI ANNIIAI
I;hunllx IiIIIIWIII IIAII !ANIJ
hum
Ihuvmut :1 Munlh I Ynai
Mnntli Indini7~ Inihxi
8 JULY 1915
556332 7.75
 300
West Germany
19712 ;;'973'
1974 1975 FOREIGN TIRADE PRICES IN US$1INIEXl 1070.100, seaennelly edlueled
ion
..100'
200
-Italy
1912
1'11001 AVIIIAIII ANNIIAI
IAII1;7 MONTH Ilhnip, 6110'NT11 IIAII NINGI
Irvin
Ihrvinlu 7 Mnnlhl I You
Much Inhn7 1111111
Approved For Release 2008/11/13: CIA-RDP86T00608R000500150001-1
1011101 AAI MAN ANNNAI
IAIINI MANIA Ch 1np, IIIIIIWIII IIAII AINI,I
1'1111001 "M nh1 I Yn1
Mmn1 nhn 7 I I IIh11
I5
160
iao
300
201
100
1`260
1'So
Japan
Unites Kingdom
Italy
Afaparl rndhnpwf ploli ae baud en Ni month wripfhmd moving avrnpei 24vurpr lar phn l monlhJ rompu~d lwdMr-npr /o, pnvlaul J months,
Approved For Release 2UU8/11/13 : CIA-KUP86I UU6U8K0005UU15UUU1-1
1972 1973 1974 1975
I'uuul AVIIIAG1 ANNUAI
LAIE0I MUNIH 611NW11I HAIL SINGE
Imm
Ihrrnlni I Month, I Yu'
Mnn1h I wfi',; Inhu
Jan 75