ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 1999
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: August 6, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

1
` ~ ~ , .., , I \\ A, {~ ~~i ~ ~~ease+2400/09/14'! CfA-RQP86T 0608R000504'140031-9
~Econom~ic Intelligence ,:Weekly
 Approved For Release 2b00/A9/14:CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
Secret
No Foreign Dissem
~conc~mi~ Intelligence meekly
Secret
ER EIW 75-31
6 Augur 1975
Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000~~,140~;D1 X62
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP~T00608R000500140031-9
PiATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject tr, Criminal Sanctions
Claa~tfled by 01319
Exempt from penerol d?clostiflmlion uhedvle
of E.O. 11632,)) exemption((mtsgory:
AutomotBc~afllyy(d~clauifie~d on:
Date impoulble to Determine
Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 : ~bREaRDP86T00608R000500140031-9
i'Jo Porelgn Dlssem
ECONJMIC INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY
6 August 1975
_
Developed Countries: Inventories. in Perspective , , , ,
International Bond Market: Record Level of Issut3s . , , , , , , , ,
` 25X6
.. ........~o
Ita!;t Launches Risky Reflation Program . , . , , , , , , , ; , , , , ..
vvav~w~nun~ rmana~ai rOSITIOn ,
.. ... ... 1b=
Chinn: Outlook for Grain Imports , , , , .... ~~
`Publication of ;nterest, Statistics
The OECD Now Anticipates a 1975 GNP Growth Rabe of Less Phan 1% :n
the 17 Smaller Gauntries, Compared with Their long-Run Average of More Than
5~?. In its semiannual Economic Outlook, the OECD indicates that the countries
with the gloomiest growth prospects are Switzerland (-3.2596), Ireland (-1.5%), and
the Netherlands (-0.5?x), Only Norway is forecast to achieve creditable growth
(4.590, because of stimulus from its oil sector. Even though the OEI:D has lowered
its fc;recasts from earlier in the year, we believe they are still a shade too optimistic.
Recovery in the Big Seven, crucial to the smallc;r countries, will likely be slower
than the OECD expects.
The Temporary Restrictions on New Foreign Wheat Sales by Canada and the
EC Will Tighten Grain Markets, Forcing the Saviets To Raise Their Offer Prices
Ii TL___ u._._. .. _. _ _
25X6
- -rr..,...,. ..r ~:~~ ~..
Commission, The Commission is unlikely to approve large export contracts until
the world supply picture becomes clearer,
Note: Comments and queries regarding the Economic /ntel/lgenee {Meekly arc welcomed. They may be duected
25X1 A to the Office of Economic Fesearch, Code 143, Extension 7555.
25X6
SECRET
Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
SECRET
The EC's Compromise Set of Guidelines on Raw Materia~ Issues Is, art Best,
Only a Building Block Toward a Community Raw Materials Policy. The guidelines --
which were hammered out at a meeting in Brussels last month -- will serve as
a point of departure for discussions at the Seventh Special Session of the UN
on 1 September. The Community has agreed to examine raw material issues on
acommodity-to-commodity basis and to endorse programs to stabilize LDC export
earnings, without specifying the means of financing such programs.
Me:,l Prices in Major World Markets Remain lielatively Stable Despite Weak
Demand. In the last month, zinc, lead, and copper stocks held on the London
Metals Cxchange rose 170%, 3596, an~i 17?.6, respectively. Because of the large
inventory overhang, prices wilt remain flat even after economic recovery in the
industrial countries starts. In most of these countries, domestic stocks of key metals
remain unusually large in relation to both current and expected consumption.
(Confidential)
Approved For Release 2000/09/14 $~~-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
SECRET
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: INVENTORIES IN PERSPECTIVE
Inventory-building was reduced sharply in early 1975 in four of the major
foreign countries, as well as in the United States, halting ?he rapid accumulation
of surplus stocks that occurred last year.* In all of the countries examined, except
the United Itingdom, cumulative surpl~,ls stocks appear to have peaked alter the
turn of the year. In Japan, Canada, and the United State, they hit record or
near-record levels. Moreover, because surplus stocks of this magnitude are unusual
at this stage of the business cycle, we expect stockbuilding to play an abnormally
weak -and perhaps even anegative -role in recovery over the next few quarters.
In early 1975, companies attempted to bring their excess inventories into line
with sagging sales. In three of the major developed countries, they reduced
stockbuilding ,ubstantially, v~hile in two others they actually cut inventories.
25X6
In the United States, manufacturing and trade inventories fell in fo~.ir
of the first five months of 1975, sliding down. at a record pace in May;
total stocks, including raw materials, dropped by $3 billion in the first
quarter and $5 billion in the second.
25X6
For a definition of surplus stock accumulations as used in L':is azticle, see the methodological note,
which follows the second graphic. France and Italy are excluded from this analysts because of a lack of
quarterly data.
Approved For Release 2000/09/14 S~'Ji~C-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
 25X6
Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
SECRET
25X6
'I'he decline in stockbuilding was a major factor in the first-quarter
deterioration in real GNP (seasonally adjusted). In the United States, the stock
drawdown accounted for the entire 3% dro in GNP.
Implications for Recovery
In sharp con~rast with most earlier post.~ecession periods, when inventory
rebuilding gave a strong boost to expansion, stock changes are expected to be
a neutral force at best for several months to come. A key factor determining the
role of stocks in upswings is the timing of the inventory cycle peak in relation
to the ~~isiness cycle. Usually, recovery begins at a time when inventories already
v neared their low. On those rare occasions wh
~he t;usiness c cle trou have overlapped -
- stockbuilding has remained weak or negative
for the first few quarters of the recovery period.
25X6
25X6
25X6
Approved For Release 2000/09/14SE~~A-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
 25X6
Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 : 6>FERDP86T00608R000500140031-9
INTERNATIONAL BOND MARKET: RECORD LEVEL OF ISSiJE4
Moderation of inflation and a fall in short-term interest rates facilitated a
record $9.1 billion in new international bond issues in the first half of 1975,
compared with $6.5 billion in all of 1974. This surge has enabled countries with
large but manageable cur*?mt account deficits to float longer term obligations.
Oil-exporting countries have increased purchases substantially. These and other
investors remain cautious and selective, and nations with the most serious financing
problems have not benefited from the revival of the bond market.
New International Bond Issues,
by Currency of benominatlon
a
SECRET
Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
Factors at Play
The return of a normal in?erest rate structure, with bonds yielding I% to
2% more than short-term Eurodollar deposits, has provided investors with the
incentive to purchase new bond issues. The relatively short lives of new issues,
5-8 years, indicate the concern of investors over prospects for a new burst of
inflation.
The volume of issues denominated in strong European currencies has
increased the most. Swiss franc and West German mark bonds have been particularly
popular since they offer investors the opportunity to hold preferred currencies
and still receive a competitive rate of return.
the Swiss impose a 10% quarterly tax on new deposits.
The share of new issues denominated in dollars dropp,d from 65% in 1974
to 46% in first half 1975. This trend is likely to b~? reversed in the second half
because of the recent strength of the dollar.
Composition of New International Bond Issues
January-June 1975
Currenry of Denomination
Type of
Issuer
U8
Dollar
Deutsche-
mark
Swiss
Franc
Other
Total
All issuers
4,180
2,477
697
1,763
9,117
Private firms
947
569
370
498
2,384
Foreign state?owned
enterprises
1,497
865
114
884
-
3,360
Foreign governments
1,156
690
165
191
2,202
International organi-
zations
580
353
48
190
1,171
Boon for Qualified Borrowers
New bond issues have accounted for about half of the medium- and long-term
funds raised internationally so far this year. Last year, borrowers were forced to
resort to Eurocurrency roans at floating interest rates for more than 80% of such
funds.
25X6
a
SECRET
Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
25X6
25X6
25X6
Governments and their agencies accounted for nearly two-thirds of new issues
in the first half of 1975, compared with just over half in 1974. France, one of
the most active borrowers, floated more than $1 billion worth.
Public and private borrowers from Sweden, Austria, and
Australia -countries with relatively large current account deficits -tapped the
market for nearly $1.7 billion.
Those countries with lower credit ratings have not bees, able to take advantage
of the market's recovery. Italy and h.arri-pressed LDCs have floated no bonds. -
OPEC Activity
OPEC cuuntries have become important participants in the bond market. We
have direct evidence that Kuwaiti purchases amounted to $200-$400 million in
the fn~t half of this year, and we suspect the actual total substantially exceeds
$400 million. The Saudis have been increasingly active, recently purchasing all
of a $150 million issue by AT&T. Kuwaiti financial institutions have helped to
manage and sell more than one-third of the $9 billion in new issues; several, designed
to attract Middle East investors, have been denominated in Kuwaiti dinars.
Implications
The resurgence in bond issues has improved the ability of private markets
to handle longer term borrowing, reducing the need for intermediation by
commercial banks. It also may be an early sign that the wealthiest OPEC members
are lengthening tre maturity structure of their massive portfolios. The relief may
be temporary because an economic upturn in the industrial nations could push
up short-term interest rates this fall. The anticipated OPEC price hikes could also
hurt the market, by renewing inflation fears. (Confidential No Foreign Dissem)
25X6
25X6
25X6
Approved For Release 2000/09/14 : 6DP86T00608R000500140031-9
 25X6
Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
SECRET
25X6
ITALY LAlIR1CHES RISKY REFLATION PROGRAM
Rome's bald r_ew reflationary package reflects the Moro government's
eagerness to demonstrate unimpaired leadership following heavy Communist gains
in the June regional elections.
The $5.5 billion program -expected to be approved by the cabinet this
week -places Italy in the forefront of the major developed nations in adopting
antire~ession measures. It represents a marked shift in policy and .ups counter
t~~ the a~ivic~ of the OECD, the EC Commission, and the Bank of Italy. These
bodies have been advocating a more conservative posture, to av yid aggravating
inflation and jeopardizing the sharp but tenuous improvement in the balance of
payments.
Political expedience was the key factor motivating the center-left government
to veer down this economically risky path. The Communists have found an
increasingly sympati:etic audience for claims that they alone can solve Italy's
problems. By pr:.:.mpting many of their spending plans, the More government
apparently hopes to undercut Communist efforts to win a larger role in the national
political scene.
The Package
The new spending program attempts to stimulate demand while stilling public
clamor for improved governmental services. The measures fall into three major
categories:
Approved For Release 2000/09/145~QR~4-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
SECRET
? improvements in public housing, hospitals, ports, airports, and urban
transportation ($2.S billion);
e increased export insurance coverage ($1.75 billion); and
w aid for small and rnedrum-size businesses, :or agrict.~lture, and for
economic development of southern Italy ($1.25 billion).
The Impact on growth
This fiscal stimulus should generate a direct expansion of domestic demand
equivalent to 3% of GNP, with the bulk of the impact coming in 1976. Multiplier
and psychological effects on consumers and investors will amplify this impact,
provided that the government i~ not forced to abort the program.
After falling sharply i.*~ late 1974, industrial output has continued to decline.
May alone brought a 14% drop, and many observers believe production fell further
in June and July. Unemployment continues to edge up and is expected to average
4% this year, compared with 3% in 197~E. Short-time work in the first quarter
was double the comparable 1974 level.
Demand has shown no signs of reviving in recent months. Despite rising real
incomes, consumers continue to hold back on spending because of iob uncertainties.
With capacity utilization at record lows, investment has plummeted, even in the
face of easier credit. Export volume, usually a strong prop to production, has been
stagnant since last quarter 1974.
The new program, along with sharp increases in government pensions and
wages, will boost the excess of budget appropriations over revenues for 1976 by
70% - to $18 billion, the equivalent of 9% of GNP. Although the cash deficit
may lag because of bureaucratic delays, government spending will stimulate the
inflationary process.
Consumer prices rose at an annual rate of 9% in the latest 90-day period
for which data are available, down from about 2S% the same time last year. The
near-term outlook already has been darkened by threats of a new hike in oil prices,
rising prices on other imports, and a weakening lira. Most omniously, wage rates -
already 30% above last year's level and not yet digested in the price structure -
are sure to rise further this fall when labor unions representing more than 4 million
workers negotiate new contracts.
Approved For Release 2000/09/1 ~E~~A-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 : ~~RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
Industrial Production'
I ndox: 1970=100
ITALY: Economic indicators
Consumer
Foreign Trado l/olume /
~ Indax:1970=100
I II III
1974
J
112
1. Seasonally Adjusted. ~2.,Two Months, Only;
Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :~~IA-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
_ SECRET
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
.... And on the Balance of Payments
The antirecession program also will worsen the trade balance, which had been
expected to deteriorate in any case. By stimulating both consumption and inflation,
the increase in government spending will raise demand for imports of raw materials
and consumer goods and negatively atfQct exports. As a result of the new package,
the trade balance could worsen at an annual rate of $2 billion.
Even before the reflationary program was announced, imports seemed sure
to pick up as companies completed adjustments in their stocks of raw materials,
particularly oil. At the same time, exports were not expected to grow much because
of the slow recovery foreseen in major markets and dwindling sales to the non-oil
LDCs. Renewed capital flight, an apparent reaction to Communist success in the
recent regional elections, already is hurting the bala:~ce of payments. (Confidential)
Low copper prices and improvident economic policies have created a foreign
exchange crunch in Zaire. Foreign loans are urgently needed, but the government
is resisting moves to put its financial house in order.
Background of the Crunch
With two-thirds of its foreign exchange earnings from copper, Zaire has been
hit hard by falling copper prices. Export prices fell from a peak $1.20 a pound
in June 1974 to about 60 cents by yearend. Imports soared in 1974 because of
higher prices for oil and other goods and because of expansionary domestic credit
and fiscal policies. In addition, .repayments on past borrowings resulted in a large
net capital outflow despite considerable short-term borrowing. The balance of
payments, as a result, moved from a surplus of $54 million in 1973 to a deficit
of $226 million in 1974. This shift has continued into 1975.
In the first quarter, foreign exchange expenditures exceeded receipts by $126
million, requiring further borrowing and the drawing down of foreign reserves to
a record low - $90 million in April 1975. Zaire now finds itself unable to borrow
sufficient funds to maintain imports and meet its debt obligations.
16
Approved For Release 2000/09/14$E~A-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
SECRET
Zaire: Balance of Pa~mente
,.Exports
Of;which
`Go~fper'
. Imports '
.: Of;which:
:,Oil
Tade `balsmce
Sevres said transfers (net)
l:urrent`account balance '
Capital.accaunt balance
t),vorall surplus/deficit
Dealing with the Crunch
1,038
46 104
3y2 429
=331. -473
61 ._ .,44
.-7 -182 .
54 -226
To cope with the situation, Zaire introduced import controls in early 1975.
Foods, dntgs, and raw materials for domestic processing may be imported freely;
all other items require hard-to-get individual licenses. Even authorized imports are
often canceled because the buyer is unable to obtain foreign exchange to make
the advance payment demanded by the supplier.
The reduction in imports is disrupting the small industrial sector, which is
heavily dependent on foreign inputs. As a result, Zaire's real growth rate, which
dropped from 6% in 1973 to less than 4% in 1974, will probably fall further
in 1975.
The shortage of foreign exchange also has forced GECAMINES, the
state-owned company responsible for almost all copper output, to restrict imports
of raw materials and spare parts. This problem and the government policy of
replacing foreign with indigenous tvorkers are causing rapid deterioration of copper
producing facilities. Recent equipn;ent breakdowns are likely to hold 1975 output
well below the scheduled level of 482,000 tons (output in 1974 was 493,000 tons).
Production could fall below 400,000 tons, if the situation is not corrected. At
this level, output would be even below Zaire's reduced quota under the recent
CIPEC agreement.
Kinshasha must obtain large foreign loans if it is to survive the current crunch
without severe shortages, inflation, and urban unemployment. popper prices ire
Approved For Release 2000/09/14 : GPA-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
SECRET
unlikely to rise enough over the next year or two to finance imports at the 1974
level, and other exports show little promise of expanding enough to make up the
difference. Foreign loans of the requ,red amount will not be for`hcoming if Zaire
does not institute a systematic program for allocating foreign exchange and for
controlling government expenditures. As yet, xCinshas}ra appears unwilling to
commit itself to such a program. We believe, liowev?r, that it will be forced to
change its ?ititude during the coming months. (Confidential)^
CHINA: OUTLOOK FOR GRAIN IMPORTS
We do not expect the PRC to purchase additional large quantities of grain
for delivery in 1975 even if current favorable growing conditions should turn sour.
Peking has booked 3.6 million tons of wheat for delivery in 1975 under long-term
agreements with Canada and Australia. It has also contracted for about 700,000
tons of grain under a similar agreement with Argentina, of which about half may
be delivered this year.
Peking imports grain to help feed urban areas of North China and thus reduce
the load on the domestic procurement system. This region produces two grain
crops annually. The first or summer crop (primarily winter wheat and barley) is
harvested in June and is largely consumed by November, when the second or fall
crop (mainly coarse grains) is harvested and available for consumption. The second
crop must carry the Chinese during the seven months until the summer crop is
harvested the following year. This ,year's summer crop was good in North China,
and the outlook for the fall is also favorable. We conclude that domestic output
plus grain imports already booked will provide North China with ample grain until
November and possibly beyond. 'The fall harvest will carry North China beyond
the first of the year even if growing conditions were to deteriorate.
In the fall, Peking will probably contract for 2.5 to 5.0 million tons of wheat
from Canada and Australia for delivery in 1976 under the third and final year
of the long-term agreements. The balance of the agreement with Argentina
reportedly has beer.. abrogated by Buenos Aires. China thus may not import any
Argentine grain in 1976. (Secret No Foreign Dissem)^
Approved For Release 2000/09/145~~~-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 5~{~-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
Aid and Trade Activities of Communist Countries in Less
Developed Areas of the Free World, June 1975
(ER RP 75-21, Secret No Foreign Dissem, Jule 1975)
The June report highlights Communist activities in the LDC petroleum sector
during the first half of 1975. It also contains summaries of Communist aid to
the LDCs for the first half.
Code 143, Extension 7234. 25X1 A
18
Approved For Release 2000/09/14 $e~~~-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
~CaN01'~II C I1V DI CAT?1Z~
Prepared by
The Office of Economic Research
August 6,19i'5
Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
The Economic Indicators provide up-to-date information on changes
in the domestic and external economic activities of the major non-
communist developed countries. To the extent possible, the Economic
hrdicators are updated from press ticker and Embassy reporting, so that
the results are made available to the reader weeks - or sometimes months -
before receipt of official statistical publications.
Comments and queries regarding the Economic Indicators are
welcomed. They may be directed to the Office of 25X1 A
Economic Research, Code 143, Extension 7402 or 351-7402.
Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
 25X6
Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS PRICES Mant111yAvorapo Cash Price
40
lME US
4Aup 56,8 83.0
28 Jul 50.7 00,0
Jun 75 G4.1 02.3
Ju174 07.3 85.8
150 ~--
t Approximelee world market price froquontly used 6y major world producers and traders,
I h h l it I I f h I II
Jl`
Jul 74 198,0
188.5
181.0
147.9
190.1
300
INDUSTRIAL
P1r~Ai`~RIAI.S
25o INL'c.K
zoo -
150
,oo
July 1972 1973 1974
a t oup on y sme quent 1 es o t eae mete s are aqua y traded on the LME.
ZProduceri price, coven mostpr'~E ts~~rT~1~C~.~~lt~I,~~t~~te~~IIt00/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R0005001C4~~~1~
3 Ouoted on New York market.
US Dealer
C Par Pound SELECTED MATERIALS
Aluminum Meior US Prod.. dl6
Steal Composite. S4.T
Iron Ora Non~Oessemer Old nenee, $tiT
Chrome Oro nuuien, $/Mr
Chrome Oro S. Alrlu. SILT
LME ~$ Forrochrame us Chores, dlb
Nickel Meior US Prod. Cathode. SAb
4Aup 19.8 19.0
Menpnnaso0ro 40%Mn.,S/LT
28Ju1 10.8 19.0
__ - _ _ Tunpston Oro o5%W03, S/ST
I Mercury NY, $/70Lb Flssk
Ju174 74.6 24,5
5ilvor lME ash, fJfroy 0:
~ Per Pound ~ RUBBER
4Aup
28Ju1
Jrtn 75
Jul 74
LfdE US
304.3 331.0
311.9 338.5
314.0 342.4
380.8 420.6
10
(USD) /~// ~ ~ t59.o Mf USD
7.7 4Aup 110.0
28Ju1 155.0
Jun 7b 155.0
31 Jul
58.8
150
28 Jut
54.0
Jun76
89.9
125
Jul 74
128,3
5 S?type :ryrone, lIS f.a.e. export price. A-g i
:~
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
PRICES Monthly Avoropo Caah Prico
LME US
28Ju1- 58.7 80.8
Jun 75 ` 64:1 82.3
Ju174 87,3 85.9
r Per Pound SELECTED MATERIALS
4 Aup
28 Jul
Jun 75
Ju174
LME US
10,8. 19.0
18.8 19.0
10.0 19.5
24.9 24.5
C Pbr Pound
333.3
US 300 `"~3o9,t LME US
~
38.5
4Aup 304.3 331.0
38.5 `"? I w /~{ 28Ju1 311.9 338.5
Aluminum Meior US Prad., cJl6
Sloel Comporln, Snr
Iron Oro Non~Oeuemer Oid flenee, $A.T
Chremo Oro fluuisn. SAN1
Chrome Ore S.Alriu,$/tT
Ferrochrome US Cherae, Nlb
Nickel Meio: US Prod. Cathode, S/Lb
Manganese Ore 4BlbMn., $rLT
Tungsten Oro 05$YJ03,SiST
Mercury NY,S/70L6flerk
Silver LME urh,NfroyO:
Curront
38.30
280.23
10.75
135.00
57.50
53.50
2.01
al.zo
5,:.39.42
140.00
514.1 ~
Fob 75
39.00
209.03
17.53
135.00
57.50
52.50
2.01
87.20
,990.58
228.4U
440.09
CPYRGHT
world produces end traders,
traded on the LME.
MP USU
4 Aup 170,0. 168.5
26Ju1 ,.155.0 107.0
..Jun 76 .155.0. 147.9
Jul 74 190.0 190.1
SR
NA
NA
27.4
29.8
CPYRGHT
This is an indez compiled
by the Economiat for 19.
nw msteriaia which
Doter international Credo.
Commodities en
wei0hted by 3?year moving
avenges otimports into
industrialized eountrie~.
oiled Statea. B AUGUST 1975
Jen 74 Jan 73
28.00 I 25.00
212.13 200.00
lz.1a 11.90
38.00 45.75
33.50 25.50
:.2.50 20.00
1.02 1.53
52.80 31.40
2,872.40 2,241,20
275.54 202.50
380.29 200.15
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
AGRICULTURAL PRICES MonthlyAvorupo Cash Prico
wwEaT
Kc:au City No. 211ord Wlntet
4Aup 3.83
28 Jul 4.00
Jun 75 3.2b
Jul 74 4.34
4Aup 8.02
28Ju1 8.13
Jun 75 5.16
Jul 74 8.80
4Aup 0.4935
28Ju! 0,4830
Jun 75 0.4521
Ju174 0.5880
~~Rhl $ Per Bushel
Chicrpo No. 2 Y~!!ow
4Aup 3.1D
28Ju1 3.17
Jun 76 2.81
Jul 74 3.28
4Aup 20.50
28 Jul 18.60
Jun 75 13.83
Ju174 25.40
4Aup 88.00
28 Jul 83,00
Jun 75 53.89
Jul 74 71.75
July
CPYRGHT
Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
A?7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140031-9
Monthly Avernpe Ceah Prico
4Aup 3.83
28 Jul 4.00
Jun 7b 3.26
Ju174 4.34
4Aup 8.02
28 Jul 8.13
Jun 75 5.15
Jul 74 8.80
4Aup 3.10
28Ju1 3.17
tan 76 2.81
Jul 74 3.28
4Aup 20.50
28Ju1 19.60
Jun 76 13.83
Ju174 25.40
$ Per cwt.
f.ob. mills, Houston, Tex.
28 Jul 19.b0
21 Jul 19.50
Jun 16 19.50
Ju174 28.60
C Per Pound
New York prico
4Aup 77.00
29 Jul 80.00
Jun 76 03.48
Jul 74 108.90
CPYRGHT
4Aup 0.4935
28 Jul 0.4930
Jun 76 0.4521
Ju174 0.5880
4Aup 88.00
28 Jul 83.00
Jun 75 53.89
Jul i4 71,7b
JUIY
July 1972 1973 1974 1975
CPYRGH-
This is en index compiled
by the Economist for 18
food commo it~es which
enter intemetionel trade.
Commodities oro
weighted by 3?yeer mavinp
everepoa of imports into
industrialized countries.
A roved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R00050014003~~899997975
A.7 pp