ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140027-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 1999
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: July 16, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

CLAOIS
,.
Ec~no~rnri
~~ooiosria `:
(V~ ~y
ntelligence Weekly: ~ 16 JuI~ ~'
~,
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No Foreign Dissem
Economic Intelligence Weekly
Secret
ER EIW 7.5-28
16 July 1975
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFOR1~1iATION
Unt~lthorized Disclosl~re ~ubiect to Criminal Sanctions
Claulf?~d by d1S719
Er~mpt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11632, exemption category:
? 38(1), (2), and (~)
Automatico ly declassified on:
Dote Impouibb to Determine
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No Foreign Dissern
16 July 1975
Soviet Lrop Prospects Deteriorate Further . 3
Growing Pressure on Rice Prices . 4
Fertilizer Prices Skid . 7
Dev~:oped Countries: Improved Outlook for Housing Construction . 8
tcuador: Emerging Payments Problem 12
Saudi Arabia: Aid as a Foreign Policy Tool 14
Rising OPEC Economic Aid to LDCs 16
The Soviet Grain Crop Now Is Estimated at 200 Million Tons, down 15 million
tons from our previous forecast. Drought conditions have worsened and spread
in recent weeks. Although no grain contracts have been announced, rumors point
to Soviet contracts or negotiations involving 10 to 11-1/2 million tons of wheat,
corn, and barley. (Confidential)
Housing Construction Shows Signs of Revival in the United States, Canada,
the United Kingdom, and Japan. A turnaround in France and Italy is expected by
yearend. because of
an unusually large inventory of unsold dwellings. Lower prices for building ,naterials,
some softening in mortgage rates, and government assistance are factors in the mild
upturn.
Job uncertainties, high mortgage rates, and high prices make a housing boom
unlikely in the near future. Budget problems and concern about inflation will
impede government efforts to spur the industry. Housing construction thus cannot
be counted on to spark a recovery, as it has in previous business cycles.
Food and Commodity Issues Continue To Dominate International Meetings.
? At this week's Trade Negotiations Committee meeting in Geneva,
developing countries will intensify pressure for preferential treatment of
tropical product exports. Developed countries are expected to introduce
the issue of security of raw material supplies, over LDC objections.
Note: Comments and queries regarding the F.conomlc /ntel/igence {Meekly ate welcomed. They may be duecled
25X1A to the Office of Economic Research, Code 143, Extension 5943.
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o The UN Conference on Trade and Development will consider a plan for
financing commodity stockpiles in meetings starting on 28 July. The
proposed fund, tutaling $6 billion, would be used to finance buffer stocks
of such commodities as copper, coffee, and rubber. Exporting and
importing countries as well as OPEC states will be asked to fund the
progi am.
a The World Food Council hopes to begin lining up financing for its
International Fund for Agricultural Development at the September
meeting. The Council is seeking an initial fund of $1 billion to aid the
poorest food-deficit Gauntries. It is counting on substantial contributions
from OPEC countries but has received no commitments.
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SOVIET CROP PROSPECTS DETERIORATE FURTHER
The drought in the USSR worsened anti spread in late June and early July,
leading us to lower our estimate of the 1975 grain crop from 215 million tons
to 200 million. A crop of this size and the reduced outpttt now in prospect for
forage crops could result in Soviet grain imports well in excess of 10 million tons
in F'Y 1976. The USSR imported only 6-1 /2 million tons in FY 1975.
Unseasonably hot weather and scant rainall in the last 10 days of June cut
soil moisture to critical levels in the eastern and southern Ukraine and in the North
Caucasus and the Central Black-Soil Region. Crop conditions remained critical in
western Kazakhstan and the Volga Valley. Lower temperatures and moderate rain
in the Ukraine during the first 10 days of July did not materally relieve drought
conditions.
The drought has not damaged winter grains appreciably because they were
already mature when moisture levels fell. In western Irazakhstan and the Volga
Valley, however, sown acreage that would normally produce 1 U million tons of
Major train Growing Regions in the USSR
~- -
L)ISf illnl:
20'~
(''?nhal
r~
141a~F E:u i6,.
(i'
r?, _ ~ '
Economic region
.~~ Percentages show reglonp share of grain prodllctlon.
Shares shown add to92ioof total production.
~~-
~ 1 ___ ___.__._~___._.
... ,.
~-- ~ ~
._. _]____-_L--_.___..____.__....~__..._ ......__..______..____.._
i i
ti~ ~
~~ -~ ~ --
5505G0 574
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spring grain already has been lost. In addition, acreage that should .have produced
several milli~~ n tons of corn apparently has been lest ;n the Ukraine and North
Caucasus.
We will have to reduce our forecast for 1975 still further if growing conditions
remain poor and harvesting weather is unfavorable. The spring grain crop is
particularly vulnerable in the New Lands area of Siberia, where cool weather has
slowed maturing. Early arrival of winter could catch the crop unharvested, causing
heavy losses and lowering the quality of the grain saved.
Production of forage crops - w::ich provide two-thirds of Soviet livestock
feed - is as important as the grain harvest in determinir~~; the USSR's need. for
grain imports. Forage crops have been severely hurt in major catty and sheep raising
areas in the Volga Valley, the Ukraine, and the North Caucasus. Even with a normal
output of forage crops, the current grain crop projecticn falls about 10 million
tons short of estimated Soviet requirements.
Meanwhile, the app~rent entrance of t}ie Soviets into the international grain
market is clearly indica~ive of their concern. No Soviet contracts for grain imports
have been announced formally, but reliable sources olaim that nurcirases of 2-3
million :ons of wheat, 41 /2 million tons of corn, and 1 million tons of barley
have been or ~~P being negotiated. US grain companies have been told that sales
of up to 7 million tons of corn and 7 million tons of wheat ~NOUId be acceptable
to the US Government.
bringing total rumored contracts to
10 to 11-1/2 million tons of grain.
We believe that the grain that the Soviets are now d~rkering for is intended
only to offset losses already sustained. If the. crop outlook deteriorates further,
Moscow probably will come i:ito the market again to preserve its livestock program.
(Confidential) ^
GROWING PRESSURE ON RICE PRICES
Asian export prices for rice recently have fallen sharply because of good
1974/75 harvests in major exporting and importing countries and prospects for
a bumper crop next year. The price of Thai rice, for example, dropped to $33'2
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0~
Jul
72
Jen
73
(Export Prices of Milled Rice
(US $ Per ton)
fob mills, koustonl
/~~ Thai Pricei(Wtiito, 5% hrokens,
/ Q fob Bangkok)
Jy
Jul
73
Jen
74
Jen
75
1 Thailand suspended prico quotations from 5 Merch 1973 until January 197a
and reduced exports because ut domostic rice ~ homages.
75
2nd Week
par ton last week -down 17% from January 1975 and 48% from April 1974.
US prices, stearied during the past seven months by i?L-480 sales and strong Middle
East deman:i, probably will also come under pressure before long.
In 1 y75 an estimated 9.1 million tons of milled rice will be available for
export, up 1.4 million tons from actual exports in 1974. This increase reflects
good harvests in three major exporting countries -the United States, Thailand,
and Burma. At current F :es, imports are expected to reach about 8.0 million
6
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World Production of Paddy Rice
Million Tons
Crop Years Endinx 31 Julv
1975/76
1973/74
1974/75
Forecast
Total
317.0
316.3
327.8
Asia
290.'
287.8
298.1
China
:05.0
l OS.O
107.0
India
65.7
60.0
65.0
Indonesia
22.6
23.5
24.0
Thailand
14.4
14. s
14. S
Burma
8.4
8.5
8.5
Other
74.6
76.3
78.8
Western Hemisphere
14.7
16.4
17.3
Of which:
United States
4.2
5.2
5.3
Africa, Europe, and Oceania
11.6
12.1
12.4
tors, compared with 7.7 million in 1974. International demand for rice is sluggish
because of good crops in several importing countries - particularly Indonesia, where
stocks have increased substantially. Postponement of purchases by importers
anticipating lower world prices or increased domestic output in 1975/76 also is
a factor. If world rice output rises by 11.5 million tons in 1975/76 -our current
forecast, assuming normal weather - some countries will have less need for imports
and others should be able to buy at prices lower than at present.
Thailand is feeling the brunt of t}te decline in import demand. By replanting
after the floods in early 1975, the Thais managed to raise output by 100,000
tons in 1974/75, to a record 14.5 million tons. Meanwhile, production increased
by 900,000 tons in Indonesia and reached new highs in otter importing nations
such as the Philippines, Malaysia, North Korea, South Vietnam, and Taiwan. T1~.ai
exports consequently have been running at an annual rate of only million tons,
compared with the 1.6 million tons available.
Purchases by Middle East states have done much to stabilize prices in the
US market since November. MiCeast countries generally favor US rice because of
its high quality; their purchases from the United States are expected to double
in 1975, to nearly 800,000 tors. These leiiveric;. probably will make up a!~o~at
a third of total US rce expa~ts this year and half of total Middle East ,rarcttases.
US rice sales under PL-480 continue firm, with the ending of shipments of 300,000
s
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tons annually to South Vietnam and Cambodia being largely offset by increases
in shipments to Bangladesh and South Korea. US p~7ces nonetheless are likely to
trend downward during the second half, since projected export sales in 1975 are
300,000 tons below the estimated amou~it available. (Confidential) ^
World :ertilizer prices continue to plummet as a result of sluggish demand.
In the last three m:.nths:
? Japanese and Arab producers of urea have cut export prices by 35Io.
? West European anti US suppliers of concentrated phosphate fertilizer have
reduced prices from $275 to $180 per ton.
? Tunisia, Togo, and Senegal have quietly absorbed freight and insurance
charges and made other COIICCSS1011S redwing the actual price of
phosphate rock by 15"I~25?o in individual new contracts; official prices -
tied to the Moroccan price -are unchanged.
? Morocco indefinitely postponed the 8`7a increase in the official export
price of phosphate rock that had been scheduled for 1 July.
Many firms are cutting output ill an effort to stem the price slide. Major
West European and Japanese producers of nitrogen fertilizer are operating their
plants at only about 50`% of capacity, compared with full production in early 1975.
Moroccan production of phosphate rock is down l Oh-I S% from a year ago, and
the industry is prepared to make additional cuts rather than reduce its price.
llespite cutbacks, producti~~n of chemical fertilizer probably will outpace
consumption in 1975/76, putting more downward pressure on prices. Uncertainty
regarding grain prices and continued higl-. domestic prices of chemical fertilizer
probably will hold down the increase in fertilizer consumption in developed
countries. Many importing countries, badly overstocked with fertilizer, have reduced
:,reports dramatically or banned further purch~ises. India and Indonesia, for example,
have already bought all the fertilizer they will require in 1975/76, and the
Philippines has a large oversupply. (Confidcntial)^
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DEVELOPED COUNTRIES:
IMPROVED OUTLOOK FOR HOUSING CONSTRUCTION
Housing starts have turned up in several major developed countries since the
beginning of 1975 and should rise in others by yearend. A housing boom
nonetheless appears to be a long way off. Tlie industry probably will not be a
leader in the upcoming economic recovery, because the recession leas made
consumers cautious and because high construction costs and interest rates have
narrowed the market. In recent business cycles, housing construction generally has
picked up much faster than other sectors, helping to spark the re~ovey.
Housing Starts Turn Up
All the major developed countries except West Germany either have reversed
the slide in housing starts (seasonally adjusted) or are expected to do so in the
second half.
Ir. France and Italy, starts turned down later than in the other countries
and proba~ly are continuing to slip; government measures should Help
to bring a turnaround in the second half.
L_~couraging Signs
Government assistance programs and recession-induced progress in holding
down the cost of home buyi?~ are impr~~ving the environment for a housing revival.
s
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Tok3?o and Rome have eased credit restrictions, while Paris, Ottawa, and Rome
have budgeted increased funds to subsidize private housing. To step up public
building material, Ottawa intends to boost its federal mortgage fund by $200
million, or 20%, and Rome plans to pump an unprecedented $1.5 billion into
low-income housing in 1975. Italy's planned outlays, which equal 14%o of the total
value of residential construction in 1974, will not be realized fully, because of
the usual bureaucratic delays.
Prices of key building materials such as cement and lumber generally have
softened after two years of waning demand. After rising sharply in 1973, material
costs began to fall in Canada and Japan in early 1974 and continued to drop
through the first quarter of 1975. In Italy and West Germany, housing construction
costs leveled off in lase 1974. Only in Britain, where inflation has been worsening,
did the cost of building materials rise in the first quaver.
Mortgage rates likewise have tended to level off in most countries, following
steady increases in 1973-74. In Britain, Canada, and West Germany, mortgage rates
fell by more than 1 percentage point from December to April, and vi the United
States they dropped almost half a point. Mortgage money appears to be readily
available in all of these countries, although its cost is still exceptionally high by
historical standards.
Prospects
The revival in housing construction in the second half of 1975 is likely to
be fairly weak. Because the economic growth rate is expected to average only
1.5%, unemployment in developed countries will remain at the highest levels seen
in many years. The shortage of jobs will keep some potential buyers out of the
market and, more irnportant, discourage purchases among the employed.
Uncertainties about interest rates also will deter home-buying. Mortgage rates
probably will soften little if at all in the months ahead, because heavy government
borrowing requirements and reviving private demand will exert pressure on money
markets. Many families will be kept out of the ,narket by high financing costs;
others will delay purchases for a time, in the hope that mortgage rates will ease.
Government financial a~3 would have to be stepped up substantially to have
an appreciable effect on the housing market. Fiscal constraints and continuing
concern about inflation ti?ill limit further financial incentives to private housing and
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new appropriations for public housing projects. Some governments -
will continue to resist even bailout assistance to the industry until the large
overhang of unsold dwellings is worked off. (For Official Use Only)^
ECUADOR: EMERGING PAYMENTS PROBLEMS
Quito's longstanding dispute with the Texaco-Gulf consortium -producer of
practically all Ecuadorean oil -will cut export revenues this year. Although
progress is now being made toward ending the dispute, a continuing boom in
imports is expected to generate a large current account deficit.
Million LJS $
Projected
1972
1973
1974
1975
Trade balance
57.6
119.0
300
-100
Exports
346.6
532.0
1,100
1,000
Imports
289.0
413.0
800
1,100
Net services
-97.6
-115.2
-300
-300
Transfer payments
15.8
38.3
30
20
Current account
balance
-24.2
42.1
30
-380
Oil shipments began to decline in May 1974, when the government slapped
on conservation ceilings that forced Texaco-Gulf to reduce output from 240,000
b/d to 210,000 b/d. Because further cuts resulted from technical difficulties with
the Trans-Andean pipeline and co~isortium shutdowns aimed at forcing policy
changes, oil shipments dipped 18% in 1974 and an additional 29% in the first
half of 1975. Total export earnings, which ;;oared to $1.1 billion in 1974, will
slip to $I billion this year even if oil shipments soon regain their earlier peak
level.
The dispute centers on Quito's oil tax policy. Company officials m~iintain
that the tax-paid cost of $1 I a barrel for Ecuadorean crude - in e: fect until last
week -made it noncompetitive with Saudi benchmark crude, which assts an
average of $10.24. Declining tanker rates have reduced the short-haul advantage
of Ecuadorean crude, much of which goes 'co Caribbean refineries via tlie Panama
Canal.
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Texaco-Gulf also has become increasingly disturbed by the government's failure
to pay the remaining $3 million due on a 25% equity purchased in the consortium
and to pay a fair share of operating costs. This failure, along with the tax and
production-ceiling disputes, caused the consortium to abandon exploration,
postpone plans for opening new fields, and de-ay expansion of the 250,000-b/d
pipeline to the Pac~fic. The government's oil policy also discouraged the Cayman
Group from going ahead this year with plans to construct a pipeline spur to its
concession.
Ecuador: Trends in Trade and Foreign Reserves
1,200 million USj$
Forelpn floserw
million US S
i ~.. ~ . .
To force Quito to come to terms, Texaco-Gulf shut down production for
two weeks in May and suspended operations indefinitely in early June. At the
same time, it offered to make new investments totaling $165 million in exchange
for more conciliatory policie,. On 9 July, the government agreed to cut taxes by
43 cents per barrel, fallinb short of the consortium's demand for a cut of at least
60 cents. We believe that Quito will soon make additional concessions because
it cannot afford a prolonged loss of oil revenues.
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Accelerated expenditures on economic development and welfare will bring an
estimated 38% jump in imports in 1975. Although Quito has temporarily banned
automobile imports and has restricted credit financing of other purchases abroad,
it has avoided severe curbs for fear of hurting development programs and aggravating
inflation. Even if oil expc:ts are promptly resumed, a current accoant deficit of
nearly $400 million is likely.
Because foreign reserves totaled only $274 million at the end of May, Quito
will seek foreign capital to cover the deficit. It probably will be forced to rely
mainly on commercial sources. A request for $1 billion in credits from Middle
Eastern governments thus far has been ignored. (Confidential) ^
SAUDI ARABIA: AID AS A FOREIGN POLICY TOOL
though still small, part of its vast oil wealth to
pursue longstanding foreign policy goals through
aid programs. These policy goals are Arab unity,
25X6 regional stability reduction
of Soviet influence, and the creation and
strengthening of moderate governments
throughout the Arab world. King Khalid and
Crown Prince Fahd have increased both the volume
of aid commitments and the sophistication with
which aid is used as a foreign policy tool.
In the first half of 1975, Riyadh pledged $2.9
billion in new aid, compared with $2.5 billion in
all of 1974. About $1.8 billion of the new
commitments is earmarked for the Middle East
alone. Egypt continues to be the major beneficiary,
receiving $760 million in Saudi commitments in
the first half - nearly all untied aid for
balance-of-payments relief.
The granting of untied aid is a recent
development in Saudi aid practices. Under Faysal,
the Saudis followed a fairly conservative policy of
funding development projects supported by
In the months since King Faysal's death, the Saudi Arabian Aid Commitments
Saudi government has been using a growing, 1st Half 1975
Million US $
Recipient
Amount
Total
2,936.4
Middle East
1,828.8
Egypt
760.0
Iraq
200.0
Jordan
257.0
Lebanon
23.5
North Yemen
18.3
Oman
2.00.0
Syria
370.0
Africa
915.6
Algeria
400.0
Gambia
4.5
Guinea
10.0
Mauritius
34.6
Morocco
100.0
Senegal
10.0
Somalia
11..5
Uganda
St?.0
Sudan
260.0
Tunisia
35.0
Asia
192.0
Indonesia
100.0
Malaysia
70.0
r'akistan
22.0
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international organizations such as the World Bank. The shift in emphasis is an
outgrowth of Saudi Arabia's enormous financial resources and the desire to exert
more influence in the Arab world. Aid to Egypt is designed to strengthen Sadat's
moderate leaderships among other Arabs The recent
pledge of $200 million in aid to Baghdad is intended to encourage Iraqi political
moderation and perhaps helped in arranging a 50/50 division of the former
Saudi/Iraqi neutral zone. A desire to resolve a border dispute probably also played
a role in the Saudi decision in May to grant $200 million to Oman - so far,
with inconclusive results.
Regional political stability is a key consideration in Saudi aid to both the
Yemens. The Saudis have been traditional sources of a:d for the Yemen Arab
Republic and reportedly are considering giving $300 million in military assistance
to the regime. Sandi delay in reaching a decision recently prompted San'a to
threaten to turn agai,: to tl;e USSR for aid. Riyadh has given further assurances
that aid will be forthcoming.
At Cairo's urging, the Saudis have improved relations with the People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen
-. Substantial addi*ional aid to the PDRY is unlikely, since it will not adopt
more moderate policies just to please the Saudis.
The recent unpublicized transfer of $400 million to Algiers probably
represented an effort to encourage Algerian moderation in OPEC councils and at
the next Producer-Consumer Conference. An alternative, much less likely
explanation is that the sum is earmarked for eventual relending to Egypt, to satisfy
earlier Algerian aid promises to Cairo.
Political considerations have been instrumental in Saudi denials of several loan
requests. Riyadh turned down Morocco's request for $80 million in military aid
for the liberation of Spanish Sahara because of indications that Spain plans to
give up the Sahara shortly. A Libyan request for a reported $200 million was
rejected out of hand owing to the strained relations and conflicting ideology of
the regimes. Although the Saudis probably will approve project aid of up to $100
million for South Korea, no balance of payments relief will be forthcoming _ 25X6
Where political considerations are not dominant, the Saudis leave generally
pursued their traditional, conservative lending policies. Riyadh shelved an Indian
request for financing of a major power project, indicating that it might consider
smaller protects already screened by the World Bank. The Saudis also leave rejected
an Ecuadorean request for nearly $700 million unless guarantees from international
financial institutions are obtained. (Secret No Foreign Dissem)^
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Although OPEC economic aid to the LDCs continues to grow, a few donors
and recipients account for most of the assistance, and credit terms are stiffening.
OPEC countries disbursed $4.5 billion in bilateral aid to LDCs in the first half
of 1975, compared with $3 billion in all of 1974. An addition:~l $1. l billion was
funneled to multilateral aid institutions, mainly the IMF Oil Facility. Financial
transfers to special ~~rab funds and regional development banks have been small.
httra-Arab flows have accounted for about 701, of bilateral aid to LDCs so far
this year. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait alone disbursed about $ ] .9 billion in newly
committed funds, mainly to Egypt. Intra-Arab transfers under 1974 commitments
reached more than $1 billion and consisted almost entirely of Rabat "war chest"
grants for Egypt, Syria, and Jordan.
Iranian disbursements have jumped mainly because of large prepayments to
Communist countries. Romania, Bulgaria, and North Korea together have received
some $680 million in payments against f~;cure delivery of goods needed to support
Tehran's development goals. Egypt is the only other major recipient of bilateral aid
from Iran.
Bilateral aid to non-oil LDCs* totaled only $295 million in the first half.
Tr..nstcrs from OPEC-funded multilateral institutions provided an additional $935
million. Nearly all of this sum was channeled through the IMF Oil Facility, which
provided $590 million for Spain, Turkey, and Chile alone.
Impact on Non-Oil i.. "~r
OPEC bilateral and multilateral aid has been covering a little less than one-third
of the 510 hil{ion increase in non-oil LDC import bills that has resulted from higher
oil prices. Some of the poorer countries, particularly Moslem states such as
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, North Yemen, and Pakistan, have fared well. OPEC aid to
other hard-hit countries-India, for example-has barely made a dent in skyrocketing
oil bills.
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Non-oil LDCs designated by the
United Nations as most seriously affected
drew about $2 billion in aid from OPEC
countries and OPEC-funded sources in
1974. So far this year, they have received
only $415 million, and this downward
trend is likely to continue until nev:
sources of OPEC concessional aid are avail-
able. Moss of the more advanced LDCs in
Latin America and East Asia have had to
draw Heavily on foreign reserves to meet
their oil bills.
OPEC pledges of bilateral economic
aid to the LDCs and to multilateral agen-
cies totaled $10.3 billion in the first half of
1975, compared with $9.2 billion in the
second half of 1974. More than half of the
new bilateral pledges involve cash or com-
modity assistance that can be transferred
rapidly; the remainder consists of project
aid that will take considerably longer to
implement. We expect OPEC bilateral dis-
bursements and payments to multilateral
agencies to rise to $8 billion in 1975, up
from $5 billion last year.
Non-0il LDCs Able to Cover
a Substantial Share of Higher
Oil Costs Through OPEC Aid
Projected
1974
1975
Afghanistans
100+
100+
Bangladeshi
100+
100+
Jordan
100+
100+
North Yemeni
100+
100+
Pakistani
100+
100i~
Somaliai
100+
100+
Sudani
100+
100+
Ugandan
100+
100+
Costa Rica
79
100+
Zaire
:'
100+
Lebanon
100+
88
Malagasy Republica
41
82
Guyanas
33
78
Mauritanian
92
77
South Yemeni
100+
71
Senegaln
59
69
El Salvadora
58
63
Nicaragua
9
57
Hondurans
54
54
Malii
92
50
Chada
l00
36
Sri Lankaa
98
36
Ethiopian
52
33
Tanzanian
68
15
Togo
50
13
Guineas
100
5
Uruguay
91
....
Because several OPEC members have
seen their current account surpluses decline
or disappear in recent months, Saudi
Arabia, Iran, and Kuwait account 1'or 80Io
1. Excluding any transfers through multilateral
institutions in second half.
2. ]ncluded in UN List of countries most seriously
affected by higher prices for essential imports.
of new bilateral commitments. The range of recipients has remained narrow;
two-thirds of the pledges so far in 1975 have gone to Middle Eastern and South
Asian countries, especially Egypt, Syria, and Afghanistan. At the same time, outright
~?ants have dropped to abo~.tt one-fifth of bilateral aid flows, down from one-third
last year.
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 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RI~c~~T00608R000500140027-4
OPEC Countries: Estimated Economic Aid' to LDCs, by Donor
Disbursements
Pledge
s
Bilateral
Multilateral
Bilateral
Multilateral
2d Half
1st Half
2d Half
1st Half
Zd Half
1st Half
2d Half
1st Half
1974
1975
1974
1975
1974
1975
1974
1975
Total
1,839.5
4,514 ~
1,809
1,121
4,911.4
7,098.1
4,332
3,163
Abu Dhabi (UAE)
292.9
316.6
147
51
902.2
625.5
280
6
Algeria
11.0
15.0
67
6
17.5
2.8
51
17
Indonesia
....
....
....
6
....
1.0
31
....
Iran
330.5
805.0
258
129
605.1
1,455.5
720
500
Iraq
68.5
219.6
63
7
268.5
567.5
16
11
Kuwait
250.7
950.0
265
129
527.9
1,305.1
587
264
Libya
47.0
6.9
131
....
177.1
152.9
229
....
Nigeria
0.6
1.4
....
98
1.2
1.4
121
29
Qatar
57.5
106.8
15
....
310.7
21.3
20
....
Saudi Arabia
765.8
2,040.2
602
427
1,917.5
2,936.4
1,651
1,584
Venezuela
15.0
52.2
260
268
183.7
28.6
626
752
1. Excluding credits carrying maturities of less than five years, bond purchases, and private assistance.
2. Including all money pledged to the IMF Oil Facility, part of which may be disbursed to developed countries.
Pledges ~o multilateral institutions, which reached $3.2 billion in the first half,
consist mostly of OPEC support for the IMF Oil Facility and Venezuela's
contribution to a special Trust Fund managed by the Inter-American Development
Bank. We estimate that at least $3 billion more will be pledged in the second half
through capital subscriptions to the IMF, the new $1 billion International Ftln~ for
Agricultural Development, and the Third Window of the Worid Bank.
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Secrat
OPEC Countries: Estimated Bilateral Economic Aid to LDCs, by Recipient*
2d Half
1st Half
rd Half
1st Half
1974
1975
1974
1975
Total
1,839.5
4,514.7
4,911.4
7,098.1
Africa
305.7
451.8
434.8
1,424.1
Algeria
....
400.0
13.5
454.1
Burunei
....
....
....
1.0
Chad
3.0
....
....
....
Ethiopia
1.0
....
....
....
Gabon
15.0
....
15.0
....
Gambia
1.1
....
....
4.5
Guinea
32.0
1.0
10.0
15.0
Guinea-Bissau
....
N.A.
0.5
N.A.
Lesotho
....
....
....
1.0
Malagasy Republic
....
....
3.0
....
Mali
1.0
1.2
2.1
35.3
Mauritania
2.5
5.5
12.5
15.2
Morocco
57.6
1.0
8.1
160.4
Niger
3.1
....
3.1
....
Rwanda
....
....
....
5.5
Senegal
15.0
....
33.0
10.0
Somalia
13.1
19.4
39.5
56.9
Sudan
12.5:
2.8
59.4
465.2
Tanzania
0.3
....
112.0
14.4
Togo
2.0
....
....
....
Tunisia
6.0
....
6.8
58.8
Uganda
27.6
4.9
15.1
125.8
Upper Volta
....
....
....
I.0
Zaire
....
16.0
100.0
....
Zambia
....
....
1.2
....
East Asia
????
200.0
3.0
671.0
Indonesia
....
100.0
....
300.0
Laos
....
....
....
1.0
Malaysia
....
....
....
170.0
North Korea
....
100.0
....
200.0
North Vietnam
....
....
3.0
....
Europe
S.0
75~.^
425.0
580.0
Bulgaria
....
160.0
....
160.0
Malta
5.0
....
5.0
....
Romania
....
420.0
420.0
....
Yugoslavia
....
175.0
....
420.0
(Continued on next page)
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Secref
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cret
OPEC Countries: Estimated Bilateral Economic Aid to LDCs, by Recipient ~
(Continued)
Million US $
Disburseme
nts
Pled
ges
2d Half
1974
1st HaL~
1975
2d Half
1974
1st Half
1975
Latin America
15.2
68.2
188.7
29.6
Costa Rica
....
4.6
18.6
....
El Salvador
....
6.0
29.1
....
Grenada
0.2
1.0
....
1.0
Gcatemala
....
8.0
37.8
....
Guyana
15.0
18.8
5.0
....
Honduras
....
5.0
44.6
....
Jamaica
....
....
....
28.6
Nicaragua
....
5.5
20.4
....
Panama
....
19.3
33.2
....
Middle East
983.3
2,862.7
3,118.0
3,509.5
Bahrain
14.0
5.8
87.9
35.0
Cyprus
0.1
....
0.1
....
Egypt
480.0
1,876.4
1,870.6
1,760.2
Iraq
....
100.0
....
200.0
Jordan
114.5
198.4
181.2
309.5
Lebanon
3.0
1.8
27.9
38.5
North Yemen
67.7
10.3
51.1
77.7
Oman
29.9
102.0
....
268.5
South Yemen
24.1
6.8
69.1
79.1
Syria
250.0
561.2
580.1
741.0
Turkey
....
....
250.0
....
South Asia
530.3
177.0
741.9
883.9
Afghanistan
17.8
15.0
88.3
719.0
Bangladesh
62.5
62.0
153.5
29.0
India
....
N.A.
33.8
98.6
Nepal
....
....
....
0.3
Pakistan
405.0
100.0
354.0
37.0
Sri Lanka
44.0
....
112.3
....
(Secret No Foreign Dissecn)
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Secret
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140027-4
ECONOMIC INDICAT'OI~S
Prepared by
The Office of Economic Research
July 16,1975
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 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140027-4
The Eco~:omit Indicators provide up-to-date information on changes
in the domestic and external economic activities of the major non-
communist developed countries. To the extent possible, the Economic
Indicators are updated from press ticker and Embassy reporting, so that
the results are made available to the reader weeks - or sometimes months -
before receipt of official stiatistical publications.
Commenis and queries regarding the Economic Indicators are
welcomed. They may be directed to the Office of
Economic Research, Code 143, Extension 7402 or 351-7402.
Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140027-4
 25X6
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Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140027-4
 INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS PRICES MonthlyAuer,lg6 Cash PFICO
40
July 1972 1973 1974 1975
100 r
LME US
14 Jul 5G.2 GU,G
7 Jul 53.8 6D.G
Jun75 54,1 G2.3
Jul 1A 87.3 85.G
ZINC 6 Per Pound
Approved For Release 2000109114 :CIA-FT~~8R000500140027-4
~ Monthly Au6rano Cash Price
LME US
14 Jul 16.3 19.0
1Jul 15.5 190
Jun75 16.0 19.5
Ju174 24.8 24.5
16114 50.0 34,8
0
July 1912 1913 1974
150 r
LME US
14 Jul 32.2 38,5
7 Jul 32.1 38.5
Jun75 33.8 38.5
Ju174 50.0 34.U
STEEL SCRAP $ Per long Ton
LME US
14Ju1 3D1.5 318.5
1 Jul 306.7 330.5
Jun75 314.0 342.4
Ju174 3868 426.II
July 1972 1973 1974
500 r
10
15D
LME US
14Ju1 16.3 19.0
1 Jul 15.6 19.11
Jun 75 1 D.0 I D.5
Ju174 24.8 24.5
LME US
14 Jul 307 5 328.5
1 Jul 306.7 330.5
Jun75 314.0 342A
Ju174 386.8 42D15
SELECTED MATERIALS
Aluminum Major US Prod., ulh
Sleet Comporile,$AT
ImnOre Non6essemer0ldAange,$!tT
Chrome Gre Auuian, Brtd1
Chrome Ora S. Auice, ShT
Ferrochmme US Chmge, tAh
Nickel Mejer U9 Pmd. Celhade, SM
Manganese Ore 49%Mn., $2T
Tungsten Ore A5%W03, $4;T
Mercury NY, $I761h Flask
Silver LME rash, drroy Or
Jen 14
2s.oD
212.13
12.16
36.00
33.50
22.50
1.62
52.eD
2,872.40
275.54
360.29
NR
14 Jul 32.0
1 Jul 31.5
Jun15 29.5
Jul 74 35.2
_ Jon 73
25.U0
209,86
I1,9fi
45,15
25.50
7DDo
1.53
a1.4D
z241sD
282,50
200.15
SR
NA
NA
NA
23.6
97D=100
0
us
14 Jul NA
7 Jul 59.67
Jun75 G8.94
Jul 74 12fi,3U
July 1972 1973 1914 1975
t Appmsimales world marker price Irequently used by major world producers and traders,
olthough only small quamitias al these metals are actually waded on the LME.
i Producers' price, covers most primary metals sold in iha Unilad Slates.
3 Ouoted on New York markal. 4 Camposile price for Chicago, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh,
S S?type styrene, US Las. eapert price. A?6
MP USD
14 Jul 155.D 153,5
1 Jul 15S.D 163.5
Jun75 155.0 14L9
Ju174 195.0 19111
LME U5
1 Jul 53.8 GO,G
uu75 54.1 12.3
d174 87.3 U5.6
LME US
4 Jul 32.2 38.5
;7 Jul 32.1 38.5
Approved For Release 2006~~"I~~H~IA-
10D
producers and traders,
d an the LME.
0?'~O~f~(4mOd00140027-4
MP usD
14 Jul 155,0 153.5
1 Jul 155,0 153.5
Jun75 155.0 14L9
Ju174 195.0 190.1
Current Jan 75
39.00 39.00
289.23 289,59
18.14 17,00
135,00 107.35
57.50 51.50
53,50 52.50
2.81 2.01
s7,2D B7aD
4,093.98 ,308.02
145.00 227.73
459.80 422.2D~
Thia is a compiled indas
by the Economist for 19
raw materiels which
enter imemetional Credo.
Commodities ere
weighted by 3~year morlag
averages of imports into
induslrieli=ed ccunirios,
16 JULY 19]5
566693 ] 15
 AGRICUITURAI PRICES Maothly AvaroOa each Price
WHEAT
Aonaoa Ciry No, 2 Nord Winter
D I I I I t't41JUL I
SOYBEANS
Chicago No.l Yellow
0
July 1972 1973 1974
1.0 r
D I I I I 1.141JUt I
14 Jul 3,04
1 Jul 3.15
Jun75 3.25
ul 14 4,34
Approved For Release 2000109114 :CIA-RDP
SUGAR
Warld Aaw New York No.11
14 Jul 5.80 25
7 Jul 5.18
Jun75 5.15
Ju114 8,80
14 Jul 0.4075
7 Jul 0.4775
Jun75 0.4521
Ju114 0.5000
0
July 1912 1913 1974 1915
15r
1974 ~N975
152.1
1? JUL
14 Jul 18.50
1 Jul 14,50 50
Jun15 13,83
Ju174 25.40
14 Jul
18,5D
14 Jul
75.00
1 Jul
14,59
5D
7 Jul
89.00
Jun75
13,83
Jun75
83.49
Ju174
25.4D
Ju174
108.90
;~ 14 Jul 0.4515
r 14 Jul 52,39
14 Jul 52.79
f
I -' 7 Jul 0.4775
1 Jul 52.00
1 Jul 52.00
150
'Jun75 D.4521 55
Jun75 53.99
Jun75 53.99
z
FJul74 0.5880
1 Ju174 11,75
52
Ju174 71.75
.
I I I s. aw 9
25~ I I I 1.14 JUL I
I
July 1972 1973 1914 1975
$ Por cwt.
f.o.6, mills, Houston, Tas,
7 Jul 19.50
30Jun 19.50
Jun15 19.50
Jul 14 26.50
COCOA a Par Pou:.d
Ohenaian n~ New York price
FOOD INDEX
1D0
SUGAR
World Aew New Yark No.11
rI
0
1.14 JUL
L_
This is r. compiled index
by the Oconomisl far 16
loud commodities which
solar international trade,
Commodities ere
weighted by 3?year moving
auere0os of imports into
industrielired countries.