ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 9, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 15, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Economic Intelligence Weekly
Secret
ER EIW 75-2
15 January 1975
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15 January 1976
Trade Talks Move Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
OPEC Invastmort in Dollars Grows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Developed Countries: Overhang of Inventories . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Developed Countries: Shambles In Housing Constructicn . . . . . . . . 10
Sugar Prices Tumble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
USSR: Problems Mount at the Kama Truck Plant . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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The Buildup in Inventories that has thus far softened the slump in major
industrial countries wall be a drag on recovery. Above-normal accumulations since
yearend 1971 are estimated at about $35 billion for Japan, equal to 8% of 1974
GNP. In Canada, the overhang is 2% of GNP.
The Slowdown in Italy and West Germany rtes been confirmed by recent GNP
data. Italy grew at 3.9% last year, compared with 5.4% in 1973. Germany grew
at only 0.4% in 11974, down from 5.3%. We expect a further slowing of Italy's
growth rate and a gradual upturn in West Germany's growth rate.
As a Followup to the World Food Conference, the United States has proposed
a meeting on 10-11 February of 20 major grain exporters and importers to develop
a coordinated system of nationally held reserves. Most of the large importers will
stress the use of reserves to stabilize prices rather than solely to assure supplies.
Several invitees have reservations about such a meeting in a forum outside the
Multilateral Trade Negotiations.
The IMF Proposal To Lend Up to $14 Billion in 1975 to meet members'
oil needs has the strong support of EC and Japanese finance ministers at the current
No IC. l'ummenI% mid (I tic rcr?jrdIIIr Ilse Feonnnrir Inie?//i a?nre HIreAI ' ate %%c I. umed. ' 1 IIcy I I I a ) 114: dIIei led
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Func meeting In Washington. The plan would recycle the equivalent of only about
20`31, of OPEC surplus reserves this year and would take care of an even smaller
share of the developed countries' deficits. Most countries can :,till be oxpoctod
to sock bilateral loans from OPEC members.
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TRADE TALKS MOVE FORWARD
Multilateral trade discussions continue in Geneva next week, in the wake of
the enitctnrent of the US 'Trade Act of 1974. In spite of' the precipitous rise in
oil prices and emergence of widespread stalgllalion since tlho Tokyo discussions of
1973, sonic of the basic positions of the participants remain unchanged. Certain
countries will doubtless voice concern about liberalizing trade in the midst of
recession. i)il'ferences over the use of export controls will also emerge.
Major Issues
Rising concern is evident within the FC, particularly in France and Italy, that
new trade concessions will increase domestic unemployment. In this connection,
the I:uropean and Japanese ptess characterize the US Trade Act as a "double-edged
sword" with protectionist previsions that could be invoked if the economic decline
continue,.
Assured access to goods in short supply has become a major issue since the
Tokyo conference. Japan and the EC favor substantial limitations ,n the use of
export controls. Canada and Australia regard control over raw watenal supplies
as their main bargaining chip and will probably use their leverage in this area to
obtain concessions in others. LDCs prize their newfound market power and will
try to maximize their benefits without conceding any freedom to restrict supplies.
Objectives of Developed Countries
Overall, the EC has more limited objectives in the trade negotiations than
does the United States. The Community views the talks as a means of prc-:e ving
economic peace with the United States and avoiding a trade war. The IC has
two basic aims: preservation of Community institutions and maintenance of trade
peace. The EC will push for harmonization of tariff's on industrial goods (reducing
high tariffs by a greater percentage than low tariffs) and for international agreements
covering major agricultural commodities. While it recognizes that it may have to
make concessions on some commodities, the EC intends to preserve the basic
principles of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
The Community position will represent a compromise between the limited
objectives of the French and the more liberal aims of the British and Germans.
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? Pails views the FC as ar) integrated, independent grouping that should
he largely free of external influence. It regards the Conrrnon External
Tariff (('X'I') and (lie CAP as linchpins of Furopean unity and will resist
any changes that would weaken these. As the French see it, the
harmonization principle could involve raising as well as lowering tariffs.
? Bonn believes that tariffs should be cut appreciably and that
harmonization is not an end in itself'. West Germany is more willing than
Prance to negotiate on agriculture since it is disenchanted will) various
aspects of' the CAP. While the Germans support the idea of world
commodity agreements, they oppose the inclusion of food aid and
internationally supervised storage facilities in such arrangements.
? London shares Bonn's positions on tariff's and agriculture. Though
favorably dispcsed towards the talks, tht, British feel that current
economic uncertain ties could stifle progress at Geneva.
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span favors uniform percentage reductions in tariffs on all industrial
products and supports the concept of agricultural commodity agreements. Tile
Canadians want to negotiate tariff reductions sector by sector rather than to apply
an overall 1'orntula. While Ottawa is closer to the United States than to the EC
position on agriculture, preferring freer market access for agricultural products,
it probably will not vigorously oppose the Community proposals.
The less developed countries are expected to insist on preferential application
of any new trade arrangements. They are concerned about market access for their
products and the effects of t,jriff reductions on advantages conferred by trade
preferences. They are likely to pish hard for improvements in the generalized
system of preferences.
Exclusion of OPEC members from the trade preference provisions of the US
Trade Act has evoked sharp criticism from many LDCs, particularly in Lat;nn
America. Venezuela and Ecuador protest that they have not restricted oil supplies
to the United States and that their exclusion from the generalized pref-,:relices
offered non-OPEC DCs undermines hemispheric cooperation.
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Holdings by OPEC states of dollar assets, including Eurodollars, quadrupled
during the first nine months of 1974 to at least $34 billion. Unless OPEC members
reduce their share of investment in dollar assets, their dollar holdings will approach
$100 billion by the end of 1975.
The foreign official assets of the OPEC states grew from $21 billion at the
end of' 1973 to $52 billion at the end of' the third quarter of' 1974.
Dollar-denominated holdings increased from about $8 billion, 40'%~ of the total,
to at least $34 billion, or nearly two-thirds of' the total.
The growing concentration in dollar holdings reflects both the ability of
international dollar markets to satisfy OPEC investment goals and the lack of
attractive alternatives. The depth and versatility of the Eurodollar and US capital
markets have enabled producers to retain effective control over their investment,
to earn a reasonable return, and to minimize the risk of' political seizure. Investment
in other currencies has been constrained by greater concern over devaluation (as
in the case of sterling), by capital controls, and by the limited size of domestic
markets.
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Prospects
The size of the dollar markets assures a continued heavy inflow of OI'I:C
investments, Assuming stable oil price:; and output, foreign official holdings of'
OPEC states should increase by about $60 billion in 1975. II' the share of'
investment in dollars remains unchanged, OPEC dollar holdings will grow to almost
$100 billion, Even in the event of a sharp decline in US and Eurodollar short-term
interest rates, we would not expect a substantial drop in the share of OPEC wealth
going into dollar assets
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: OVERHANG OF INVENTORIES
The continuing buildup in inventories in major industrial countries, while
softening the slump, poses an obstacle to early recgvery.
In each of the five countries for which data are available, the real value of
additions to stocks from the spring of 1973 to the fall of M4 74 exceeded the
real increment in GNP -- a rare phenomenon. If it had not been for stock-building,
GNP would have dropped in most of these countries during the last three quarters
of 1973 inst.;ad of merely showing a smaller rate of growth. In 1974, the continued
accumulation of stocks moderated the leveling off or decline of GNP experienced
in these countries. By contrast, inventories plummeted in 1958, the last recession
to bring a drop in the abgregrate GNP of the major industrial countries.
In the earlier part of the econu.nic slowdown. firms continued to build stocks
because they expected demand to revive quickly Moreover, material shortages and
accelerating inflation made stock-building attractive. In 1974, the drop in final
demand was so abrupt that sales slumped even more than output, resultiiig in an
unplannned increase in stocks.
Japan has had th- most pronounced buildup in ir,"entories. In the first nine
months of 1974, $15 biliion worth of stocks (at 1973 prices) were added while
GNP was suffering a cumulh.tive loss of $6 billion. Since early 1972, accumulation
of inventories in excess of the historic stock/output norm has totaled about
$35 billion - a figure equal to 8% of annual GNP.
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Changos in Stocks and GNP'
9IIIInn 1073 US $ (seerotlally arlluetod)
KEY
Change III GNP over pravlous quarter
NU hanpo In Stocks over previous qunrtor
-3
-5
I II III IV I II III IV I II III
1972 1373 19'14
I II III IV I II III IV I II III
1972 1973 1974
I II III IV I II III IV I II
1972 1973 1974
1 Each graph is scaled according to the relative size of the country's GNP.
584975 1.75
I II III IV I II III IV I II 111
1972 1973 1974
I II III IV I II III IV I II III
1972 1973 1974
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Cumulativo Abnormal Additions to Stocks'
I II III IV I II III IV I II III
1972 1973 1974 10
IV I II III IV I II m
1073 1974
I II III IV I II III IV I II III
1972 1973 1974
West Germany
I II III IV I II III IV I II III
1972 1973 1974
NOTE: Defined as the difference between total additions to stocks and the rod
t 1
1 II III IV 1 II III IV I II III
1972 1973 1974
changes in final demand (GNP minus stock changes) and the long -term marginal stock/nut ratio.
r Each graph is scaled according to the relative size of the country's GNP.
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In C'rarada, inventory accumulation ran at normal levels through 1973.
Stock-building subsequently has accelerated even though the GNI' growth rate has
plunged. By September 1974, abnormal accumulations of goods equaled 2'/? of
annual GNI'.
In Nest Germany and the United Kingdwn, inventory accumulation has been
erratic. Stocks were drawn down in the first quarter of 1974 because of increased
foreign demand for German products and the three-day work week in the United
Kingdom. In the next two quarters, stocks grew rapidly. In September, the excess
accumulation was still less than 1'/, of GNP in both countries.
The timing and pace of economic recovery in these countries will depend
heavily on how rapidly industry tries to bring stocks back to desired levels. If
business chooses to liquidate stocks before final demand revives, the current
recession will be deepened but recovery will be more rapid once begun. If firms
hold stocks constant and allow an increase in demand to gradually improve the
stock/output ratio, below-normal stock accumulations will act as a drag on recovery.
Housing construction in major developed countries is experiencing one of its
sharpest downturns in 30 years and faces continuing hard times in 1975.
Housing starts began to fill off in several countries in 1973 because of
overbuilding and rising construction costs. The problem deepened in 1974 when
costs rose further and tight money kept many consumers and builders out of the
market. Japan, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States have
been the hardest hit so far.
Country Situations
Housing starts in Japan were down 36% in the second quarter of 1974 from
a year earlier and picked up only slightly in the third quarter. Although dismissals
of workers have been limited by the Japanese police of providing lifetime jobs,
unemployment has increased considerably faster in construction than in other
sectors.
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Developed Countries: Trends In Residential Construction'
WEST GERMANY
A1A
I II III IV 1 II III I II 111 IV I II III
1073 1074 1073 1074
FRANCE
JAPAN US
13.7 102
-2A 9 -223
ITALY
11.6
50 61
(Percent)
UK
04
CANADA
10.6 11.0 9.2
A.6
-201 -210
-24,1 -204
-23.6
I II III IV 1 11 111
1973 1974
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The u'r.v, (:rrnrna huuvinlt wtusfruction industry. Ionlt accusttwmrtl to boom
conditions, has Ji11Imd hadly since late I'17:3, 1lnuvinlt staffs weir If 4I',i by the
lust quarter ul' 1974 and have remained far heluw I'17,1 levels. A shift cal
construction workers to nonresidential 11rujecfs held lilt, III llloyntenf in cutlsllllc'liull
In the third tlttarler to or five lintel the year-earlier level.
In the Unl(rd tiingdonr, huusinle stares dropped by ahntil one-fuorllt in 1974,
Mortgage rates of 14', -ICI-I/~'; were a major factor in the decline, Iln(-ml)loymenl
in the ConstIIICI un intlusity has been runttinl! at 14';-, accuunlinp fur one-filth
oI' the national fo181.
Developed Countries:
Interest Rates for Mortgage Money
564991 1.75
! I I I I I I I I
0
1 II III IV 1 II 111 IV I 11 111
1972 1973 1974
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Kurat
/''carne iq the ont? 111:lior t titiIitly ill which 1t +ident al building li.i, held up
wrll, 111C industry I';1q bcnclifttl Irui, 1!'ivrrl-1tieiif hou,ing subsidies ;nail, 1111111
rrcrntly, flit, rc0110111y'q strong Ilrtfill n,:111cr, I ttiplnymeIll has hrt?n prnl'prd up
by public works profccls,
(11 l/gl1', lionising conslniclio11 beg6n In drop ill I1174 otter a gclleralIV gtlnlig
showing! alit, previous Year, housing starts d-opped by '~' - ill 111, srrnnd tluarlet,
cllltlllaretl with the salve Illiarler of I'173 ?- itself a stilt period, '111C decline has
prompted Ilse Tn?asilry to reduce the tligeuunt role ho 8,;",
In Canada. housing construction remained brisk until flit, second hoarier o1'
I974. BY September. starts had plunlmnted 24';; (runt Mt, 1'17.1 level. partly because
ol' a perccntagt, point rise in nlorlgage
Even with an easing of' credit in 1975. recovery in housing construction will
he impeded by the Minch on real incomes, general economic uncertainty. and prices
that place homes beyond the reach of 111,1uy families. I'ven when the job market
improves and the econortlic climate brightens. a heavy backlog of unsold dwellings
will absorb much of' the rise in demand.
Buyer rer.ist;ince in recent weeks has punctured the speculative boom and sent
world sugar prices tumbling to 3(, cents per pound f.o.b. Caribbean ports. down
from the 65-cent mid-November high. Sugar prices probably will decline further
le fore yearend because ill" slackened world demand and prospf: 1s for ;a larger sugar
crop.
The recent price drop was expo-:fed. since the November spiral seemed to
represent market overreaction to adverse crop reports and exaggerated warnings
about the 1975 supply situation. Little trading has taken place. Major importers
in the United States and Japan are curtailing purchases. Lack of market activity
suggests that most importers already have filled their requirements for at least the
first quarter of 1975.
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The rntl of (15 ;utd 11K prefrrcntial buying ;trr;u gciiients at the spars of 1975
and the shill of this tripe to the Itee market could complicate IIS and I'K
purchasing but probably will not substantially affect overall supply and demand
relationships, (Willi the end of ('ommonwcallh preference, the (Ittite(l Kingdom
has to reconcile Its policy with the sugar policy of its F.(' p..-rtuers who have a
long history of protecting domestic beet growers.) The deml c ol'these atrangemenls,
cnnibhted with last year's chaotic market contlitions, has p,ompted several sellers
to enter into long-term hilalcral agreements to insure Police markets for their sugar.
The (hosed States and the llnited Kingdom, long attunctl to preferential deliveries.
apparently have not yet contracted for all of their 1975 rcoluitcments, They may
litid thetttselves, as a result, competing for supplies in a narrowed market over
the next several months.
for the next few months, world sugar supplies will remain Iigltt because of:
? an vtticipated 21.';. drop its world production to about 79 million torts
in the I')74/75 crop year,
? an estimated 5',( reduction in free market supplies caused by smaller F('
and Fast European shipments, and
? low world stocks - equal to about I811,;, of annual consumption - which
will inhibit further drawdowns to supplement diminished production.
Prices probably will continue to move erratically over the next few months
while following a gradual downward trend from their present exaggerated level.
Iligh prices for sugar and deepening recession in major importing countries will
continue to exert downward pressure on demand. On the supply side, prospects
for an increased I975/76 harvest should bring prices down by next fall to the
20-30-cent range. Iliglt prices have induced an expansion of sugar acreage, and.
given average weather in Europe and the USSR. 1975/76 output will exceed the
1973/74 record of 80.4 million tons.
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%crsf
USSR: PROBLEMS MOUNT AT THE KAMA TRUCK PLANT
Startup of production at the sprawling Kama Truck I'luirl, scheduler) h- he
the largest heavy truck plant hr the world, is being delayer) beyond the I971.75
plan period by planning errors, crnnstruction mistakes, and disliust of, Western
contractors. I)il'ficullies at Kama are forcing the USSR to order additional
Iw,rvy-duly trucks ill the West ;nett to post fume plans I'or -molher giant truck plant
at Krasnoyar,i., in Siberia.
Initial production of the 8- to I I-ton diesel trucks was first planned for 1974,
recently reset for 1970, and now seems unlikely before 1978. Dull-wale production
(150,000 trucks and 250,00( diesel engines per year) may not be possible before
the end of (lie 1976.80 Plan.
Too hasty mid Too Secretive
Kama officials, under intense pressure to built) the complex and rut it in
operation by 1975, began construction before the engineering layout and the
selection of production equipment had been completed by Western suppliers. The
attempt to carry out design and construction concurrently have resulteti in lost
time. higher costs, and the tying up of enormous investment resources. The Soviets
have not been able to capitalize, as expected, on the experience gained in building
the TolyatIi Passenger Car Plant. Design, construction, and procurement of
equipment at TolyatIi was carried out under close supervision of Fiat.
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Repercussions
Failure to start Kama up on schedule already has had wide repercussions.
The Krasnoyarsk 'T'ruck Plant, which the Soviets were planning to build in Siberia
during 1976-50, has been postponed indefinitely. Moscow is buying Inge numbers
of trucks in the West to till immediate needs, in particular for long-haul transport
and for Siberian devc',)pment. West Germany over the next two years will supply
10,000 heavy diesel trucks worth nearly $400 million, Japan will furnish 4,000
to 5,000, and other Western countries (including the United States) are likely to
supply an additional 1,000 to 2,000. The experience at Kama shows that the Soviets
have overestimated their engineering capabilities anti have not advanced nearly so
far as they had thought on the basis of the Tolyatti experience
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Oil I)ollnrs for the Pun Adrill Pipeline
Kuwait 's ;l g ree nun n l Tho Pan Adrla OHH Pipollno
with Yugoslavia on O Janu-
ary to finance one-third of'
the reel of the Pa ii A,1.?;.,
,J- k
pipeline illustrates the grow- n/~11\14re./
ing commitment (,I' I)Cfro? - -~~ HUN,
dollars to I:aslerll l;lirope.
The 400-mile pipeline, to be N gl(?~ NnrSad
Omh~p, fhncero
111111( ill Ill CS(II)lil1C(I C(-SC M
S43() million, will carry oil
from the Adriatic port of
( /1
Onlisal.j to refineries in Yu- l I
goslavia. !Itit, varv_ an(I
('iechoslovaki;l. About 480.000 b/d of the 660,00() b/d scheduled to flow through
the pipeline annually will be delivered within Yugoslavia. Financial details o(' the
agreement are to he worked out next month.
noommo n,od
VUGO.
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INDUSTRIAL, PRODUCTION I
INI)I X 1!I70 Moodily AvaIaua- I (o (I
GNP'
AvPraq. Annual Ihnwth (ta)r !Inn a
t'Pll,nl+l (,llnoupn
I nlP~l huru lYPVr!mv I YPI,t I Muni lw
Mnntll Mnnlh 191!1 I alhnr 1 alhrl
Ort 74
(1O
Nov 74
35
23 70
7(11
I
Oc114 (
O1
53
04 4 t
S.mdouudhmlc Sc.)rr i
1975
RETAIL SALES'
Cnntlanl M4t1Pt (rtlcri
Avn Ppr Annual Cl nwlh nab Smu
Comilmni Pistol
t'r u? 1 Chang
I atnl
b?m 1`nr+nut I Yral
Plrrmua
United States
74 III
05
32 2 2
-2 t
United Slates
Japan
14111
-02
53 -39
08
Japan
West Germany
74 III
05
2 9 03
1 9
West Germany
France
1411
01
54 30
02
France
United Kingdom
74 III
1 0
2 1 06
4 2
Uni' d Kingdom
Italy
7411
02
38
40
0 7
Italy
Canada
74 III
0
5 3
4 I
0
Ca?ada
A~
naU. Annul Gn+nlh nalr Smr
r'rrlr
I r1r0 6nm
nI tna-..
I,n+r+,i
I Yrar 1 Month,
hlrnlh M
nmh 1
'1711
Nov 14
1
38
1 4
83
15 7
lug 74
01
10
-103
60
Sop 74
2 8
2 a
0
50
Sop 74
1
00
09
7,2
-13
Nov 74
04
28
-0 1
8 5
Aug74
22
05
05
103
Sop 74
3 7
4 5
3 4
56
dd
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A?1 Note: US data provided by US government agencies
15 JANUARY 1975
Footnotes appear on page A?4.
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DOMESTIC PRICES'
INIII X 111111 Monthly Avnlagn- 1(111
Aval ago Annnal (towlh IIf!o ennp
Po t all! I.Ilanno
I ainU Ilnm flay,,,,,, I Ywrr ! Mnutlw
Mnnllr Mrnnh I!I111 lalh"r Iallinl
11.1 j 170 750 71111
.I!1 N9 14!1 I;III
I (I I I II 111 7 71 7
Nov14i I1
WAGES IN MANUFACTURING 1.4
United States
lalry' ""' Pvrrmrv 1 Yau ;I Monlht
Man,A Mnnth 19111
Eul?ar tarhar J
I O!c 14 I 0 2 c 7 At
rnnrnr Lhan n
1.111( Irnm Prvrmuv I yo.,
Month (!1111 arinr
Japan
I Sep 74 I 03 ' 100 102 00
J
i
1
apan
I See 74 2 1
71 Y 11,
Weal Germany
Fr
Oct 74 ! -03 90 95 ' 101 West Germany
174 111 20
112 120
ance
Sep 74 13 114 81 i -80 France
74111 BO
138 205
United Kingdom
Nov 74 04 84 47 83
United Kin
dom
Italy
Y
g
Jun 74
1 5
Aug 74 68
142 1 102
C
i
205 150 18 1 1181y
Sep 74 0 1
I
176 19 4
anal; Nov 74 01 115 89 -36 Canada
Au 74
,,roved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000
15 JANUARY 1p
500140002-10 9 15 2
A-2
1 Months
F AIIiIr )
345
81
284
333
2490
18
 FOREIG~pTMQgd For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP86T00608R00050g11,4Qp,Q2-1
BASIC BALANCE 5
Current end long Term Capital Transactions
Chaney
Semllogenthmlc Scale
1975
(Inl,1n1 n
9.11117
1 l I'~
11!1:1117
(?111:1',
91111
11 1',
!1111
.1,1')
:11,114
!dl It
111,!1411 '
13/,1!111
:11 I'
11,117!1 15.113
(3,IILti
47,719 1141111
111 I
Nnv 14 11 9111
1 :
ux1a111n .41 3,5112 1.2113 4,114!1
:1!1111 :1 1111 7!111(7 7I I
2 (1111 79 1!11
7:1 I1 i1,
7!1 2
l elr%l
tnd of
Mnnlh
P~II,on US S Jon 1970
1 o1Ir1
, oh~1
United Stites I
-3.581
4.274
-4.021
United States
Nov 14
158
Japan
Nov74 1
-311
Japan
Nov 14
137
West Germany
Oct 74
877
5,935
8,105
1 -1.300
Wrst Germany
Nov 14
32 9
France
7411
-1.036
-2.112
-515
1,597
i -
France
Jov 74
90
United Kingdom
i
74 111 '
- 1,248
-4,052
-1,485
2,587
United Kingdom
Dec 74
68
Italy Approved
Canada
(Pt r l4ele~l;
7A 11 -A&;
145
144
145
41
137
179
B B
34 1
33 1
44
80
84
2 8
60
72
17
e 1
54
43
58
58
.
200 /0W13:1t31A-RVJP86T00608R0005bUM400U2r1
813 a BOB Canada Dec 74 58
 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000500140002-1
MONEY-MARKET RATES
United Status
Japan
Wnsl Germany
France
United Kingdom
Canada
Eurodollars
EXPORT PRICES
National Currency
United Status
Japan
Wail Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
EXPORT PRICES
us 5
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
(lrplwnnlalivn Ilelny
(1an1a1 placed Ilnanca paper
Coll loolloy
IolaySnrb Inane (3 nun,1111
Coll Illicitly
51arialg Ininlllank Innne(:I nnullhyl
Ihlanca pieta(
(fine month dapualta
1 aluyl
Mnnlh
Nov 14
Nov 74
Oct 74
Jul i4
Oct 74
Aug 14
Aug 14
1,011 Pill (fain if tummy(
1 Yrar 3 Monlhy I Mnnlh
I amyl flnfo la,hrl lathy, Ialhn
Inn II 114:1 If 16 it 511 111111
Oar. 13 1:1 1111 WOO 1:1 01) 17 J, (I
Ilnc 2 rt 114:1 1:1 1111 11 411 II 1111
npc 211 17 1111 I I II II 1:1 :III 12 ()1)
(loi: 71. 17111) 11, Jill I I / 1 17 111
hoc P. I I) 10 1150 11 25 10 711
Oar, 25 1101 111(11 12 (14 1)1.211
Au.,au. Annual Gwwlh Ital. Smto
I'.,, oral I:hanun
Nom Novn I,% I Year :1 Menhir
Mnnlh 11111) 1011,01 I at tin
39 I 130 j 290 21,11
111 103
I7 00
(1 I t (1 0
no 134
53 t00
24 , 128
:111 0 50
200 147
321 I50
304 1(14
49 1 616
311 190
A,..agr Annual liruwth flair Son r
V.-I. rid Chauur
I all Inn, rrrvmut I yra, .1 Mnnlht
Mnr.lh MnnIl, I'llll laitnr tall,.,
Nov74 39 ! 130 j 296 250
Nov74 I2 149 211 -84
Oct74 44 149 124 78
Jul74 30 153 132 280
Oct14 12 120 249 -00
Aug 1 3 0 153 31 8 45 1
Aug 14 10 ' 143 1 390 52
TRADE-WEIGHTED EXCHANGE RATES6
At of 10 Jan 15
United Stales
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
r. ,,,,, Chanijr Inn?
Uri 00 18 or. 11 t'1 Ma. 73
1026 ! 689 I 027
1088 -261 1442
34 18 1694 11 82
1488 -150 397
3900 2449 989
3129 -2985 2281
557 i -099 060
3 Jan 75
011
005
-Oil
038
017
0
-084
IMPORT PRICES
National Cunancy
Aver.un Annual Nn,wlh Ilat. !imr e
I'.,, 'nl (:hams.
lal.tl Nam 1'i.vie,1,1 1 Yrar If Monnie
Mm,,f, Munch 111111 laths lather
vnrtuu ataooi Nov 74 113 10 1 45 3 1 3
Japan Nov 14 0 1 105 Bill 4 11
West Germany Oct 74 _05 on 29 5 5 9
France Jul 74 ill 159 648 20 n
United Kingdom Oct 74 15 21 0 4y, 4 to 9
Italy Aug 74 III 214 81 0 01 H
Canada Aug 74 02 11 4 31 5 11 4
EXCHANGE RATES
Spot 11.IN'
At of III Jan 15
IIS S
I'll Ilan lint fill Ill ()n, 11 19 ht.n 7.1 7 Jan 75
Japan ly.nl 00033 2055 243 1254 003
West Germany IO.ut,ct, mull 04195 6087 3519 1847 024
France Utancl 0 2280 1293 15 79 345 062
United Kingdom (pound u.rlmgl 2 3545 15 63 .9 04 .433 030
Italy (loo) 00015 -344 -1(112 1266 020
Canada ldonail 10020 863 042 043 -0 78
FOOTNOTES FOR WEEKLY INDICATORS
I S.asonalty adjusted
7 Average lot latest 3 months comper.d with average In, previous 3 months
3 Wholesale Ante rndne% tov.r industrial goods
4 Hourly .aininge for the United State, Japan and Canada
hourly wago talc for others West German and French data
tee for the beginning of the duertat
5 Converted to US dollars at the currant market at,, of exchange
6 Weighting is hard on 'ach listed country a trade with 16 other indmursht.d countries
to tailors the c:ompat,t,v, impact of orchange rata variations among the molar tunancies
15 JANUARY 175
HApproved For Release 2005/06/13 : C1-RDP86T00608R000500140002-1