WESTERN EUROPE CANADA INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000500020003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 6, 2008
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 20, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
Western Europe
Canada
International Organizations
completed
Secret
No. 0251-75
August 20, 1975
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WESTERN EUROPE - CANADA - INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with
occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
Dutch To Cut NATO Forces . . . . . . . . . . .
USSR Pessimistic About Situation in
Portugal . . . . . . . . . . . 3
General Franco's Meeting with Juan Carlos
Could Portend Policy Moves . . . . . . . . . 6
Buy British Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Greek Navy Increases Firepower . . . . . . . . 10
The Bavarians Know What Is Really
Important . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Con,-nunist-Socialist Collaboration at Center
of Italian Political Debate . . . . . . . . 15
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Dutch To Ct'.t NATO Forces
The Dutch government, under pressure to
trim the budget, informed NATO last week that
it plans to make further reductions in naval.
forces in order to reduce defense spending. The
plan, if implemented, would significantly reduce
alliance capabilities for sea surveillance and
anti-submarine warfare by January 1976.
The Hague has agreed to consult with its
allies before making any final decisions. US
embassy officials in The Hague believe that the
Dutch government may have advised NATO of the
planned reduction in order to mobilize opinion
within the alliance against such a step and strengthen
the hand of key Labor ministers who feel strongly
about The Netherlands' obligations to the alliance.
The Dutch notified NATO of their intention
to retire 15 long-range Neptune patrol aircraft
used in sea surveillance and anti-submarine d".ty
and postpone the purchase of US-built Orion aircraft
originally planned as replacements. In addition,
the Dutch flagship, a guided missile cruiser,
would be de-commissioned next month rather than
in 1977 as planned.
The NATO military committee in Brussels
is concerned that if the Dutch do reduce their
forces, the surveillance of Soviet submarine
activity in the Eastern Atlantic will be seriously
hampered. The committee previously recommended
speeding-up the Dutch replacement program and
even suggested increasing_ the number of patrol
aircraft.
In addition to serious budget difficulties
stemming from inflation and unemployment, the
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government of Prime Minister den Uyl has been
facing growing anti-militarism as well. Furthermore,
the current atmosphere of detente has raised
questions regarding Dutch participation in NATO.
Both den Uyl and Defense Minister Vredeling
have displayed skill and flexibility in managing
the Dutch defense effort over the past two years.
Like other small NATO members, the Dutch have
sought ways to stretch their budget to cover in-
creasing defense costs. A ten-year c'efense
budget plan extending through 1983 and approved
by NATO reflects the den Uyl government's desire
to maintain its commitment. Although the plan
is less than two-years old, the government had
earlier indicated that it was considering other
measures to reduce government spending, in addition
to the latest move affecting naval forces. Some
government opponents also object to the extended
time period covered by the plan which will commit
future governments to these policies.
Earlier this year, the Dutch government
agreed to purchase the US-made F-16 to replace
the F-104 fighter aircraft. The government took
this step despite some domestic opposition to
the move. Den Uyl may hope to signal to the
allies that he is in no position at this time
to follow NATO suggestions to expand the Dutch
defense effort, but, if prompted, might be able
to keep the Neptunes in service if NATO strongly
objects to their retirement. The draft defense
budget for 1976 will be presented to parliament
next month, with debate scheduled to begin in
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USSR Pessimistic About Situation in
Portugal
The Soviets yesterday published an authorit-
ative article on the situation in Portugal. Un-
like previous Soviet commentary, the Pravda
article expresses Moscow's views directly, rather
than putting them in the mouths of the Portuguese
Communists or others.
The tone of the Pravda article is defensive
and pessimistic. As the pressure on the Portu-
guese Communists has increased, exrressions of confi-
dence about the course of events have given way to
increasing criticism of what the Soviets term "out-
side meddling."
The Pravda article draws the analogy between the
situation in Prtugal and events in Chile just before
the overthrow of former president Allende that was
first sounded by the Soviets in a broadcast to Hung-
ary on Friday. Pravda goes on to criticize NATO, the
Western press, Western economic organizations, and
"international social democracy."
The Chinese also are dragged into the cast of
evildoers; they are a- 'r Zed of cooperating with
"international react. by fomenting discord in An-
gola and the Azores.
Pravda charges cat leaders of the Portuguese
Socialists are providing a rallying point for re-
actionaries by attacking the Communists, but Moscow
was more critical of the Socialists just after they
left the government. Indeed, Pravda again calls for
concerted action by the Armed Forces Movement, the
Communists, Socialists, and other left progressive
forces.
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Pravda offers no practical advice and provides
no clues about what, if any, action the Soviets
themselves might take in support of the Portuguese
Communists.
Moscow would clearly like to see the Portu-
guese Communists recover from their present isola-
tion, but there is little indication the Soviets
believe their exhortations will have much practical.
effect.
They may, in this article, be preparing an ex-
planation for an eventual collapse of the Communist
position in Portugal, placing the blame primarily on
the Socialists and the West.
Privately, the Soviets may already have advised
the Portuguese Communists to prepare for a return to
a clandestine status, as Lisbon's ambassador to Mos-
cow alleged recently.
Hungarian Statement
The Hungarian party yesterday issued a short
statement that had been clearly coordinated with
Moscow. In the statement, the Hungarian party:
--Exp_-essed shock at the increasingly organized
attacks against "democratic" developments in
Portugal.
--Cited cooperation of all "democratiz and
anti-fascist forces" as the best defense.
--Assured "the Portuguese Communists and the
anti-fascists" of Hungarian solidarity.
Statements such as this provide a cheap and
easy way for the Soviet and the East European par- 25X1
ties to display their support of the Portuguese
Communists; the Hungarian statement will probably be
followed by others from Eastern Europe.
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General Franco's Meeting with Juan Carlos
Could Portend Policy Moves
The meetings which General Franco is hol3ing
this week with his designated successor Prince Juan
Carlos have sparked speculation that an important
political announcement is pending. It could come at
a cabinet meeting scheduled for Friday.
Speculation stems from the unexpected nature of
Juan Carlos' sudden visit to Franco at his vacation
retreat in northwest Spain. Franco customarily meets
with his cabinet several times during his long summer
vacation, but this is the first time Prince Juan Carlos
has interrupted his own vacation to join Franco at La
Coruna. The prince, who just visited Franco there
last month, is scheduled for three days of talks with
Franco, but government officials refuse to disclose
any details.
Franco has given no indication that he is ready
to turn over his powers to the prince, although there
has been speculation that such a move could come as
early as October. Such rumors crop up periodically,
but there is a wid' range of possible topics for the
talks--many of which will reportedly be taken up at
the cabinet meeting.
--Possible cabinet changes; rightists have re-
portedly been pressing Franco to replace
Prime Minister Arias. Arias has been under-
cut by Tr,se Solis Ruiz, Franco's recent appoint-
ment as minister secretary general of the Na-
tional Movement.
--Base negotiations with the US; Spanish negotia-
tors have taken a hard line in the ninth round
of talks that began this week. The possibility
has been raised of asking the U35 to withdraw
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from all its facili?~ies in Spain except the
naval base at Rota if Spain's desire for a
NATO connection cannot be met.
--Counter-terrorist measures; tough new regula-
tions are planned that are likely to draw a
hostile reaction from Spain's European neigh-
bors.
--The recent military arrests; Franco may want
to sound out Juan Carlos on the handling of
the officers arrested for their political
activities. Some of those arrested were re-
portedly classmates of the prince a - he
military academy.
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Buy British Campaign
A recent series of appeals to "Buy British"
by Trade Minister Peter Shore reflect growing
pressure on the government to protect British
jobs from foreign competition.
Shore is concerned about increasing imports
of goods that directly compete with those produced
domestically. He has promised to look into allega-
tions that foreign goods are being "dumped" into
the UK and to take action where charges can be
confirmed.
The trade minister has been careful to balance
his views by reiterating the government's opposition
to import controls. The success of Labor's economic
policy rests heavily on an export-led recovery and
import controls would risk damaging retaliation
from abroad. There have been reports that Shore
is considering the merits of an official advertis-
ing campaign urging consumers and industries to
use more British-made goods. The government may
look on such a campaign as a way of reducing
political pressure for the imposition of selective
import controls.
Trade unions and left-wing Laborites favor the
use of import controls to curb unemployment which
is already at a record level. Last week the economic
committee of the Trades Union Congress recommended
that the government be pressed to adopt selective
controls as soon as possible. The unions are
especially concerned about the effects of imports
on the textile, automobile, television tube, and
electrical appliance industries.
Pressure from the labor movement to buy
British could have an effect in the selection of
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certain weapon systems. The British army, for
example, would probably like to purchase the
helicopter mounted Franco-German anti-tank guided
missile, Hot. Instead the army could end up
purchasing the inferior British Aircraft Corporation
(BAC) Hawkswing missile because of union pressure
and the government's desire to set an example to
buy British. Furthermore, an unequivocal recommenda-
tion by a bipartisan parliamentary committee that
the army purchase another Franco-German anti-tank
missile--the Milan--may run into opposition from
the politically powerful unions. Workers at one
BAC plant recently recommended that the company
produce a modified version of an existing British
missile for the army to buy in place of the Milan?
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Greek Nam Increases Firepower
The Hellenic Navy, which has had chronic
materiel problems, is presently being modernized
and revitalized.
In the past, the Hellenic Navy's principal
deficiencies were insufficient numbers of surface
combatants, poor antiaircraft capabilities, and
inedequate long range antiship firepower. To
correct those deficiencies, the navy has, during
the past year:
--Requested transfer of one destroyer and
two nonmissile patrol boats from the US
navy, and ordered four guided-missile
patrol boats from France;
--Requested transfer of seven used non-
missile patrol boats and started negotia-
tions for purchase of four submarines, all
from Germany;
--Receiaed two small patrol boats from a pri-
vate Greek shipyard;
--Undertaken overhaul of destroyers to
improve sonar and fire-control systems
and of the sonar systems in the older
submarines;
--Ordered modern antiaircraft guns and surface-
to-air missiles for ships;
--Improved operational coordination pro-
cedures with the Hellenic Air Force;
and
--Trained. the first group of naval heli-
copter pilots.
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New surface combatants which the Greeks hope
to add to the fleet during the next two years will
mean a major increase in overall firepower.
1975
1977
Destroyers
11
12
Missile Patrol Boats
4
8
Nonmissile Patrol Boats
(esimated)
20
30
Submarines
8
8*
The additional destroyer will add to the
number of large guns available to the fleet. The
armament of the four new missile patrol boats--to
be delivered by France by 1977--will at least double
the number of long range antiship missile launchers
in the fleet and, if the latest French missile
launcher is purchased, could quadruple the number.
The increase in nonmissile patrol boats will, give
the navy a better convoy escort capability and
make more fast craft available to support raiding
force operations.
If Greece receives four submarines from Germany,
the navy's capability for antisubmarine warfare and
surface shipping interdiction would be upgraded.
The new submarines are quieter, easier to maintain
and have more effective electronic equipment than
the four American submarines which they are scheduled
to replace.
Improvements which are being made to the 11
destroyers will significantly increase the Greek
Navy's staying power during any future sea campaign.
'T'here are indications that the four US submarines now
in service may not be retired when new submarines are
commissioned; thus, the number of submarines in two
years would be Z2.
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The fire-control system is being improved to
provide more effective firepower against surface
ships and coastal targets, and improved sonars will
enable the main arm of the fleet to defend itself
better against submarines.
The self-defense capability of the fleet
also is being improved by the addition of new
antiaircraft weapons. During 1975, the navy
hopes to put large calibre antiaircraft guns on
three and perhaps seven of the destroyers and equip
the destroyers and destroyer escorts with an effec-
tive surface-to-air missile system. Some of the
antiaircraft machineguns and small man-portable
antiaircraft missiles being purchased by the
Greek government will probably be carried on
small ships. Although these weapons will not
completely end the navy's requirement for land-
based air support, they will significantly increase
the fleet's ability to operate effectively without
constant air cover.
The navy command is emphasizing training and
coordination--both within the navy and between the
navy and air force--to increase the fleet's wartime
effectiveness. Increased emphasis on aerial support
is also demonstrated by the first group of navy
pilots being given helicopter training. Formerly,
navy sonar operators have performed antisubmarine
warfare training in helicopters flown by air force
pilots.
The overall improvements the Hellenic Navy is
making in materiel and training should significantly
enhance its effectiveness. Effectiveness also
should be increased by what is almost certain to
be an improvement in the navy's morale as it receives
equipment priorities which are not less than those
afforded the army or air force.
The navy's missions, both national and in support
of NATO, are expected to be centered in the Aegean
and Sea,of Crete. (Although Greece no longer commits
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naval forces to NATO, the fleet would probably be
made available to NATO during any confrontation
with the Warsaw Pact.) In the event of war with
Turkey, acsigned missions include convoy escort
and mine warfare operations to support Greek
forces on the Aegean islands. The navy would also
be responsible for interdiction of Turkish shipping
and supporting commando raids on the Turkish coast.
In case of war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact,
the navy would conduct antisubmarine and patrol
operations to assist NATO's defense of the Dardanelles
and Italian naval o erati_ons ' the Ionian Sea.
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The Bavarians Know What Is Really Important
Bavarian Interior Minister Bruno Merk has re-
quested the West German ministry of the interior not
to go through with plans to schedule next year's
Bundestag election on either October 3 or October 31.
Merk's objection to the first date is that it
falls within the three week period when Munich hosts
the world's biggest beer-bust, the "Oktoberfest."
Merk believes--and he is probably correct--that many
thousands of people will be traveling to or from the
Oktoberfest on October 3, and might not vote.
The Bavarian official objects to the second date
because November 1 is a legal holiday in many parts of
West Germany, and tens and even hundreds of thousands
of West Germans will take advantage of a three-day
weekend to travel. Again, they might not vote.
One would not be surprised if the federal auth-
orities see the merits of Merk's arguments, and sched-
ule the election sometime between October 3 and 31.
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Communist-Socialist Collaboration at Center
of Italian Political Debate
Italian government and party leaders
are still grappling with the consequences
of the Communist Party's unprecedented gains
in the June regional and local elections.
The main controversy centers on the continuing
trend toward closer relations between the
Communists and the Socialist Party, which
is pledged to support the Moro government
in parliament.
Since the elections, the Socialists
have shown a clear preference for alliance
with the Communists in the new regional
and local governments. The Socialists,
who gained moderately in the elections,
now share power with the Communists in
most major Italian cities, 5 of the 20
regions and nearly a third of the 94 prov-
inces.
Socialist leader De Martino has rebutted
criticism from partners in the national
government--the Christian Democrats, Social
Democrats, and Republicans--by maintaining
that he is against a Socialist-Communist
coalition at the national level. Such an
alliance would not control a majority in
the present parliament, but that could
change after the next national elections
which must be held no later than 1977.
De Martino drew additional fire from
the other governing parties last week by
signing a joint communique with Communist
chief Berlinguer on the situation in Portugal.
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The communique called for a political agreement
in Portugal between the "democratic" parties--
including the Communists--and the Armed
Forces Movement.
It was the joint signature by De Martino
and Berlinguer, more than the document
itself, that drew criticism. Although the
Communists and Socialists have consulted
discreetly on policy matters in recent years,
they have not issued joint communiques since
the dissolution of their common "front" in
1957.
Berlinguer scored a major plus by
persuading one of the governing parties
to sign the communique. That will help
him deflect the renewed criticism he has
come under as a result of his party's recent
signing of a joint communique on Portugal
with the Soviets. The communique seemed
to give stronger support to the Portuguese
Communists than Berlinguer has in the past.
On many occasions, he has publicly stated
his disapproval of Portuguese Communist
strategy.
De Martino, on the other hand, will
be able to point to the less-than-revolutionary
language in the document he signed with
Berlinguer to bolster his argument that
Italy's Communists are developing into a
legitimate national party. The Socialists
have used this line to help justify growing
collaboration with the Communists.
The Socialists, meanwhile, have spelled
out what they regard as a suitable successor
to the Moro government, which is almost
certain to be replaced before the end of
the year. Although still opposed to giving
the Communists any cabinet positions, the
Socialists desire an arrangement that would
allow the Communists to participate indirectly.
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in those areas, the two parties have agreed
to negotiate formally with the Communists on
Last week, the Socialists pointed
to the regional administrations in Lombardy
and Campania as models for the next national
government. Although the Communists are
excluded from the center-left governments
formed by the Christian Democrats and Socialists
the regional legislative program.
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