STAFF NOTES: WESTERN EUROPE CANADA INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000400130022-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 7, 2008
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: April 17, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release
2008/02/07:
CIA-RD P86T00608 R000400130
Approved For Release
2008/02/07
CIA-RD 6TOO608ROO0400130
 Approved For Release 2008/02/07: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400130022-1
Secret
gualu-'~ K DUE
Western Europe
Canada
International Organizations
? State Dept. review
completed
Secret
118
No. 0177-75
April 17, 1975
Approved For Release 2008/02/07: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400130022-1
 Approved For Release 2008/02/07: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400130022-1
Approved For Release 2008/02/07: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400130022-1
 Approved For Release 2008/02/07: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400130022-1
SECRET
WESTERN EUROPE - CANADA - INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
This publication Is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Europe Division, Officu of Current Intelligence, with
occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
Government Crisis Looms in Finland .
The EC in Dublin and Luxembourg. . . . . . . .
4
Dutch Leaders Affirm Support for F-16. . . . .
6
Peacekeeping Leads to Arguments at the UN. . .
8
Turkish Cypriot Leader Under Fire in
Constituent Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . .
10
Prospects for Demirel Government . . . . . . .
12
Portuguese Military Leader Promises
Elections Will Be Held
15
-i-
SECRET
April 17, 1975
Approved For Release 2008/02/07: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400130022-1
 Approved For Release 2008/02/07: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400130022-1
SECRET
Government Crisis Looms in Finland
Some Finnish political observers believe
President Kekkonen intends to force new electic'r-:t
prior tc the European security conference,
which may be held in Helsinki this summer.
The prospect of an early election was
most recently raised when Kekkonen wrote letters
to feuding government leaders scathingly critical
of their performance. He warned that r. was
considering dissolving parliament. The
President has chastized leaders be ore,
and most observers were at first willing to
discount this letter as Kekkonen's latest
"kick in the pants."
The prospect appeared more serious, however,
when the newspaper of the coalition Social
Democrats took the unusual step of publisl.iing
the text of the letters. As a result, the
coalition Center Party, two of whose lead,iNrs
Kekkonen criticized by name, and the coa7i;tion
Swedish Peoples Party have begun to gear tip
for an election campaign.
Kekkonen probably is awaiting the outcome
of Center Party consultations this week on
the issues dividing it from the Social Democrats.
If he remains dissatisfied, he will probably
dissolve parliament before the end of the
month and call an election for July 20-21.
Some Finnish conservatives speculate that
with the European security conference summit
probably coming up in Helsinki, Kekkonen may
hope that, the next coalition will include
the Communists. F -1
April 17, 1975
SECRET
25X6
25X6
Approved For Release 2008/02/07: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400130022-1
 Approved For Release 2008/02/07: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400130022-1
le
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2008/02/07: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400130022-1
 Approved For Release 2008/02/07: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400130022-1
SECRET
The EC in Dublin and Luxembourg
The EC foreign ministers' Dublin-Luxembourg
discussions, April 12-15, devoted some time to
consideration of the changing relationship be-
tween developed and developing states despite
the overshadowing issue of Vietnam and the
need for decisions on continuing EC policies.
The informal weekend meeting near Dublin
spent Saturday on a free exchange of views over
long-term prospects for European union. The for-
eign ministers moved to more immediate concerns
when news from Paris showed that the preparatory
consumer-producer conference might fail despite
US-EC solidarity there against developing coun-
try demands. Talk began in Dublin and continued
in Luxembourg about the Middle East and the
stalled EC-Arab dialogue, Portugal where the EC
is still dubious of the merits of any joint de-
marche, and Vietnam. No major decisions were
made.
Press leaks about the US-EC exchange on
Vietnam caused considerable chagrin. Irish
Foreign Minister FitzGerald, who was chairing
the sessions, described the leaks as false
and misleading because of their negative tone.
He emphasized that the Nine--who offered to
consider ursTing a cease-fire on both sides
in Vietnam--had unanimously considered the US
message a helpful use of the US-EC consultative
process.
Earlier hopes that the Luxembourg meeting
could note the successful end of negotiations
on the first phase of EC Mediterranean policy
were abandoned earlier this month because
April 17, 1975
-4-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/02/07: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400130022-1
 Approved For Release 2008/02/07: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400130022-1
SECRET
of continuing disagreement with the Maghreb.
The ministers decided that the agreement with
Israel, which had been designed for parallel
implementation, would nevertheless come into
force on July 1.
The raw materials question and changing
relations between developed and developing
states received peripheral attention in Dublin.
in Luxembourg, British Foreign Secretary Callaghan
outlined his plans for the forthcoming Commonwealth
ministers' conference and for other meetings deal-
ing with the raw materials question. Commission
papers on the topic were Laken up, and the coun-
cil requested a complete commission study of the
EC's raw materials needs as soon as possible.
The ministers agreed on the importance of coordin-
ating community positions in advance of meetings
dealing with raw materials and requested the com-
mittee of permanent representatives to set up
the appropriate consultation procedures.
The council also set up a preliminary pro-
gram on consumer protection, approved joint EC
representation in Ankara and Athens on the Aegean
dispute and agreed on distribution of a second
aid installment under UN auspices to countries
facing the mos"erious balance of payments
dice uilibri a.
April 17, 1975
-5-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/02/07: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400130022-1
 Approved For Release 2008/02/07: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400130022-1
SECRET
Dutch Leaders Affirm Support for F-16
There are strong indications that the Dutch
government has already made the decision to opt
for the US F-16 as a replacement for its F-104s.
Foreign Minister van der Stoel's chief
advisor on the replacement issue has confided to
US Embassy officials in The Hague that he is work-
ing on a message to the Dutch ambassador in
Washington instructing him to explore the
possibility of making an advance payment for the
F-16s. Such an arrangement would eliminate the
possibility of a rise in price due to some future
improvement in the dollar exchange rate compared
to the guilder.
Defense Minister Vredeling, testifying before
parliament on April 15, said he would stand by
h:.s decision to recommend the F-16. Vredeling,
a member of the Labor Party, was responding to
the resolution passed by his party congress on
April 11 rejecting both the F-16 and the French
Mirage F-1E.
Vredeling went on to say that the decision
would be made by the cabinet and would not be
subject to a direct vote by parliament. Foreign
Minister van der Stoel, also a member of the Labor
Party, has declared support for Vredeling's
recommendation, according to a Dutch newspaper.
Failing a parliamentary debate on the issue,
the Labor Party's only recourse would be a vote
of no confidence in the government. Although the
Labor Party congress was dominated by young
militants, cooler heads in the party's parlia-
mentary group would probably balk at bringing
down the government over the F-104 issue. One
April 17, 1975
-6-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/02/07: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400130022-1
 Approved For Release 2008/02/07: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400130022-1
SJ U.KL;'1'
compromise solution already mentioned publicly
is a reduction in the number of aircraft to be
ordered. This suggestion is being strongly
resisted by the defense ministry.
There have also been favorable signs in
Copenhagen, where the Dutch ambassador told his
US counterpart that the Dutch government would
hold to its original decision to buy the F-16.
The ripples caused by the Dutch Labor Party's
resolution also seem to be subsiding in Denmark.
The Danish media, which had initially equated
the Dutch Party's statement to a government
decision, yesterday emphasized that the Labor
Party resolution is not binding on the govern-
ment. One of Denmark's most influential news-
papers, Berlingske Tidende, called on the Danish
government to stop dithering around waiting for
the Dutch to make up their minds and get on with
its original plans to buy the F-16. The parlia-
mentary defense committee's chairman told US
embassy officials in Copenhagen yesterday that
"everything is back on track."
April 17, 1975
-7-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/02/07: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400130022-1
 Approved For Release 2008/02/07: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400130022-1
SECRET
Peacekeeping Leads to Arguments at the UN
The Security Council meeting today to re-
new the mandate of the UN peacekeeping forces
in the Sinai points tap the general agreement
that exists among UN members on the positive
contributions such forces have made and con-
tinue to make since the first one was estab-
lished in June 1950. Despite this broad appre-
ciation, however, UN states have never been
able to agree on guidelines to be followed in
establishing and subsequently monitoring these
operations.
The principal stumbling block to negotia-
ting guidelines continues to be the Soviet's
attitude on how the Peacekeeping operations
should be controlled and the national represen-
tation, both of the forces in the field and of
the Secretariat officials headquartered in New
York. The Soviets insist that the primary re-
sponsibility for establishing and conducting
peacekeeping operations should remain with the
Security Council--as the UN organ chiefly
responsible for the maintenance of internation-
al peace and security. In line with this policy,
the Soviets have long tried to circumscribe the
responsibilities of the SecretaL] c;C,lar_?ai in
supervising the day-to-day activities of the
peacekeeping forces and to restrict his role
ch fly to one of reporting on the progress of
peacekeeping operati_~ns and of implementing
Security Council directives.
To ensure that the permanent members of
the Security Council retain the primary power
in peacekeeping operations, the Soviets continue
to urge the establishment of a permanent com-
mittee.that would be responsible for day-to-day
April 17, 1975
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/02/07: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400130022-1
 Approved For Release 2008/02/07: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400130022-1
SECRET
operations of any peacekeeping forces. This
Article 29 Committee--named after the article
empowering the Security Council to establish
those subsidiary organs which it deems neces-
sary to carry out its functions--would advise
the Secretary General on all aspects of the
peacekeeping force's functions and thus would
effectively have a veto over any initiative by
the Secretary.
The Soviets have also resurrected the
Military Staff Committee as an alternative
mechanism of control. The Military Staff Com-
mittee, an organ of the Security Council, was
originally established as the body responsible
for supervising the implementation and direc-
tion of military operations conducted by the
Security Council. When political factors pre-
vented it from assuming such military respon-
sibilities, the command functions were dele-
gated on an ad hoc basis which was determined
by how, and under whose responsibility, the
peacekeeping force in question was established.
The other major Soviet concern is the
question of equitable geographic representation.
The Soviets have long felt that Warsaw Pact
members have been discriminated against when
the troop composition of peacekeeping forces is
determined. At the same time, they feel that
inequitable geographic distribution within the
UN Secretariat itself further prejudices Mos-
cow's chances of a fair share of peacekeeping
slots.
Earlier hopes of resolving these issues
in a smaller negotiating group made up of four
of the five permanent Security Council members--
China has consistently refused to accord the UN
any peacekeeping authority--have been setback
by the reaffirmation of these traditional Soviet
posi Lions.
April 17, 1975
-9-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/02/07: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400130022-1
 Approved For Release 2008/02/07: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400130022-1
SECRET
Turkish Cypriot Leader Under Fire in Constituent
Assembly
Rauf Denktash is facing his first serious
challenge as leader of the Turkish Cypriot
community in the continuing debate over a
constitution for the "Turkish Federated State
of Cyprus."
Debate has been unexpectedly acrimonious
in the Turkish Cypriot constituent assembly,
with most of the disagreement focused on the
powers of the presidency. This has necessitated
several extensions of the deliberations which
began on February 24 and were to be completed
by April 9.
A majority of the speakers have argued
that the powers to be accorded the presidency,
which Denktash is expected to assume, are
inordinate and could lay the basis for an
authoritarian regime. The delegates have
already substantially modified the original
draft that for the most part was formulated
in Ankara. While the draft still provides
for a strong presidential system, Denktash's
critics have succeeded in reducing the presidential
term of office from 7 to 5 years and in imposing
a limit of two consecutive terms on any individual.
The beleagured Turkish Cypriot leader
is reportedly being challenged by four opposition
groups who have been working together in the
constituent assembly to curb presidential
powers. He has also encountered opposition
within his own cabinet, forcing him to dismiss
one minister. Another minister, now in the
UK, is not expected to return to Cyprus.
April 17, 1975
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/02/07: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400130022-1
 Approved For Release 2008/02/07: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400130022-1
SECRET
Denktash still enjoys Ankara's backing
which gives him control over the Turkish Cypriot
political and administrative machinery. The
prospects are, however, that he will face
increased political opposition and challenges
in the future now that the heretofore cohesive
Turkish Cypriot community is faced with a
greatly diminished threat from the Greek Cypriots.
This could lead Denktash to assume a
tougher stance in the intercommunal talks
in an effort to restore his popularity, although
Ankarn still has the determining voice.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/02/07: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400130022-1
April April 17, 1975
 Approved For Release 2008/02/07: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400130022-1
SECRET
Prospects for Demirel Government
The newly installed government of Prime tli.nister
Suleyman Demirel, which won a narrow vote of confi-
dence last Saturday, will have to perform a delicate
balancing act if it is to provide effective leadership.
Demirel must deal with serious strains that will in-
evitably develop within the governing coalition and
at the same time parry attacks from a determined op-
position.
In his first major speech since the parliamentary
vote of confidence, opposition leader F3ulent Ecevit
charged corruption in the vote and warned that he
would require only eight honest men "without gambling
debts or weaknesses exploitable by big profiteers" to
bring down the government. The eight votes represent
the difference between the 218 votes cast against the
government last Saturday and the 226 needed to unseat
the government under the constitution.
Ecevit, however, probably does not want to be
blamed for plunging Turkey into another government
crisis and has claimed Lhat his Pepublican Peoples'
Party will play a "moderate" opposition role. lie
hopes that the government will make enough legislative
and policy mistakes to assure a victory for his party
in the next election.
Demirel's Nationalist Front coalition partners,
who are united primarily by a desire to be in the
government and to avoid elections, are reportedly
already at odds with each other. One of the partners--
the Islamic-oriented National Salvation Party--is
noted for its uncooperative and obstructionist tac-
tics; it was instrumental in breaking up the previous
government in which it participated along with former
Prime Minister Ecevit's party.
April 17, 1975
-12-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/02/07: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400130022-1
 Approved For Release 2008/02/07: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400130022-1
The Salvationiritti, who challenge Turkey's; choicee,
of Won torn models for moth rnixatl.on, oppone f or.ei.gln
private invesitment and tourism and advocate a varluo,
utopian economic policy. Their holding of important
economic portfolion doers not bode well for. the economy.
Another vulnerability of the DL mi rel clover. nmenI
in it o dependence on the r;mall. 1'.7n-Tur.kir;h national
Action Party, a group even more extr(irli , than the
Salvat ionints;. Led by Alpaulan Turken, thin national
uociali.'t party boantr; of i.t:ri right wing "c;ommandoi;"
many of whom have been involved in recent clashes
between loft and right wing utudents. Turkrn' party,
which has only three seats in parliament, is over-
roprosented in the government with two posts;, although
at doer; not head a ministry.
Cloth of the extreme right parties; in the coali-
tion advocate a hard line on Cyprus; and can be expected
to oppose giving up any of. the territory now hold by
the Turkish Cypriot,,;. Both also oppose Turkey's mem-
bership in {IATO and On.,- 1,C. Although t)emirel and his
foreign and defense ministers are experienced and
moderate figures, they may have the name trouble
Ecevit had in keeping the extremists in line.
Demirel also reportedly laelicveer; that he cannot
appear to be any less committed to the national in-
terest than 1:cevit; he will have to stand up to the
Greeks on Cyprus.
Cemirel appears determined to show the military,
which forced him to resign in 1971, that he is capa-
b:ie of effective rule and that it was wrong to unseat
him. Although the military still dislikes and mis-
trusts Demirel, it will probably mLintain a "hands
off" p.alicy unless there in a dramatic ri.c in civil
unrest or Demirel tries to take some form of revenge
against the armed forces.
The next months will be critical for the qov-
ernnaent. I f it can survive until the summer when the
April 17, 1975
-13-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/02/07: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400130022-1
 Approved For Release 2008/02/07: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400130022-1
ratttclr.titrr anti parliam"nt 1.1() i_ttt_o r,ocnr,rl, I. L rnhould
;faun a lc)nil i)rtnt:hi.nrl nt)nll. In Auilur;L? Drtni.rnl
w.i.l.l. lit Ai)-lc.' to mw t.hr annum. tnii.l.tary promot.i.onrr
~)n( rrar * i rlninntltn to try to build riUpt)t)rt w i. t.:hi.(1
t:hr, army. Iln In .n 1rr'ady rnportndiy try.i nU to culti-
vatn cvr.tain rrnnior offi.cnrn h- hnl.invnrl arr' tr m ),-
theti.c to him.
April 17, 1975
-14-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/02/07: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400130022-1
 Approved For Release 2008/02/07: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400130022-1
p()f't.trrttinno ltlr, r _t ;ti r, r, !.]nr^t ir,tlfi,
hli 1 1 fin 11n 1(1
11r1mi ra I Atif-r .i r) pnr:1 ('O'It i tl)ln, t al)i (11')r
~mnf(jitirr rj a (1r)mitl ltlt_ itlr't)1)r'Y Of t.)lr' :t1- 31}
pnvr)l III i Otl r`y' ('x)1111( i I , promi "-I (11i
f,)lat_ n1r'r't.i('flr, 4i 11 ii" ho 1(1, 1), 11, f.!fat.. ! ho Al-trod
j"(lrr?nr; ,avw(?f'lnilt. 1?1 I I tlr)t n 1 1O.,: i f "1 f, f. () 1)O
a "j)ri r;r)tlnr'.' of t:1lr: voFiiil f ' .
In afl )lntir-1!tn't trlr':'i,:r''1 ltltr'r ?Jir r j)r) }
('(712t. i WI r) t.;' i r l n r'rlliflt.r?r t 11 r= 'd i (1r'aj~rr }rl r ilr:j,i r' i r)t}^
f,11at_ tlIr- 'r)1?r'r"'r?tlt t'.i(III I I-a1)r'n1 r~r' gIr1 1';' f11('
n1t}t'f (;)rlfi 1t. 1a t. tnitllito tint (If ft -r 1, 11Tt,
tills' rnr111I ?rt11'tl 11f)'v: f.11at t )lr' jtr-()j`lr, A') ilr)t.
fav()a' t,lir' ''~r,'.rr+r "nI ?. t`()1it'i ('?1t7t 1Jlli() r;al?i
t:llat r'1r'Ct.iO11.?z 7.= t. 1)n 1x'1,1, '1 r'('ltrc;rr t_r) ['711
?1r )r'r
t11rrt (?{s' aft or t.lin j'r")1'1r 111x1 ,?13t_rt1 `r0
.ror? f r- rr? r 1r t i r)n ?rit2l rl fir' 1 i Sin t 1 ~, i ,.'I 1
H ,*
toy aa?, f rc.; a )11)')) )t(, :lrltlr-tl, rtwr??.~n
f.1111. t11 r? r?1r ir,i}rl :21.1 not, lfrr (.r s_!1n ,.rr)?'r,..nilr
(1EC 1S:t* rl to M!;?r' tr;?'arri 11
1 r r ? r 1 ; r t. r.. r. r:
i21 [`r ? ter' l ~. )r'-:r .._ ir' r;r~._ ai"t` ?1 at ..
(' S It r. rl... ,,r., r r71,1?'t'ar.r? ,7?,'')+ o ff i(?nr
(, t i x111 () , .1 ?1 r r, l t`
Who ^.rr;'r?ci a !}(?a 1 t~f t 11(' !r''.'r*T11211't ;ti';' a It.
An