STAFF NOTES: WESTERN EUROPE - (Classified) - INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000400120049-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 1999
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: March 17, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

~; N ~ ~ ~ I ~'pv~~~k~,{ ~ 2~0~/14 :CIA-~tDP86T006U8R00040d120049-3
S'/NFD
n~t'~ CJrgan~zations ~ ~ `~ 17 Mar 75. ~ O
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Secret
No Foreign Diuem
~4G1~~ f~04C~
Western Europe
25X6
I nternatianal Organizations
Secret
11~
OCI-053-75
March 17 , 1975
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E, O. 11652, exemption category:
5 56 (1),121, and 13)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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25X6
WESTERN EUROPE ---- INTERNATIGi~AL ORGA!1~i,~~~47'~ONS
This publication is prepar8d for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Europe Division, Office of C~~rrent Int~ailigen~:e, with
occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. Thoy should bo directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
25X6
Varied Spanish Reaction to Portuguese
Events , 2
F.esumption of Talks flay Be Delayed. . 3
Italian Communists Convene National Congre~.s 4
March 17, 1975
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 25X6
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SECRET
25X1A
Phone: [phone]
Varied Spanish Reaction to Portuguese Events
Independent Spanish commentators and
^~oderate politicians are saying that the left-
wurd drift iY.l Portuguese politics can no ,Longer
be stopped and that this should be a lessen
to Spain to organize democratic rorces before
it is too 1at~~.
The three leading independent Spanish
newspapers aye using the Portuguese experience
to demonstrate why Spain sho~xld lose :~o time
in organizing nor-e:ctremist political forces
in anti.cipatior~ of. France's demise. According
to. the Catholic-ori~aa~,tea Ya, the chaotic
situation arising :crom the problems of silc-
r:ession t.o ~;aeca.no in Portugal is a result
of the abs;~~t.ce of organized political forces
other than those wkLich "operated clar;.destinely,"
i.e., the Communists. An editorial in Informa-
ci,ones points to the need for Spaniards to
medic i:Q on the Portuguese events and to
take advantage Jf time "to organize democratic
political life ire which the sovereign people
and its decisions are not exposed to the will
of extremism on right or left which are only
capable of governing with the help of force."
25X1X in Madrid reports that the
prevailing sentiment amcng forward looking
Franco loyalists as well as the opposition, is
that. there is no time to lose in organizing
forces in the center and to the right of center.
These moderates fear, Y~owever, that the far
right will continue to view all change as
dangerous and argue for more severe crackdowns
on dissenters. Thus moderates fear that the
far right will close ranks in such a way as
to prevent political developmerxt capable of
coping with the post-Franco situation. (Con-
fidential)
March 17, 1975
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25
Resumption of Talks May Be Delayed
The resumption of tYie interco
tions on a Cyprus settlement may b
ing disagreement between Greek and
over the venue and the composition
The Greek Cypriots prefer to
New York where they believe it wil
UN Secretary General Waldheim to p
role. Turkish Cypriots have oppos
f W ldh d p
or a .,elm an are also re orted
in New York would be subjected to
.pressures. A Turkish Cypriot radi
d
ay noted that Turkish Cypriot off
t h ld h
0 o t e negotiations in any Eu
The intention to re lace Rau'
A
Turkish Cypriot negotiator will fu
efforts to get the talks started.
apparently designed to support Den
that as President of the newl re
Y P
Turkish State of Cyprus" he is an
Makarios and can no .longer negotia
Clerides who holds a lower officia
Celik, who presented the Turkish C
recent Security Counci? debate on
new negotiator for the Turkish Cyp
d '- T k ' h
cor ing ~.o a ur is Cypriot radio
The replacement of Clerides a
individuals of lesser stature woul
setL-ack to the talks and increase
that Athens and Ankara will become
Secretary General Waldheim wa
contacts with the twe sides in New
efyort to get the talks resumed.
M
SEC~tET
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mmunal negotia-
e delayed f~11ow-
Turkish Cypriots
of the delegations.
hold the talks in
l be easier for
lay a substantial
ed a;?y major role
to fear that talks
artisan, pro-Greek
P
o broadcast to-
icialr~ would agree
ropean capital.
Denktash as the
rther complicate
This move is
ktash's contention
claimed "Federated
equal to President
te with Glafkos
l position. Vedat
ypriot case at the
Cyprus, will be the
riot community,ac-
broadcast.
nd Denktash with
d deal a serious
the likelihood
more directly
s scheduled to begin
York today in an
(Secret)
X1A
arch 17, 1975
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SEC121:T
25X1A
Phone: 143-
Italian Communists Convene National Congress
The Italian Communist Party opens its national
congress tomorrow in a confident mood, but still faces
serious pronlems in its pursuit of a di~~ect voice
in the national government. The main aims of the
congress will be to unify thF party behind a strategy
to overcome these obstacles and to launch the Communist
campaign for crucial local elections expected t~ take
place in June.
The Communists have made substantial progress
in recent years toward securing greater public ac-
ceptance of the party--one which is qualified to take
a place eventually in the national government.
Despite the party's strong position, however,
there is evidence of division in Communist ranks over
party chief Berlinguer's strategy of seeking membership
in a coalition with the Christian Democrats.
At the leadership level, the disagreements seem
confined to the timing and modalities of Berlinguer'G
strategy. Some party leaders would prefer to speed up
the process and make fewer demands on the Christian
Democrats, but Berlinguer and the group around him--who
will remain in charge after the congress--see the "historic
compromise as a long-term objective that depends on
major changes in Christian Democratic policies and
leadership.
25X1X dissension is even
more acute among the rank and i e who have trouble
grasping the subtleties of Berlinguer's line. Many
members fear that the party is sacrificing its revolutionary
aims, and they wonder how the national leaders can aim
at a modus viv= with the Christian Democrats while
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blaming all of Italy's ills on them. Party officials
havE tried to dispel these doubts, but the congress
will doubtless devote considerable time to clearing
up the remaining confusion.
Another troublesome tonic will be the Communists'
strained relations with the Socialist Party. The Com-
munists had hoped to emerge from the congress with a
plan for coordinating leftist activity in Italy, but
the Socialists are refusing to follow the Communist
lead. The Socialists instead aYe criticizing the
Communists' governmental ambitions and stressing their
own demand for a larger role in the center-left coalition.
Finally, the Communists will try again to convince
skeptics that they are not subservient to the Soviets.
As differences have gradually narrowed between the Com-
munists and the governing parties in f=elds such as
economic policy, the Communists' tie with P?~oscow has
increasingly beEn seen as an obstacle to their broader
participation in any Italian government. Thus, the
Communists will undoubtedly point out that they no
longer insist on Italian withdrawal from NATO as a
condition for their entry into the government ZSecret
No Foreign Dissem)
Dsarch 17, 1975
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SECRET
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