STAFF NOTES: WESTERN EUROPE (Classified) INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000400120025-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 1999
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: February 7, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000400120025-9 Secret
No Porcigrr Di.r.renr
Western Europe
InternationalO~ganizations
Secret
:~. ~~ 3
No. 0127-75
February 7, 1975
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aaekground Use Only/ControZZed OisRem
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. O. 11652, exemption category:
? 5B (1-, (2-, and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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sLC1z~ ~7~
WESTERe~ EUROPE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIaN;
This hublic~.tion is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Europe Division, Office o{ Current Intelligi nre, wrtlr
r~rcasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors ~f the individual articles.
Strikes by Government Employees in Spain
Add to Labor Unrest. 3-4
Prospec~s for Progress in Euro-Arab Dialogue 6
Third SesGion of the Preparatory Committee
for the NPT Conference Tackles T}iorny
Issues 7-10
Franco Said Preparing to Relinquish Spanish
Headship of. StatE .12-13
Italian Government to Face Confidence Vote 14
Talks on Formation of Government Collapse
in Denmark 15
Arab Moves to Expel Israel From t-..'.:F? I.LO 16
ANNEX: EC Cements Ties with 46
Developing Gauntries .17-21
February 7, 1975
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~~11~~11 25X1 A
Phone: [phone]
Strikes b Government Employees in ~ ain Add
to La or Unrest
The current labor unrest has spread to
the midc37.e class as employees in at least five
government ministries staged unprecedentea
work stoppages for several hours this week.
This was followed by a petition to Prime 1"linist,er
Arias, signed by several Hundred government
empJ.oye.es, including some second-echelon officials.
The government employees appear to have
been influenced by the general labor unrest
in recent months, as well as by stirrings on
the Spanish political scene. Beth Franco and
Arias in their recent state-of-the-nation speeches
spoke of opening the government to wider participate
tion. The recent discussions about forming
political associations, which became legal
last month, undoubtedly have encouraged government
workers to express their frustrations. Both
the strikers and the petitioners cited problems
of pay, professional status, and worki:~g conditions.
The petition also called for the government
to carry out long-promised reforms of public
administration and to institute political neutrality.
The government--no doubt perturbed by
the unprecedented work stoppages by civil servants--
is rumored to be planning to announce substantial
pay increases for government employees. It
will probably couple this with administrative
punishment of a few of the ringleaders.
Additional unrest among the middle class
is evident in ttie strike by small shopkeepers
in Madrid as well as a strike by Madrid's actors
and actresses over professional issues which
has closed Madrid's theaters. The key issue
here as in some industrial conflicts, is the
lack of worker representation in the regime's
labor organization. This middle class discontent
may force the government to make a decision
on whether to grant the right to strike.
February 7, 1975
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Meanwhile, industrial strike activity
has quickened again, with same 7,500 workers
on strike in liilLao, around 9,000 miners idle
in nearby Asturias, and shipyard ::orkers on
strike in E1 Ferro.l.
Thy atmosphere has been further charged
by student demonstrations in Madrid, Valladolid,
Seville, and Oviedo. The students are demanding
more fx?eedom, educational reform, amnesty for
political prisoners, and expressing support
for striking industrial workers. The government
has taken a hard line toward both the student
and industrial demonstrators.
In the past week, some 36 members of an
extremist Catholic labor organization were
arrested during a gathering at a Madrid church,
stiff fines were levied on a dozen priests
in Pamplona for their alleged participation
in .recent labor agitation, end a sit-in by
employees of Madrid's largest hospital was
forcibly ended by the police. (Confidential)
February 7, 1975
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Phone: [phone]
Prospects for Progress in Euro-Arab
Die ogue
Arab League Secretary General Riad has
expressed increasing interest in getting
the dialogue with the EC moving, at least
at the level of an exchange of technical
---r-- _
LJ/~ I/~ Z?he Euro-Arab dialogue and the
question cf Palestinian Liberation Organization
participation in it will be discussed at
a meeting of the Nine next week.
Riad is still firm in his da:^ands for
PLO participation. It is tb.z impression
25X1X of however, that. the Arabs
believe that haggling over this issue has
unduly delayed the st~::t of talks.
An EC internal working group has bee:.
charged with preparing project proposals
by late February for later presentation to
the Arabs. Recognizing the sensitivity of
the coming US negotiations in the Middle
Eust, the community has taken pains not ?~o
publicize these preparatory arrangements.
The working group report may provide
the basis for implementing the recent French
proposal which calls for a meeting between
experts representing the EC and Arab League
presidencies. The EC would not exclude
Palestinian "experts" from those representing
the Arab League.
The Nine still view the Euro-Arab dialogue
as a purely technical forum and have no desire
to become embroiled in political issues. They
nevertheless acknowledge that a decision to
allow PI,O participation at any level could
have a political effect. (Confidential No Foreign
Dissem/Background Use Only)
February 7, 1975
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Phone: [phone]
Third SESSlon of the Preparatory Committee
for the NPT Conference Tacklos Thorny
:issues
The third and last session of the preparatory
committee for the May conference to review the
Non Proliferation Treaty is currently meeting in
Geneva. This meeting must still se~tt'.e a number of
thorny issues regarding the agenda, organization
and financing of the full conference and the com-
mittee may be hard pressed to complete its work
during the two-week session.
The NPT Review Conference--called for in the
treaty itself--will provide the first opportunity
since the treaty's entry into force five years
ago for all NPT adherents to review the treaty's
accomplishments and reaffirm their commitment to the
treaty's goals. The parties to the treaty hope
that international attention aroused by the review
exercise will induce additional countries to accede
to the treaty.
Although the review conference is not a UN-
sponsored meetii:g, the UN Secretariat is providing
administrative servi~;es for the conference and, in
'line with this responsibility, has drawn up draft
rules of procedure for the May meeting. These
rules have generated debate, particularly over the
manner in which decisions are raache~~ at the con-
ference. The solit is over whether t~ require
consensus on any conference decisions or to resort
to voting if attempts at consensus fail. Some
countries are willing to accept a voting require-
ment for stalemated procedL,ral decisions, but they
argue that substantive matters must be decided by
consensus sine; all the parties must support the
conference's proposals if these are to have any
effect. It is feared that a negative vote could
subsegu.ent.ly be used to justify non-compliance.
February 7, 1975
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The preparatory meetings have already estab-
lished the basic outline of the conference's
organization. Two main committees will probably
divide the review work--one group discussing the
political aspects of the NPT and the other con-
centrating on tho technical issues arising from
the implementation of some of the treaty's
articles.
Membership in all the committees and access
to their deliberations is another sticky problem
for thQ preparatory meeting. The treaty itself
~.imits participation in the review conference to
treaty parties--those who have both signed a~zd
ratified the NPT as well as a required safeguards
agreement between the state and the international
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). More than half of the
states that have signed the NPT, however, fall
into the category of signatories. These are
states that, for one reason ar another, have not
completed the entire ratification process.
Among the signatories alone are a number of
important states whose ratification is considered
vital for the treaty's future. These countries
are primarily the EURATOM states--minus France,
which remains aloof from the NPT--and Japan. The
EURATOM states negotiated a single safeguards
agreement with tYie IAEA which gives EURATOM the
responsibility for monitoring and safeguarding
nuclear materials within its boundaries. Be-
cause of this umbrella safeguards agreemen~c, no
individual EURATOM country can become a full NPT
party until all EURATOM members have completed
the necessary ratification procedures and Gpproved
both the treaty and safeguards agreement.
For reasons that are not entirely clear but
may have something to do with the concerns of a
few officials in the foreign ministry over nation-
al prestige, Italy is continuing to stall its
parliamzntary approval of the two agreements.
Because Italy has not ratified them, this has
prevented its ETJRATOM allies from becoming NPT
February 7, 1975
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parties as well. As the review conference
approaches, however, and as Italy continues
to drag its feet, Germany and the Benelt~x
countries in particular have begun to agitate
strongly for some kind of status at the review
conference. For the past several weeks, repre-
sentatives of these countries have been pressing
the UK and the U5--as two of the treaty's three
signatory powers (the USSR is the third)--to
allow their participation at the conference.
These countries realize that demands for
complete participation at the May meeting, with
the same status as full NPT parties, ~~:.e likely
to gain little support. A major obstacle would
undoubtedly be the USSR, all of whose Eastern
European allies have ratified both agreements
and have IAEA safeguards in place on their
facilities.
What seems likely to result from the
deliberations at the preparatory committee over
conference participation rights is the right of
NPT signatories to attend as observers. This
might grant them the right to speak in the two
main committees (possibly only upon written re-
quest to the committee's chair~:~an) and to table
papersror the committee's consideration. They
would not be permitted to vote, however, or to
participate in the actual decision making.
Financing the three preparatory meetings and
the review conference itself poses anther problem.
A proposal to finance the four meetings--at an
estimated cost of $336,x00--from the regt4lar UN
budget was defeated by the UN General Asssmbly in
1973. Since then, the preparatory committF~es
have attempted to work out a formula for appor~
tion:ing the costs among the conference's partici-
pants--with little success thus far. Proposals
range from one presented by some nonali~Yned s~?ates
that would require the UK, U5 and USSR to assume
90 percent of the costs to suggestions for
February 7 , 1975
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pro-rating financial assessments on tho regular
UN budgot contributions. While no docision hag
yet boen taken on tho financing issue, it seems
likely that the threo signatory powers will bo
required to assume tho lion's sharp of the
oxponses. (Confidential)
February 7, 1975
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Franco Said Preparing to Relinquish Spanish
Headship of State 25X1X
25X1 C
~ General Franco was making preparations as o
late January to turn over his position as head of
only his post as commander in chief of the armed
forces.
os, his chosen successor.
Juan Carlos has been
receiving nightly briefings from Franco for the
transfer of power;, this would leave Franco with
Rumors have been circulating in Madrid that
Franco would step down ever since he resumed power
last September after a midsummer illness. ~ 25X1C
25X1C - maintain that Franco is not seriously i11.
His condition apparently is complicated, however,
by the fact that the medication used to treat his
Parkinson's disease is not compatible with the treat-
ment. he is receiving for phlebitis.
The delicate state of Franco's health has
produced an unusual amount nf. political stirring 25X1C
in recent months, in Madrid have
reported that Juan Carlos has been talking with Frar~co's
family about the General's resignation, but that the
talks have been deadlocked mover the terms of the
financial and other arrangements to be accorded
the family when Franco resigns.
Other reports centered on the visit to Madrid
last month of the ambitious Manuel Fraga Iribarne,
who is Spain's ambassador to London. Fraga reportedly
was interested in exploring the possibilities of
establishing a political association to further his 25X1C
political career. Juan
Carlos asked Fraga to sound out senior Spanish officers
as to whether they would support Juan Carlos were he
to begin to apply pressure on Franco to step down.
February 7, 1975
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Franco's illness last summer has made ~4p~ciiards
aware of how close the post-Francs period m~..y be.
Many were surprised when he reassumed his not and
are ready to see him give it up. The u1tr~>,rightists,
who persuaded him to come back last fall, will do
their best to encourage him to stay on as long as
he can.
If Juan Carlos is sworn in, his immediate problem,
aside from the resen+,;nent he will face from the far
right, will be to establish his independence from
Franco. The tendency will be strong, as long as
Franco is functioning in some capa,city~ to refer
vital decisions to him. (Secret No Foreign Dissem/
Controlled Dissem)
February 7, 1975
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Italian Government to face Confidence Vote
The debate now underway in the Italian parlia-
ment on reform of t)^.F state radio-TV network has
turnea into a major ~cest for the Moro government.
Moro has decided to make the vote on this issue
a vote of confidence for his government.
The proposed law is controversial because it
amounts to a dilution of the Christian Democrats'
traditional control of the state network. A court
ruling last year struck down the laws that gave
the Christian Democrats a monopoly on state communi-
cations. In the ensuing negotiations on new
Legislation, the Christian Democratic leadership
was forced to share control of the network management
with several of the other parties, including the
Communists and Socialists.
Christian Democratic right-wingers are dissatis-
fied with the new arrangement, however, and Moro has
had difficulty holding a majority together in the
face of obstructionist tactics by the NPR-fascists,
who gained nothing as a result of the new law. He
has had to withdraw one version of the law out of
fear that disgruntled Christian Democrats would defect
to the opposition in any vote on the issue.
By turning the balloting on the z~adio-TV question
into a confidence vote, Moro is trying to enforce
discipline within the coalition. Although Moro could
still lose, elements of his majority are less likely
to de~ect in a confidence vote since it is taken by
a public show of hands. If it was not designated
a confidence vote, the balloting would be secret.
(Confidential)
February 7, 1975
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Phone: 1 3-
Talks on Formation of Government Collapse
in Denmark
Social Democratic leader Anker Jorgensen
took over the task of forming a new government
in Denmark after week-ling efforts by President
of Parliament Karl Skytte broke down yesterday.
Skytte wss name3 by the Queen to head the
negotiations on January 29 after Prime P~linister
Hartling's Moderate Liberal government resigned
over some controversial budget proposals. Seven
of the ten Danish political parties took part
in the talks that were intended to produce a
majority government. The other three, all left-
ist parties, dripped out because of Skytte's
pre-condition that a new government support
Danish membership in the EC and NATO.
The most logical combination, a Social
Democrat-Moderate Liberal majority coalition,
failed }o materialize because of personal
animosity between the two party leaders and
differences over an economic program. In
addition, the Social Democrats were instru-
mental in the fall of the Hartling government.
The refusal of most of the negotiating parties
to participate in a coalition with maverick
Progressive Party leader P4ogens Glistrup also
contributed to the collapse of the talks.
Differences among the parties over a
solution to the country's economic problems,
which were merely underlined during the
latest rand of talks, do not augur well
for a coalition government. Jorgensen may
have to settle for a one-party minority
government. If so, he will need the coopera-
tion of tlln non-socialist parties, and may
have to water down his legislative program,
particularly his economic plan, in order to
survive. (Confidential)
February 7, 1975
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25X1A
Phone: [phone]
Arab Moves to Expel Israel From the ILO
The confederation of Arab trade unions has
decided to mount a campaign to expel Israel from
the International Labor Organization.. The Arab
trade unionists will reportedly introduce a res-
olution proposing Israel's expulsion at the Jui~~e
conference of the ILO, arguing that Israel con-
tinues to violate the rights of Arab citizens
and workers in "Palestine and the occupied ter-?
ritories."
The ILO constitution does not include a pro-
vision for expelling members and the contemplated
Arab move could succeed only by flouting ILO con-
stitutional procedures. In any case, introduction
of such a resolution will dismay those who are in-
creasingly concerned about the growing politici-
zation of UN agencies. Western labor delegates
to the ILO, especially, may threaten to boycott
the organization if it becomes a forum for attacks
on Israel. (Confidential)
February 7, 1975
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25X1A
Fhone:: 143-5205
ANNEX
EC Cements Ties with 46 Developing Countries
The EC completed negotiations last week
on a comprehensive five-year cooperation agreement
with S6 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries.
It will likely be signed in Lome, Togo, on
February 28.
The agreement has been hailed by community
officials as a model for the West's future
relations with the third world, and leaders
on both sides say it will mark a turning point
in relations between rich and poor nations.
Although such claims may be somewhat exaggerated,
a provision which guarantees the developing
countries "stable" earnings from key commodity
exports may in fact prove to be especially
significant in i:he growing debate over third-
world economic demands.
The agreement, to be known as the Lome
Convention, provides for free entry to the
EC of all industrial products and 96 percent
of the agricultural exports of the 46 developing
countries. Such preference s, together with
financial aid, were also the main ingredients
of the community's earlier association arrangements
in Africa. But the export stabilization scheme
as well as a protocol on industrial cooperation
have added new dimensions to the EC's approach
to relations with the developing countries.
Tn replacing the earlier and more limited
trade and aid accords, the Lome Conventionz
also extends the EC's links to an additional
18 commonwealth countries and 6 independent
African states. The community has for some
February 7, 1975
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years had agreements with 19 African states
under the Yaounde Convention and with Kenya,
Uganda, and Tanzania under the Arusha accords.
The 46, led by Senegal and Nigeria, have
demonstrated remarkable solidarity throughout
these negotiations, given the complexity ~f
the economic issues and the political diversity
among them--in particular between the Francophone
and Anglophone Africans. This accounts, in
great part, for the "generosity" of the community
in the new arrangements. The EC, nevertheless,
hopes to gain in return a considerable measure
of goodwill in the third world--a valuable
asset in a world concerned with access to raw
materials and potential new export market.
Export Stabilization
The export stabilization scheme responds
to the developing countries' long-standing
demand for stabilization of earnings from their
exports of ra~~ materials and i_s the first such
agreement between developed and developing
states. The arrangement provides that the
EC will make direct loans to those signatories
whose earnings from exports to the EC of 12
agricultural commodities and from iron ore
fall below a minimum reference level.
Although falling short of what the developing
states want in the context of their demands
for a "new world economic order," the stabiliz-
ation scheme may still have an impact on such
discussions between developed and developing
states at the UNCTAD conference on commodities
next week in Geneva. The Nine will at least be
able to claim they are taking account of develop-
ing country interests.
For their part, the 46 also value the protocol
on industrial development as evidence of their
new "partnership" with the Nine. For the first
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time, the EC is embarking on a concerted prograrn
of industrial development and diversification
that will focus on research and technology
adapted to the needs of the participating developing
co~~ntries.
In their demands for major concessions
in trade and aid, the 46 were motivated, in
part, by fears that as the EC expanded its
Mediterranean policy and its scheme of generalized
trade preferences for other developing countries,
their special benefits would decrease.
The EC will relax its rules specifying
how mtach process~.ng a developing country export
must undergo before it qualifies for duty-
free entry into the community. Developing
countries complained that existing rules harm
their budding export-or.ie;ited industries ar~d
make regional arrangements among the poorF~r
states difficult. The EC has approached these
negotiations carefully due to fears that. more
liberal rules could provide a back door for
eni:ry into the EC of cheap manufactures from
dF:veloped countries such as Japan.
On agricultural issues the EC was more
firm, refusing to grant free and unlimited
access to EC markets for agricultural products
that would seriously compete with community
growers. Although 96 percent of the agricultural
products of the 46 can enter free of duty,
the community decided only t~ grant preferences
comparable to what other developing countries
receive on the remaining 4 percent, thus preserving
the sanctity of the EC's common agricultural
policy.
The most difficult negotiations centered
on the price the EC would pay for imported
? sugar and the community took full advantage
of its bargaining power and favorabJ.e market
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trends. Caribbean sugar producers, hoping
to take advantage of still high world sugar
prices, initially c?.emanded four times the current
EC price as well as guarantees nn future sugar
imports.
Responding to pressure from UK refiners
of cane sugar, the community agreed o:~.ly to
guarantee the import of t.4 million tons of
sugar yearly at a price not lower than the
EC support price for its sugar. Tn separate
negotiations, however, the UX agreed to pay
a higher price for its sugar, but this was
only about half that demandad by the sugar
producers.
Reverse preferences--preferential access
for EC exports to the developing country markets--
was a highly political issue in the negotiations.
The US has always opposed such preferences
because the, contribute to dividing up markets
in the developing world.
In the face of French opposition, the
46 succeeded in eliminating all reciprocal
obligations from the new agreement. It is
now up to the developing countries to grant
reverse preferences if they wish, but only
Senegal, the Ivory Coast, and possibly one
or two other states will do so.
Aid and Institutional Arrangements
Over the next five years the EC has agreed
to provide approximately $4.1 billion in development
assistance through the European Development
Fund. This replaces the Third European Development
Fund, which since 1969 has made almost $1 billion
available to the signatories ~f the Yaounde
Convention. Until last week the 46 had persisted
in their demands for a $8 billion fund while
the Nine, led by Germany and Italy, had resisted
any offers of more than $3 billion in development
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Both sides regard the convention a~ an
important step toward "equality" of relations
between developing and developed states. The
46 have, in fact, rejected the earlier association
label as implying less than full autonomy for
the developing countries.
Reflecting this sensitivity, the participants
to the agreement will meet regularly at the
ministerial and the ambassadorial level. Tn
addi'~.,ion, they will establisY~ a consultative
assembly composed of members of the European
Farliament and representatives appointed by
the developing states.
These institutions may provide a regular
channel of communication between the community
and the less developed states at a time when
other channels between the developed and developing
worlds have become increasingly jammed by hostility.
(Confidential No Foreign Dissem)
February 7 , 197 5
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