STAFF NOTES: SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000400080031-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 23, 2005
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: April 28, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
No Foreigp Dimm
gu&~P HDVM
Soviet Onion
Eastern Europe
Secret
158
April 28, 1975
OCI No. 0094/75
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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE
This publication Is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intel.
ligence, with occasIonal contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should
be directed to the authors of the Individual articles.
CONTENTS
April. 28, 1975
Soviets Meet with Syrian Foreign Minister . . . . 1
Soviets Speak Up Against the Hegemony
Clause in Japan-China Treaty. . . . . . . . . . 3
Grechko Discusses World War II . . . . . . . . . 4
Nomination of Leaders to Republic
Supreme Soviets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
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Soviets Meet with
Syr an F ore gn n ster
Syrian-Foreign Minister Khaddam's visit to the
USSR last week marked a continuation of Moscow's
efforts to prepare for a resumption of the Geneva
conference.
The communique issued at the end of the visit,
however, left unclear whether the Soviets were able
to make substantial progress on Geneva with the
Syrians, particularly over the issue of PLO repre-
sentation. The Syrians have been strong advocates
of early participation at Geneva by an independen-
Palestine Liberation Organization delegation. Al-
though the Soviets have supported the "equal" par-
ticipation of PLO representatives, they have been
ambiguous about the timing of Palestinian attend-
ance and have kept open the possibility that the
PLO will become part of another delegation.
The Palestinian issue will be discussed dur-
ing the visit to Moscow of a PLO delegation headed
by Yasir Arafat, which began yesterday. In addi-
tion, Gromyko is apparently planning a trip to the
Middle East next month to continue discussions on
Geneva.
The Syrian-Soviet communique was markedly
warmer on bilateral issues than the one issued
after Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi's visit last
week. In what may be an effort to signal their con-
tinued displeasure with Cairo, the Soviets once
again stated their commitment to building Syrian
military strength and praised Syria's political
policies.
The four-day trip to Damascus by Soviet Chief
of Staff Kulikov--which coincided with Khaddam's
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stay in Moscow--may have been designed to under-
score continuing Soviet military support at a time
when Moscow was pressing Khaddam on Geneva. Kuli-
kov met with President Asad and Syrian military
leaders and probably checked on how Damascus is em-
ploying Moscow's substantial military aid.
It is likely that Syria's dispute with Iraq
over the waters of the Euphrates River
was din-
cussed it Moscow.
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Soviets Speak U Against the Hegemony
clause in Japan-China Treaty
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The Soviets have inveighed against the pro-
spective Japan-China peace and friendship treaty
with signed commentaries in Pravda and Iuv estia.
Moscow seems reconciled to the conclusion of a
treaty, b!t it ix trying to stiffen Japanese opposi-
tion to the inclusion of a reference to "anti
hegemony" that is patently directed at the Soviets.
The commentaries are tough on the Chinese and
--given the fact that Moscow would prefer that
Tokyo not sign any treaty with China until it is
willing to sign one with the USSR--relatively easy
on the Japanese. The Soviets charge that Chinese
leaders have admitted that the Soviet Union is the
target of the hegemony language, and that Peking's
purpose is to cover its own designs and to drive
a wedge between the USSR and Japan. The commen-
taries praise Japanese leaders who are sensitive
to the real purposes of the Chinese and are re-
sisting the hegemony language in the treaty.
The timing and tons of these conuuentaries sug-
gest that Moscow sees some hope that Tokyo will be
able at least to water down the treaty's language.
The Soviets probably believe, with some justifica-
tion, that their strong representations in Tokyo
against the treaty have caused the Japanese to take
a tougher stand in the talks than they would have
otherwise. Even:if Tokyo capitulates, the Soviets
would have helped create a controversial is a be-
tween the two countries and would have the Japa-
nese on the defensive when they deal with Moscow.
The Soviets might also press the Japanese to make
amends by supporting Moscow's Asian security con-
cept, which the Soviets will probably dust off
before very long as their contribution to t
141-i , 1 ad tustments under way in East Asia.
April 28, 1975
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Grechko Discusses World War II
Defense Minister Grechko, in an article ap-
pearing in the March 1975 issue of ProbZems of
Peaoe and SoaiaZiam, attempts to clarify four major
contradictions the Soviets face in trying to pro-
ject their version of the causes and the course of
World War II. While it breaks little new ground,
the article is the most detailed and authoritative
statement of its type to emerge during the'pub-
licity for the "Great Thirtieth" celebrations. The
four contradictions are: 1) the wartime alliance
with the Western imperialist powers, 2) the non-
aggression pact with Germany, 3) the repression and
privation of the 1930s in the USSR, and 4) the So-
viet role in the war against Japan.
Grechko grapples first with the complex prob-
lem of explaining how imperialism could be at once
the enemy and the ally of the Soviet Union. He ex-
plains this in standard class terms: the "people"
sided with the Soviets, while ti,e exploiters were
for the Germans. The rhling circles of the im-
perialist powers, he writes, saw German fascism as
their class ally in the struggle against the Soviet
Union. "However cor:plex and contradictory inter-
national relations in the capitalist world were in
the 1930s," he continues, "it remains an indisputable
fact that other imperialist powers, directly or in-
directly, invested effort and money in the prep-
aration of aggression agal.nst the USSR and the
creation of the German fascist army." The policy
of appeasement practiced by the imperialists served
the same end, he claims. Meanwhile, the Soviet
Union was doing all it could to avert war and was
trying to arrange an international al.:.iance against
Germany. These overtures were rebufLed, however,
because the imperialists saw socialism, not fas-
cism, as their maim enemy. When the Western
powers' calculated attempts to direct Germany's
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aggression against the USSR failed and they found
themselves instead victims of the German army,
they were unable to offer effective resistance and
fell one by one to Hitler's forces. This gave
Germany the economic base from which to launch an
attack against the Soviet Union--the primary target
all along--and the Soviet Union and the Western
powers became allies.
Grechko then attempts a detailed explanation
of the need for the repression and privation in the
Soviet union during the 1930s, a need which he as-
serts was directly related to war preparations.
Bearing in mind Lenin's dictum about being encir-
cled by hostile forces, the Soviet Union was aware
of the risk of war and took the necessary meas-
ures during the prewar period to build up an eco-
nomic, military, moral, and political base of de-
fense. Soviet domestic policy of the 1930s--col-
lectivization, liquidation of the exploiting
classes, the uniting of the disparate nationalities
of the USSR and other measures--were directed to
this end and made it possible for the USSR to em-
bark on a fundamental technical restructuring of
the Soviet armed forces and their armament.
This process, Grechko explains, took time,
and it was therefore necessary to try to delay the
start of a war that was becoming "increasingly in-
evitable." In this situation, the only recourse
was to conclude a non-aggression pact with Germany,
which gave the USSR two vital years to build up the
country's defenses.
Grechko addresses himself to the fourth con-
tradiction, the Soviet role in the war against
Japan, in terms somewhat more straightforward than
previous Soviet statements, including his own. He
notes that the Soviet Union entered the war against
Japan only in August 1945, and he does not make the
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usual claim that the Soviet Union defeated militarist
Japan. He does, however, ignore the US-Japanese war
in the Pacific, saying only that the Soviet army and
the Mongolians defeated the Japanese Kwangtung army.
In an ambiguous formulation, he states that the So-
viets estimate "at their true worth" the contribu-
tions of the peoples of the USA, Great Britain,
France, Canada and other countries who fought the
Germans.
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Nominations of Leaders to
Republic Supreme Soviets
The results of the first day of nominations of
candidates for election to republic Supreme Soviets
were published by Pravda on April 25. The ranking
of Politburo members according to number of nomina-
ting districts indicates little change in status
following the Central Committee plenum that dropped
Shelepin from the leadership. Brezhnev leads with
nominations from 16 electoral districts. Podgorny
and Kosygin are tied for second place with 10;
Suslov and Kirilenko have three each; and the other
leaders all have one.
The distance between Brezhnev's score and that
of Podgorny and Kosygin is not quite as great as in
Pravda's first day of reporting on last year's nom-
inations to the USSR Supreme Soviet. Nevertheless,
coverage of Brezhnev's candidacy overwhelms all
others. Pictures of meetings in electoral districts
carried by all central newspapers but one show only
Brezhnev's portrait being held up by enthusiastic
supporters. (The Moscow Oblast paper shows Brezh-
nev's portrait out in front, flanked by those of
Podgorny and Kosygin.) Brezhnev's name appears
first in the accounts of meetings in each republic.
Nominations of top leaders are honorary in all
cases but one. The ratio established by Pravda.on
its first day of reporting is generally maintained
throughout the nomination campaign. The central
and republic press will continue to publish reports
of these honorary nominations during the next couple
of weeks. Election day is June 15.
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Following is a tabulation of the number of
district nominations for each lcadc:. as initially
reported by Pravda this year and last year:
1974 1975
Lire mhnev 21 16
Kosygin 11 10
Podgorny 11 10
Suslov 4 3
Kirilenko 4 3
Andropov 2 1
Grechko 2 1
Gromyko 2 1
Grishin 2 1
Kulakov 2 1
Kunayev 2 1
Mazurov 2 1
Pelshe 2 1
Polyansky 2 1
Shcherbitsky 2 1
Shelepin 2
April 28, 1975
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