STAFF NOTES: SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000400080017-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 23, 2005
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: April 4, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
No Foreign Dimem
gulvp HOUE90
Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
Secret
1%Ijz 8
April 4, 1975
No. 0086/75
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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE
This publication is prepared for regional specialie~s in thl Washington com-
munity by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intel-
ligence, with occas!onal contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should
be directed to the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
April 4, 1975
Soviet View of Southeast Asia. .
Romania.: Ceausescu Traveling Again
Romanians Stand Fast at the CSCE .
Belgrade Upset At Grechko
Version of Wartime Liberations .
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Soviet View of Southeast Asia
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Moscow, although obviously pleased with Hanoi's
successful operations in South Vietnam, is still
treating them as justified retaliation for Saigon's
violation of the peace accord. 25X1 C
. Kuznetsov, the Deputy Chief of the South-
east
Asia division of the Soviet Ministry of For-
eign
Affairs, argued that recent events were more
the
result of a South Vietnamese collapse than of
a major North Vietnamese offensive. Kuznetsov
25X10 avoi g the US role in Indochina and
old hay Moscow still wanted a nego--
tiated settlement and would welcome any US initiative.
Despite this effort to portray the Soviets as
reasonable, Kuznctsov acknowledged that Moscow
backed the PRG's position on negotiations, in-
cluding the necessity of President Thieu's removal.
Kuznetsov said that Moscow still favored a politi-
cal rather than a military solution in South'V:et-
nap, but he gave no indication that Moscow wa!:s
making such an argument in Hanoi:
The Soviets are also still talking about.; nego-
tiations in Cambodia, although they clearly ;d.ew
them as nothing more than a means to provide an
orderly transfer of power. Kuznetsov concedFsd that
Moscow recognizes that Sihanouk will probably play
some role in Phnom Penh after a communist victory.
He denigrated Sihanouk's importance over the long
haul, however, and repeated long-standing Sc;viet
complaints of Sihanouk's unreliability.
April 4, 1975
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Romania: Ceausescu Traveling Again
President Ceausescu left Romania on April 3 for
a tour of Japan, the Philippines, Jordan, and Tunisia
in hopes of bolstering Romania's political prestige
and international economic position. He will be gone
until April 19.
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April 4, 1975
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Ceausescu had hoped to have an even more ex-
tensive itinerary, including Kuwait, Australia, New
Zealand, and Indonesia. Invitations from the last
three arrived too late. Xuwait, from which the Ro-
manians had unsuccessfully sought a $500-million
credit, canceled out at the last minute because of
the assassination of King Faisal.
Japan, one of the few great industrial powers
that Ceausescu?.f.as not visited, is viewed by the
Romanians as a good potential source of technology
and credit. The Japanese press has already repo-If
that Romania will receive 10 billioii yen in bank
loans to help finance Ceausescu's Constanta port
expansion project. Ceausescu, however, will re-
portedly be less successful in obtaining Japanese
development aid because Tokyo considers Romania a
"substantially industrialized country."
The Romanians will play up the "fellow Oeveloping
country" theme in Manila, which only recently established
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In Jordan and Tunisia, Ceausescu will wear the
"friend-of-the-Arabs" robes that have helped Bucha-
rest expand markets and obtain oil in he Arab world
even whilA maintaining relations with Israel. Ceau-
sescu can be expected to plump for the inclusion of
other Mediterranean and European states--including
Rontania--in the Geneva talks on the Mideast. In
addition, Ceausescu's desire for some form of assc-
ciation with the nonaligned movement will undoubtedl
come up in Tunis.
April 4, 1975
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Romanians Stand Fast at the CSCE
Romanian objections to the formulation of sev-
eral key items on the CSCE agenda could prolong the
second stage of the European security talks in
Geneva, but it is doubtful that Bucharest will re-
main adamant to the point of causing significant
delays,, The Soviets will oppose most if not all of
the Romanian positions, and the Romanians may feel
that by advancing the issues they have made their
case.
Bucharest is obviously trying once again to
have its views on national sovereignty accepted and
legitimized in every possible international forum.
In the case of the European security talks, the Ro-
manians are also trying to ensure that the confer-
ence documents do not endorse the status quo between
Eastern and Western Europe. The pursuit of these
goals has sometimes put the Romanians at odds with
the US, but more often has worked against Moscow.
pose ions in six areas.
--Peaceful change of borders: Bucharest
still harbors aspirations of regaining
northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, now
part of the USSR.
--Quadripartite rights and responsibilities:
The Romanians strongly oppose the present
language because they believe it dovetails
neatly with the Brezhnev Doctrine, under
which Moscow claims the right to inter-
vene in fraternal socialist countries
whenever the leading role of the party is
threatened.
April 4, 1975
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--Nonuse of force: Bucharest would like
to hit t is subject by treating
it in a separate document because it
fears the Soviets have military de-
signs on Romania.
--Voluntary confidence-buildLing measures:
The Romanians object strongly -to so-
Viet proposals that these measures
should be voluntary. Bucharest believes
that this arrangement would give Moscow
too much latitude to apply military and
psychological pressure.
--Basket II language on lesser developed
countries: Romania often likes to repre-
sent itself as a le:*ser developed country
in order to gain economic benefits that
it could not otherwise obtain.
--Follow-up: Bucharest favors the creation
of a permanent CSCE secretariat that
could call periodic meetings. The Roma-
nians feel that, in the event of real or
imaginary Soviet pressure, they could use such
an institution to take some of the heat
April 4, 1975
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Belgrade Upset At Grechko Version
of Wartime Liberations
The day after Tito issued a stinging rebu'.tal
of Warsaw Pact Commander Yakubovsky's "denigrF.tion"
of the Yugoslav war effort (Staff Notes;, April 4),
a similar article by Soviet Defense Minister Grechko
appeared in a Prague military daily. Milika Sundic,
a radio commentator with excellent access to inside
sources in Belgrade, has indicated the official re-
sponse to this article also will be heated.
In a broadcast on Thursday, he criticized
Grechko and Yakubovsky by name and attacked Grechko
for going one step further in disputing any non-
Soviet "contribution to the great victory over
fascism." In view of the Soviet marshal's efforts
to belittle the Yugoslav national liberation strug-
gle, Sundic said, the question arises whether
Soviet officers--or other officials actually want
good relations with Belgrade. He added that the
article's appearance in the Czechoslovak press "re-
minds one of many things unfavorable" to both coun-
tries. In a final shot, Sundic asserted that Soviet
marshals sometimes meddle in politics more than
is proper for military men in a socialist country.
Tanjug, the Yugoslav news agency, has thus far
given its domestic audience no more than the flavor
of the Grechko article and a repetition of the key
parts of Tito's angry response to Yakubovsky. Bel-
grade will undoubtedly issue a more dgta.iled reply
once Tito, who iv on tour in the Kosovo. has studied
the Grechko article. 17 1
29k*A
April 4, 1975
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