STAFF NOTES: SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000400080001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 9, 1999
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 13, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

1 / A, / fe e 2000109/14
Sei\ ip Union, st:er'n Europe:
S/NOD%NQA
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No Fortigr, Diurm
(5ffITT HOUE
Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
Secret
1.'8
March 13, 1975
No. 0079/75
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ro c1 a cE o
o zuur~rn p
controizod Uinvem
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Invowed
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. 0. 11652, axomption category:
5 5B (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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SOVIET UNIO;i - EASTERN EUROPE
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intel-
ligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should
be directed to the authors of the Individual articles.
March 13, 1975
Strategic Specialist in USA
Institute Talks About SALT . . . . . . . . . . 1
Brezhnev Proposesi Summit-Level
Finale of CSCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Cracow Leaders Discuss Shortages . . . . . . . . 5
Bulgaria - West Germany:
Strengthening Relations . . . . . . . . . . . 6
New Soviet Minister of
Transport Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Soviets Negotiate for Large Purchase
of US Color TV Technology . . . . . . . . . . 9
Hungary at the Crossroads--Part III . . . . . . 10
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Strategic Secialist in USA
Institute Talks out SALT
L. S. Semeyko, a strategic specialist in the
USA Institute, has suggested to US officials that
the USSR could reduce the aggregate ceilings on its
strategic weapons by as much as 30 percent in the
aftermath of a SALT II agreement. He said that
reductions beyond this level could not be made
without taking into account the iauclear forces of
China, Great Britain, and France, and that nego-
tiations on the reductions could begin immediately
following signature of a SALT II agreement.
These propositions on reductions in central
strategic systems go far beyond the present offi-
cial Soviet position. The latter makes no refer-
ences to percentage of reductions, envisions reduc-
tions only in the post-1980 period, and is heavily
hedged with statements regarding the necessity for
reductions in nuclear weapons in third countries
and in US forward-based systems.
Semeyko made these comments last week in two
conversations with US officials involved in arms
limitation negotiations. On the second occasion,
two other members of the USA Institute were present.
All three seemed to be making a special effort to
portray the Soviets us both reasonable and inter-
ested in additional progress ;,n arms control. For
example, Semeyko observed that the USSR would not
reach its allowed MIRV ceiling of 1,320 until well
into the ten-year SALT 11 treaty, and could there-
fore accept a reduction in the MIRV ceiling without
having to dismantle existing systems.
He also raised the subject of mobile ICBMs,
asserting that the USSR is less interested in them
than the LS. ile q':.7ted the commander of the stra-
tegic roc'cet forces to the effect that the Su-,,'et
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fnion does not intend to build mobile ICBMs. When
pressed on the discrepancy between this position
and the Soviet stance at SALT I, Semeyko replied
that "maybe our position has changed." His sta e-
ment is at variance with evidence that suggests
probable Soviet development of a mobile ICBM.
Mambers of the USA Institute do not hold policy-
making positions, nor do their views necessarily re-
flect those of the leadership. On occasion, opinions
elmilarly expressed to Americans in the past have
failed to materialize as official Soviet positions.
Nevertheless, the institute appears to have a sig-
nificant advisory role, and the ideas of its members
may be representative of at least one school of in-
formed opinion. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND
USE ONLY)
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Brezhnev Pro oses Summit-Level
Finale of CSCL
Party chief Brezhnev has sent letters to the
leaders of major Western countries proposing that
the summit-level finale of the CSCE be held on June
30. This is the first time since the conclusion of
the conference became a realistic possibility that
the Soviets have suggested a specific date. The
timing suggests that Moscow would like to have the
security conference out of the way prior to a Brezh-
nev visit to the US.
The Soviet delegation in Geneva has shown new
vigor in pushing the talks along. The delegation
chief, who was in Moscow for four days at the be-
ginning of March, fought hard for a short Easter
recess and has sought to get the West to begin
planning for the final stage of the talks. The
Soviets seem to think that a wind-up can be achieved
without making any serious concession to the West on
the arcane problems that remain to be resolved.
Brezhnev's letter was timed to coincide with a
discussion of the security conference by EC leaders
at their meeting in Dublin earlier this week. They
reportedly reacted very favorably to the letter and
had "surprisingly few misgivings" about it. Several
of the participants at the Dublin meeting expressed
the view that the West should move quickly to take
advantage of Brezhnev's personal commitment to de-
tente.
Nevertheless, the statement approved by the
Nine on the security conference is cautious. It
supports a conclusion "at an early date and at the
highest level" only if "balanced and satisfactory
results" on all agenda items are achieved.
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The West Europeans are not prepared at thin
time to pay an exorbitant price to bring the socu?-
rity conference to an end. In Dublin, the EC
leaders called for Soviet flexibility and agreed
not to cave in entirely if the Soviets continue to
be intransigent. At the same time, the heads of
government called for further EC study of outstand-
ing conference issues, probably to determine where
Western concessions might still ultimately be made.
(CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
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Cracow Loaderri Discuss Shortages
At least one Polish provincial leader has al-
ready followed Gierek's lead of last Thursday by
frankly and publicly discussing the shortages, espe-
cially of moat and milk products, that face the
Polish worker. (Staff Notoo, March 11 and 12).
US consular officers in Cracow have reported
that, for the second time in a week, provincial
party first secretary Jozef Kiasa apologized for
the shortages to a National Woman's Day gathering
on Marc; 8. A consular officer attending the meet-
ing stated that Kiasa"nervously" admitted that there
are "many still existing shortages" an9 failures in
the trade and service sectors. Kiasa singled out
the women of Nowa Iluta, Cracow's industrial suburb,
for special attention, thus lending further credibility
to the rumors of growing disenchantment in that area.
Kiasa promised to do everything possible to reduce
shopping lines and to provide bigger, more modern,
and better supplied stores, but the consular officer
reported that half the audience refrained from ap-
plauding at the end of the speech.
Consular officers, who report seeing longer
lines than usual in front of meat, grocery, and
fabric stores, spoke to Cracow's mayor, who also
admitted there were "significant" shortages." He
specifically blamed bad weather for the problems,
but poor distribution may be a major contributing
factors. The mayor claimed that the meat and butter
shortages would be under control "in a few weeks,"
thanks principally to imports from the Soviet Union
and East Germany. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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13u19arira - West German
Strength-o-nT-ng Relations
Foreign Minister Mladonov's visit to West Ger-
many last weak highlighted Sofia's interest in placing
economic and other relations with Bonn on a firmer
footing. The visit was the first to West Germany by
a high-ranking Bulgarian since the two countries es-
tablished diplomatic relations in 1973.
In his talks with the Germans, Mladenov stressed
the desirability of expanded cooperation on all
fronts--economic, political and cultural--and avoided
contentious economic issues. He made it clear that
Sofia does not intend to reduce imports of West Ger-
man goods to redress its unfavorable trade balance
with i;onn, which increased sharply in 1974. He
steered clear of the sensitive questions of obtain-
ing credits on concessionary terms. West Germany
is already Bulgaria's largest Western trading part-
ner, accounting for some 22 percent of Sofia's trade
with the non-Communist world; trade with West Germany
last year amounted to approximately $390 million.
Mladenov emphasized that Sofia was not satisfied
with trade alone and wanted to establish a "legal and
contractual basis" for bilateral relations. Further-
more, he hoped that poV.tical contacts would expand
and "in the not too distant future will reach the
level ...of our economic relations."
If Mladenov's remarks are taken at face value,
they represent a substantial commitment on the polit-
ical front. A number of official visits are already
being arranged. Foreign Minister Genscher and Trade
Minister Friderichs will travel to Bulgaria sometime
this yeaz and, to the reported delight of the Bul-
garians, President Scheel has invited Bulgarian
Party leader Zhivkov to visit Bonn in late 1975 or
early 1976.
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Both parties expect to sign soon a long-term
cooperation agreement and are actively discussing a
cultural agreement. A technical and scientific co-
operation agreement is, however, stalled over the
status of scientists in West Berlin. This same issue
recently blocked similar Romanian - West German dis-
cussions.
An interesting sidelight of the visit is the
increased prominence in foreign relations of Lyud-
mila Zhivkova, daughter of the Bulgarian party leader.
Zhivkova, went to Egypt with Mladenov last month, and
also accompanied him to Bonn. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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New Soviet Minister of
Transport Construction
On March 6, Pravda announced the appointment of
Ivan Dmitriyevich Sosnov as minister of transport
construction. Sosnov, who has been the ministry's
first deputy minister since 1966, succeeds Ye. F.
Kozhevnikov, who at age 69 was retired on pension.
Ill health may have forced Kozhevnikov's retirement.
The 66-year-old Sosnov has held top posts in
the ministry for over 20 years. He headed admini-
strations responsible for the construction of rail-
roads in the Soviet East (1954-57) and the Urals
(1957-58) and served as deputy minister for eight
years.
Sosnov is a native Ukrainian. He has traveled
outside the Soviet Union occasionally in connection
with Soviet transport construction assistance pro-
grams. Two of his more recent trips include a visit
to the US in October 1971, when he was invited by
US Secretary of Transportation Volpe to observe US
construction of underwater tunnels, and a trip to
Czechoslovakia in May 1973 for the signing of a pro-
tocol agreement on Soviet technical assistance for
the construction of the Prague subway. (UNCLASSI-
FIED)
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Soviets Negotiate for Large Purchase
of US Color TV Technology
After several years of intermittent negotia-
tions with two US firms, the USSR appears ready to
award contracts for technology and equipment for
the production of color television picture tubes.
The US firms have submitted bids totaling more than
$130 million--$25 million for machinery and tech-
nology for production of glass parts and $107 mil-
lion for machinery and technology for all other
aspects of picture tube parts and assembly. The
two contracts make up a complete technology package
for an annual output of 1.5 million color TV tubes.
Soviet problems with volume production of good
quality color picture tubes span many years. Al-
though the USSR currently has plant capacity to
produce about a million color picture tubes per
year, usable output is only about 500,000 units,
many of which are of substandard quality.
Most color TV picture tubes now produced in
the USSR are based on an unhappy marriage of Soviet
and US technology. The USSR purchased a complete
line to make one component part (shadow mask) from
the US in 1969 after efforts to produce the French-
designed "chromatron" tube failed. Apparently, the
Soviets have now decided that only turnkey purchases
will make possible efficient large-scale production
of quality color tubes for receivers. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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Hungary t the Crossroads Part Zti
Today the Staff Noa?^ conoZudoo a three-
p irt ooritao on Hungary prior to tic party
congrooo that opono on Monday. Thio inotaZZ-
niont dioouoooo the probable impact of the
3ongrooo on the Hungarian party, r+xaminoo
Budapeot'o foreign reZationo, and considers
doveZopmento over the immediate future.
The Party
The party congress will focus directly on the
need for a more unified, disciplined, and committed
Communist party. A spe;ial effort will be made to
paper over differences deepened by lengthy policy
debates, to upgrade the party's guiding role, and
to meet the demand for a united party in the face
of detente. Changes in the pa':ty rules will limit
the right of dissent and facilitate tighter dis-
cipline.
The regime has been preoccupied with the party's
health since 1972, when lengthy and vituperative
policy debates over economic and cultural issues
opened many wounds. The continuing debate prompted
Kadar to warn party members publicly that there were
limits to party democracy. The expulsion of several
sociologists in June 1973 was both a commi+.:ment to
tightening the party ranks and a warning to unruly
intellectuals.
Last November the Central Committee reiterated
the previous year's call to induct more workers and
young people into the party, and initiated a program
to weed out the corrupt and incompetent. The resolu-
tion apparently stir-'lated a close screening of party
members in 1974. Coi::rary to rumors at several junc-
tures, however, the program apparently has not led to
a political purge or a formal exchange of party cards.
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In fact, Kadar told an audience of older function-
nrien at the party school last September that the
'"change of generations" under way was a gradual
process, and not something to be done "at the sound
of a whistle."
The congress will approve a now party program
to replace one drawn up in 1948. Drafted by a com-
mittee headed by Kadar, the program will apparently
define in ideological terms where Hungary stands,
where it is gi)ing, and how it will got there. It
will probably brim with orthodoxies, but will also
reflect Kadar's continuing policy of moderation.
Foreign Relations
Representatives from a number of Communist
parties will attend t:ie congress, but the highest
level delegations will come from Hungary's close
Warsaw Pact allies. There is growing evidence that
Brezhnev will make an appearance and if he does, he
will--as he did at the congress in 1970--endorse
Kadar's leadership and Hungary's achievements.
Moscow is no doubt pleased with its Hungarian
ties. Kadar's Hungary has been responsive, stable,
and loyal in foreign affairs. Moreover, the Soviets
can be confident that Budapest will continue to co-
operate. Hungary is overwhelmingly dependent on Soviet
raw materials, and more than 50,000 Soviet ground
troops are in the country.
Moscow's role in Budapest's policy debates has
been most apparent in the cultural/ideo,,.ogical area.
Never comfortable with what it perceived as Hungarian
permissiveness, by 1972 Moscow was reportedly urging
a stricter hand. At the same time, the Soviets
launched efforts to construct a web of ideological
cooperation agreements among the East Europeans.
Hungary initially resisted the Soviet move, but the
network of agreements--minus Romania--was completed
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the next year. Soon ct:me calls from the Soviets
for another international Communist. conference.
in December, Kadar and Bulgarian leader Zhivkov
became the first East European leaders to publicly
endorse a conference. A Soviet-inspired round of
bloc meetings on cultural and ideological matters
also was initiated. These meetings--the most re-
cent session was held last week in Prague--provide
the most direct evidence of Moscow's concern that
detente not erode Communism in Eastern Europe.
A direct Soviet hand in the economic debate
is less visible. Nonetheless, domestic critics
may have taken special encouragement from Moscow's
expressed unhappiness in 1972 over excessive in-
vestment by Hungarian enterprises. These diffi-
culties may have led Moscow to conclude that a
decentralized Hungarian economy could not mesh well
with its more central-minded allies within CEMA.
East Germany and Czechoslovakia apparently were
also pressing for more central controls in Hungary.
Budapest has been similarly responsive to Mos-
cow in foreign policy. Earlier hints of moderation
toward China have been superseded by vituperative
attacks on Maoism and strong support for an inter-
national Communist conference that will have at
least a latent anti-Chinese tone. Hungary expected
to be a direct participant in European force reduc-
tion talks, but the Soviets decided otherwise.
Budapest's eager advance work on European security---
indicative of good ties with Western Europe that
have made Moscow nervous---has yielded to a more
docile stance.
Hungary continues to be on generally good terms
with its East European allies. Budapest still finds
the greatest kinship with Gierek's Poland, the least
with Hcnecker's East Germany and Husak's Czechoslovakia.
Hungary's relations with maverick Romania are com-
plicated by a traditional antipathy and a large
Hungarian minority in Romania.
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Kadar's personal friendship with Tito has gon-
orally kept Hungarian-Yugoslav relations on an even
keel, despite past; modifications dictated by Moscow
and some anti-Yugoslav feeling among elements within
the regime. In 1974, the two ].evaders resumed the
personal contacts that had been frequent and regular
in the mid-1960s, and economic relations havo flour-
ished in recent years.
Despite its loyalty to the Soviets, Budapest
has at times cultivated ties with some West Euro-
peans that. go beyond the Soviet lead. Recently, it
has perceptibly improved its relations with Austria,
Finland, the Vatican, and--in the economic sphere--
West Germany. In eacil case, Budapest has special
reasons. Ties wi~.,h Austria and Germany have a cer-
tain historical basis; relations with the Vatican
are an extension of its domestic policy toward religion;
the Finns are on. of the Hungarians' few ethnic
brothers.
Although US-Hungarian relations have not pro-
gressed'beyond the Soviet-US warming, Budapest likely
attaches extra importance to its ties with Washington
because of the large Hungarian-?unerican minority and
because the U:; still holds the Crown of St. Stephen--
a traditional Hungarian symbol of political legitimacy.
Outlook
At least as long as Kadar remains in charge,
Hungary seems likely to follow its present moderate
course. Kadar favors conciliation and persuasion
as the way to weld national unity and invigorate
national energies. He is not given to sharp turns
in policy, although he recognizes that in politics,
as in chess, it is sometimes necessary to sacrifice
a pawn or two along the way.
The tightening of economic and ideologica]. con-
trols over the past few years represents such a
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sacri2ieo, but it does not signal the end of the
game. In the economy, Kadar will continue to root
out malfeasance, improve worker-management relations,
and strengthen party controls. He will, however,
try not to inhibit managerial competence, initiative,
and willingness to take risks. He seems even less
willing to respond to calls for greater cultural
orthodoxy.
How successful Kadar will be in pursuing the
middle course will depend mainly on developments
beyond his control. Moscow appears relatively
satisfied with the trend of events in Hungary, but
if it should insist on tougher ideological controls
and a significant recentralization of the economy,
Kadar would be in trouble.
For the present, Moscow's demands will continue
to be tempered by memories of 1956 and a persistent
Hungarian nationalism, which has a strong anti-Soviet
strain and a traditional Westward look. Although the
Soviets undoubtedly desire to change this outlook--
it may be the real aim of their calls for more
orthodoxy--they must allow Hungary a certain inter-
play with the West and some domestic novelties to
avo::- fueling further anti-Soviet sentiment. (SE-
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USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM)
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