STAFF NOTES: SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000400070047-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 3, 2006
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: March 10, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Pop Secret
5UIPP HOUE
Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
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158
March 10, 1975
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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE
This publication Is prepared for regional specialists In the Washington com-
munity by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intel-
ligenco, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should
be directed to the authors of the Individual articles.
CONTENTS
March 10, 1975
Jewish Emigration . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . .
Romanian Chief of Staff Begins US Visit.
Yugoslavs Try to Drag Moscow
into Macedonian Dispute . . . . . . . . .
. . .
4
Academy of Sciences Celebration
On Again . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . .
6
Shelepin's
British Fu
Prospects Dimmed by
ror . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . .
8
Moscow Care
fully Cultivates Lisbon . . . .
. . .
10
The Fringe
Hating Jew
of Soviet Dissidence:
s and Loving Russia . . . . . .
. . .
11
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Jewish Emigration
Jewish emigration from the USSR totaled 1,038
last month, matching the January rate, but well be-
low the pace set last year. Through February,
2,246 emigrants had received exit permission for
Israel, ccmpared with approximately 4,000 in the
first two months of 1974 and 5,100 in 1973.
The Netherlands embassy, which represents Is-
raeli interests in Moscow, attributes the decline
in the emigration rate this year to uncertainty
(promoted by the Soviets) about conditions in Is-
rael, the expense of application, and the usual pat-
tern of harassment of applicants. The rate of out-
right refusal reportedly has not increased.
Despite the overall decline in Jewish emigra-
tion, the number of Moscow Jews leaving the Soviet
Union was up slightly in January and February. So-
viet authoriti ss may calculate that by easing emi-
gration restrictions on well-educated and articu-
late Muscovites they will reduce activist agitation
in the capital, and negative publicity in the Wt?cf-
March 10, 1975
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Romanian Chief of Staff Begins US Visit
Romanian Colonel General Ion Coman, who arrives
in the US today for an sight--day visit, is the first
chief of staff of a arsaw Pact army to visit this
country.
According to the US embassy in Bucharest, Coman
sees his trip as the beginning of a series of visits.
He mentioned the possibility of an exchange of visits
between the Romanian military academy and the National
War College, and also an exchange of visits by naval
training ships. While Coman may shy away from sub-
stantive matters, others in his entourage have sug-
gested an intore3t in US army training practices and
equipme' .
Conan is a trusted member of party boss Ceausescu's
inner circle of advisers. His career has closely paral-
leled Ceausescu's, and their friendship dates back to
at least the late 1940s, when they served together in
the army's higher political directorate. Soon after
Ceausescu became party first secretary in 1965, Coman
was appointed to head the army's political directorate.
Later he served as head of the military and security
affairs section of the party Central Committee. I
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Yuco~,iav-:: Try To Drag Moscow
to Muc."don an Dispute
Belgrade is apparently trying to implicate
Moscow in its polemic with Sofia over the Mac-
edonian issue.
Over the past week or so, Yugoslav propaganda
has stepped up attacks on Bulgaria for harboring
Yugoslav Cominformist exiles. In fact, large num-
bers of Yugoslav citizens did take refuge in Bul-
garia after Tito broke with Stalin in 1948. A few
are now prominent in the Bulgarian cultural world,
and they support Sofia's position that the Macedonian
people are Bulgarians. One such Cominformist--
Venko Markovski--recently received a high Bulgarian
award, and the Yugcslav press immediately seized on
the incident to hit hard at Bulgaria's "hostile in-
tentions" toward Yugoslavia.
Sofia may regret the Markovski award, especially
if it took the step without full approval from Mos-
cow. The Soviets have been trying to live down the
embarrassment of last year's Cominformist affair and
the current polemic can only complicate its always
fragile relationship with Belgrade.
In making a major issue of the connection be-
tween Bulgaria and Cominformists, Belgrade is
implicitly placing the Soviets on notice that their
assurances of good faith are in question. Rumors
to this effect are already circulating in Belgrade's
diplomatic and journalistic circles. One well-in-
formed commentator--Milika Sundic of Zagreb Radio--
last Friday claimed that Bulgaria's hostile attitude
extends to the European security talks and prepara-
tions for the European Communist Conference. Sundic
thus questions the motives of both Sofia and Moscow.
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in sending this message to Moscow, Tito may
hope that the Soviets will feel constrained to
urge Bulgaria to make some concessions on the
Macedonian matter in the interest of improving
relations with Belgrade. Moscow may get Sofia
to cool the issue for awhile, but the Soviets are
not likely to urge major concessions that might
complicate the domestic situation in Bulgaria.
March 10, 1975
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Academy of Sciences Celebration On Again
Politburo member Kirilenko has announced that
the Academy of Sciences will celebrate its 250th
anniversary with a jubilee session in Moscow this
year. In listing the participants--"party, state,
and public organizations and... representatives of
the working people"--he did not mention foreign sci-
entists.
A Central Committee decree had sanctioned a
r:eremonial session in 1974, and scientists around
the world had received invitations for May 14-20.
The meeting was postponed in late April with an
artificial excuse citing preparations for holding
elections to the Supreme Soviet. The celebrations
of republic academies, also mentioned in the Cen-
tral Committee decree, were held.
Kirilenko, speaking on February 28 at an award
ceremony for the Soviet Encyclopedia Publishing
House, did not set a date for the academy session.
Jewish scientists in Moscow have heard it will be
in May. Although the Academy of Sciences was
founded in early 1724, it did not open until late
1725; observance this year will thus not do great
violence to history.
The reason for the postponement last year re-
mains unknown. Speculation at the time centered
on the poor health of Academy President Keldysh and
on the possibility that Soviet and foreign scien-
tists would create embarrassing incidents. Jewish
scientists are trying to revive support for a con-
ference of their own to coincide with the official
observance. They would like to attract visiting
foreign scientists to some of the sessions and to
advertise the plight of the Soviet scientists.
The organizers are among those scientists who have
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lost their jobs and access to technical information
after applying to emigrate. About 40 of them now
gather for a scientific seminar every Sunday at the
Moscow apartment of physicist Mark Azbel.
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She lepin's Prospects Dimmed
e
y Brit3s Furor
Alexsandr Shelepin, Politburo member, former
head of the KGB and a long-time aspirant: for the
top job of general secretary, received another
damaging blow to his career as a result of the
public uproar in the UK resulting from his planned
trip there in April. Shelepin, in his capacity as
chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade
Unions, was invited by the British Trades Union
Council, but strong British press, parliamentary,
and public reaction, may yet force him to cancel
the trip.
One reason for the British reaction is Shelepin's
past service as head of the KGB. Although he held
this post for only three years from 1958-1961, many
British have neither forgotten nor forgiven. Stories
about the unsavory nature of the KGB and about some
of Shelepin's own activities while heading it are
being featured in the British press.
The protests in Britain, coming as they do in
the aftermath of tiro successful visit to Moscow of
Prime Minister Wilson, occur at a particularly bad
time for Shelepin. The primary purpose of Wilson's
visit was to heal the breach between the two coun-
tries caused by London's ouster of 105 Soviets for
espionage in 1971. This was the most massive ex-
ptlsion in history and the KGB's worst public rela-
tions disaster ever.
Shelepin's Politburo rivals, already alarmed
by his aggressive ambitions in 1964 and 1965, may
view this affair as yet another argument against
his achieving a top post requiring international
activities in an era of detente. Indeed, they might
even raise questions about his effectiveness in his
current position.
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The British reaction comes in the wake of
similar problems created by Shelepin's visit to
West Germany. Shelepin had repeatedly tried to
visit West Germany in his capacity as trade union
leader, but on each occasion he was thwarted by
unfavorable public reaction in Germany, stemming
from the KGB murder on German soil of a Ukrainian
nationalist leader. He finally made the visit in
January, but only by keeping it brief and publicity
to a minimum.
Yury Andropov, Politburo member and current
chairman of the KGB, is probably viewing these
events with considerable concern. Although not
a front-runner in the general secretary sweepstakes,
he is by dint of personal qualities and connections
in the small circle of Politburo members who could
aspire to move up. Andropov probably had assumed--
logically enough--that he would first have to shift
from the chairmanship of the KGB to another job,
perhaps a senior party post, before ascending to
the position of general secretary. Shelepin's dif-
ficulties, however, would apply to him as well, per-
haps with even greater force, and he must see in
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Moscow Carefully cultivates Lisbon
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Remarks by Foreign Minister Gromyko ind.c;ate
that the Soviets are continuing to play it cool
regarding Portugal. In a conversation on March 5,
Gromyko wont so far as to assure the Portuguese
ambassador that Moscow "will do nothing to inter-
fere with the internal affairs of Portugal." Gromyko
noted several times that detente was the key element
in current international affairs; in affect he was
tolling the ambassador that the Soviets place more
value on good relations with the major Western
nations than on quick gains in Portugal.
Meanwhile, the Soviets are continuing to ex-
pand their official contacts with Portugal, which
were established only lr,st year. On March 7,
Portuguese Secretary of State for Fisheries Ruivo
completed a three-day visit to the USSR. Talks
with his Soviet counterpart Ishkov resulted in an
agreement on joint research and training in fisheries.
The agreement says nothing about possible visits of
Soviet fishing ships to Portuguese ports--the subject
of considerable speculation in January. As in the
case of previous diplomatic exchanges, the Soviets
reported Ruivo's visit without fanfare. This week
also ti%tnessed the inauguration of Aeroflot service
to Lisbon via Frankfurt.
The Ruivo visit and Gromyko's statements illus-
trate Moscow's desire to demonstrate its sympathy
with the changes in Portugal and position itself to
take some credit for favorable developments there.
On the other hand, the Soviets hope to avoid the
kind of blatant involvement that could rally do-
mestic and foreign opposition.
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The Fringe of Soviet Dissidence:
Hating Jews an Loving Russia
The authoritarian, Russian-nationalist wing of
Soviet dissident thought is becoming more pervasive.
the nationalin s are
beginning to overshadow such democratic-leaning dis-
sider;ts as A.ndrey Sakharov within the USSR if not
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Moreover, the nationalists' line
of thought has developed a shrill, extremist fringe
with its own "t;amizdat," underground literature.
An example of this "ultra-Slavophile," nearly
fascist writing has recently been made available
to the US embassy in Moscow by a Soviet Jewish
source. The Jewi h community is particularly con-
cerned over the highly inflammatory character of
the articles, their attack on traditional Slavophiles
for being, in effect, soft on Zionism, and the
apparent intent of the extremists to use Russian
nationalism to provide greater popular support for
the regime.
The document given the embassy confirms this
view and more. The tract's jingoistic agitation
reaches the ridiculous iii its claims that tradi-
tional Slavophiles have failed to warn the Russian
people that Zionism is in control of the West, that
it has a plan to take over the USSR, and that mil-
lions of Jews--presumably worldwide--are plotting
to enslave noii-Jews. Another theme that sets the
document apart from traditional Slavophile litera-
ture is criticism of the Russian Orthodox Church,
including the charge that the church has succumbed
;o "cosmopolitanism." This now generally dormant
,term harks to the Stalinist era, when it had strong
anti-Semitic overtones.
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The tract also zeroes in on prominent dissidents
in general, calling them "agents" of Zionism. It
specifically labels such loading figures an Snkharov
and oven Solzhonitsyn (whom some traditional Slavo-
philos consider one of lhair own) as "cosmopolitan
anemias" of the Russian people. Dissident writers
Sinyavsky and Daniel are tarred with the same brush.
The document's programmatic portion cantors on
an appeal to all Slavophilen to address more force-
fully "honest party, Soviet (local government), and
military workers, patriotic cultural and artistic
figures, and others, Communist and non-party, who
have influence and a voice in administrative organs,"
in order to ma':o clear to them the evils of Zionism.
It calls for a broad program to curb the influence
of Jews in the country, particularly by reducing
their numbers in universities, institutes, and gov-
ernment agencies. The document ends with an
orgiastic appeal for all true patriots to bring
about the salvation of the Russian people by sup-
porting "Communism and Soviet power."
The claim that true Russian values can flourish
under a strong Soviet system and that Communism and
Russian nationa!:.Lm may indeed be complementary are
the main characteristics of the extremist line. In
contrast, traditional Slavophiles generally oppose
the regime, particularly on questions of religion
and freedom of exprt 'on--issues on which they con-
verge with non-Slavop..lle dissident thought. The
pro-regime line of the extremists inevitably fuels
persistent speculation among other dissident circles
that the "ultra-Slavophiles" have some support,
active or passive, from segments of the Soviet
establishment, particularly from the military and
security organs.
This document and others like it may be plants
circulated by the regime itself, possibly as part
March 10, 1975
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of the tactic of encouraging the fragmentation of
Soviet dissidence, whatever its orientation. Even
no, their circulation would be a mon uro of the
regime's estimate of the strength of Russian na-
tionalism and of the possibility of capitalizing cn
it to benefit the Soviet system.
Past reporting on the existence of an extremist
fringe of Russian-nationalist dissidence suggests,
however, that the document is genuine. Earlier,
reporting supports the speculation that sr-me ole-
mente of Russian nationalist thought, though not
necessarily its extremist version, enjoy the sym-
pathy of, and posuibly a degiee of protection from,
responsible individuals in all echelons of the
Soviet establishment, incl g the party lerJor-
ship F__ I
Maverick sculptor Ernst Neizvestny, a Jew no,,
waiting to emigrate, recently echoed other Soviet
sources when he told a US embassy officer of the
existence of strong Russophile, anti-Semitic feel-
ings among influential groups of society. Neizvestny,
who has a wide range of acquaintances, also spoke
of "secret societies" made up of various intellec-
tuals, military, security, and party officials, who
periodically meet to assess the strength of Russian
"patriotism" and to discuss ways of combating Jewish
influence in the country. Members of these "soci-
eties" appear to be fully in favor of Jewish emigra-
tion, because they see it as an effective way of
riding the country of Jewish influence.
Neizvestny labeled these "secret societies"
as "fascist," and said they are based on the Rodina
(Fatherland) clubs around the country. In January
1971, the Western press reported the existence of
one Za Rodinu (For the Fatherland) society, al-
legedly composed of xenophobic, anti-Semitic
Stalinists; the press report did no-%'-. indicate
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whether za Rodinu wan a clandestine organization,
though this ma be resumod.
N~3 zves II y s curzen s a emen s
concerning Ro ina su,gest, however, that the so-
ciety reported in 1971 does exist, that it has
grown, and that it has given rise to more extremist
offshoots with goals generally the same as those of
the alleged, clandestine organizations wi
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