STAFF NOTES: SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP86T00608R000400070026-4
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
15
Document Creation Date:
December 27, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 5, 2012
Sequence Number:
26
Case Number:
Publication Date:
February 7, 1975
Content Type:
REPORT
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HOUE
Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
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To Secret
Top Secret
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Feilruarv 7. 1975
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I
SOVIET UNION ? EASTERN EUROPE
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the USSR ? Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intel-
ligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of hitch lonnco. Comments and Queries are welcome.
CONTENTS
February 7, 1975
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Berlin: The Endless Negotiation
1
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Moscow's Unofficial Artists
Plan Another Exhibit
6
Polish Views on Soviet-US Relations
8
Bulgaria: Tightening the
Screws on Youth
9
Romanian Defense
Minister in Yugoslavia
11
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Berlin: The Endless Negotiation
In a time of detente, Berlin is no longer the
bunion that the Soviets, in Khrushchev's phrase,
could step on whenever they wanted to give the West
a pain. Tho passing of the age of sharp confronta-
tion, and the signing of the 197' Quadripartite Agree-
ment on Berlin, do not mean, however, that the Berlin
question has disappeared, merely that the debate is
now conducted on a different level and in more muted
tors. The Quadripartite Agreement incorporates each
side's philosophy--stating with benign inconsistency
that West Berlin is not a constituent part of West
Germany and shall not: be governed by it, but ties be-
tween West Berlin and the FRG shall be strengthened.
Differences in interpretation of the agreement are
therefore inevitable, and, in fact, were anticipated.
In recent weeks, the Soviets have made a number of
complaints about Berlin matters in conversations with
West German and Allied diplomats. They have protested:
--Plans to establish an EC vocational center in
West Berlin. The Soviets maintain that since West Ber-
lin is not itself a member of the EC, establishment of
the center can be interpreted to mean that it is a con-
stituent part of the FRG, a violation of the Quadripar-
tite Agreement.
--Establishment last year of the FRG Federal En-
vironmental Agency office in West Berlin. The issue
here is similar to the EC vocational center, but more
direct since it is a purely FRG institution. As far as
the Soviets are concerned, the environmental office is
still operating illegally, although they are not trying
to keep it from functioning.
--West German extension of the 1972 FRG-Austrian
consular treaty to "Land Berlin." The Soviets contend
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that too extension of this and other FRG treaties
to Woft Berlin is illegal. They regard the designa-
tion "'sand Berlin" as invalid because it implies that
West is a constituent part of the Federal
RepuLA.c.
--Nomination of West Berlin Governing Mayor
Schutz as a plenipotentiary in cultural matters under
the A63 French - West German friendship agreement.
The 3oviets, as might be expected, protested the in-
volvement of a West Berlin official in a Federal Ger-
man. agreement. The French have responded that the
plJoipotentiary has only limited functions and, at any
ra..e, is appointed by individual Lando, not by the
Wevt German Federal Government.
--Decisions by the Western Allies to grant landing
11.ghts in West Berlin to airlines not three-powers.
This is a long-standing controversy. Occasionally
;;Ile Soviets claim that the Allies are letting the com-
mercial airlines of other countries use the established
flight corridors to West Berlin, but generally their
complaints are limited to the grant of landing rights
in the city. This, then, raises the question of whether
East Germany will grant overflight rights to these air-
lines; the result is often sterile debates over which
pqrmission should be obtained first.
--Allied toleration of the right-wing Bund Freies
Deutschland party in West Berlin. The Soviets have sug-
gested that this group should be banned as a fascist
party, but have not pressed the issue when the Allies
have denied it was fascist.
The Soviets have also expressed disappointment
over the cool Western response to their proposals for
a lavish celebration in Berlin of the 30th anniversary
of V-E Day. The Soviets apparently intended these
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ceremonies to take place entirely in West Berlin,
thereby strengthening their role there without a
corresponding increase in the residual Allied pres-
ence in East Berlin.
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?
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/the West Germans
thought that Schmidt had obtained the Soviets' agree-
ment that individual West Berliners would be covered
by agreements the FRG made with third countries.
In a broader sense the sniping on Berlin issues
reflects a nagging Soviet suspicion that the idea of
a united Germany is still a long way from extinction
in the minds of West Germans. Recent West German pro-
tests over the concept of an East German citizenship in
the consular treaty between the GDR and Austria may have
aroused underlying Soviet concerns that the German re-
unification issue can still influence West German policy
and, indeed, may never vanish. The FRG-Soviet dispute
over the "peaceful change" formulation at CSCE has prob-
ably had a similar effect, since the problem essentially
concerns West German efforts to leave open a legal path
to eventual reunification of the two Germanies.
The foreign policy line of detente and their desire
for good relations with West Germany affect the means
the Soviets employ, but Moscow's basic objective of de-
fining West Berlin as a separate entity will remain un-
changed. The Soviets may tolerate certain actions with
which they disagree, such as establishment of the Fed-
eral Environmental Agency in West Berlin, but they will
never legally recognize any step that seems to violate
the dictum that West Berlin is not a constituent part
of the FRG. In a sense, the adversary process of seek-
ing precedents and establishing limits amounts to a con-
tinuous renegotiation of the Quadripartite Agreement.
February 7, 19/5
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Moscow's Unofficial Artists
---MFIEBTher Exhibit
Dissident artist Oscar Rabin told a US embassy
officer on February 6 that an exhibit of works by
Moscow's unofficial artists has been approved "in
principle" by city officials. According to Rabin,
who arranged two such exhibits last September
a group of unofficial
artists has been negotiating-over the past several
weeks with the city Committee of Graphic Artists for
authorization to stage an exhibit in Moscow's Exhi-
bition of National Economic Achievements. At this
stage, the major sticking point seems to be the selec-
tion of an exhibit hall. The hall offered by the com-
mittee, Rabin said, is not ideal for an art exhibit be-
cause of poor lighting and inadequate space. Rabin
apparently believes this problem can be resolved soon,
however, and he expects the exhibit to open the first
part of next week.
Some 20 local non-conformist artists are expected
to exhibit their works, and they have allegedly been
promised that the exhibition will run for about one
week. In contrast to September's art show at Izmaylovo
Park, not all non-union artists will be allowed to par-
ticipate. The artists' works are being reviewed, and
only the "best" will be included. The city committee,
also, has rejected the works of several artists.
some, if not all,
artists who participate In the exhibit will be invited
to join the Graphic Artists Committee, which is con-
oidered one step below the Moscow Union of Artists.
Authorization for the exhibit seems to be a posi-
tive step for the artists, but has caused further splits
in the ranks of unofficial artists. Some have argued that
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the offer should be accepted only if all artists
are allowed to participate. Others do not wish to
miss the chance to attain greater acceptability in
the eyes of the authorities and thereby more oppor-
tunities to show their works publicly. At this point,
however, both groups seem to be willing to accept a
compromise with city officials. The aim of the au-
thorities seems to be to bring the most prominent
artists into officially sanctioned structures in order
to exert greater control over them.
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February 7, 1975
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Polish Views on Soviet-US Relations
Immediately after Moscow's rejection of the
1972 US-Soviet trade agreement, Polish media were
noticeably reluctant to discuss US-Soviet relations.
In the last two weeks, however, the media have
picked up the theme that detente prevails despite
the temporary setbacks caused by a "minority of
congressmen."
Although proclaiming the "correctness" of the
Kremlin's decision to renounce the agreement as an
unwarranted attempt at interference in Soviet in-
ternal affairs, the media have emphasized that the
US administration is still working to improve re-
lations with the Soviet Union.
Warsaw's low-key approach to Moscow's abroga-
tion of the trade agreement was to be expected.
Gierek has based his program of economic develop-
ment and modernization on creating a balance be-
tween increased trade and contacts with the West
and a strong alliance with the Soviet Union. The
Poles will look for ways to play down the signifi-
cance of any event that might make this balancing
act more difficult.
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Bulgaria: Ti htening the Screws on Youth
The Council of Ministers has recently announced
tough new regulations to improve the "labor educa-
tion" of Bulgarian youth. These restrictive mea-
sures seem indirectly aimed at two problems--a nag-
ging labor shortage and a fear of ideological de-
generation among Bulgarian youth.
Each young person upon completing his primary
education or military service must now register with
a bureau of manpower, which will give out job as-
signments according to the "needs of the national
economy." Aspiring students must hold a "steady
job" for at least eight months--and in some cases up
to two years--before they are eligible to enroll in
higher educational institutions. Failure to regis-
ter or the abandonment of assigned positions makes
either the young people or their parents liable to
a sizable fine.
The regulations are designed to correct prob-
lems that the regime has recently stressed in press
commentaries:
--The lax and parasitical attitude of young
people who neither work nor study and who are
supported by their parents.
--The distaste of youth for "socially useful
labor."
--The growing gulf between young Bulgarians
who consider themselves white-collar bureaucrats
and "socialist workers."
--The need to improve labor productivity, which
was stressed at a national party conferenco and sev-
eral BCP Central Committee plenums last year.
February 7, 1975
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Sofia is worried about the commitment to Com-
munism of Bulgarian youth, particularly in an ora
of expanding East-West coatacts. "Idle youths"
are thus warned against assimilatinr "intern ways
and losing the),e socialist militancy.
The new legislation also betrays the regime's
concern with manpower problems. The country's
chronic labor shortage has been aggravated because
young Bulgarians remain in school longer and thus
enter the labor force ct an older age. The as-
signment to the USSR of some 15,000 Bulgarian
workers, who could find employment at home, com-
pounds the problem. The regime probably expects
that the new decision will pum at least som
workers into the economy.
February 7, 1975
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pomanian Defense Minister in Yugoslavia
Defense Minister Ionita arrived in Dubro4nik on
Thursday for what has been announced as three days of
talks on coopezation between the "friendly armies" of
Yugoslavia and Romania.
Ionita's visit follows on tilt. heels of top-level
party talks in Romania last weekend between Romanian
party boss Ceausescu and the number-two man in the
Yugoslav party, Stan? Dolanc. Dolanc and Ceausescu
probably discussed a wide range of issues of mutual
concern, including:
--The state of US-Soviet relations and their
implications for stability in the Balkans.
--Rumors about Brezhnev's health and Soviet
leadership changes.
--Preparations for the European Communist
Conference.
--The unstable situation in the Middle
East.
Ionita is spending his time on the Adriatic
coast, not far from Tito's current residence at a
Montenegrin spa. The Romanian Defense Ministey: could
meet the Yugoslav President before his departuvi on
Saturday.
There is no firm explanation of the upsurge in
Yugoslav-Romanian contacts, but we may soon have more
information. Some Romanian chiefs of mission in the
West have been recalled to Bucharest for consultations
next week. When they return to their posts, their
reading of the situation could filter out.
February 7, 1975
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