STAFF NOTES: SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000400070017-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 5, 2012
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: January 24, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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gUj~~ Kn, U~
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Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE
This publication Is prepared for regional specialists In the Washington com-
munity by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of rurront Intel-
ligonco, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and quorios are welcome.
January 24, 1975
Roy Medvedev on the Soviet Leadership .
Pravda Recalls Brezhnev's
ideological Confidence . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Hungary Wants Claims Talks with Bonn
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ROY Modyec'ov on the Soviet Loadornhik
Uissidnnt historian Roy I4edvedev offered some
lucid and intelligent comments on the Soviet leader-
ship at a social function in Moscow on January 22.
I4edvcdov has ties in the intellectual commu-
nity which give him access to gossip and probably
some occasional second- and third-hand bits of po-
litical information. Ho is also well known to West-
ern newsman and diplomats, and his thoughts are
probably influenced by ideas and information cur-
rent abroad. Medvedev is, however, an astute and
articulpte observer of Kremlin politics. We agree
with the general sense of his presentation and many
of his particular observations. Following are a
few points we think need to be qualified.
--i4edvedev says that Brezhnev's personal
staff has become extremely large and
powerful--even more powerful than the
party Secretariat. It is true that
1rezhnev's staff has grown in size and
influence, especially in terms of its
foreign policy responsibilities. tied-
vedev exaggerates this development,
however. Brezhnev's personal aides
number only a little over a half dozen
and cannot rival the Secretariat in
power.
--tledvedev asserts that Brezhnev's po-
sition is completely secure and that
he will go on ruling as long as he wants
to and is capable of doing so. We judge
Brezhnev's position to be relatively
secure, but he does not have the pres-
ent and future entirely within his hands.
I?iedvedev ignores the dynamics of col-
lective leadership which still obtain
and the vagaries of fortune.
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--Medvodev's characterization of indi-
vidual loaders seems Just, although
in some cason his estimates are a
trifle absolute. tie dismisses the
chances of three leaders becoming
General Secretary: Kulakov is a
"narrow specialist" in agriculture,
Polyansky has no standing, and Shale-
pin is an intriguer. Although those
leaders have some serious marks a-
gainst thorn, we would not ruIe out
25X1 their chances
January 24, 1975
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Pravda Recalls 1rezhnev's
Ic ao owl- Conf =en
Amid the speculation over the future of Brozh-
nev and detente, a Pravda editorial on January 16
gave both a boost by reviving the confident approach
to ideological competition with the West that Brezh-
nev took in his "victory through contacts" speech
at Alma Ata in August 1973.
On the surface, the editorial is fully in line
with the continuing public exhortations for increased
ideological vigilance and awarenesR, which is said
to be needed as a result of the "contemporary stage
of international relations," i.e.,, detente. This
theme has been the hallmark of the generally defen-
sive nationwide campaign whose main impetus came
from the CPSU Central Committee resolution of late
last summer on the ideological pluses and minuses of
the Belorussian party.
Pravda points out familiar dangers and offers
the now time-worn remedies, but, for the first time
since the campaign began, it balances this defensive
approach with the confidence that Brezhnev displayed
at Alma Ata. The editorial states that, as a result
of the "correctness and invincibility" of Marxist-
Leninist ideology, "we are confident that the ex-
pansion of contacts, the exchange of information and
the development of ties between...various countries
under the conditions of detente will disseminate
the truth about socialism and give new supporters
access to the idea of scientific communism."
Brezhnev's thesis that communism's ideological
strength not only safeguards it from domestic erosion
by detente but that detente offers an opportunity
to proselytize the faith abroad may have been designed
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partly to overcome the reser,Yations of the party's
ideological guardians to his policy. The idea,
however, was never enthusiastically endorsed by
other Soviet leaders or by the party apparatus.
The appGarance of the Pravda editorial suggests
that Brezhnev's long-dormant thesis is not wholly
to maze the point anew.
January 24, 1975
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Hungary Wants Claims Talks with Bonn
Budapest wants to sot up a joint commission
with the West Germans to settle Hungarian claims--
totaling about Y400 million--against Wazi Germany.
Budapest obtained a claims settlement worth $28
million in 1971 for property confiscated by the
Germans.
The Hungarians raised the matter during the
recent visit of 1-lest German foreign office state
secretary Wischnewski. Budapest is apparently
seeking compensation for the suffering of those
Hungarians (mostly Jews) who were incarcerated in
German concentration camps. Budapest had raised
the general question of additional claims during
Scheel's visit to Hungary last April. Now it has
gone a step further by setting a price tag on the
claims and proposing the commission.
Wischnewski reportedly agreed only to present
the Hungarian suggestion to Bonn. The West Ger-
mans are likely to resist Hungarian efforts to re-
open the question. One German diplomat said Bonn
considers it a dead issue. Another pointedly
noted that Hungary was an ally of Germany in World
liar II and added that domestic political consid-
erations made any discussion of additional claims
impossible for Bonn.
Nonetheless, the West Germans cannot flatly
reject the Hungarians because Bonn had earlier
agreed to entertain any claims that could be rea-
sonably justified, a statement it now regrets. The
Hungarians are undoubtedly encouraged by Bonn's
recent settlement with Yugoslavia of similar
claims. Belgrade was given low interest credits
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in lieu of a cash payment, and Budapest may be
looking for the same thing. During Wischnewski's
visit the Hungarians once again expressed interest
in borrowing large sums from Bonn during the next
five-year plan.
January 24, 1975
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