MIDDLE EAST-AFRICA-SOUTH ASIA STAFF NOTES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000400050066-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 66
• Publication Date: December 30, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
Middle East -Africa -South Asia
TES
Top Secr6t25X1
145
December 30, 1975
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^
MIDDLE EAST AFRICA - SOUTH ASIA
This publication Is prepared for r-ogional specialists In the w:.."'r tnn com-
munity by the Middle East - Africa (Division, Office of Current )ntolligunco,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intrlligunce. Comments and quorios aro wolcomo. They should be directed to
the authorsof the Individual articles.
Angola: FNLA-UNITA Strains
2
Ethiopia: Government Trios to Revive
Lagging Rurai Program
6
Dec 30, 1975
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Angola
PNLA-UN.tl'A Strains
The alliance foLmed last summor and fall by
Jonas Savimbi of the Na~lonal Union for the Total
Independence of Angola and Holden Roberto of the
National Front for the Liberation of Angola is
badly strained by now fighting between forces of
the two allies.
Even if the fighting stops and ljresent strains
ease, long-standing differences between the two
groups will preclude the transformation of their
marriage of convenience into something lasting.
Early last week, the National Front's senior
representative in Huambo, the capital of their
nominal joint government, reported that heavy fighting
had broken out in that city between troops of th,,;
Front and the Union.
The Front forces in the Huambo fighting are
loyal to Daniel Chipenda. Chipenda was a central
committee member of the Popular Movement or the
Liberation of Angola, but left it about a year ago
after losing a bid to oust its leader, Agostinho
Neto. Chipenda and a few hundred of his troops
subsequently joined the National Front. How many
of them took part in the clashes with the National
Union is not known.
(Continued)
Dec 30, 1975
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Chipenda forces predates the current fighting.
Friction between the National Union and the
Chinda' s Role
the
Chipenda forces are undisciplined, antagonistic
toward the local population, and refuse to submit
to command by National Union authorities, who were
put in charge of milary operations in central
Angola under terms of an agreement between the two
groups.
Chpenda is distrusted by both Roberto and
Savimbi. Chipenda has refused to accept Roberto's
authority and operates as a free agent, apparently
obtaining much of his support directly from South
Africa. Fie has never hidden his own political
ambitions, and his efforts to oust Neto from the
Popular Movement have made Roberto cautious.
Roberto apparently prefers to keep Chipenda
in central Angola, where he cannot challenge Roberto,
but where he can undermine Savimbi.
Chipenda, like Savimbi, is an Ovimbundu, the
dcminant tribe in central and southern Angola.
Savimbi and other National Union leaders view
(Conti rued)
Dec 30, 1975 3
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Chiponda as a formidable political rival because
of his family ties, his fame as a soccer player in
Portugal prior to the insurgency, and his reputation
as a military leader.
The National Union's alliance witl: the
National Front nominall7 re-established an earlier
association between Savimbi and Roberto. In the
early 1960s, Savimbi was in charge of foreign
relations for Roberto's group. In 1964, however, he
led an Ovtnbundu mutiny against Roberto when the
latter, refused to fight the Portuguese in southern
and central Angola, fearing it would erode his
own tribe's domination of the fight against the
Portuguese.
Two years later, Savimbi established the
National Union and began operations againct the
Portuguese in !--.:nt,rn1 Angola. Roberto apparently
still belLoves that northern Angola, where his
tribe is dominant, should be the main front against
the Popular Movement,
aavimbi, however, regards the National Front
as weaker militarily than his own group. The Front
has not been able to maintain pressure againu t
the Popular Movement from the noi"_h, even with
Zairian support.
The National Union, with important help from
South Africa, is bearing the burden of the military
effort, and unless the National Front can resume
the offensive, Savimbi may eventually conclude
that the Front is irrelevant and end the alliance.
Savimbi has said on numerous occasions that
he does not rule out political accommodation with
the Popular Movement, a position that can only serve
in the long run to increase Roberto's uneasiness.
Roberto believes the struggle against the Popular
Movement must be settled by military, not political,
means.
(Continued)
Dec 30, 1975 4
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Savimbi undoubtedly will hold Roberto peer-
sonally responsible for the disruption caused by
Chiponda's forces in central Anogla. So far, the
feuding between the two sides does not appear
to have extended to the National Union campaigns
in eastern Angola, perhaps because of the South
Africans.
Should the South Africans withdraw, however,
a key element in the military effort agair.it the
Popular. Movement: will be lost, and Savimbi'jq control
over operations in central Angola will be seriously
affected. Then there-uuld be even greater divisi6n
between him and Roberto.
Dec 30, 1975 5
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Ethiopia
Government Prise to RRoviva
Lagging Rural Program
The ruling military council has made clear
that it is determined to continue its trouble-
besot eamr:,,aign to indoctrinate the rural population
in the regime' a socialist goals through the use of
students.
In a proclamation on the year-old program
issued in mid-December, the government publicly
admitted errors and mismanagement. In an attempt
to rally student support, the government promised
to release students now imprisoned, exempted
from punishment others who failed to complete their
service, and made certain other concessions.
A government spokesman has admitted that 25
percent of the 57,000 young men and women who were
sent to the countryside had deserted. An official
connected with the rural campaign has privately
put the desertion rate at 50 percent. The US
embassy in Aduis Ababa reports that the students
still enrolled in the program have congregated
in the larger towns because of peasant opposition
to them.
The initial enthusiasm that at least some of
the students had for the program has been eroded
by the government's inability to provide them with
direction and. logistical support--and sometimes
even food. In some areas, the government has been
unable to protect the campaigners from landlords
and other foes of the program.
Although the government is probably sincere in
its expressed determination to continue the program,
prospects are not bright that it will be any more
successful in the future. It is not likely that the
council will assign the necessary funds to the
campaign, nor that administrative and logistical
(Continued)
Dec 30, 1975 6
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inadequacies will be overcome. Some students
have been sufficiently cowed by fear of reprisals
to return to their rural posts, but student enthu-
siasm will almost certainly remain low. The pre- 25X1
carious security situation in man parts of the
country is a further obstacle.
Dec 30, 1975.
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