STAFF NOTES: MIDDLE EAST AFRICA SOUTH ASIA
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP86T00608R000400040024-9
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
9
Document Creation Date:
December 27, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 5, 2012
Sequence Number:
24
Case Number:
Publication Date:
July 24, 1975
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
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Body:
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51T1Y AN.
117
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Middle East
Africa
South Asia
Top Secret
Top Secret
139
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July 24, 1975
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?
MIDDLE EAST ? AFRICA ? SOUTH ASIA
This publication is prepared for re0,1nai specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and quei ies are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
C NTENTS
Iran: Anti?Israeli Vote Explainod .
1
United Arab Emirates: Soviets Resume
Diplomatic Probe 2
Pakistan: Sind Chief Minister Increasingly
Prominent 7
July 24, 1975
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Iran
Anti-Ierae1i Vote Explained
In a meeting on Tuesday with the US embassy's
political officer, an Iranian foreign ministry
official explained Tehran's vote for the resolution
adopted at the Islamic Conference in Jidda last week
that calls for Israel's expulsion from the UN.
The official stated candidly that Iran did not
agree with the resolution, but decided not to oppose
it because of Tehran's efforts to achieve closer
relations with the Arabs. He added that his izovern-
ment believes it would be impossible to expel Israel
from the UN. If the issue is raised there, however,
Iran would most likely abstain; it could not oppose
expulsion outright. He said Iran's position has been
explained to the Israelis and they "understood."
Prime Minister Hoveyda told visiting White House
Fellows on the same day that Iran had made clear to
the Arabs that it did not agree with the suggestion
that Israel be expelled because it would serve no
useful purpose. Iran's national policy, he added,
was to support UN Resolution 242. He regratted it
had not been carried out, but expulsion was not the
remedy.
Although the Shah wants to indicate Lo the US
and Israel that Iran is not fully embracAlg the Arab
side of the Middle East dispute, he would not be un-
happy if the net result of the expulsion move is to
increase the pressure on Tel Aviv to be more flexible.
The Shah, who has thought for some time that Tel Aviv
is too intransigent, believes the Israelis should
9eize the opportunity they have at present to make
peace with President Sadat. The Iranian monarch is
expressing this view with increasing frequency and
vehemence.
July 24, 1975 1
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United Arab Emirates
Soviets Resume DipZomatie Probe
The Soviet Union, eager to strengthen its posi-
tion on the Arab side of the Persian Gulf where its
only embassy is in Kuwait, is again attempting to
establish diplomatic relations with the United Arab
Emirates (UAE). At the moment, the ball is being
carried by surrogates on behalf of Moscow.
The most recent Moscow-sponsored effort to get
cn exchange of diplomats with the UAE took place in
early July when Warsaw sent a special envoy to Abu
Dhabi.
The Soviet diplomatic initiative suggests that
Moscow may be hoping for a more favorable political
climate in the GLif since King Faysal's death in late
March. In 1972, Sheikh Zayid--the UAE president--and
several other Gulf rulers appeared to be ready to
exchange ambassadors with Moscow, but backed off in
deference to Faysal's strong opposition to an expanded
Soviet presence in the region.
Whether the UAE embraces the current Soviet-
inspired overtures may depend on how Zayid reads
the Saudi position. Those UAE officials who look
favorably on ties with communist governments--UAE
Foreign Minister Suwaydi heads the list--have undoubt-
edly been heartened by some signals of a softening
by Riyadh on the issue.
Saudi Crown Prince Fahd has recently stated that
his country follows an open door policy towards all
countries and wants "good relations with both East
and West." It is highly doubtful that the Saudi gov-
ernment will itself make any abrupt policy changes,
but Fahd may be signaling a long-term shift in Riyadh's
traditionally strong anti-communist policy. This
could certainly encourage Moscow to pursue its efforts
in the Gulf. '
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Pakistan
Sind Chief Minister Increasingly Prominent
The successful handling of a recent kidnapping
incident by the Chief Minister of Sind Province,
Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, appears to have added to Jatoi's
reputation as one of Pakistan's more effective high
officials. Jatoi could well become one of the main
contenders for the prime ministership at some future
date when Prime Minister Bhutto leaves the scene.
Jatoi's intervention following the kidnapping
of the Sind provincial transportation minister by
disgruntled students last week led to the minister's
release, unharmed, two days later. Jatoi agreed to
consider the students' demand for better transporta-
tion facilities, but he refused to yield to their
other demands, which included a call for the release
of a detained Sindhi separatist leader. He threatened
the kidnappers with "stringent punitive action" and
showed he meant business by having the police raid
dormitories and arrest about 100 students.
Jatoi has been chief minister of Sind since
December 1973. Before that he was a minister in
Bhutto's federal cabinet. Now 44, he is, like Bhutto,
the scion of a prominent Sindhi landowning family and
has been active in Pakistani politics since the 1950s.
Bhutto named him to the Sind post to replace Mumtaz
Bhutto, the Prime Minister's cousin, who had antagonized
some regional and ethnic groups in the province.
Mumtaz is Jatoi's main political rival in Sind.
Jatoi is generally viewed as having done a reason-
ably good job as chief minister. Under his steward-
ship tbe province has been relatively stable, and the
local popularity of Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party,
of which Jatoi is a leading member, appears to have
been maintained. Jatoi has been described by US
officials as an effective conciliator, apparently
honest, and decisive when necessary.
(Continued)
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Should something happen unexpectedly to Bhutto,
Jatoi appears to be one of the few persons who might
be able to garner enough support within the nationally
dominant People's Party to become leader of the party
and the government. As a Sindhi, Jatoi is not en-
meshed in the factional bickering that divides the
party in Punjab, Pakistan's most populous province.
Although he was embarrassed recently when one of his
two wives, an Anglo-Indian, engaged in a flagrant
love affair in Karachi, his political standing does
not appear to have been seriously damaged.
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