LATIN AMERICA TRENDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300120052-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 52
• Publication Date: December 31, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
~a#in Arneri~a~~ ~r~n~
State Dept. review completed
Secret
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December 31, 1975
No. 0541/75
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Thi; publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Hemisphere Division, Office of Current Intelligence:
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
December 31, 1975
Guyana May .Aid Angola 1
Mexico: A Helping Hand 4
Chile: Church-State Tensions Slacken 5
Uruguay: Communist F:oundup 7
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Guyana May Aid Angola
Prime Minister Burnham may decide to send a
token force of Guyanese Defense Force (GDF) personnel
We have no indication when Burnham plans such a
move. An MPLA delegation ,now in Georgetown, h as been
given extensive publicity and red carpet treatment by
Guyanese officials including a lengthy meeting with
Prime Minister Burnham. A mass rally sponsored by
the ruling People's National Congress will cap their
visit and may be the beginning of a campaign to drum
u su ort for Gu a a's involvement in the conflict.
December. 31, 1975
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Mexico: A Helping Hand
In a gesture aimed more at winning plaudits in
thethird world than making a meaningful contribution
to rebuilding Vietnam, Mexico this week presented
Hanoi wit`: a varied assortment of reconstruc.ion aid.
Included Caere dump trucks, medicines, prefab hoL?s es,
farm tools, and marine cables. The goods arrived
December 30 on a Mexican navy ship that left Acapulco
harbor October 28. A high-level delegation of Mexican
officials, ir_cluding an under secretary for foreign
relations and one of President Echeverria's two
brothers (Dr. Eduardo Echeverria, an adviser on health
for the government), flew to Hanoi the same day to
hand over the gifts.
The delegation also included specialists in for-
eign trade and investment, agriculture, and petroleum.
'The Mexicans intend to work out a package of coopera-
tion agreements with the Vietnamese. A Vietnamese
technical team is currently studying petroleum tech-
nology in southeastern Mexico, tree site of last year's
large oil finds .
Last May, when Mexico established diplomatic re-
lations with North and South Vietnam, Foreign Secretary
Rabasa said that President Echeverria conducts foreign
policy the way he thinks is best for Mexico. Many would
argue this theory and cite numerous diplomatic snafus
to prove their point, but this move, coming eight months
after the fall of the Saigon government, seems safe.
Obviously, Echeverria feels that helping Hanoi will demon-
strate further that his foreign policy is free of US
influence and, at the same time, will cement ties to the
third wor. ld .
December 31, 1915
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Chile: Church-State Tensions Slacken
President Pinochet's decision to release a
number of priests who were being detained for aiding
fugitive terrorists has halted--at least for the
moment--the steady decline in church-state relations
over the past several months. Fundamental tensions
remain, however, and the church is likely to remain
an irritant to the regime.
In making the amnesty gesture, Pinochet tacitly
admitted that members of the clergy charged with
harboring "criminals" might have been inspired by
altruistic motives and sentiments of mercy. The
President warned, nevertheless, that the government
would not treat future offenders quite so generously.
The Catholic Church had earlier agreed to dismantle
the interdenominational Committee for Peace, which
the government had strongly criticized for being pro-
Marxist.
Cardinal Silva met with Pinochet on December 22
to inform the President about his recent trip to the
US and Europe and to reiterate how poor Chile's image
was abroad. Silva again stressed the Church's concern
over the impact of the government's austr~rity measures
on the Chilean people--a view that is shared by some
junta members, particularly the outspoken General Leigh.
In his Christmas message several days later, the
Cardinal urged the government to grant a general
amnesty on New Years to all persons jailed for their
political opinions who have not committed criminal aci.s.
According to press sources, Pinochet intends to re-
lease 50 additional prisoners soon.
December 31, 1975
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Church officials believe that Piroch`t's interior
mina.ater, Cer.eral Cesar Benavides, is a major obstacle
to improving relations. The minister is said to be a
doctrinaire, stubborn individual who refuses to compro-
mise; his obstinacy, which is not out of step with the
puritanical Pinochet, probably accounts for a large
measure of the regime's rigidity on the human rights
issue. The interior ministry's rulings on detentions
have frequently contributed to the bad press that Ch:.le
has received abroad.
For instance, the two-month imprisonment of British
national Dr. Sheila Cassidy for giving medical attention
to an important terrorist leader is a glaring example of
the government's shortsightedness. Dr. Cassidy, who
claims to have been tortured., will no doubt see that leer
accusations are widely circulated in 6Jestern Euz?ope,
where public opinion is generally receptive to denun-
ciations of Chilean human rights violations.
The US Embassy in Santiago believes that the church-
state difficulties as manifested by these probler~~s are
deep-rooted and that little change is in sight unless
there is a basic shift in government attitudes. As fa.r
as we can see than i anytime soon.
December 31, 1975
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S E C R E T
Uruguay: Communist Roundu
Recent arrests of two leaders and a number of
activists of the Communist Party have been heavily
publicized, giving rise to some speculation as to
their significance. Some aspects of the anti-
communist propaganda campaign suggest that it may
be a prelude to a rupture in relations with the USSR,
ali:hough a similar campaign in late 1973 did not
portend a break.
The military's anti-subversive arm staged an "in-
formative conference" on December 29 for senior govern-
ment officials, diplomats, foreign military attaches,
and same press representatives. The major announce-
ment was that acting party first secretory Jose Massera
and propaganda secretary Vladimir Turiansky had been
arrested e.nd had provided information indicating the
existence of an armed group of from 300 to 400 members.
The oral presentation was followed by a display
of equipment--said to come from Communist caches--that
included mortars, rocket launchers, grenades, rifles,
and small arms, as well as supportive materiel.
There was frequent mention of the Soviet Union
during the conference, particularly citing financial
support and training of local party personnel. The
military spokesman described the Uruguayan Communist
Party as the most powerful threat facing the nation,
because or its backing from the Soviet Union.
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December 31, 1975
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CARICOM Leaders meet
Delegates reached accord on economic, political,
and general measures for regional economic develop-
ment at the conference of Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
heads of government which met December 8-10 in St. Kitts.
Established in 1973 to promote regional economic
integration, CARICOM embraces three broad areas of co-
operation: a modified common market, a community
economic treaty, and coordination of international
issues. It is composed of five independent countries
and seven territories still associated with Great Britain.
Successor to the Caribbean Free Trade Association,
CARICOM is more a free trade area than a common market.
The economies of its members are basically competitive
and its members continue to do much more business with
outsiders than with each other. The larger membez?s are
dissatisfied with what the group has achieved. ,Jamaica,
with a rising trade deficit, has urged better observes nee
of the provisions of the agreement. Guyana has attacked
treaty loopholes that facilitate a growing inter-
Caribbean trade of commodities originating outside th e
.region. Consequently, CARICOM has been slow in achieving
its goals.
Major decisions were made at the summit to promote
and ex~,and intraregional trade, to establish a mechanism
for balance-of-payment support, and to implement a
regional food plan to reduce the massive food import
bill, which now runs at one billion dollars annually.
The food plan will be implemented through a Caribbean
food cooperative, which has been created by the CARIC OP?1
Secretariat. The delegates also reached accord on th e
future of the University of the West Indies as an into -
gral part of the region's institutions of higher educa-
tion. A committee will be set up to prepare guidelines
on the objectives and function of the university, which
December 31, 1975
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will be presented to a special heads of government
meeting in Trinidad in March.
??articipants at the conference emphasized CARICOM
solidarity and agreed in principle to coordinate for-
eign policy objectives and tac~ics more closely. They
view colonial power interests cvith some concern. CAI2ICOM,
in fact, issued the first categoric condemnation of
French presence in America by denouncing French coloni-
zation plans for Guiana as an attack on the peace and
security of the region. CARICOM also called on Britain
to help its associated states obtain European economic
aid. Another important agre~ament reached was resolute
support for self--determination for Belize and a denun-
ciation of the Guatemalan threat against it.
The CARICOM summit demonstrated cooperation and
rational dialogue on practical issues. Careful planning
and hard work have achieved a measure of organizational
strength. The future, however, is difficult and un-
certain. Divisiveness continues to plague the region.
Its resource base is extremely narrow, and industry is
too small in scale and too inefficient to compete ef-
fectively for outside markets. Nationalism, particular-
ly as manifested in restrictions on trade, will continue
to be a major barrier to integration. The adoption of
other characteristics of a common market is a long way
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December 31, 1975
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