LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS STAFF NOTES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300120049-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 21, 2005
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: December 10, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
Latin American Trends
7, 1
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Secret
i44
December 10, 1975
No. 0539/75
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S E C R E T
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CONTENTS
December 10, 1975
Paraguay: Moving Toward Brazil . . . . . . 1
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Argentina: Mounting Violence
NAMUCAR: A Faltering Start . .
Venezuela: COPEI - A Divided
Political Force
Bolivia/ 'Chile: The Long, Hard
Road to the Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Paraguay: Moving Toward Brazil
Paraguay, in its buffer position between the
large countries of Argentina and Brazil, has in the
past generally dispensed separate but more or less
equal treatment. It has not necessarily been trying
to play one big power off against the other but has
been trying to garner the advantages from each re-
lationship without allowing either larger country to
dominate Paraguayan affairs. Traditionally, the
Paraguayans have identified culturally with the
Argentines. The government, however, views the govern-
ment of Isabel Peron as unstable, is concerned about
a possible turn toward the left by Argentina, and is
now indicating a marked in the direction of Brazil,
which Paraguay views as a future world power whose
economic interests in Latin America could assist
Paraguayan development.
This tilt was particularly evident during the visit
to Paraguay by Brazilian President Geisel in early
December. Pomp and ceremony attended the first visit
of a Brazilian Chief of State in 35 years, and the
government declared a three-day holiday for public em-
ployees. Preparations included a crackdown on Com-
munist Party members and subversives, with the number
of arrests rumored as high as 400 although official
records acknowledged only about one-tenth as many.
President Geisel received the highest decoration
Paraguay bestows on a foreign official, and he returned
a priceless gold book captured by the Brazilians in the
War of the Triple Alliance some 100 years ago. More
concrete accomplishments included the settlement of a
boundary dispute, the granting to Paraguay of $3.5 billion
in credits for construction of the Itaipu hydroelectric
project, and the signing of a new treaty of friendship
and cooperation calling for extensive Brazilian involve-
ment in Paraguayan development.
December 10, 1975
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Paraguay admits privately to a deliberate policy
of closer rapprochement with Brazil but at the same time is
worried about retaliation from Argentina, perhaps in
the form of harassment of river shipping. Argentina
has previously tried to torpedo the Itaipu project.
Brazil wants to draw Paraguay closer into its sphere
of influence but is also concerned about reaction from
Argentina and from Bolivia as well. Although both
countries hope to avoid needless offense with their
new treaty, they are not at all sure this is possible.
I
December 10, 1975
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Argentina: Mounting Violence
The "rules" of political violence may be under-
going some changes in the current exchange of killings
by both left and right.
Last week's guerrilla murder of a retired general
outraged the military, but was not unprecedented. What
was unusual about that incident was the deliberate
killing of the officer's wife, who was abducted, then
strangled and shot. This particularly vicious, inten-
tional killing of a bystander may have been the spark
that ignited subsequent retaliatory killings.
Late in the week rightwing groups seeking to avenge
the death of the general killed 12 university students
in two different cities. The students, some from Peru
and Boliva, were not known to be linked to the general's
murder, and were apparently chosen at random. The
latest violence also included other killings carried
out in extremely brutal fashion,.
For some time political viclence has generally
been selective, attempting to avoid innocent bystanders.
The left, in resorting now to the murder of the general's
wl.fe, seems driven by frustration over continuing failure
to foment social upheaval and provoke the military. Even
so, the act was limited. The right, however, judging from
its massive retaliation, feels far more enthusiastic than
the left about the prospect of widening the scope of
political killings.
December 10, 1975
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NAMUCAR: A Faltering Start
The constituting articles for NAMUCAR (Naviera
Multinacional Del Caribe) were signed by Mexico,
Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, Jamaica, and Costa 24ca
last week. Each country contributed $500,000 to cover
operating expenses for the first six months.
Colombia and Panama, two of the original states
setting up the organization, did not sign the official
agreement; Panama is expected to do so early next year.
Colombia's interest in NAMUCAR has waned perceptibly
and government officials are open2y pessimistic about
the organization's chances of success. The .Lopez go v-
ernment is still committed publicly to membership in
NAMUCAR--for pol.:Ltical reasons--but its participation
at best will be reluctant and minimal.
Although NAMUCAR's finances are temporarily as-
sured, it will be many years before trained personnel
are available and the fleet will lie large enough to
pose a serious challenge to foreign ship operators in
January 1976 are overly optimistic; the first two ships
will not be ready until March, at the earliest. Heavy
financial looses are expected during the first months
of operation and NAMUCAR is not expected to break even
until near the end of its second year.
The big question, of course, is who will be shoul-
dering the losses in the meantime. In the past Caracas
has been irritated by the attitude of some of the
NAMUCAP members who believe that Venezuela's massive
oil wealth obliges it to fund a substantial part of the
shipping company's operations. Any attempt to pressure
Venezuela to do more than its share could cause the Perez
administration to reassess its support for the fleet, an
action which could have a crippling effect on the organi-
zation's long-term prospects.
December 10, 1975
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Venezuela: COPEI - A Divided Political Force
The opposition Social Christian (COPEI) party's
national convention has been postponed again, this
time until early next year. The delay reflects the
intense battle within COPEI to elect a new secretary
general and national executive committee.
Radical Senator Luis Herrera Campins and former
president Rafael Caldera are presently involved in a
bitter struggle for control of the party. Another
factor is Herrera's maneuvering for the presidential
nomination two years hence. Herrera has strong sup-
port from the party's radical youth organization and
from a number of influential leftist party leaders.
Herrera is dissatisfied with Caldera's leadership and
has accused him of imposing party candidates for na-
tional elections. Many Copeyanos, including Herrera,
believe that had it not been for Caldera's personal
intervention in 1973, Herrera would have been the
party's choice and made a better showing in the cam-
paign than Caldera's hand-picked candidate.
In the current battle for the secretary general
post, Herrera is supporting the candidacy of a former
ambassador to the US, Pedro Pablo Aguilar. Caldera
and party moderates, in the meantime, are campaigning
for Jose Curiel, former cabinet minister and Caldera's
campaign manager in the 1968 elections. The intensity
of the struggle for what some perceive as the soul of
the party is reflected in clashes that have occurred
at several regional party meetings where delegates to
the national convention are being selected. Preliminary
results of these conventions indicate that Aguilar will
control over three-fourths of the delegates and will
win election as secretary general.
December 10, 1975
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No matter who wins, divisions within the party
will persist and perhaps become even deeper as time
draw-Ts near for the nominating convention. Supporters
of Herrera are already warning of a split if he is
again denied the party's nomination. Moderate elements
within COPEI are also saying that Herrera's nomination
as standard bearer would be disastrous for the party
and would ensure the governing Democratic Action Part
another five years in office.
December. 10, 1975
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Bolivia/Chile: The Long, Hard Road to the Sea
The recent announcement by the Chilean Foreign
Ministry that there is little likelihood of a quick
solution to Bolivia's aspiration for a sovereign out-
let to the sea suggests that Santiago has not yet
decided on how far to go in satisfying La Paz and
is deliberately stalling to protract the negotiations.
Chile's statement reflects its intent to squelch
continual Bolivian agitation for some concrete indi-
cation that progress is being made. Persistent claims
by Bolivian ambassadors and officials that Santiago is
expected to answer La Paz's demands on such and such
a date are indicative of the kind of pressures Presi-
dent Banzer's government is using to keep the issue
alive and to urge faster movement in reaching a settle-
ment.
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Meanwhile, Peru is standing fast and making no
proposals of its own, apparently content to let Chile
and Bolivia haggle over the problem alone. The new
leadership in Lima would be unlikely to get actively
involved unless an agreement was at hand that affected
the erstwhile Peruvian provinces won by Chile in the
War of the Pacific. Under the terms of a 1929 protocol,
Peru would then have a voice in any arrangement to be
concluded. Bolivia may be underestimating the diplomatic
difficulties in squaring any settlement with Peru while
it focuses primarily on urging Chile to table an offer
satisfactory from La Paz's point of view.
It is difficult to predict how long Chile can
string Banzer along without making at least a token
gesture. If Banzer is under pressure from his own armed
forces to resolve the issue soon, then he might be forced
at some point to break relations with Chile and accuse
Santiago of bad faith. The most likely course of events,
however, is that Bolivia will continue to spar gently in
hopes that Chile will eventually find it more profitable
to retain an ally--especially in light of its distrust
of Peruvian intentions--then to risk addin yet another
black mark to its international image.
December 10, 1975
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