STAFF NOTES: LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300120036-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 12, 2006
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: September 10, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
gul~p KO~E
Latin American Trends
State Dept. review completed
Secret
142
September 10, 1975
No. 0526/75
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LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Hemisphere Divisio-i, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
September 10, 1975
Chile: Clampdown on the Universities . . . . 2
Regionalism: With and Without the US . . . . 4
Nicaragua: Anderson Articles Fallout
Continues
Cuba: Provinces to Disappear
Argentina: Major Scandal Unlikely . . . . . . 9
Stalemate in Surinam . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Chile: Church Again Blasts Regime . . . . . . 12
Cuban Chronology for August 1975 . . . . . . . 15
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Chile: Clampdown on the Universities
The pattern of arrests and dismissals of univer-
sity personnel and students over the past month sug-
gests that a massive purge is unfolding. The latest
round of detentions has struck a damaging blow at the
universities' capacity to function usefully in Chile's
educational system.
A government-directed shakeup of the administra-
tion of the University of Chile is apparently under
way. A new vice-rector has been named to head the
eastern campus in Santiago, a focal point of the
student and faculty dissent. More faculty members
have been discharged at the Catholic University in
Santiago, where conflict again erupted last week.
Only three or four members of the 15-man political
science faculty now retain their jobs. Press sources
claim that the dismissals stemmed from plans to hold
a seminar on "the crisis of democracy in the world"
which was to have included participation by former
President Eduardo Frei. The majority of those arresteu
at the Catholic University were members of Frei's
Christian Democatic tarty.
While high level Chilean officials, including Pres-
ident Pinochet, have alleged that the expulsions and
arrests were prompted by illegal political activity on
the campuses, there is some evidence that a more probable
reason was the go:~ernment's intention to replace dis-
senters with government supporters. The number of per-
sons jailed or ousted from the universities is not clear.
Meanwhile, many appeals for writs of habeas corpus sub-
mitted on behalf of those still being held have been re-
jected by the courts.
The wives of some professors in custody have denied
the government's charges and have told US Embassy of-
ficers that their husbands were not political activists
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but victims of personal grudges. Some charge that dis-
gruntled colleagues--seeking promotions or bitter over
losing their jobs--have fingered others as Marxists.
So far, the government has been vague about the
specific nature of its charges, which has reinforced
questions about the legitimacy of its actions. The US
Embassy says the over-all effect has been the trampling
of university autonomy and deteriorating morale in the
educational community. Representatives of the University
of California, which has an educational exchange agree-
ment with the University of Chile, are concerned about
the continued existence of educational freedom in Chile
and are considering terminating the exchange program.
Whatever may be the government's intentions in
moving against the universities, it will further damage
"hile's image abroad and have a negative effect on hopes
for a meaningful liberalization of its security restric-
tionc.
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Regionalism: With and Without the US
Increasing involvement in international confer-
ences has given the Latin American governments a
broader context in which to examine and sharpen the
focus of their own special interests.
The Latin ' experiences in various UN activities
and especially their connnection with the Group of 77
and the nonaligned movement have convinced them of the
value of solidarity with other blocs with similar
problems and aspirations. At the same time, the Latins
have become more conscious of themselves as a region
and have a clearer sense of how they can meet certain
needs on a regional basis. Despite the poor results of
most regional and subregional experiments of the past,
the Latin Americans are taking a new look at the poten-
tial benefits of the OAS and the proposed Latin American
Economic System (SELA), the former with and the latter
without the US.
At broad, global forums, the Latins have seen their
interests diluted in the flood of grievances from less
developed areas and they have also seen the intensity of
the Latin cases fade alongside the bitter determination
of the participants in the Middle East and other politi-
cally divided areas. While the Latins value the concept
of a new international order and other third-world prin-
ciples and agree with the tactic of mass lobbying, they
are also aware of specific economic and political goals
that might be better served by efforts within the
regional community.
Playing on this theme, the new and energetic secre-
tary general of the OAS, Argentina's Alejandro Orfila,
is winning converts to his conviction that the pan-
American forum can be a key court for the presentation of
Latin American positions, propositions, and complaints to
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Washington. Orfila strongly advocates a de-Latinization
of the OAS procedures, which after years of juridical
disputation have become mired in minutiae.
Orfila evidently has sold his practical approach to
Mexican President Echeverria, one of the OAS' strongest
critics. Echeverria has instructed his delegates to
back Orfila fully in the effort to revitalize the OAS
and take the lead in bringing greater decisiveness and
rationality into the organization. Echeverria has also
contacted his rival for Latin leadership, Venezuelan
President Carlos Andres Perez, to ask for Venezuela's
cooperation with Orfila. Both Mexico and Venezuela
seem ready to increase their financial support of the
OAS as well.
Working committees have begun assembling in Panama
to labor over the statutes and principles of SELA, which
will be the subject of a full Latin and Caribbean con-
ference there beginning October 15. SELA--a brainchild
of Echeverria and Perez--is slowly developing accept-
ability in the rest of the hemisphere as a forum in which
the Latins can marshal their assets in practical business
schemes. In SELA, they can cope with differences in size
and development among the countries by means of special
privileges for the poor. Gradually, SELA is emerging as
the vehicle by which the Latins can find the consensus
with which they hope to challenge the US at the OAS.
The many Latin American barriers of cultural division,
regional rivalries, and differing political and economic
systems will remain as formidable as they have been in
the past. But Latin advocates of regional cooperation are
increasingly confident that the lessons of old failures
and the new momentum for altering international relation-
ships will lift them over these hurdles.
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Nicaragua: An1arson Articles Fallout Continues
?resident Somoza continues to orchestrate his
counterattack against Jack Anderson's published al-
legations of Somoza's abuses, including AID fund mis-
use.
The major daily Novedades--owned by Somoza--has
headlined and praised Ambassador to the US Sevilla-
Sacasa for his efforts to rebut the charges. The
Nicaraguan Government has also quickly released a US
State Department note, in reply to a formal request
from Sevilla-Sacasa,stating that no official documents
were given to Anderson and that there are no claims
regarding illegal expenditures of AID funds by any
Nicaraguan government organization.
Other aspects of the counterattack have included
the firing of Somoza's press secretary and increased
censorship of La Prensa. This daily is owned by op-
position leader Joaquin Chamorro, who Somoza believes
to be the source of information for Anderson's columns.
Somoza is also beginning efforts to have his rubber-
stamp congress stage an official show of support.
Because the original Anderson articles were seen
by few in Managua, the Nicaraguan strongman allowed
Novedades to publish laundered translations of the
columns. However, given that his selective editing
may be exposed and that his continued public campaign
may spark another column by Anderson, Somoza may find
that he has succeeded only in generating er embar-
rassment for himself.
September 10, 1975
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Cuba: Provinces to Disappear
A specially administered area in eastern Cuba
may be the forerunner of a new political-administra-
tive subdivision designed for adoption throughout the
country. The new jurisdictional structure could be
introduced as early as next year, but the timing prob-
ably depends on popular acceptance of the new concept.
Cuba currently comprises six provinces, which
themselves are divided onto 59 regions and 416 munici-
palities. The draft constitution now under study de-
fines Cuba only in terms of regions and municipalities
and makes no mention of a provincial level of public
administration. This treatment of the highest tier of
government below the national level matches the ambi-
guity of previous cryptic indications of structural
changes, suggesting that the Castro regime was sending
up trial balloons to test popular receptivity to the
demolition of a sociological feature having deep his-
torical roots. The matter was finally brought out more
clearly by Castro himself on July 26, when he explained
that the reorganization was required by "social and
political reality."
The Tunas territorial subdivision in Oriente pro-
vince gives a hint of the new system. The territory is
made up of three of the province's 13 regions, and con-
sists of 6,664 square kilometers with a population of
382,000 people--compared to the province total of 36,601
square kilometers and 3,008,000 people. The territory
is governed from a key regional transportation center for
the area, and its governor is Faure Chomon, a member of
the Cuban Communist Party Secretariat, who was shifted
to the territory in late 1970.
Using the Tunas territory as a guide, the new
political-administrative structure is likely to consist
of between 20 and 25 units at the regional level. Be-
cause no information is available on the subdivision of
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the Tunas territory itself, however, no valid conjecture
can be made about the reorganization at the municipality
level. Whatever the breakdown, the impact will be con-
siderable. The structures of the party, several of the
mass organizations, and some government mii.istries are
based largely on the provincial political-administiative
boundaries, and major changes in these entities would
have to be made to accommodate the new system.
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Argentina: Major Scandal Unlikely
Peronist legislators have side-tracked Radical
Party efforts to investigate the financial dealings
of President Peron and former social welfare minister
Jose Lopez Rega.
The controversy was touched off by press reports
in mid-August that President Peron had diverted about
$800,000 from Peronist welfare funds to her late
husband's estate. Spokesmen for Mrs. Peron blame the
improper transfer on her lawyer--former Interior Min-
ister Benitez--and claim that she is taking steps to
correct the mistake. Other Peronists, however, have
attempted to defend the action by noting that the check
was intended to cover a portion of the inheritance due
the sisters of Peron's former wife Evita. They also
argue that only a fraction of the amount congress ap-
propriated to Juan Peron two years ago in restitution
for property confiscated during his overthrow in 1955
had been put into his account. The Radicals claim
that their repeated requests for a full accounting of
the amount budgeted for restitution have not been
answered by the government.
The Radicals have been fairly low-key in their ef-
forts to launch an inquiry. Their proposal, which would
set up a special investigatory commission, suggests a
calculated effort to gain favorable publicity for the
party while avoiding an uncontrolled escalation of the
debate on political corruption. The Peronists have
nevertheless responded to the disclosures with great
apprehension, probably out of fear that a thorough in-
vestigation would reveal extensive misuse of government
funds by Mrs. Peron's administration.
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Because the problem of graft is endemic throughout
the Argentine political system, it is rarely a topic
of public debate. The surfacing of this issue is an
obvious attempt by President Peron's opponents to force
her from office. The danger of such an action, however,
is that a scandal of major proportions would discredit
civilian politics in general in the eyes of military
leaders and probably much of the general population.
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Stalemate in Surinam
The defection from the predominantly black ruling
coalition c- three non-Creoles representing Javanese,
Chinese, and Hindustanis, has deprived the government
of i:s legislative majority and brought parliament to
a standstill with independence barely two months away.
The impasse was dramat:.?ed at the opening of the
new legislative session last week when the failure of
both the government and the opposition to gain a major-
ity prevented consideration of the annual budget. The
deadlock is especially inopportune since the constitu-
tion to be implemented after independence still has to
be adopted.
One solution would be to dissolve parliament and
hold elections. Despite reports to the contrary, how-
ever, Minister-President Henck Arron apparently opposes
calling an election prior to the November 25 independ-
ence date because of the possibility that his coalition
could lose, and because of the likelihood that an elec-
tion would intensify racial divisions.
Arron is trying to rebuild his coalition. He is
pressuring the defectors to return and has persuaded
Minister of Economics Edward Bruma, whose divisive
tactics precipitated the defections, to make concessions
to the Chinese mFrchant community in order to regain the
allegiance of the Chinese representative. The Chinese
ha.vo yet to be placated but their traditional desire to
stay out of the -political spotlight in Surinam may facili-
tate Arron's tas-k. His efforts are hindered, however, by
his being seen by non-Creoles in the government as too
susceptible to Biuma's influence.
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Many of the non-militant members of Arron's govern-
ment favor forming a new "national" cabinet which would
include opposition party centrists. Arron prefers not
to take this step, partly because he is aware that such
a move could cause Bruma to bolt the coalition altogether,
taking with him many of the young activists in Arron's
party.
The most likely prospect for the next two months is
for Arron's coalition to mend its differences sufficiently
to retain minimal control until independence. After that
milestone, however, Surinamese priorities are almost
certain to take a new and probably chaotic course.
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Chile: Church Again Blasts Regime
The Chilean Catholic Church has taken another
step toward open criticism of the junta this week by
publishing a document implying strong condemnation
of the government's human rights stand. In public
statements last month, church leaders hinted that
they were becoming impatient with the lack of progress
in curbing the more flagrant abuses by security intelligence forces.
Although the government apparently is not taken
to task directly in the document drafted by the bishops,
it is clear that the regime is the unspoken target.
The statement emphasizes that there will not be any
real peace in Chile until its citizens enjoy "the right
to physical and moral integrity." In their toughest
language yet, the church leaders state their conviction
that man "cannot be subjected to physical torture, out-
rage or terror, either by way of punishment or to force
him to say what he is not willing to say in oraar to
harm himself or others." Implicit in the statement is
the church's concern over the security forces' continued
practice of ignoring existing legal safeguards against
arbitrary detention and torture.
The government's social and economic policies also
come under fire, particularly the reduction in public
services and the suffering of the needy as a result of
current austerity policies. The church has consistently
taken issue with the government over the failure to
institute measures to improve the well-being of the
lower classes.
In other portions of the document, the church ex-
presses its belief in the right "to study" and "to
think"--obvious references to the widespread purge in
the universities evidently being undertaken by the
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government. The recognition that some sectors have
lost their rights, that a number of national leaders
have been "dispersed or scared,'"and that almost all
possibilities of dialog have been closed is a clear
indictment of official treatment of the "recessed"
opposition parties, especially the Christian Democratic
Party (PDC). PDC leaders have privately voiced the
same criticisms.
While the church acknowledges the service rendered
by the armed forces in freeing the country from Marxist
dictatorship, it warns Chilean leaders not to "create
new obstacles by making mistakes which might turn out
to be irreparable." The strong tone of the bishops'
statement is probably intended to pressure the govern-
ment to take some positive action to remedy its "errors."
President Pinochet is reportedly planning to announce
some liberalization measures in a major address on the
September 11 anniversary of the coup, and church leaders
evidently hope their plea will be heeded. The govern-
ment will undoubtedly flinch at the latest blast from
the church hierarchy, but it will probably try to recon-
cile its differences without resort to polemics.
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Cuban Chronology For August 1975
July 31-
August 2 - Foreign Trade Minister Marcelo Fernandez
Font heads Cuban delegation to the SELA
conference in Panama.
August 1 - PCC secretariat member Antonio Perez
Herrero meets with Yemeni and South
Vietnamese Communist Party officials in
Havana.
August 2 - Foreign Minister Gonzalo Facio announces
in San Jose that Costa Rica will "soon
establish trade relations with Cuba."
August 4 - President Dorticos recovered from back
surgery and returns to work.
August 5 - Castro interviewed by Pravda on the com-
munists' future in Latin America. He dis-
cusses results and implications of Latin
American-Caribbean Communist Party meeting
held in June in Havana. He also expresses
warm admiration for the army officers
running Portugal. Castro is also quoted
as paying admiring tribute ':o the Soviet
detente policy as an important factor in
advancing the fortunes of the international
communist movement.
August 6 - National Bank of Cuba director Raul Leon
Torras arrives in Kuwait for meetings with
finance and foreign affairs ministers.
Chilean MAPU delegation headed by Jaime
Mujica, arrives in Cuba.
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August 8 - Trinidadian economic-scientific dele-
gation arrives in Havana.
Cuba and Czechoslovakia sign energy co-
operation protocol.
August 9 - Castro returns $2 million ransom paid by
Southern Airways in November 1972 for a
hijacked airplane.
August 12 - The National Committee of the Central
Organization of Cuban Workers (CTC) re-
leases a communique expressing solidarity
with the struggle for independence of the
Puerto Rican people.
August 13 - Cuban ambassador to Argentina Emilio
Aragones Navarro escapes unharmed from an
attack in front of the Cuban embassy in
Buenos Aires.
August 15 - Nguyen Thi Binh, foreign 'sinister of the
Provisional Revolutionary Government of
the Republic of South Vietnam arrives in
Cuba.
Cuban ambassador to Colombia Fernando
Ravelo Renedo arrives in Bogota.
August 16 - The Dominican Center for the Promotion of
Exports (CEDOPEX) issues a report forsee-
ing the reestablishment of trade with Cuba.
50th anniversary of the creation of the
Cuban Communist Party is celebrated. Castro
speaks.
August 17 - Mexican President Echeverria arrives for an
official six-day visit to Cuba. Joint com-
munique issued on August 22.
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August 18 - Portuguese military delegation headed
by Vice Admiral Rosa Coutinho arrives
in Havana at the invitation of Raul
Castro.
August 21 - The Department of State announces that
US firms based on foreign soil will be
allowed to do business with Cuba for the
first time in 12 years.
August 24 - Raul Castro speech marks anniversary of
Cuban Women's Federation. He salutes
role of Cuban women in building socialism.
August 25 - Philippine First Lady Imelda Marcos ar-
rives in Havana on official visit. Re-
lations will be resumed between the two
countries "in the shortest time possible."
August 25 - Raul Roa heads Cuban delegation to the
-29 non-aligned countries' foreign ministers'
meeting in Lima.
August 26 - Cuban agricultural and engineering experts
arrive in Jamaica.
Japanese foreign trade delegation arrives
in Havana.
August 29 - Cuba and USSR sign cooperation protocol
for peaceful use of nuclear energy.
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