STAFF NOTES: LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300120031-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 12, 2006
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: August 6, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
I~IIUI~P HOUE
Latin American Trends
State Dept. review completed
Secret
132
August 6, 1975
No. 0521/75
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LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Hemisphere Division. Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
August 6, 1975
Homage to Pan-Americanism . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Argentina: Mrs. Peron's Status . . . . . . . . 3
Colombia: Taking On The Foreign
Banks 4
Ecuador: Relations Between
Government and Labor . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Bolivia: Church-State Difficulties . . . . . . 7
Guyana: Jagan's Offer . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
The Life of a Diplomat in Havana . . . . . . . 9
Cuban Chronology for July 1975 . . . . . . . . 11
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Homage to Pan-Americanism
The San Jose conference to amend the Rio Treaty
and the immediately following meeting of consultation
to end the Cuba sanctions, taken together, provide an
unusual perspective on the state of Latin American
relations with the US.
The record of the relationship over the past year
and more charts a picture of basic antagonism. In
general terms, and in the context of redefinition of
power in international affairs, Latin America does in-
deed find its interests at odds with those of the US.
The long-:..eld tradition of "natural" alliance between
the US and the rest of the hemisphere has often seemed
a lost ideal as wrangling and bitterness became a com-
monplace accompaniment to much of the business between
Washington and capitals to the south. The ambivalence
that underlies Latin American attitudes toward the US
has been evident for the most part in the frequent
contrast between country "x"'s style of bilateral deal-
ings with the US and its mode of operating in multi-
lateral forums.
the meetings at San Jose over the past severa3.
weeks, however, exhibited the ambivalence en masse.
The countries of Latin America, which in concert h.ve
regularly deplored US meddling, influence, and involve-
ment in their affairs, have now in effect paid homage
to the judgment that their basic security is naturally
and inevitably linked with the US. After critically
reviewing the Rio Treaty for two years, the Latin govern-
ments wanted only small alterations of the 28-year-old
document, and endorsed the pact essentially as was.
One change in the treaty addressed a weakness that
has long been evident---the requirement that sanctions
imposed by a two-thirds vote can be removed only by the
August 6, 1975
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same procedure. For the last two years this require-
ment has been ignored by over half the signatories in
their relations with Cuba, but their efforts to bring
the treaty's dictum in line with reality were repeat-
edly stymied by a blocking one-third-plus-one vote.
Technically, the two-thirds rule remains in force until
the amendments agreed on at San Jose are ratified by two
thirds of the member governments.
As 'n expedient solution, the delegates in San
Jose for the amendment process reconvened as the "Organ
of Consultation," the necessary guise for dealing with
sanctions issues, and voted a "freedom of action" resolu-
tion that leaves each OAS member's relationship with Cuba
a purely bilateral affair.
Agreement on both these matters was broad. Peru
and Panama, on the "leftish" end of the Latin spectrum,
remained unhappy with some basic concepts of the Rio
Treaty. On the conservative side, Uruguay, Chile, and
Paraguay took strong exception to release of the sanctions
obligations. The achievements of the two meetings left
the overwhelming portion of the membership of the OAS
feeling considerably more positive about the traditional
inter-American system than they had in some time. The
experience over all as an admission that despite the
many complaints from Latin America about the role of the
US, certain basic mutualities of interest have relative
permanence.
August 6, 1975
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Argentina: Mrs. Peron's Status
Interior Minister Benitez, head of the so-called
"mini cabinet," has gone to great lengths to assure
congress and the public that President Peron is well
and exercising the functions of chief executive. In
published testimony given in the Chamber of Deputies,
Benitez claimed that she was in the best of health,
following an examination by four physicians, and was
in fact merely in need of rest. Moreover, he stressed
that Mrs. Peron is being directed by no one. Over the
weekend the President herself made a point of appearing
in public and for the first time in weeks met with re-
porters and press photographers.
Though Mrs. Peron has all but ceased to function
as President, the question of her formal retention of
the office is of some consequence. She is, after all,
the constitutional successor, at a time when the govern-
ment's detractors widely profess to favor constitutional
solutions to the nation's problems. Moreover, as the
heir of Juan Peron, she is the ceremonial and, so far,
formal head of the Peronist movement, to which so many
continue to pledge loyalty.
Thus the issue of Mrs. Peron's official status, as
well as her health and whereabouts, continues to be
politically relevant, even though power has clearly
passed from her hands. Indeed, the very weaknesses of
the President--the subject of endless rumors--may well
be of use to the "mini cabinet," by diverting attention
away from its day-to-day work at a time when the glare
of publicity would only make the government's activities
more difficult. In addition, the longer Mrs. Peron re-
mains in any capacity, the more time the "mini cabinet"
will have to take on administrative problems before
facing the unrestrained maneuvers of political sectors
vying for control. For these reasons, it is quite pos-
sible that the members of the "mini cabi~iet" are working
hard to keep Mrs. Peron in office and in the public eye.
I I
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Colombia: Taking On The Foreig: Banks
The Colombian Government has begun a gradual
process of "Colombianizing" foreign banking institu-
tions. Under an order issued by the Superintendent
of Banks, all banks operating in the country must be
at least 51 percent Colombian-owned by June 30, 1978,
or they will be obliged to cease operations.
Although the "Colombianization" process is reason-
ably leisurely and involves nothing as politically
hazardous as nationalization, the Superintendent of
Banks' order imposes a rigid timetable on foreign
bankers. They must make a declaration of their inten-
tions no later than 'Leis week. If they opt to remain
active in Colombi-., they must relinquish 5 percent in-
terest to local 'Jarticipation by December 31, 1975; 20
percent by Decerber 31, 1976; 40 percent by December
,1, 1977; and 51 percent by June 30, 1978. Foreign
banks operating (nly a branch or branches in Colombia,
but wishing to remain active, must establish a local
banking corporation to acquire the branch or branches
in accordance with the above schedule.
.The government expects the banks to resist this
order and apparently intends to temper or stiffen fur-
ther official action on the basis of the stand taken
by the foreign banking community. The government would
probably look with disfavor on any attempt to test the
legality of the decree law under which the present order
was issued, a move that could tempt some bankers. The
Colombian Congress would very likely sack the government
in sucn a test; congressional action would be required
under the international banking statutes of the Andean
Pact.
A more forthcoming approach by the banking commu-
nity, however, would probably be well received by the
government. Although there seems little doubt that the 25X1
"Colombianization" order will eventually be carried out,
the government would more than likely grant any reason-
able extension of the 1978 deadline.
August 6, 1975
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Ecuador: Relations Between Government an-.3 Labor
Inflation is threatening to do serious damage
to the cooperative relationship that the left-leaning
Rodriguez administration has maintained with the
country's labor movement over the three years of mili-
tary government.
Ecuador's oil boom, which lasted from late 1972
until early this year, funneled petroleum revenues--
or at least the promise of such revenues--into many
working-class groups. In addition, even when inflation
became a major factor in the Ecuadorean economy about
six months ago, workers were generally able to cash in
on the momentum of the boom years, winning most of the
wage increases they sought. Now, however, with infla-
tion in the 25 percent annual range, real wages are
clearly declining and many workers--still clinging to
the boom mentality--have begun to believe that oil
improves the lot only of the rich. As a consequence,
the number of labor disputes has increased sharply over
the past year.
Minister of Welfare and Labor Ramiro Larrea, a
civilian who has held that post since February 1974,
..as tried valiantly and in large part successfully to
maintain a reasonably good relationship between the
military government and labor. He has encouraged the
negotiation of new labor-management agreements, the
number of which has now reached about 1,500 (compared
with only two in 1962). He has also prompted the gov-
ernment to curb the country's multitude of labor law-
yers, whose inflammatory activities in the interest of
self-enrichment have long outraged labor unions.
There is currently an insidious erosion of govern-
ment-labor relations, however. This is a growing con-
cern to the government, which has enjoyed a longer life
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and greater popularity than most Ecuadorean regimes
in large part because of the support of labor. As
that support slowly declines, government leaders are
almost certain to lose some of the confidence that
has characterized the administration's position over 25X1
the past three years. Such a change could impair the
efficiency of the government or, alternatively, nudge
it in the direction of authoritarianism.
August 6, 1975
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Bolivia: Church-State Difficulties
The recent expulsion of three Spanish-born nuns
underscores the uneasy, if not hostile, relationship
between liberal Catholics and the Banzer government.
Ignoring the government's pledge to consult
church leaders before moving against church property
or personnel, police in Oruro raided a parish house
and arrested the nuns for allegedly harboring leaders
of the illegal Bolivian Workers' Central. Interior
Minister Juan Pereda justified the raid by claiming
that the nuns were also concealing documents advocating
armed uprisings and had money in their possession to
finance such activities. Following a few days in
prison the nuns were expelled amid loud protest from
leading clerics.
The action is the latest in a long series of moves
by President Banzer against those whom he suspects of
opposing his policies. he resents the increasing in-
volvement of clerics with student and labor groups--two
sectors often hostile to his administration. Banzer's
suspicions are heightened by the fact that three-fourths
of Bolivia's priests and two-thirds of its prelates are
foreign born. Among the most highly suspect are US
priests, most of whom are associated with the progressive
wing of the church. The Americans, who constitute over
a tenth of the church hierarchy in Bolivia, are not only
a source of government concern but also a potential tar-
get of nationalistic criticism because of their superior
economic resources and their relatively comfortable
living conditions.
The current government is relatively stable by
Bolivian standards, and the church alone has only limit-
ed capabilities to challenge it. At the same time Banzer
is sensitive to any opposition to his policies and,given
the current proclivities of the liberal clergy, the church
could increasin 1 become a serious thorn in the Presi-
dent's side. 25X1
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Guyana: Jagaz's Offer
Cheddi Jagan, secretary general of the Marxist-
oriented People's Progressive Party (PPP), has re-
luz:antly decided to provide limited political sup-
port to the ruling People's National Congress (PNC)
party 25X1
Jagan. s ecision appears to have resulted from pres-
sure by Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro to cooper-
ate with Guyanese Prime Minister Forbes Burnham in
building a socialist state.
Jagan reportedly said that his party could work
with other Guyanese who were interested in the country's
evolution toward socialism. To this end, he said, it
could support the PNC but, at the same time, would not
hesitate to criticize and oppose any moves inconsistent
with building a socialist society. He would continue
to take the ideological initiative should Buraaam's
party waver in its advance toward socialism.
For some time relations between the two parties
have been strained due to racial animosity between the
black-based PNC and the East Indian-based PPP. Further
ill feeling was added when Jagan charged Burnham with
rigging the 1973 elections. As a result, the two
parties have been critical of each other and unable
to pursue their socialist program jointly.
At the moment, Burnham does not appear to be in-
terested in Jagan's gesture nor do the prime minister's
political plans for Guyana appear hindered or threatened.
According to an earlier report, Burnham would insist that
the PP? be disbanded and join the PNC before he would
accept Jagan's support. Given Jagan's refusal to accept 25X1
these conditions, his decision to offer limited support
to the government will do little to promote cooperation
or to alleviate underlying resentments.
August 6, 1975
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The Life of a Diplomat in Havana
The recent experiences of some Venezuelan of-
ficials indicate that the life of a diplomat in Havana
can be aggravating e---in for those representing govern-
ments whose friendship the Castro regime clearly de-
sires.
Local authorities apparently do little to help
locate suitable facilities for an embassy or personal
residence, and rents tend to be extremely high. The
Venezuelan government, forewarned of the housing prob-
lem, recently delayed sending a permanent diplomatic
mission for several months until it was assured of the
availability of appropriate accommodations. In order
to put pressure on Havana, the Venezuelans made it known
that no Cuban embassy personnel would be welcome in
Caracas until the problem was resolved.
Other irritations also face diplomats in Havana.
Several Venezuelan diplomats recently asked to have
some office furniture moved five miles from its place
of storage to the newly established embassy. The task
probably could have been com--leted in a few hours by a
single truck; instead the Cuban government office re-
sponsible for providing services for foreign diplomatic
missions sent three vans and the movers managed to
stretch the job into an all-day affair. The Cubans
then charged the Venezuelans $2000 for the move.
The Venezuelan experience is not unique. It is
fairly representative of troubles faced by other mis-
sions in setting up offices in Havana. The difficulties
encountered by foreign diplomats are not necessarily an
indication of the Castro regime's attitude toward a
specific government. Rather they appear to reflect
simple bureaucratic ineptitude possibly combined in some
cases with a desire to gain foreign exchange. Neverthe-
less, such incidents run the risk of alienating diplomats
August 6, 1975
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representing countries whose friendship the Cubans
otherwise have taken pains to cultivate. Venezuelan
diplomats are so annoyed that one or more may demand
reassignment or--failing that--may resin.
August 6, 1975
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Cuban Chronology for July 1975
July 1: A party/government
by Central Committ
Acosta arrives in
Cuban Industrial C
Angel Gomez Trueba
July 2: Venezuelan Ambassa
Raul Taylhardat ar
delegation
ee member Ar
Lisbon.
onstruction
arrives in
dor to Cuba
rives to ass
headed
mando
Minister
Madrid.
Adolfo
ume post.
Ten federal deputi
es from Mexi
co arrive
in Havana at invit
ation of Cub
an Insti-
tute for Friendshi
p with Peopl
es (ICAP)
.
July 3: A delegation of UJ
Mexico at invitati
C membero ar
on of Mexica
rives in
n Social-
ist Party.
July 4: At an impromptu pre
ss conferen
ce Mexica
n
President Echeverr
ia calls for
"the im-
mediate lifting of
sanctions a
gainst
Cuba and its entry
American system."
July 8: Mexican National Pr
Javier Alejo makes
into a just Inter-
operties Secretary
brief visit to Cuba
to prepare for SELA
July 9 Prime Minister Mich
meeting.
ael Manley of Jamaic
a
arrives on an offic
ial visit. Joint co
m-
munique released Ju
ly 14.
Soviet and Cuban Cooperation Subcommission
meets in Moscow.
July 10: France expels three Cuban diplomats for
alleged connection with a terrorist ring.
Foreign Ministry issues a protest and
denial on July 22.
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July 10: President of the National Bank of Cuba
arrives in Panama City to hold a series
of meetings with national and inter-
national banking authorities.
Cuban Machinery, Development Ministers
arrive in Bulgaria.
Castro states that the CIA made various
attempts on his life.
Vice Prime Minister Flavio Bravo arrives
in Belgium for economic discussions.
Fidel Castro is elected a precandidate
for delegate to the First Party Congress.
Cuba and Jamaica establish joint Economic
Commission.
A Cuban Communist Party delegation led
by the head of the Central Cor+mittee's
Internal Education Department, Francisco
Antonio Diaz, arrives in Prague.
July 15: Havana Domestic Service reports on a
speech Secretary Kissinger made at the
University of Wisconsin World Affairs
Institute. Havana describes the speech
as "a violent attack nn the Third World."
July 16- OAS meets in San Jose.
28
July 21: Portuguese Armed Forces Movement dele-
gation headed by General Otelc de
Carvalho arrives in Havana.
July 22: Cuban Mines and Geology Minister Manuel
Cespedes Fernandez arrives in Moscow.
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Week of Alicia Alonzo performs in New York with
July 24: the American Ballet Theater.
July 24: Cuban Foreign Trade Minister arrives in
Kingston.
Cuba and East Germany sign economic and
scientific cooperation agreement.
Cubana airlines inaugurates regular
service to Panama City. Cuban delegation
to SELA meeting on first flight.
July 25- Cuban Military Delegation headed by Chief
28 of General Staff and First Vice Minister
of MINFAR Brigade Commander Senen Casas
Regueiro in Lisbon.
July 25: Cuba, USSR sign agreement on construction
of a nuclear power plant.
July 26: Major event celebrating the 22nd anniver-
sary of assault on Moncada Barracks held
in Santa Clara. Guests include mayor of
Panama City and visiting Portuguese dele-
gation. Castro speech is a lesson in
Portuguese history and a discussion of
proposed administrative divisions of Cuba.
July 27: A delegation from the National Front of
the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen
(PDRY) arrives in Cuba.
July 28: A party delegation headed by Isidoro
Malmierca concludes a visit to Jamaica
at the invitation of the People's National
Party of Jamaica.
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July 30: OAS votes to end 11-year economic and
diplomatic isolation of Cuba. (Cuban
reaction muted. Small item on back
page of GRANMA reporting the vote but
no editorial comment as of August 4).
July 31: SELA meeting begins in Panama City.
Minister for Foreign Trade Marcelo
Fernandez heads Cuban delegation.
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