STAFF NOTES: EAST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300110007-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2004
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: April 7, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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East Asia
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A P r 4 7, X975
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EAST ASIA
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CONTENTS
April 7, 1975
A Domino's Eye View of the
Situation in Indochina 1
Sino-Malaysian Territorial
Disagreement
Burma: He Win Reshuffles
His Team . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Son of the Impossible Dream: Ambonese
Extremists in the Netherlands
NORTH ASIA
North Korea: Who Manages
Foreign Relations?~
., 13
Japanese Eye US Trusteeship
as-Oil Storage Site. . . . . . . . . . . 18
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A Domino's Eye View of the Situation in Indochina
8outheant Aoian Branch/RAP
Most Southeast Asian leaders expected that
Hanoi would eventually dominate all of Indochina,
but the rapidity with which the military situation
in o?,uth Vietnam deteriorated over the past three
weeks has come as something of a shock. Last week,
Thailand and Indonesia publicly called for a
meeting of the foreign ministers of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)--Singapore,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia--
to discuss the impact on regional affairs partic-
ularly security, and to devise a common strategy
for..'sealing with the changing Indochina situation.
On April,,7, the Thai foreign minister reportedly
said such a meeting will be held in Kuala Lumpur,
May 13-15
Thailand wants to explore the possibility of
developing the five-nation association into a
mutual defense organization. Thai Foreign Minister
Chatchaiwill probably also use the forum publicly
to promote his idea of getting great power endorse-
ment,of Thailand's neutrality, and by extrlnsion
the neutrality of all of Southeast Asia. =' necent:
developments in Vietnam are having a greater impact
on Thailand than any other country and, while Bangkok
does not regard a communist take-over in Indochina,
as an immediate security threat, it is concerned
over;the.long-term implicatio-as of potentially
hostile neighbors on its eastern border. Bangkok will
undoubtedly speed up efforts already under way to
break from-US policies in Indochina.
Indonesia has tried to play an active role
in resolving the conflicts in Indochina and is
the,,only Asian,state,participating in the ICCS in
Vietnam. Few,. leaders in Jakarta were optimistic.
about South Vietnam's ability to withstand North
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Vietnamese pressure over the long term, but In-
donesian military officers were concernod that
total communist control of Indochina would in-
crease the potential for subversion elsewhere in
Southeast Asia. Jakarta therefore will probably
enthusiastically support Thai efforts to use ASEAN
to promote regional security cooperation. For
some time, Indonesian military leaders have been
advocating a greater security and intelligence role
for ASEAN. Indonesia has been lukewarm to'the con-
cept of Southeast Asian neutrality, however, since
Malaysia first proposed it in 197.0. Jakarta may
try to use the ASE11N forum for a coordinated ap-
proach to the qunation of establishing relations
with new Indochina governments.
Kuala Lumpur opposes the idea of developing
ASEAN into a military alliance. The Malaysians
believe that such a development would unnecessarily
antagonize Asian communist states Ley suggesting
that the ASEAN nations expect a military confronta-
tion. Instead Malaysia intends to capitalize on
ASEAN concern over Indochina by renewing its efforts
to promote a Southeast Asian zone of neutrality.
The five ASEAN partners endorsed this concept in
principle when Kuala Lumpur.first proposed it five
years ago, but few'believed it was practical in the
near term. Malaysia probably calculates that recent
events in Indochina will ma::e the other partners
more receptive. Kuala'L'impur will argue that
regional neutrality will buy time, particularly
for Thailand, to cope with the changed political
situation in Southeast Asia.
Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew is one
of the Southeast Asian leaders most concerned
about the probable extension of communist pressure
onto the Malaysian Peninsula,via Thailand. In
,the past,.however, he has generally denigrated ideas
of a regional defensive body as unrealistic. Lee
believes guaranteed neutrality for Southeast Asia
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is a noble but impractical goal and argues that
regional security depends on 'a balance of forces
between the great powers.
The Philippines has not taken'a l:ublic position
on the ASEAN meeting. President Marcos may well
use the opportunity to renew his calls for a
Southeast Asian summit conference, a pet idea of
his that other ASEAN leaders have consistently
rejected. Developments in Indochina will probably
cause Marcos to intensify his current effort to
create an independent Philippine foreign policy
and reduce Manila's long-standing identification
with the US. Marcos, however, shows no interest
in terminating US military base rights and is
therefore likely to remain cool to proposals for
neutralizing Southeast Asia. Marcos may. try to
turn US foreign policy reverses in Indochina to
his own advanLa a, hoping to get a more favorable
hearing on Philippine requests for economic and
military aid as well as better terms in the ongoing
negotiations over a new-base agreement.
An ASEAN foreign ministers' conference, when
it finally convenes; will probably produce no
diplomatic surprises and :ay well be lit; le more
than a group hand-holding session. Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Singapore already recognize Hanoi,
and Thailand will probably renew efforts to'_open
a dialogue with the North Vietnamese on eventual
relations. There will probably be more discussions
about expanding'ASEAN: to include Indochina once
the situation there has stabilized.
Other 5outhea6t,Asian states have displayed
little immediate concern about events in Indochina,
Australia's Prime M.tni :;.er Whitlam has :publicly
looked forward to the demise of 'the Thieu government
and his Labor government is not uneasy over the
political consejuer' s of its collapse., Whitlam
probably, hopes, _ however,. that his offer of planes
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:to. help evacuate'-refugees wsll dispel any
.tn outaooJc to, feel much impact from the current
''l.Australian counterpart, ie.banieally toe inauiur
.not as critical, of US Indochina policies as Sts
suggestions that:he is smua over the aurrnnt
Ne,W n
may reiterate a previous proposal that a
general Southeast Asian conference--including t4 e
Indochina stated--he convened once the Indochina
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Malaysian officials have privately expressed
concern over Peking's continued publication of
maps depicting China's long-standing claim to the
'rseng-idu Reef--an area of shoals lying on the East
Malaysian continental shelf some 60 nautical miles
off the Sarawak coast where Malaysia has sponsored
petroleum extraction. There is no evidence that the
issue is likely at this time to disturb relations
between the two countries, but it could create fric-
tions sometime in the future.
Since 1949 most of the South China Sea has been
depicted on maps published both in Peking and in
Taipei as within the territorial limits of China--
although Peking have indicated 25X1
that the map symbol is used
se-claimed island groups and
does not represent an official territorial sea claim.
Tseng-mu Reef is described in Peking publications
as "the' southernmost part of China" and within the
Nan-she (Spratly) group of islands. Although Tseng-mu
is not pinpointed by geographical coordinates, the
term clearly. applies to an extensive group of shoals
whose wester.' extremity, termed Lydie Shoals on West-
ern hydrographic charts,:is located about 57 nautical
miles northwest of Bintllu oa the Sarawak coast. From
Lydie Shoal, numerous shoals and banks--some not named
and none above mean low tide--extend east for about 70
miles. Chinese maps include most of these shoals as
Chinese territory. All lie in shallow waters on the
East Malaysian continental shelf.
The basis for any Chinese claim to East Malaysian
shelf waters rests on shaky legal grounds. Neither
Teeng-mu nor other shoals and banks claimed consist of
any known land area that conceivably could fit the
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definition of an "island" and thus be used to pro-
vide base points for delimiting shelf boundaries.
The nearest Chinese-claimed "land", appears to be
Louisa Reef (Nan-tung Chiao)--actually no more
than a iewrocks--located some 165 miles northeast
of Lydie Shoal.,. Even if Peking's claim to Louisa
Reef were recognized and the roof were used as a
base point from which to allocate shelf boundaries
between the PRC and Malaysia, a Chinese claim to
Tbeng-mu Reef would not necessarily be valid, since
a trench over 200 meters deep separates Louisa from
the East Malaysian shelf.
Malaysia's right to exploit seabed resources
on the extensive East Malaysian continental shelf
appears unquestioned, except for a curious orris ion
of the East'Malaysian shelf in the 1966 Continental
Shelf and-Petroleum Mining Acts. These acts claim
for Malaysia shelf rights to "...the seabed and
subsoil of. those submarine areas adjacent to the
coast of the States of Malaya"; use of the term
"States of Malaya" seems to limit legal claims only
to shelf waters off peninsular Malaysia. Regardless
of the ambiguities in these acts, petroleum conces-
sions on the East Malaysian shelf have been granted
and exploration undertaken since the mid-1960s.
Sarawak Shell maintains concession rights on the
shelf. A large gas field about 100 miles offshore
from Bintulu, is unde+ development.
Peking has. voiced no objection to past and
present seabed exploration and exploitation under
Malaysian auspices near PRC-claimed reefs and shoals.
Nevertheless, the persistence of Chinese claims
suggests Peking's interest in its South China Seas
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Burma: No Win Reshuffles His Team
Extensive changes in the Burmese cabinet and
military command during the past several weeks
indicate that although President No Win still
dominates the regime, factional rivalry is contin-
uing within the government. The changes include the
appointment of two new cabinet ministers, a number
of new deputy ministers, and the transfer of sev-
eral key regional military commanders to less
influential posts.
Some of the shifts appear to have strengthened
the role of the civilian leadership of the ruling
Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP) at the ex-
pense of the army. Friction between these two
elements is not new, but until now the army clearly
has had the upper hand. BSPP officials reportedly
believe, however, that the transfer of the regional
commanders to jobs with less authority as deputy
ministers was a move to increase party control over
the army. The commanders allegedly had resisted
BSPP guidance and party officials claim that shift-
ing the men will make army officers generally more
responsive to the party.
The army has actually increased its-role in
the regime, however, since one of the two civilian
cabinet ministers has lost his post. Minister of
Mines Dr. Nyi Nyi was forced out on a constitutional
technicality--he did not meet one of the qualifica-
tions for office. Despite his replacement by a mil-
itary man, some BSPP leaders were not displeased at
the change. They disliked Nyi Nyi and were jealous
of his influence with Ne Win.
The changes also apparently enhance the position
oc General San Yu as the number two man in the gov-
ernment. Several of the new appointees have close
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ties to San Yu and one of the ,replaced regional
commanders had been hostile to him. San Yu has
long been regarded as the heir-apparent to
No Win, but he is disliked by several members of
the inner circle.
,No Win may have engineered the shake-up in
part to play off various elements in the government
against one another. After the riots in Rangoon last
December, his prestige appeared to have been damaged
and there were some signs that his position might be
in danger.'It is,now-clear, however, that No Win re-
mains in full control and that the continuing ri-
valry amon subordinates is,not a threat to him.
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INDONESIA
Son of the Impossible Dream:
Ambonese Extremists in Whn Nothi lands
On April. 2, Dutch authorities in Arnhem an-
nounced the arrest of ten Ambonesi exiles charged
with plotting to kidnap Queen Juliana. The ten
reportedly planned to hold the Queen hostage until
their demands for independence of the south
Moluccan islands in eastern Indonesia were satis-
fied. The ten are members of an extremist off-
shoot of the exiled Republic of the South Moluccas,
a dissident Indonesian organization centered in
the Netherlands since the early 1950s.
Christian Indonesians from the island of Ambon
in the south Moluccas provided a large segment of
the East Indies colonial troops dating from the
early days of Dutch administration. The Ambonese
developed a special relationship with the Dutch
and so firmly adopted Dutch culture and values
that they were frequently called "Black Dutchmen."
Ambonese troops participated in the conquest of
other parts of colonial Indonesia and later served
as security forces throughout the archipelago--a
tradition which did not endear them to latter-day
Indonesian nationalists.
The transfer of sovereignty from the Nether-
lands to the Federal Republic of Indonesia in
1949 created problems for the Ambonese, who had
little in common with the nationalist Javanese
controlling the government. More important, many
Ambonese troops had fought on the Dutch side against
Indonesian independence. Fearful of retaliation
from victorious nationalists, dissident Ambonese
rebelled against Jakarta's rule in April 1950 and
proclaimed a Republic of the South Moluccas
encompassing Ambon and several surrounding is-
lands. After negotiations failed, Jakarta sent
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troops against the. rebels--soizing the major
towns within a matter of weeks, although
sporadic resintrnce continued in the interior
of Ambon Island until mid-1952.
The cause of the doomed republic was quickly
taken up by the sizable Ambonese community in the
Netherlands, most of whom were former members of
.the East Indies colonial army. By mid-1951 an
estimated 11,000 former troops and their families
had been removed to the Netherlands and placed in
refugee camps. Few had any skills other than
soldiering, and they proved an almost indigest-
ible lump in Dutch society. Their disillusionment
was and is a fertile breeding ground for propa-
gandists of the Moluccan Republic. As early-as
December 1952, Dutch government officials began
promoting the idea of repatriating the Ambonese
refugees to Indonesia.
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The stickiest problem is that of second-
generation Ambonese, who have become the driving
force of the political dissidents.. Although the
old leadership of'the Republic of the South
Moluccas still appemrs on the letterhead of the
Ambonese political organization, radical youth
have been responsible for recent publicity-
creating violence. In addition to the purported
kidnap plot, Ambonese extremists carried out a
gas-bomb attack on the World Court in 1974. In
1970 they had attacked the Indonesian Embassy,
and such activities are a continuing irritant in
Indonesian-Dutch relations.
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North Ko;oai Who Manages Foreign Relations?
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As late as 1966, only time-tested party func-
tionaries filled the ranks of the Korean Workers
Party's (KWP) Political Committee. They were al-
most all colleagues of Kim I1-song in the anti-Japa-
nese guerrilla movement of the 1930s and were named
to high office essentially on the basis of loyalty
to Kim, not administrative genius. The currency of
loyalty has by no means been devalued in Pyongyang.
Beginning in the late 1960s, however, the Political
Committee was expanded to accommodate specialists in
diplomatic and economic affairs. Their promotion re-
flected a requirement for new skills in handling
specialized problems as well as a conscious effort by
Kim II-song to integrate key government administrators
into the ruling party hierarchy.
tional battles.. Better educated an more W.
Enter the Experts
in 1966 and 1970, Pyongyang added the foreign
affairs specialists who-are now full members o2 the
Political Committee; the candidate members were brought
aboard between 1972 and 1974. For the foreign affairs
specialists, ai for the Political Committee generally,
the 'distinction between full and candidate membership
is more than just one of a voting or non-voting voice
in formulating policy. It is also a matter of differ-
ence in age and background. Kim Tong-kyu, Pak Song-
chol, and So Chol, the diplomatic experts who are full
members, are in their early sixties, all veterans of
the Kim I1-song guerrilla band.
In contrast, the candidate members--Yu Chang-sik,
Kim Yong-nam, and Ho Tam--are in their late forties
or early fifties. They were recruited for Central Com-
mittee and Political Committee membership from the.For-
eign Ministry and have no background in either the anti-
Japanese movement or in,the party's early postwar fac-
d cosmo olitan
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than their committee seniors, they have helped
soften the rougher edger of North Korea's diplo-
matic style. While their seniors have had little
experience outside the communist world, these
candidates have pioneered ties with the developing
nations and strengthened North Korea's position in
international forums.
The Full Members
Kim Tong-kyu, named a vice president of the
North Korean government in November 1974, is the
highest ranked of the six foreign affairs experts.
He became a candidate member of the Political Com-
mittee in 1966 and a full member at the Fifth KWP
Congress in 1970. In connection with his recent
assumption of the vice, presidency, Kim has appar-
ently moved from ninth to fifth place in the party
hierarchy. His past foreign affairs assignments
include service as consul general at the nearby
Soviet port of Nakhodka and director of the Central
Committee's international Department.
Pak Song-chol has been the most prominent for-
eign affairs figure in postwar North Korea. He be-
came a full member of the Political Committee in
1966 and once held fourth place in the party lineup;
he is currently ranked only eighth. Pak served as
foreign minister from 1959 to 1970. In 1972, he
was named Pyongyang's chief negotiator on th3 North-
South Coordinating Committee, set up to explore
avenues of political interchange between the two
Koreas. Currently first vice premier of the cabinet,
Pak has broad government responsibilities that prob-
ably fill his schedule and limit his iealings abroad.
In the past, Pak Song-chol played an influential role
in North Korean relations with Moscow and Peking.
So, Chol was named a full member of the Political
Committee in 1970; he follows Pak Song-chol in party
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rankings. Like Pak and Kim Tong-kyu, So Chol has
recently taken on administrative chores outside
the realm of foreign affairs. He is currently
chairman of the KWP Central Committee's inspec-
tion Committee, n, body responsible for party dis-
cipline. So's pizi; assignments include tours as
charge d'affaires in Peking, ambassador to North
Vietnam and to Czechoslovakia, and chairman of
the subcabinet level Committee for Cultural Rela-
tions with Foreign Countries that handles people-
to-people exchanges.
And the Candidates
Yu Chang-sik, now ranked first among the Polit-
ical Committee's candidate members, is apparently
one of the golden boys of the KWP. Soon after join-
ing the. Committee in 1973, Yu became deputy to Pak
Song-chol on the North-South Coordinating Committee;
he held the position until January 1975. At the
relatively young age of 53, Yu has achieved unusual
prominence in both foreign affairs and party adminis-
tration. He was vice minister of foreign affairs in
the early sixties and then served as chairman of the
Central Committee's Liaison Department, responsible
for subversive activities directed against South
Korea. Yu Chang-sik has more recently been identi-
fied as deputy chairman of the Central Committee's
Organization and Guidance Department, which handles
all party personnel matters, and as chairman of its
External Affairs Department. (The responsibilities
of this newly created organ are not precisely known.)
Yu's rise in January to the top ranking of the Politi-
cal Committee's candidate members--from fifteenth
only a few months earlier--occurred at the same time
as his appointment as a secretary of the Secretariat
of the Central Committee.
Kim Yong-nam,,named to the Political Committee
in 1974, is also enjoying rapid upward mobility. He
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became a secretary of the Central Committee Sec-
retariat early this year, rising at that time from
fifth to second, place among candidate members. Kim
Yong-nam's long service as a vice minister of for-
eign affairs--he had prime responsibility . for rela-
tions with the USSR and Eastern Europe--was punc-
tuated by'tours as a deputy department chairman on
the Central Committee. He has, for the last sev-
eral years, been chairman of the Central Committee's
International Department, which has the main respon-
sibility for the formation of diplomatic policy.
The political fortunes of Ho Tam, Minister of
Foreign Affairs since 1970, are less clear. Ho
achieved candidate membership on the Political Com-
inittee three years ago; he seems to move up and, down
in the upper third of the candidate roster. As for-
eign minister, and earlier as vice minister, Ho has
specialized in dealing with Middle Eastern and African
states. He is the most widely traveled of North
Korea's diplomatic specialists and is Pyongyang's
chief spokesman for foreign affairs initiatives.
A Rising Generation
The promotion of Kim Tong-kyu and such younger
menus Yu Chang-sik and Kim Yong-nam to positions
of greater administrative responsibility does more
than recognize outstanding talent and bring a foreign
affairs weight to a broad range of decision-making.
It is one of the signals of Kim 11-song's intent to
begin turning the affairs of state and party over to
a new generation
Kim Tong-kyu, the newly appointed vice president,
though the same age and background as Kim 11-song, is
a decade younger than the current, seasoned team of
vice presidents: Choe Yong-kon and'Kang Yang-uk.
,Choe and Kang have held their posts, in one guise or
another, since the early 19509, and elevation of a
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younger man to this height is a striking change.
Kim Yong-nam and.Yu Chang-sik have,becomo the young-
est of the secretaries of the Central Committee's
Secretariats their positions are the party equiva-
lent of vice premier in the cabinet.
While Kim I1-song began to give the Korean
Workers Party a younger cast several years ago, over
the past yyear, the transformation has appeared to
take on higher priority. Last month, for example,
the,general secretary spoke with unusual candor on
the matter, telling a conference of industrial ac-
tivists that'"the old cadres...are all valuable
treasures of our. party (but) three decades have
passed since,liberation...and they have now reached
an old age and are unable to keep pace with the rap-
idly developing realities." In foreign affairs man-
agem nt, at least Kim is acting to remedy the prob-
lem.
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Japanese Eye US Trusteeship as Oil Storage Site
I F
Japanese firms are considering constructing a
94-million-barrel crude oil storage facility or
central terminal station in the Palau Islands, part
of the US-administered Carolina group east of the
Philippines. Officials claim that participation by
oil-producing countries and international oil firms
will be essential. The project could eventually
include a refinery and serve as a transshipping
point for other East Asian nations.
First-stage plans call for tanks holding 30
million barrels--six days of current Japanese
imports--to be built at a cost of $670 million.
Japan currently has crude and product stocks of
about 340 million barrels--68 days of imports--and
Tokyo will try t& increase this to at least 500
million barrels by 1980. The Japanese oil companies
are looking for sites abroad beca'ise of strong
local opposition to building new storage,facili.ios
in Japan.
Besides adding to storage capacity, the Palau
facility would encourage large tankers to use
Indonesia's Lombok and Makassar Straits--the route
east of Bali and Borneo--in preference to the
shallower, congested Malacca Strait. T'kyo has
become increasingly sensitive to the problems of
using the Malacca Strait since a 238,000-ton
Japanese tanker ran aground there in January, causing
a massive oil spill. Middle East crude would be
delivered to Palau in 500,000-ton tankers and then
to Japan in smaller ships. About 80 percent of
Japan's crude oil.imports now pass through the Malacca
Strait, with only three tankers regularly using the
Lombok-Makassar route. Oil industry spokesmen
estimate that diverting tankers of 280,000 tons or
more to the Lombok-Makassar Straits-would add only
0.2 percent to the price of oil in Japan.
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 The Palau protect would be loss costly than
is proposal to build a pipeline and storage
ilitiss in the Isthmus of Kra in Thailand. The
a
c
l
Japanese also have been considering Wilding a central
terminal station in Indonesia, but Tokyo and Jakarta
n
ti
e l
o
oca
have yet to agree on a mutually acceptabl
despite several years of negotiation.
April 7, 1975
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