STAFF NOTES: EAST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300110003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 10, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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 Top Secret
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East Asia
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February 10, 1975
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February 10, 1975
Indonesia's Timorous Aspirations. . . . . . . 1
Malaysia: A Fettered Press . . . . . . . . . 7
NORTH ASIA
South Korea: Pak's Referendum. . . . . . . . 9
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Portuguese Timor, a long-neglected stock in
Lisbon's imperial portfolio, may soon become the
focus of international attention and the cause of
some diplomatic embarrassment. Changes of govern-
ment in Lisbon since last April have had repercus-
sions in Dili, capital of the Portuguese overseas
province, and in Jakarta, which controls the other
half of the island. In June, Portugal proposed a
plebiscite in Timor in March 1975 on the colony's
future status. This announcement stimulated a flurry
of political activity in Timor and reawakened fears
in Jakarta that the colony would become a gateway
for subversive activity directed at Indonesia.
Jakarta's concerns about the stability of a
prospective independent state on Timor are well
founded, for the colony is hardly a viable candidate
for self-rule, either economically or politically.
Once the source of a lucrative sandalwood trade,
Timor today produces a little coffee and copra for
export but has been an economic liability for Lisbon
for years. While some day Timor may provide limited
revenue from oil and tourism, its land is poor and
unable to support more than subsistence farming, and
rich fishing grounds nearby are controlled by Ja-
karta. Portuguese Timor has a population of some
600,000 in an area of 7,000 square miles. About
20,000-25,000 of the residents are literate, but
few have graduated from high school. Many of the
educated are from the Chinese community of some 6,000,
which dominates the colony's economy. There are also
a few hundred permanent Portuguese residents and about
1,000 soldiers sent from Lisbon.
An independent Timor state, cut off from cur-
rent Portuguese subsidies, would need new foreign
Indonesia's Timorous Aspirations
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sponsors, and Jakarta fears it would full prey to
blandishments from the Soviets or Chinese. Even if
Timor avoided becoming a communist puppet, Jakarta
believes that the regime would be unstable and thus
attract a great deal of Communist attention. Indo-
nesia also worries about the possibility that Timer
might become a way station for illegal Chinese immi-
gration into Indonesia via the long-standing Portu-
guese ties between Macao and Timor.
Jakarta's near paranoia about Timor is partly
the result of the island's location far from the
mainstream of Indonesian life in an area Jakarta
knows little about and where it would have trouble
detecting--much less controlling--subversive ac-
tivities. Indonesia's leaders believe that independ-
ence is too risky a course, and most of them would
support Indonesian absorption of the Portuguese
colony by whatever means necessary.
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Representatives of the pro-independence groups
along with government officials and businessmen from
Timor have gone to Lisbon to discuss the province's
future. The governor of Timor referred to the group
as a "constituent assembly," causing fears in Jakarta
that Lisbon might recognize it are an interim govern-
ment with authority to negotiate an independent Timor.
The Timor problem is compounded by ignorance in
both Jakarta and Lisbon about each other's intentions
and about the situation on Timor itself.
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Jakarta has no permanent representa-
tive in Lisbon to assess Portuguese intentions or to
lobby for Indonesian interests on Timor. Indonesia only
recently decided to reopen diplomatic relations with
Portugal after a 10-year hiatus.
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Malaysia: A Fettered Pioss
Until recently, Malaysia has escaped the unfav-
orable publicity sometimes given neighboring Singa-
pore for suppression of the press. This situation
has changed as a result of the Malaysian government's
heavy-handed manipulation of the local press to ad-
vance its own distorted version of recent student
unrest in Kuala Lumpur.
The Malaysian press, normally cowed and com-
plaisant, meekly followed government orders in late
November not to report that small rubber planters
were staging protests against depressed economic
conditions. Later, when students in the capital
seized upon the rural disaffection to vent their
own grievances against the Razak government some
reporting was permitted, but the press was forced to
blacken the student movement with unsubstantiated ac-
counts of vandalism. Goverrment officials also put
out allegations that the Communist-leaning Chinese
Language Society at the University of Malaysia had
instigated the demonstrations, although in fact both
the organizers and the participants were preponderantly
Malay.
To justify stringent press controls, Kuala Lumpur
argues that Malaysia's sensitive multi-racial make-up
requires prohibitions against inflammatory reporting,
and two pieces of legislation give the government ex-
tensive legal controls over the press. The Sensitive
Issues Act, enacted in the wake of severe communal
rioting in May 1969, makes the discussion of racially
inflammatory issues a crime. The need for such curbs
was widely accepted at the time, but public opinion
has soured as the government has misused its authority
to silence opposition politicians, particularly Chinese.
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The second law is the Printing Presses Act of
1973, which requires newspaper publishers to be li-
censed annually by the government. Licenses can be
withdrawn without any reason being given, and the
government has repeatedly abused this power by sus-
pending newspapers that support opposition political
parties.
Another instrument for press control is the gov-
ernment-financed national news agency, Bernama. Since
foreign news agencies are not permitted to supply lo-
cal news to Malaysian papers and since few Malaysian
newspapers have even national coverage, Bernama has
captive customers. Government control is even more
pervasive as a result of its controlling financial
interest in the New Straits Times, the paper with the
largest national circulation; various luminaries of
the dominant United Malays National Organization also
control other prominent papers.
Government control is facilitated by the media's
reluctance to test the limits of the administration's
forbearance. This, plus the government's growing ten-
dency to see criticism, no matter how constructive or
well-intentioned, as subversive, make prospects dim for
a less fettered press.
The most recent abuse of press powers to slant
reporting has reduced the credibility of both the
government and the press. Independent-minded Malaysians,
increasingly contemptuous of the subservient press, are
now relying more on tumor for news. This public aliena-
tion is making the government's communication with its
electorate more difficult and may make authorities--al-
ready testy over any questioning of their policies--
increasingly insensitive to the public mood. In the ab-
sence of a strong political opposition to force it to
consider other opinions, however, the government could
in time follow an increasingly arbitrary course.
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The government has taken careful measures over
the past two weeks to ensure solid endorsement of
"the major policies of President Pak" in the na-
tional referendum scheduled for February 12. Pak's
.reasons for seeking at least the appearance of
voter approval at this time are apparently tacti-
cal, He hopes to:
--Put his domestic opponents on the de-
fensive; they had been planning a ma-
jor anti-government campaign this
spring.
--Lay the public relations groundwork
for new suppressive measures if an
opposition campaign materializes.
--Demonstrate to audiences at home and
abroad--particularly in the US--that
his opposition, though vocal, has
relatively little support nationally.
The government program to aseure Pak of his
mandate has three main facets. The first is an all-
out, though essentially conventional, effort to ad-
vertise the importance to the nation of Pak's lead-
ership. This will be coupled with traditional po-
litical inducements, including bribes, to special
interest groups. The second is an absolute prohi-
bition on public presentation of opposing viewpoints.
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A basic defect of Pak' s referendum procenu,
of course, is that it will solve none of his poa-
litical headaches. His opponents will continue
to demand limitations ors his power, no matter what
the final vote tally. F7 I
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