STAFF NOTES: CHINESE AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300090007-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 11, 2006
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: March 3, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
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Chinese Affairs
NSA review completed
Top Secret
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March S- 1975
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CHINESE AFFAIRS
March 3, 1975
Chen Hsi-lien:
A Study in Compromise. 1
Wrangling with Hanoi 5
More About Mao 9
More Attention to Latin America. . . . . . . . . It
Watching and Waiting in the Provinces. . . . . . 13
A Look at the
Party's Military Commission. . . . . . . . . . 16
Leaden ship Notes 21
CHRONOLOGY . . .24
ANNEX: A Larger Chinese
Role in the Balkans. .A-1
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Chen Hsi-lien: A Study in Compromise
F_ I
Of all the decisions ratified by the National
People's Congress in January, perhaps the most
glaring anomaly was the appointment of Chen
Hsi-lien, commander of the important Peking Military
Region, as a vice premier in the government. Chen
is the only military man among the 12 vice premiers,
and while he is not the only military man in the
national government--several government ministers
have predominantly military backgrounds--he is the
only man in the government with troops under his
command.
Chen's appointment was no mere gesture of
conciliation to the military. He was not just given
a government title without real responsibilities.
Thus far, at least? he has played a very active
role. In mid-February he was named chairman of
China's national games, a major sporting event that
will not take place until September. This job has
traditionally gone to military men, but Chen has
carried out other assignments as well. He led
China's delegation to Nepal for the King's coro-
natson,'.met separately.with the King, and during
his travels he apparently delivered a message from
Peking regarding amino-Indian relations
/believes
Z en also supervises the machine-building ministries,
which are concerned mainly with the production of
military goods.
The attention accorded to Chen contrasts
sharply with.the shaky political status of most ,f
China's other regional military commanders. All
of them, including Chen, came under varying degrees
of attack during the anti-Confucius campaign last
year. None of the eight commanders involved in the
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mi. itary rotation of December 1973 has been given
a oivilian job in his new location. Of the three
must powerful regional military commanders--those
who sit on the party's ruling Politburo--Chen has
d:ne the best by far. Shenyang regional commander
1.:i Te-sheng was demoted from party vice chairman
:o ordinary member of the Politburo %nd lost his
job in the national military hierarchy. Canton
regional commander Hsu Shih-yu has neither gained
nor lost. He came under heavy attack in wall post-
ers late last year, however, with no apparent effort
from Peking to halt the attacks, as had been done
earlier ;.n the year. Hsu has not appeared publicly
since the National People's Congress and has missed
several important leadership turnouts in Canton.
On the face of it, Chen seems an unlikely
candidate to prosper as a result of the National
People's Congress, which endorsed the moderate
policies of Chou En-lai. In July 1973, Chen
crossed swords with the moderates over the use of
university entrance examinations, and appeared to
best Chou in the subsequent confrontation. At that
time, Chen was probably less concerned with exams
than with the party's plans regarding the political
status of the military on the eve of the party con-
gress; he may even have feared he was going to lose
his Politburo post. During the military rotation a
few months later, Chen was brought to Peking and
rumors immediately began to fly that he was in line
for the job of defense minister or army chief of
staff. In any event, Chen got neither position,
Late last year, propaganda attacks on an
historical figure by the name of Chen Hsi seemed
aimed directly at Chen Hsi-lien. Chen Hsi was in
charge of China's northern border area--as was
Chen Hsi-lien for many years--and was accused of
collaborating with China's northern. enemies, an
obvious reference to the Soviet Union. These were
serious charges, but Chen has managed to survive
them.
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Chen's appointment as vice premier appears
to be an artful compromise between those who
perhaps wanted to exclude him from the central
government apparatus entirely, or even purge hiii,
and those who may have wanted him to become
defense minister or army chief of staff. Chen
himself has made it clear that he is anxious to
retain some civilian duties, and as the man in
charge of the troops in Peking, he is an important
man to keep happy.
Despite.his radical. stand on university
entrance exams in 1973, Chen probably is not
wedded to radical domestic policies in general.
Where he may differ sharply with the civilian
leadership is over the issue of defense spending.
Chen conceivably could argue for a larger piece of
the budgetary pie for the military, but there is
little he can do to ensure this. Even if he does
in fact supervise the machine-building ministries,
their budget must be approved by the powerful State
Planning Commission, headed by a long-time civilian
protege of Chou En-lai. Chou himself made it clear
in his report to the National People's Congress
that China's economic priorities remain the same,
with agriculture heading the list and heavy in-
dustry, including defense-related projects, coming
in last. It is possible that defense may in fact
get somewhat more money than it did last year, but
certainly not as much as some in the military would
like.
In the complex system of interlocking party,
government, and military bureaucracies, Chen is one
of three men who hold important posts in each area.
But just as he does not have a free hand to push
for special interests in the government hierarchy,
he is subordinate to Chou En-lai and to close Chou
associates in the party and military as well.
In fact, in the military hierarchy, Chen is
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accountable to ranking deputy chief of staff
Yang Cheng-wu, who criticized Chen by name during
the Cultural Revolution.
Chen should be pleased with his new responsi-
bilities, but the system of checks and balances in
the three major bureaucracies currently works in
favor of civilian moderates and against any in-
dividual who might -try to upset the balance. As
pointed out in the February issue of the party
theoretical journal Red Flag, there is little
tolerance of the notion that "each takes what he
wants and puts it to his exclusive use." Chen
probably has most of what he wants but, in return,
he will be expected to cooperate with the rest of
the team.
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Wrangling with Hanoi
I I
Signs of tension in Peking's relations with
Hanoi have increased in recer.t weeks. As in the
past, evidence of friction between the two sides
peaked earlier this year when battlefield action
was on the upswing and Hanoi's requirements for
support presumably had increased.
The frictions are evident in public comments
from both sides, as well as in recent private com-
plaints of Vietnamese officials in Peking and abroad.
Explanations of these difficulties lie in Hanoi's ap-
parent view that Peking has not provided full support
to the war effort ii. South Vietnam and in Peking's
concern that Hanoi is attempting to expand its in-
fluence in Indochina.
Recent examples of conflict center on these
issues, which, have been a source of irritation in the
no-Vietnamese relationship for years. Last month,
that the Chinese, un i e the o ie s, could
not be rusted and that Peking in fact, "does not
want to s united Vietnam." In a series of recent
reports, I Iwhose views
almost certainly reflect. Hanoi s attitude on this sub-
ject, assarted that the Chinese had torpedoed the
PRG's recent attempt to gain a seat at the Red Cross
Law of War meeting in Geneva. The official claimed
that the. Chinese had decided at the last minute not to
attend the conference, and had then lobbied with Third
World representatives against a resolution that would
have seated a PRG delegation.
There have been several other recent reports
of private North Vietnamese criticism of the low levels
of Chinese support.
North Vietnamese complaints that e
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Chinese were dragging their feet in the shipment
of war material. 25X1
in early February that in late De gem er, Peking
was 33 shipments behind schedule in weapons and
economic aid deliveries to Hanoi. Reflecting the
philosophical differences that lie behind the con-
troversy, said re- 25X1
cently that the Chinese have urged a. "slow, mod-
erate approach" in South Vietnam and were opposed
to large-scale warfare there.
Peking's own propaganda has reflected this
difference. When the fighting in. the South picked
up in January, Chinese media coverage of the situa-
tion was reserved. Instead of providing detailed
coverage of Communist victories, the Chinese press
emphasized that Communist initiatives were aimed at
preserving the Paris accords and played down the
large-scale nature of this military activity.
The friction appaLc~ntly goes beyond differences
over the Vietnam war. Last month, on the first an-
niversary of Peking's assertion of authority in the
Paracel Islands, the Chinese press took note of the
event with articles UJL,at pointed up the historical
basis of Peking's claim to sovereignty there. An
NCNA commentary also asserted that Peking would brook
no challenge to its position in the islands--presum-
abl from Hanoi as well as from other uarters. A
25X1 implied In
January that Hanoi had officially protested to the
Chinese on the Paracel issue.
Other examples of Peking's apparent unhappi-
ness with Hanoi include:
--Coverage of the second anniversary of
the Paris Accords, which was limited
to an NCNA correspondent's account in
contrast to the People's Daily edito-
rial last year commemorating the event.
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--Chinese media apparently made no
mention of the 25th anniversary
of the establishment of PRC-DRV
diplomatic relations in 1950.
The current situation in Cambodia, is almost
certainly influencing Peking's wary attitude toward
Hanoi. As the Khmer Communists, whose ties with
Hanoi are apparently closer than those with Peking,
draw closer to a military victory in Cambodia,
Chinese fears of widening North Vietnamese influ-
ence Indochina almost certainly giow. The Chi-
nese also seem to be concerned about increased So-
viet influence on the Khmer Communists--both di-
rectly and indirectly through Hanoi--ia the event
of an early Communist victory.
Peking apparently does not believe that the
Communists are likely to win a quick victory in
South Vietnam. It is clear that such a development,
together with a Communist take-over in Cambodia,
would cause serious problems for Peking. Chinese
leaders almc;:t certainly recognize that the resultant
absence of a strong US presence in Indochina would
bring Peking into even more direct and costly com-
petition there with both Hanoi and the Soviets.
This
is not to say that the Chinese are
unin-
terested
in maintaining their equities with
North
Vietnam.
The delivery in early February of
eight
MIG-19 fighters to Hanoi was probably a sop
to North
Vietnamese requests for additional military
support.
Providing aid in the form of highly visible
aircraft
may help soften Hanoi's criticism, although it con-
tributes little to North Vietnam's capability to
prosecute the war in the South.
Peking's interest in maintaining maximum influ-
ence in Hanoi is further reflected by a PLA delega-
tion's arrival in the North Vietnamese capital last
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week. The riission, headed by Sinkiang military
chief Yang Yung, almost certainly will take up
the Cambodian situation with Vietnamese leaders.
The visit is also probably a Chinese attempt to
balance the trip to Hanoi made late last year by
a high-level Soviet military group.
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Peking has devised an official explanation
fox Mao's absence from the National People's Con-
gress in January.
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According to e orricial line, Mao announced
as early as August 1973, at the Tenth Party Congress,
that he did not plan to attend the people's congress
because he did not intend to hold a government post
and wanted to concentrate exclusively on party affairs.
This official story seems to combine e.emenbs
of truth with some elements of obvious chicanery.
The explanation that Mao wants to devote his time
only to party matters does not explain his failure
to attend the Central Committee plenum that pre-
ceded the people's congress. As chairman of the
party, Mao's presence at this meeting, in light of
his exclusive attention to party matters, would
seem mandatory. Nor does this story account for
his long absence from Peking, which dates not merely
from the meetings in January but back to July of
last year. Still away from the capital, Mao ap-
pr..rently moved early in February from his home
province of Hunan to a favorite vacation spot in
Hangchou in Chekiang Province.
The story does strike an authentic note with
Mao's disinterest in occupying a government posi-'
tion. He has been on record for years as saying
he did not want to be head of state and that the
post should be abolished, as it was at the people's
congress.
This situation bears an ironic resemblance to
that of 1958, when Mao claimed he was voluntarily
stepping down as head of state to devote more time
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to party affairs; later, he was to say that the
move was not voluntary an-1 that he was deliberately
shunted aside by the party leadership. Mao would
have difficulty making that claim today, not only
because of his many statements that he did not
want to be head of state, but because the story
has widely circulated in China that he was shown
in advance and personally approved the reports and
the slate of government officers recommended by the
Central Committee to the people's congress. I
These accounts seem designed to counter any
speculation that the Chairman has been put out to
pasture, or that major steps have been taken over his
objections. In fact, a recent statement of his has
touched off a nationwide political study campaign,
suggesting Mao remains a central fi urn on the
political scene.
Paradoxically,
Mao left Peking just as the unity theme began to be
promoted vigorously in the propaganda.
Whether Mao opposed the idea of unity at that
time, he has now apparently joined the rest of the
leadership in endorsing this sentiment. How strongly
he actually feels about unity within the leader-
ship is not clear, however, for the longer he stays
away from Peking, the more "Likely he is to give the
impression that something--or someone--in the capital
displeases him.
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Peking's Third World rhetoric notwithstanding,
Latin America has long been the neglected child of
China's foreign policy. Lately, however, the Chi-
..ese have shown more interest in increasing their
contacts with certain countries in the region, and
a greater flow of delegations is one indication of
this trend.
China's vice minister of fuel and chemical in-
dustries, Tang Ko, recently spent six weeks touring
Venezuela, Mexico, and Trinidad, an unusually long
overseas visit for a vice minister. Next month,
Poliburo member and vice premier Chen Yung-kuei,
accompanied by a retinue of 21 Chinese, will pay a
one-week visit to Mexico. This deiegaton will in-
clude a vice minister of agriculture and forestry
as w?il as a ranking official of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. Although Chen probably has less
influence than his position would suggest, he is the
highest ranking official ever to visit Latin America.
.3oth political and economic considerations seem
to be behind much of this activity. Tang Ko's trip
to three petroleum-producing countries was avowedly
to determine whether they could assist China in off-
shore exploration and drilling; it is not known if
any agreements were concluded. Over the longer term,
though, Peking probably calculates that these oil
producers will grew in political influence and that
they may prove useful to the Chinese in pursuing their
anti-Soviet aims in the region. This helps explain
why Chen Yung-kuei is being sent to strengthen re-
lations with Mexico, a country whose petroleum in-
dustry appears to have great potential.
Trade seems to be another important lure for
the Chinese. Several months ago, Lin Ping, director
of the American and Oceanian Affairs Department of
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the Chinese Foreign Ministry, remarkedi
that China is increasingly interested in LLtin
America as a source of raw materials. Chile is a
case in point. Despite certain political lia-
bilities, the Chinese have carefully cultivated
relations with Santiago to ensure a steady flow
of natural fer'.ilizers and copper to China.
Peking also hopes to increase its exports to
Latin America and has recently held a number of
trade fairs in the region.
The Chinese would like to strike a balance
between economic and political goals in Latin
America, and seem determined not to sacrifice
one for the other. For example, in the interest
of maintaining cordial political. ties with Brazil,
China agreed to make a hard-currency purchase of 25X1
a significant quantity of sugar this year at a
time of very high world prices. F77 1
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Watching and Waiting in the Provinces
F__ I
Provincial leaders are treating Mao's latest
dictum to study the "dictatorship of the proletariat"
with caution. They seem to be particularly concerned
that it may lead to new attacks on them.
The troublesome quotation, which first appeared
in a People's Daily editorial on February 9th, was
expanded on in a series of articles carried in
official party papers and journals. Besides calling
for stricter adherence to party discipline and for an
end to public disturbances, the articles continue
the strong attack on a number of common practices
that undermine the collectivized economy. Cadre who
tolerate such "bourgeois" behavior also come in for
harsh words, but the articles generally counsel ed-
ucation and discussion as the remedy for such error:-
One exception is an article by Chou Ssu, a
pseudonym that suggests the article's views may
be close to Chou En-tai's (the legalist Li Ssu
was obviously an analogue to Chou's anti-Confucius
propaganda). It echoes much of the tough yet meas-
ured language common to the other articles, but it
also points out--in what some may see as a threat--
that Lenin solved a simi-ar problem in the Russian
party by purging those who persisted in their ways.
Peking has not made its goals in this study
campaign entirely clear. Stricter enforcement of
party directives, especially as they relate to the
troubled economy, certainly seems to be one of
its purposes, but the possibility of new attacks
on provincial or national figures also exists.
Understandably, the provinces have chosen to
emphasize the safer economic aspects of the study
campaign and will probably continue to do so until
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Peking's plans become clearer. Familiar whipping
boys--private plots, production bonuses, and peas-
ants who shirk collective farm duties to seek better
paying jobs elsewhere--are getting most of the crit-
ism. The provinces, however, like Peking, stress
that it is not the existence, but the unauthorized
expansion of these programs that is under attack.
As much as possible, the provinces have avoided
the more sensitive subjects in the campaign that
could easily become the basis -"or renewed criticism
of individual leaders. Most provinces have repeated
Peking's criticisms of "bourgeois lifestyles and,
muddled thinking" by "some cadre and workers," b,ot
only a handful have relayed the warnings about the
possibility of new "capitalist roaders" or enemy
agents arising in the party. Many provincial leaders,
especially those who are military men, were targets
of the anti-Confucius campaign. Peking cut that
campaign short prematurely last year, partly because
it had gotten out of hand. Provincial leaders may
fear, rightly or wrongly, that this year's study
campaign may be an attempt to continue last year's
campaign under a new name.
In addition to concern about their personal
:? lfare, provincial leaders seem worried that the
study campaign may lead to a revival of the
factional clashes that characterized some phases
of the anti-Confucius campaign. Yu Tai-chung, first
secretary of Inner Mongolia, in an address to a
provincial meeting on February 20th, dealt at length
with the need to keep the study campaign "on course"
and to educate, not persecute, erring individuals.
Szechwan, Kiangsu, and Kweichow have all made simi-
lar broadcasts stressing the importance of "accurate"
criticisms and attention to unity.
Peking also seems determined to keep the study
campaign tightly controlled--law-and-order themes
have been featured in all the national articles--but
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it is clear, too, that excessive caution or foot-
dragging by provincial cadre will not be tolerated.
One of the most recent articles in People's Daily
notes that many cadre talk a good game, but that in
reality they have made "little effort to promote"
the study campaign.
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A central document reportedly names Yeh
Chien-ying as first vice chairman of the part
military commission 25X1
The report
is plausible in view of Yeh's high rank; in the
past, the Chinese minister of defence has normally
also been the commission's first vice chairman.
Assuming the report is true, it suggests
that the military commission is now dominated by
allies of Premier Chou En-lai. The other indi-
viduals known with certainty to be commission
vice chairmen--Hsu Hsiang-chien, Nieh Jung-chen
and Teng Hsiao-ping--are all Chou supporters.
Mao is, of course, the chairman of the mil-
itary commission and, as party chairman, has been
designated commander in chief of the armed forces.
Mao's long absence from Peking and his limited
physical stamina, however, mean that his impact on
the workings of the commission is limited to the
broadest policy questions. The ranking vic;o
chairman would be in a position to influence
heavily the daily affairs of this body.
The appointment of Yeh as the ranking active
member of the military commission would help
explain why he was not named a vice premier, as
were previous defense ministers, The upgrading
of Yeh and the downgrading of the defense port-
folio serves to emphasize party authority over
the military without reflecting negatively on
Yeh.
Yeh's apparent promotion clearly conflicts
with reports of last summer that party vice chair-
men Wang Hung-wen had been made first vice chairman
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f the military commission.
Wang was
said to nave assumed the post because Yeh Chien-
ying was ill. in fact, Yeh did not appear in
public between July 31 and September 30; it is
possible that he was indisposed and that Wang was
just filling in.
Even such a temporary expedient, however,
would certainly have rankled several experienced
vice chairmen who would have felt themselves fully
capable of taking over the reins, and who would
have been concerned about the political implications
of such a development, particularly as they relate
to Wang's succession chances. In any event, Yeh
Chien-ying has recently been appearing regularly,
while Wang's star has dimmed a bit. It is by no
means certain at this juncture that Wang is next
in line to Yeh on the commission, or whether Wang
did fill in last summer--or even if he is a senior
member of the commission.
In fact, apart from the vice chairmen clearly
mentioned, we cannot be sure of the precise
composition of the commission. It has long been
thought that Premier Chou was a member, but this
has never been confirmed. Several aging military
veterans such as Chu Teh and Liu Po-cheng probably
retain their membership, and would be inclined to
support the moderates. Shenyang Military Region
commander Li Te-sheng presumably is still at least
a member of the commission's standing committee
and may hold a higher rank by virtue of his former
position as head of the People's Liberation Army's
political department. The other military region
commanders, including Politburo members Chen Hsi-
lien and Hsu Shih-yu, as well as the first political
commissars of the military regions, are almost cer-
tainly members of the standing committee. Opposi-
tion to efforts to reduce the military's political.
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power would presumably be centered in this group,
although it is unlikely the group is fully cohe-
sive.
In addition, Chang Chun-chiao may well be a
commission vice chairman now that he has been
named the PLA's top commissar, and he could have
joined the upper rank. In fact, the naming of
civilians such as Chi Teng-kuei, the first polit-
ical commissar of the Peking Military Region, to
leading political commissar posts has probably
resulted in an increasing civilianization of the
military commission. This trend, coupled with the
fact that supporters of Premier Chou hold impor-
tant posts, suggests that despite the membership
of regional military commanders the military
commission is an important instrument in the
continuing drive to increase party power
over the
military. F__ I
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The following is the text of a cable from the
US consulate general in Hong Kong.
The "Little Red Book" of Mao quotes, waved by
Red Guards in the Cultural Revolution, may have a
sober replacement in the collected quotes of Marx,
Engels, and Lenin on proletarian dictatorship pub-
lished jointly by People's Daily and Red Flag on
February 22. It is probably no coincidence that
the new collection numbers 33 quotes, exactly the
number of chapters in the original "Quotations
from Chairman Mao Tse-tung." Even the number of
words, 10,000, is approximately the same.
Time will tell what this return to orthodoxy
and further downgrading of Mao thought means. At
present, the move is clearly Mao's initiative, and
the joint editorial note accompanying the Marx-
Engels-Lenin quotations, like a preface, cites
four Mao quotations on dictatorship., led off by
his recent dictum about.the need to study Lenin's
writings on the subject. (The last of these quotes
is newly identified as coming from Mao, and warns
about people like Lin Piao coming to power if
Marxism-Leninism is not properly understood.)
The collected Marx-Engels-Lenin quotes, from
our initial reading of them in the Hong Kong com-
munist press, convey a message aimed at improving
discipline and, beyond that, at increasing pro-
duction. Three Lenin quotes come from his work
"left-wing communism, an infantile disorder"
(mentioned for the first time on the Inner Mongolia
radio on February 20), and we would guess this is a
particular warning to the left. The left may also
be the target of quote number 25, which hints at
a rectification of party membership with emphasis
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on quali i.y rather than numbers. The 10th Party
Congress in 1973 revealed that the party had
swelled to 28 million members, and the bulk of
that influx would have come from the activists of
the Cultural Revolution. In view of the rehabil-
itation of veteran cadres that has taken place
since the fall of Lin Piao in 1971, we would guess
that it is the left (and the young) who are most
likely to be culled from membership, if it comes
to that.
The joint editorial note and collection of
quotes appeared roughly two weeks after the February
9 editorial launched the "dictatorship" campaign;
this is the same interval between pronouncements
which was observed at the outset of the artti-
Lin/Confucius movement last year. The campaign
is still in the study phase, and we would expect
some discussion yet to come about the organs of
dictatorship--the courts, police, military, and
militia. We have heard nothing yet about the cam-
paign's practical effects, but propaganda has made
clear that increased production is to be the measure
of performance.
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Politburo member Hua Kuo-feng, named a vice
premier and the minister of public security at the
National People's Congress, apparently retains
the agricultural responsibilities he has exercised
for the past two years. 11
The combination of agriculture and public
security, each a full time job in itself, obviously
makes Hua a busy--and important--man, and fits with
a general trend to concentrate a wide variety of
duties in a few hands. Hua'3 continuing agricultural
responsibilities strongly suggest that model peasant
Chen Yung-kuei, also a vice premier and seemingly
a logical choice to supervise agriculture, is more
a symbolic figure than a power in his own right.
New information about Politburo member Chi
Teng-kuei, who was recently named a vice premier,
suggests that Chi fits in well with the predom-
inantly moderate leadership coalition. Many
observers have been inclined to put Chi in the
leftist camp because of his relative youth (he is
in his 40s) and because he rose to prominence
during the Cultural Revolution.
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i c, acre a party symposium in
late 1970 Lt which i was decided to rehabilitate
party officials who hcd been purged bt:t whose work
before the Cultural Revolution was good.
Those who have opvwised the rehabilitation
policy over the years nave generally been younger
officials who won their positions at the expense
of veteran party cadre and were afraid they would
lose their jobs should the veterans be allowed to
resume party work. By chairing the symposium that
adopted the rehabilitation policy, Chi seems to
have established his credentials--as early as 1970--
as a flexible youi.g official who is not afraid to
embrace policies advocated by political moderates.
This may explain why Chi did so well at the
National People's Congress, at which moderates of
the Chou En-lai mold won all but a few of the key
government positions.
March 3, 1975
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February 12 Lao economic delegation completes
visit to China where PRC aid to Laos
was discussed.
February 15 Chief Soviet and Chinese border
negotiators hold talks in Peking.
Chen Hsi-lion named chairman of China's
national games.
February West German civil air delegation
15 - 21 discusses air trans or' agreement with
Chinese in Peking. 25X1
February 16 Chinese Vice Minister of Public Health
Chiang Hui-lien arrives in Gambia to
attend independence day celebration.
Philippine President Marcos receives
Chinese medical delegation in Manila.
February 18 Chinese agree to sell 5.4 million tons
of crude oil to Japanese oil import
firm in 1975 at reduced price of $12.10
per barrel.
February 20 Mozambique friendship delegation led by
Samora Moises Machel, president of the
Liberation Front of Mozambique, arrives
in China. in,the press communique at
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the end of Machel's visit on March 2,
China and Mozambique announced that
they will establish diplomatic relations
on June 25 when Mozambique becomes in-
dependent.
Vice Premier Hua Kuo-feng meets in
Peking with New Zealand delegation
headed by Agriculture Minister Colin
Moyle.
Military District.
Liao Chih-kao, new first secretary of
Fukien, is identified as political
commissar of Fuchou Military Region
and first political commissar of Fukien
February 21 Chinese government delegation departs
for Jamaica.
dictatorship of the proletariat.
February 22 People's Daily carries 33 quotations
from Marx, Engels, and Lenin on the
February Chinese delegation led by Vice Premier
22 - 26 Chen Hsi-lien attends Nepalese King's
coronation in Kathmandu; on February
25 Chen meets King Birendra. 25X1
Delegation led by Chen Hsi-lien stops
in Calcutta for less than an hour en
route to and from Nepalese coronation;
Chen indicates a desire to improve
Sino-Indian relations.
for delivery this year.
of American wheat, which were contracted
February 27 China cancels order for 14 million bushels
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A Larger Chinese Role
in the Balkans
China is devoting a good deal cf attention to
the Balkan states and is attempting to increase Pe-
king's influeizce in the region, largely out of con-
cern over Soviet intentions.
The unresolved succession question in Yugosla-
via and the real limitations of Romanian independence,
along with crises in the Middle East and Cyprus, have
convinced Peking that important Chinese interests are
affected k; the maneuvering of the powers--especially
the UJSR--in southeastern Europe.
The Chinese have sought--with varying success--
to strengthen their influence in Albania, Romania,
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria and to encourage antagonism
to Moscow.
For about a year, streams of official Chinese
delegations and high-level visitors have criss-crossed
the Balkans, and increased numbers of Albanians, Ro-
manians, and Yugoslavs have visited China in return.
Peking's spokesmen and press have spoken highly and
frequently of Balkan policies, particularly those
aimed against Moscow.
This kind of attention is relatively new. Al-
though Peking for some years has been at pains to cul-
tivate the maverick Romanians, the Balkans in general
ranked relatively low in China's order of priorities,
as evidenced by the inattention paid to its long-stand-
ing ally Albania. In 1973, it appeared that relations
with the Balkan countries had languished, and the Chi-
nese had written off the rest of Eastern Europe as hope-
lessly under Soviet influence. China set its sights on
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the West where there were brighter prospects for
developing a community of interest in restraining
Soviet conduct and where Peking could acquire the
capital equipment and technology necessary for ac-
celerated modernization of the Chinese economy.
The Middle East and Cyprus conflicts clearly
demonstrated the strategic value of the Balkans, par-
ticularly to the USSR. Soviet airlifts to Arab coun-
tries required airspace clearance over the Balkan
states. Moreover, the deterioration in the USSR's
relations with Egypt probably gave Moscow more inter-
est in getting naval facilities in Yugoslavia.
The Balkans' strategic vulnerability in Chinese
eyes was increased by the increasingly shaky condition
of NATO's southern flank running through Italy, Greece
and Turkey, which was weakened by the Cyprus situation
and by political and economic difficulties caused in
part by Middle East oil pr?cir:g policies. In addition,
a stronger Soviet position in the Balkans that gave
Moscow easier naval and air access to the Mediterranean
and Middle East, would enhance Soviet strategic power
at Western expense.
Under these circumstances, Peking saw an obvious
interest in enhancing its influence in the area. Pe-
king's establishment of greater influence in Moscow's
backyard or encouragement of an independent course by
the Balkan states would complicate Moscow's Middle East
and European policies and tend to divert Soviet atten-
tion from China.
Peking has been particularly concerned that Mos-
cow might seek to establish strong Soviet influence in
Yugoslavia following Tito's death.
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The surfacing last
sullulter or e existence in Yugoslavia of a pro-Soviet
group accused of anti-regime subversive activities--
the so-called "Cominformist Affair"--added to Chinese
concerns.
Soviet intentions in the Balkans, in fact, have
become an important concern of Chinese policy. For-
eign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua, in a major UN speech
last fall, listed the Balkans along with oil as major
new sources of international tension. A commentary
in People's Daily fleshed out this propaganda line,
charging that Moscow had stepped up its "expansionism"
in the area. As "evidence," the article noted the
"Cominformist" plot, Soviet military exercises near
Romania, alleged demands for transit rights, and al-
leged Soviet support for Bulgarian claims to part of
Yugoslav Macedonia.
I Chinese officials
invariably point to the Balkans as a world trouble spot,
frequently adding what seems to be an element of gen-
uine concern that conflicting Soviet and US interests
in the region might well trigger a general war.
The "Cominformist" plot also provided Peking a use-
ful issue to promote antipathy to Soviet influence. Chi-
nese statements began to focus on Soviet threats to the
independence of the Balkan states and on the determina-
tion throughout the region to resist Soviet pressures,
with military force if necessary. The Chinese missed no
opportunity to publicize Yugoslav and Romanian measures
to strengthen conventional military forces, and to up-
grade partisan warfare and civil defense capabilities,
and Peking emphasized its readiness for military coop-
eration with the Balkan states.
Peking has long believed that Eastern Europe is a
Soviet Achilles' heel, and the Chinese for years have
encouraged greater East European independence from Mos-
cow's influence. This effort was stepped up last year.
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Peking had ordered an intensive propagan a campaign
to exploit Soviet-East European "divisions."
in 2a ing s view, 1as ern Europe is c a ing un er.
Soviet pressure and strongly desires independence.
Eastern Eurupe is a volcano likely to
erupt un er_ certain conditions, including a Soviet
attack against China.
Soviet efforts to convene an international Commu-
nist conference that would challenge China's Communist
credentials and isolate the PRC have further spurred
Peking's Balkan policies. Peking has sought to persuade
East European states that they and China share a common
interest in curbing Soviet attempts to impose Moscow-
oriented discipline on Communist states. The Chinese
clearly are banking on mavericks like Yugoslavia and Ro-
mania to continue to hold the line against Moscow and
thereby reduce Soviet pressure on China.
In view of Yugoslavia's strategic location and its
uncertain political future, improved ties with Belgrade
seem of overriding importance to China's Balkan policy.
The once-dormant relationship revived in the wake of
the "Cominformist Affair." On the heels of Tito's an-
nouncement of the plot, the highest level Yugoslav mili-
tary delegation ever to visit China and a Yugoslav par-
liamentary delegation arrived in Peking. Belgrade re-
paid in kind when Vice Foreign Minister Yu Chan visited
later in 1974. Prime Minister Bijedic is scheduled to
arrive in Peking this spring; he will be the highest
ranking Yugoslav to visit China. Following Yu Chan's
visit, the Yugoslav press reported that the two sides
were satisfied with the positive development of relations.
Nevertheless, the relationship is relatively frag-
ile. A renewal of ties on the Communist party level is
unlikely. Belgrade evidently was put off to some extent
by Yu Chan's emphasis on the Soviet threat, and his use
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of anti-Sovietism as the basis for Sino-Yugoslav
relations, and Belgrade made clear its desire to
keep its distance from China's dispute with Mos-
cow. China's restrained handling of the "Comin-
formist Affair" seems to reflect such caution.
Overcoming obvious temptations, the Peking press
has carefully follcwed Belgrade's lead in publi-
cizing the affair and has largely refrained from
independent comment.
Peking is less inhibited in its relationship
with Romania. Efforts to strengthen relations last
summer proved productive almost immediately. Peking
sent the highest ranking Chinese mission to travel
abroad in almost a year to Romania's 30th National
Day celebrations. The Chinese group was given an ex-
ceptionally cordial and warm reception. This pattern
was repeated later in 1974 during the Romanian Party
Congress when President Ceausescu's reference to "the
ascending trend of cooperation with China" drew some
of the warmest applause that his keynote address
received.
Peking has given extensive coverage to Romanian
defense measures, and pointed Chinese statements on
"threats of force" during the visit of Romania's for-
eign minister to Peking drew a strong disapproving
reaction from Moscow. Some observers have concluded,
in fact, that Peking is encouraging Bucharest in part
because of concern over Romanian staying power.
China's friendship with Albania also is on the
upswing following a period of relative decline. China
exchanged more delegations at all levels with Albania
in 1974 than with any Balkan country, and the warmth
in greetings and press treatment that was customary
years ago has resumed.
The relationship was given a shot in the arm
last year when Tirana bluntly rejected Soviet sound-
ings on prospects for closer USSR-Albanian relations.
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Defense Minister Balluku was subsequently purged--
apparently because he advocated a review of ties
with Moscow, which implied criticism of Tirana's
relations with Peking. Premier. Shehu later denounced
Soviet overtures as a blatant attempt to split Al-
bania from China.
The relationship is still not, however, what it
was years ago. The issue that divides Peking and
Tirana--China's rapprochement with the industrialized
West--remains unresolved. The two sides' ideological
kinship and antipathy toward the USSR are sufficient
to sustain relations at the current plateau, which
suits China's purposes in the Balkans.
China's thinly veiled anti-Soviet appeals to Bul-
garia, however, have proven completely unproductive.
The Chinese have given heavy play to Bulgarian contacts
with the West and cited examples of inequitable Soviet
economic treatment of Bulgaria. Bulgarian speeches
last year were so blatantly anti-Chinese, however, that
Peking's ambassador staged walkouts. On the PRC Na-
tional Day, the Sofia press sharply attacked the Chinese
government t:nd Mao's leadership.
Despite some disappointments, Peking probably is
reasonably satisfied with the turn of events in the
Balkans. Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania clearly rec-
ognize that good relations with China are useful 4.n
helping to counter the USSR.
Although the Soviets have made some headway in
Yugoslavia despite the Cominformist affair, Peking can
take satisfaction that Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania
all took steps last year to add new muscle to their
military defenses, and to improve relations and coordi-
nation with one another. Yugoslavia and Albania had
long been at odds with one another over ideological
and other issues, and in the early 1960s their quar-
rels were used as a surrogate by both Moscow and Pe-
king for their then-burgeoning larger quarrel. Now
the Chinese are clearly encouraging rapprochement.
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Indeed, the Chinese may be on the verge of help- 25X1
ing to finance a project in Yugoslavia that would tie
Albania closer to Yugoslavia and eventually Western
Europe.
Tirana already has indicated interest in linking the
terminus of. Albania's rail line to the Belgrade-Bar
line some 50 mi-Les away. Albania presently is not
tied to the European rail system. The rail line is
only a f'ew miles from the port at Boka Katorska, which
the Soviets covet.
Bucharest and Belgrade, moreover, have opposed
Soviet efforts to censure Peking at gatherings of Euro-
pean Communist parties. In fact, no criticism of an-
other party is a stipulation to their continued partici-
pation in the present series of Europear. Communist
party conferences.
All sides recognize. however, .ne limitations of
Chinese influence in the Balkans. As Premier Chou En-lai
remarked to a Yugoslav correspondent some time ago:
"water at a distance cannot extinguish fire." Despite
Peking's incessant talk about military cooperation, the
Chinese lack an effective military option to influence
events even if Peking were inclined to risk Soviet
counteraction. Chinese military assistance would be
of little use, and no one has proposed mutual security
pacts or even informal coordination.
Nevertheless, Chinese actions and statements
regarding the Balkans suggest that Peking is far more
worried about the dangers of a blow-up in that area
than it is about the risk of a more general European
conflagration involving Western Europe. Although
China continues to stress that Moscow's rapacity and
perfidy make a Soviet move against Western Europe pos-
sible, its statements on this subject lack the urgency
of private Chinese remarks on the Balkan situation--and
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in fact Peking probably does have a good deal to
worry about in the wake of Tito's demise.
The Chinese may in part be hoping for US ac-
tion to forestall aggressive Soviet moves. A Chi-
nese official 25X1
indicate as October before Secretary Kis-
singer's trip to Peking that China "needs" informa-
tion on US intentions toward Yugoslavia. The offi-
cial asserted Moscow was pressing Belgrade for naval
bases in the Adriatic, 'and that US policy was the
"key" to the situation.
The Cyprus situation and related Greek and Turk-
ish ties with NATO are also important elements af-
fecting the balance in the Balkans over which Peking
has little influence. Peking has tried to develop
friendly relations with both Athens and Ankara--its
embassies in both capitals are still relatively new--
and to counsel restraint to both parties. The Chi-
nese seem to have no objection to Dr. Kissinger's
efforts at mediation. Peking's overriding interest
is the maintenance of NATO's southeastern flank, and
the Chinese have made it clear that they would use
their veto in the UN Security Council to block a So-
viet role in the Cyprus settlement.
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