STAFF NOTES: CHINESE AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300080021-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 28, 2004
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: September 15, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Chinese Affairs
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September 15, 19 5
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September 15, 1975
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Appearances and Disappearances . . . . . . . . . 4
Vietnam: A Quiet Anniversary. . . . . . . . . . 6
Floods in China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Sayonara, Sihanouk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Bourgeois Rights: Right or Wrong? . . . . . . . 12
Minority Problems in the Provinces . . . . . . . 16
Gleanings from the Special Session . . . . . . . 18
Provincial Leadership Notes. . . . . . . . . . . 20
CHRONOLOGY 21
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Appearances and Disappearances
The festivities surrounding Sihanouk's return
to Cambodia brought out most members of the Chinese
leadership, plus a heavy representation from the
distaff side. The appearances, however, served to
highlight several notable absentees.
Most prominent among the missing were party
vice chairmen Wang Hung-WE.n, who may still be in
Chekiang Province overseeing the return to normality,
and Yeh Chien-ying, who has not appeared since
Army Day. There seems to be no political reason
for Yeh's non-appearance, but there have been
occasional rumors that he is not in the best of
health.
Chiang Ching made her first public appearance
in three months at the Chinese bancYUei- fnr Sihanniflk
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Madame Mao, of course, has not had a good year
politically since her failure to win a government
position at last January's National People's
Congress. The Chinese people, apparently sensitive
to that failure, have circulated numerous rumors
since then about Mao's displeasure with her. The
latest. and perhaps most devastating rumors have it
that the Politburo voted earlier this year to
reactivate its decision of the 1940s to keep her
out of politics, and that Mao wrote her a letter in
which he suggested that they go their separate ways
from now on since they had been going in opposite
(presumably political) directions anyway.
September 15, 1975
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Chiang Ching's one-day reappearance, plus
public appearances by the wives of Chu Te, Chou
En-lai, Li Hsi.en-nien and even Hsu Hsiang-chien
seemed to underscore the surprising absence of
Cho Lin, wife of Sihanouk's official host, Teng
Hsiao-ping. Cho Lin does not appear on every
occasion at which her busy husband is top man,
but the presence of so many other wives made her
absence all the more conspicuous. There is no
ready explanation for her non-appearance, but it
is at least possible that it has some connection
with the current attacks on "Water Margin." If
the novel's leading figure, who is attacked for
accepting a royal amnesty and seeking official
positions for his wife and son, is intended by
some to represent the rehabilitated Teng Hsiao-ping,
Madame Teng may prefer for the time being to
maintain a low profile. She currently holds an
unspecified position in the goverment.
September 13, 1975
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Vietnam: A Quiet Anniversary
Peking's subdued treatment of Hanoi's National
Day early this month reflects continuing friction
between the two countries, while clearly pointing
up Chinese concern that Hanoi is falling under Mos-
cow's domination.
The celebrations in Hanoi, marking the 30th
anniversary of the communist government's founding,
called for high-level Chinese attention, but Peking
appears to have played down the importance of the
event as well as the current status of China's re-
lations with North Vietnam.
Neither the message from Chinese leaders nor
the People's Daily editorial marking the occasion
included the enthusiastic expressions of Sino-
Vietnamese solidarity that were features of Chinese
statements during the war. Thus, there was no men-
tion of Peking's "proletarian internationalist duty"
to support Hanoi; no depiction of the Sino-Vietna-
mese relationship as being "as close as lips and
teeth"; no references to "sharing weal and woe";
no mention of the application of Marxist-Leninist
principles in Vietnam.
Although China sent a fairly high-level dele-
gation led by politbureau member Chen Hsi-lien to
Hanoi, the Chinese in Peking displayed a clear lack
of enthusiasm for the anniversary. in 1965 and 1970,
the Chinese held rallies marking the 20th and 25th
anniversaries of the DRV. Moreover, receptions at
the North Vietnamese embassy those years were attended
by at least three politbureau members and Chou En-
lai delivered speeches on both occasions. This year,
there was no rally and politbureau member Wu Te was
the speaker at the embassy reception.
September 15, 1975
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Chen Hsi-lien, in a speech delivered at a Viet-
namese iron and steel complex, dick pull out most of
the stops in describing Peking's ties with Hanoi,
referring to China's "internationalist obligation"
to support the Vietnamese and to the Vietnamese as
"close comrades-in-arms and brothers." Still, Chen's
remarks in Hanoi are almost certainly not as authori-
tative as the People 'o Daily editorial and the message
that was signed by both Mao Tse-tung and Chou.
More important, however, Chen took the oppor-
tunity to lecture the Vietnamese on the dangers of
Soviet machinations in Southeast Asia and elsewhere.
Without mentioning the Soviets by name, Chen warned
the Vietnamese that "the superpowers" were attempt-
ing to dominate other countries, especially in the
Third World. Chen asserted that China, itself a
Third World country, would never attempt to estab-
lish hegemony over other countries, obviously con-
trasting China's allegedly benevolent view of South-
east Asia with what. Peking considers to be Moscow's
dark designs on the area. He said China stood by
other developing countries in opposition to "super-
power aggression, intervention, control, subversion
and plundering."
The Chinese have in several recent private con-
versations expressed a conviction that Hanoi has
tilted toward Moscow. They obviously hope, however,
to increase their own leverage with the Vietnamese
and to continue to draw Hanoi's attention to the
darker side of Soviet intentions. That clearly was
Chen's objective in asserting that Peking does not
interfere in the internal affairs of other countries,
as well as his comment that China had supported
Hanoi "to the best of our ability," thus reminding
.he Vietnamese that they still owe China for past
favors.
How much confidence Peking actually has in its
ability to improve ties with Hanoi, to say nothing
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of effectively countering Soviet influence in Viet-
nam, is another question.
Differences of opinion over territorial claims
in the South China Sea have been clear for some
time--especially since Peking assumed full control
of the Paracel Islands last year--but the land bor-
der has been clearly demarcated since the 19th cen-
tury and has not been a contentious issue in the
past.
If issue3 such as these continue to surface, the
possibility of any significzan t improvement in rela-
tions between the two countries will remain remote.
the Chinese have often por-
trayed problems wit Hanoi as resulting from Soviet
"meddling," probably in order to disguise the
seriousness of Peking's difficulties with Hanoi.
Over the long run, however, the Chinese view of
Hanoi as a challenger to Peking's own influence in
Southeast Asia--especially one that has Soviet
backing--could mean that relations between the two
countries will deteriorate even further.
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Floods in China
Torrential rainstorms and typhoons which bat-
tered China in early and mid-August did not seri-
ously damage the grain crop. The stozms caused
local flooding, but skirted key agricultural areas.
Since growing conditions in North China--where urban
rations are supplemented with imported grain--have
been generally favorable, grain imports will not in-
crease appreciably.
China's transport sector was more severely af-
fected. Floods have severely hampered operations
on the main railroad from Peking to Canton. The area
in Honan Province between Cheng-chou and Hsin-yang
was particularly hard hit, and the railroad and
several highways were severed on August 8. Priority
freight movement was reportedly restored by September.
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Chinese railroads, the nation's chief means of
moving freight, are periodically disrupted by weather.
The disruption of this key line for more than four
weeks is particularly damaging; if it persists, China's
industrial performance this year be reduced.
September 15, 1975
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After five tumultuous years, Prince Sihanouk
ended his exile in Peking last week and returned to
Phnom Penh. The Chinese gave every indication that
they were pleased with the arrangements.
Peking's endorsement of Sihanouk's return was
evident in the turnout. at farewell banquets in Peking
and at his airport sendoff. More top-level Chinese
officials atten6ed these affairs than any event
honoring a foreign visitor since Kim Il-song was in
Peking last April. Moreover, the Chinese heaped
praise on Sihanouk for his past role in Cambodia's
"liberation" and expressed the hope that he "will
make still greater contributions" after returning to
the Cambodian capital. Sihanouk also had final
meetings with both Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai.
While the Chinese are clearly happy to have
Sihanouk out of their hair and back in Cambodia with
at least a nominal title--as "head-of-state"--Peking
almost certainly recognizes that the Prince is not
likely to have a significant voice in Cambodian af-
fairs. Peking, therefore, has been careful not to
jeopardize its equities with the ruling Cambodian
communists by arguing for a more important role for
Sihanouk. Since the end of the fighting in Cambodia
and Vietnam, the Chinese have concentrated their
attention on Cambodia and their ties with the new
communist regime appear to be closer than those with
any other Indochinese country. The Chinese ambassador
to Cambodia arrived in Phnom Penh last Wednesday,
the first foreign envoy to take up his post since
the communists took over last April.
Expressions of support for Sihanouk seem aimed
pro-aril.y at avoiding the impression that Peking has
September 15, 1975
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 dumped him, as well an being a gentle reminder to
the Prince that he has an obligation to the now
regime in Phnom Penh. Chinese leaders wore almost
certainly concerned that Sihanouk, whose difficulties
with the communists have been well known since the
mid-1960s, might break with the new leaders and
relocate in another country, where he could criticize
them through his many contacts in the foreign press.
This development, which Sihanouk himself has hinted
at in the past, would force Peking to side with their
new ally in Phnom Penh against the Prince and might
seriously embarrass Poking.
Peking's treatment of Sihanouk's departure in
itself does not, of course, commit the Prince to a
long-term alliance with the communists. His current
stay in Phnom Penh i.:.11 apparently be a brief one,
aftt:r which he plans to travel for several weeks,
probably as a "senior spokesman" for the new regime.
Reportedly included in his itinerary are trips to
Peking for the October 1 National Day celebrations
and for his birthday in late October. The Chinese
will probably use these occasions to reiterate their
hope that the Prince will continue to cooperate with
the comet inists .
September 15, 1975
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The reaction in Canton to the alleged closure
of free markets as of July 1 was not at all
favorable. It is still not certain whether the
markets were closed entirely, as they have report-
edly been in other areas, or whether the number
of days they were allowed to operate was severely
restricted. In any case, Canton residents
reportedly lobbied for looser restrictions on the
markets, arid they have apparently been successful.
A Kwangtung provincial document reportedly
authorized the reopening of the free markets in
Canton on August 1. The official explanation was
that the closure of the markets had prevented the
peasants from exchanging their products for other
needed goods. Most Canton residents apparently
attribute the reopening of the markets ':o popular
pressure.
The turnabout on the Canton free markets
graphically illustrates not only the ability of
ordinary people to influence events when sufficient
pressure is applied but also the uncertainty amo:ig
local officials over how to handle such issues.
It is not at all clear that Kwangtung officials
had authorization from Peking to close the markets
in the first place. In fact, rece,it propaganda,
especially an article written by the Ministry
September 15, 1975
Local authorities still seem to be in a
quandary over how to implement the so-called
restriction of bourgeois rights--the various
incentive measures including private plots, side-
line productt.on, and free markets. The restriction
of free markets, where farmers can sell produce
they have grown privately, seems to be especially
controversial.
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of Agriculture, seems to be ta.cing a dim view of
excessive aconomic restrictions. The Ministry
of Agriculture article as well as similar broad-
casts frorr. a few provinces have once again attacked
the "wind of communization," as did vice premier
Chang Chun-chiao last April.
The return of the "wind of communization"
theme suggests that some elements in the leader-
ship, mindful that popular discontent over economic
policy will likely lead to further production
disruptions, do not want to make rash changes in
current policy and are not pleased with those who
have done so. As with so many other issues, how-
ever, the leadership in Peking is probably not of
one mind over how to proceed with "restricting"
bourgeois rights. It seems likely that some
people are arguing for tighter restrictions, which
may have accounted for the free market closures,
the reduction in the size of private plots and
in some cases confiscation of the plots.
September 15, 1975
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Minority Problems in the Provinces
Until recently it appeared that the leader-
ship's special efforts in the minority areas had
largely contained the problems evident in the
1950s and early 1960s. Part of this relative
success was due to the concessions made by the
::enter--exemption from the two child limit of
the national birth control policy, preservation
of lninori_y languages, establishment of minority
publications, industries to produce special mi-
nority goods, and a privileged status in terms
of university entrance.
Another aspect of Peking's minority policy,
however, has been the leadership's effort to move
Han Chinese--especially demobilized servicemen
and youth---into minority regions. This approach
has the positive effect of diluting large con-
centrations of minorities but the negative effect
of alienating much of the native population, which
fears it will be swamped by an influx of Hans.
In fact, serious
problems have ueveioped among the Huis in Yunr..an
and Kweichou. Attempts by provincial leaders, the
majority of whom are Han Chinese, to curtail Huis
religious practices are responsible for these
problems. The latest incidents in Yunnan were
triggered when the leadership tried to force the
Huis, who are Muslims, to work on Fridays. The
Huis retaliated by trying to raid a PLA armory.
Equally serious, dissident Huis in Kweichou
recently presented a visiting United Nations team
with a petition requesting an examination of the
right of self-determination.
September 15, 1975
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Other incidents, moreover, go well beyond
earlier protests, which were characterized by
poster campaigns and street demonstrations.
These new activities--cutting a railroad line,
production sabotage, and armed clashes--tend to
erode Peking'L authority over these minorities.
The incidents in Yunnan have already triggered a
strong response--the ringleaders of the raid on
the armory have been arrested and intensive
ideological study is being carried out among the
Huis. The last attempts at "armed rebellion" by
Huis in Ningsia in 1974 were quelled by PLA troops.
Given the strong response by Peking in the
Chekiang case, it is likely that any new outbreak
of dissidence will bring a strong response from
Peking.
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Gleanings from the Special Session
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Peking is keeping its own counsel on US and
European proposals to the recently concluded UN
Special Session. In his keynote address to the
special session on September 2--the day after the
US presentation--Chinese Foreign Trade Minister
Li Chiang hewed to Peking's canned line of blaming
the superpowers for Third World economic ills,
warring of continued superpower--primarily Soviet--
efforts at world economic domination, and expressing
Chinese support for general Third World aspirations.
There were, however, some suggestions in the
speech that the Chinese hope that the session will
result in an easing of tensions between developing
and developed countries. Li, for example, spoke
approvingly of a "positive attitude" on the part of
the "Second World," an apparent reference to the
Lome agreement to stabilize earnings of some products
exported by 46 developing countries associated with
the EC. The Chinese lauded the Lome agreement when
it was signed last spring, and for some time have
been apprehensive that Western Europe--which Peking
claims is the frontline in the struggle against
"Soviet hegemonism"--would be weakened the most by
continued world economic disorders.
At the same time, Li's speech appeared to signal
that China will continue to avoid an active role in
any mechanism or agreements designed to satisfy
Third World demands. In this regard, Li appeared
to rule out Chinese contributions to any world food
stocks by stressing China's example of "self-
reliance." Peking has declined invitations to join
such international bodies as the World Food Council
and the Food and Agricultural Organization largely
because membership entails the divulgence of economic
statistics the Chinese consider vital state secrets.
September 15, 1975
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Similarly, Li's failure to make even an oblique
reference to the US proposal for a multinational
fund to aid developing countries most severely
aZfected by world market fluctuations--a concept
the Chinese support in the abstract--undoubtedly
reflects Peking's wariness of being drawn into such
potentially expensive endeavors.
Despite any reservations Peking may have over
any particular stand taken by developing countries in
the special session, Peking can be expected to con-
tinue lending strong vocal support to their cause.
China continues to see a unified Third World as a
means of diffusing superpower--primarily Soviet--in-
fluence on the world scene and thereby create openings
that China cane 1
t
AP oi
Co increase its own prestige
and 4"4:1--___
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as
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Provincial Leadership Notes
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Radio Shantung announced on September 6 that
Tsingtao--the second most important city in the
province--had formed a municipal party committee.
Tsingtao is the last major municipality to form a
party committee in the aftermath of the Cultural
Revolution. All members of the new committee are
veteran cadres that served in Shantung prior to the
Cultural Revolution. Tsingtao suffered severe
turbulence during that upheaval but
has appeared relatively calm
recen .y. The formation of the committee may have
been delayed by factional maneuvering within the
provincial party committee, to which a number of
new faces have been added in the last year.
Significant additions have also recently been
made to party committees in other provinces. Chao
Wu-cheng was identified as a secretary in Tientsin
on August 16. Chao was the second secretary there
before the Cultural Revolution. The current second
secretary, Wu Tai, is one of the few career military
officers remaining on the Tientsin committee,
which was dominated by soldiers when it was formed
in May 1971.
Inner Mongolia has a second secretary, Hung
Chou-hsing, for the first time, but his background
is obscure and the significance of his appoint-
ment is unclear. The appointment of Ragde as a
secretary in Tibet in conjunction with celebrations
of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the
Tibetan Autonomous Region appears to represent a
nod to the sensitivities of ethnic Tibetans.
September 15, 1975
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August 23 Criticism of "Water Margin" begins
in KrWangminf/ Daily.
August 31 - Chinese delegation led by Vice Premier
September 4 and politbureau member Chen llsi-lien
in Hanoi for 30th anniversary of DRV
National Day.
September 2 Foreign Trade Minister Li Chian ad
dresses 7th UN Special Session.
September Chinese trade delegation led by Chair-
3-11 man of the Council for the Promotion
of Intern t* Trade visits Sweden.
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September 4 PeopZe'a Daily editorial cites Mao
as originator of "Water Mar 'n"
criticism,
September 5 Kuo Yu-feng identified as head of
Central Committee organization
Department.
rives in Peking for five-day visit.
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High-ranking Romanian delegation ar-
Economic Minister Friderichs.
West German industrial exhibition of-
ficially opened in Peking by Bonn's
I
F
Romanian delegation led by Defense
Minister Gheorghe Gomoiu arrives in
Peking.
Chinese trade delegation led by Li
Chuan, vice-chairman of the Chinese
Council for the Promotion of Inter-
national Trade, departs for the US.
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September 15, 1975
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September 6 Vice Premier Tong Ilsiao-ping hosts
farewell banquet in Poking for
Cambodian "head-of-state" Norodom
Sihanouk; Sihanouk ends five-year
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exile in China and departs for
Phnom Penh on September 9.
September 8 Rwandan foreign minister arrives
in Peking.
September 9 China and Mexico sign scientific
and technical cooperation agreement.
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Celebrations in Lhasa marks the 10th
anniversary of the founding of the
Tibet Autonomous Region. Politburo
member Hua Kuo-feng heads delegation
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Chinese ambassador to Cambodia Sun Hao
departs for Phnom Penh to take up his
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post.
September 12 Third National Games open in Peking.
The games were last held in 1965 on
the eve of the Cultural Revolution.
September 15, 1975
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