STAFF NOTES: CHINESE AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300080020-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: September 2, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
~UIP~ MOUE
Chinese Affairs
Top Secret
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September 2, 1975
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CHINESE AFFAIRS
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The People Look at the Politburo . . . . . . . . 1
Problems with the Militia--Who Watches
the Watchers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
The Commitment to Tanzania: Hardly Altruism . . 7
The Restriction of Bourgeois Rights. . . . . . . 10
China Trade Delegations To Visit US. . . . . . . 13
A Smile for Dacca . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
CHRONOLOGY 17
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The People Look at the Politburo
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Several vic;nettes abotY; Chinese leaders have
surfaced in recent weeks. Although some of the
stories may be apocryphal, they provide some clues
as to how the Chinese peop'..e perceive their leaders.
One story circulating in Peking is that Vice
Premier Teng Hsiao-ping htis virtually invited criti-
cism of himself by stating that anyone who assumes
responsibility should not be afraid of criticism.
The story sounds very much like the rather blunt,
outspoken Teng and is consistent with a number of
indications that his confidence has grown along with
his authority.
The latest in a series of tales about Chairman
Mao's displeasure with Chiang Ching is that he re-
portedly rebuked her last fall for her efforts to
make a major political issue of using the "back
door," an expression that refers to obtaining jobs
or entrance into universities through personal con-
nections. The "back door" issue did emerge rather
suddenly in late 1973 and tended to divert public
attention from the then more important anti-Confucius
campaign. Peking finally issued a directive in March
1974 deferring any action on the issue until a later
date, and the much publicized "back door" controversy
eventually subsided. Peking is still on public record
as opposing "back door" methods, but no steps have
been taken against people who have used such methods.
According to the story, Mao's reason for want-
ing to turn a blind eye toward the "back door" issue
was that it involved so many people that to make a
public issue of it would be too disruptive. The
reasoning is certainly sound: during the brief
period when the issue was daily propaganda fare, it
created considerable confusion and consternation
September 2, 1975
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among university students who had gained admission
through their influential relatives. Some students
left the universities, others were pressured into
doing so, and still others agonized over what to do.
In any event, whether or not Mao did argue with his
wife over pursuing this matter, the Chinese people
see her as the person who opened this Pandora's box
and obviously as a disruptive force on the political
scene.
Another story about Chiang Ching is that she
failed to applaud, unlike other Chinese leaders,
after a private screening of a film about "Iron Man
Wang," China's model worker who died a few years
ago. The film was probably not produced under her
auspices. In contrast to the growing number of docu-
mentaries (such as this one) that are now being shown
in the country, Chiang Ching's "model" cultural works
are idealizations, not documentaries.
Propaganda that has supported Chiang Ching's
role in culture has not been noticeably receptive
to work other than her "models" and has occasionally
denigrated them. Under these circumstances, it
seems entirely consistent with Chang Ching's image
that she would not applaud a cultural effort that
was not of her own doing.
There is in fact some tenuous evidence that
Madame Mao is not quite the cultural force
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were enthusiastically receive but that Chiang Ching's
models were nowhere to be seen. A recent broadcast
from Shantung Province, Chiang Ching's home, failed
to mention th4 model works in a lengthy account of
cultural activities.
According to the story about the private film
showing, party Vice Chairman Wang Hung-wen stopped
applauding when he noticed that Chiang Ching was not
doing so. The Chinese people apparently have the
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impression that Wang takes his cue from Chiang Ching
and that he seems unsure of himself.
September 2, 1975
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Problems with the Militia--Who
Watches the Watchers?
there J.s reason
for concern. AS in Chekiang, the Wuhan militia was
disbanded for participating in factional struggles
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The Wuhan militia is now un er a direct command of
the Hupeh provincial authorities, and Peking presum-
ably hopes that they can straighten out the situation
without having to call for troops.
September 2, 1975
With some notable exceptions, Peking's campaign
to improve unity and stability and boost production
has made progress this year. The level of urban
crime seems to have been reduced and some advances
have been made in dealing with disgruntled youths,
who were the mai.i perpetrators. However, the inter-
vention of regular troop 25X1
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to restore pu is order and local authority to
pre - Cultural Revolution levels has a considerable
distance to go.
The militia, particularly the urban militia,
has been Peking's primary instrument to enhance
order in the last two years. In the aggregate,
the militia has performed reasonably well. The
upgrading of the militia has allowed the regime to
virtually complete the removal of the military from
the expanded civil affairs duties acquired as a
result of the Cultural. Revolution, and has supported
the priority goal of reducing the military's
political involvement. Thus, when Peking called
in the PLA in Chekiang--and in effect admitted
failure on the part of the militia--it was not
an easy decision. Furthermore, the well-publicized
nature of the decision seems to be a warning to all
parties, including the militia and its leaders, that
factionalism will not be tolerated.
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Another example of progress was reflected in
Szechwan, which announced on May 21 that the
Chengtu Municipal militia command had been estab-
lished. Szechwan has been one of the more turbulent
areas in China, and the creation of the Chengtu com-
mand is several months behind most other major cities.
One problem that seems to have arisen as the
result of Peking's emphasis on reducing factionalism
is the abuse of militia authority in the name of law
and order. activities
of militia s in Peking often border on criminal
acts--including street fighting with juvenile gangs.
One militia patrol allegedly beat to death the son
of the minister of foreign trade, who resisted their
investigation while in a Peki ncr rPQI- 11ran.l-
Such activities could provoke an eventual
backlash against the militia and those who lead
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it. In Peking, this might include alternate
politburo member Ni Chih-fu, a model worker who
commands the capital workers militia. Ni is
hardly a major political target, but the real
architects of the urban militia movement are
difficult to identify. Wang dung-wen's name has
been mentioned as a possible national militia
leader, but the impetus behind the upgrading of
urban militia is more likely to have come from more
moderate regime leaders. With the political left
in disarray, any backlash is likely to be limited
at present.
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The Commitment to Tanzania: Hardly Altruism
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Festivities surrounding the formal completion
of the five-year, $402 million Tan-Zam railroad in
Dar es Salaam this fall and the probable attendance
of a high-ranking Chinese delegation will bring into
focus Peking's heavy investment in Tanzania. Presi-
dent Nyerere's government is, in fact, the leading
African recipient of Chinese economic aid and the
second leading recipient worldwide of military as-
sistance from Peking.
The Chinese will maintain a significant aid
program and large numbers of personnel in Tanzania
well beyond ribbon-cutting ceremonies on the Tan-
Zam line. Although the arrangements are not yet
final, several hundred technicians will probably
stay on to assist in operating and managing the
railroad. The continued presence of about 300 Chi-
nese now working on several small rural development
and construction projects and of some 750 Chinese
military advisers also seems assured. Under a $74-
million agreement signed by Peking and Dar es Salaam
last year, the Chinese have also agreed to construct
two rail spurs into coal- and iron-rich areas in
northwestern Tanzania and to help develop these re-
sources.
Despite its scope and expense, the Chinese
effort in Tanzania is not aimed primarily at short-
term economic and political goals within the coun-
try itself. On the economic front, the Tanzanians
have little that China needs in terms of raw ma-
terials and the Tanzanian market is a minuscule one
for the Chinese. Politically, Peking certainly
values Dar es Salaam as a reliable diplomatic ally
and is undoubtedly pleased that Nyerere has bor-
rowed from the Chinese model for his own domestic
programs.
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Such gains, however, could probably have been
achieved with much less expense, and Peking clearly
views its considerable investment in Tanzania in
terms of the long haul and the larger African--and
Third World--context. On this broader plane, Pe-
king has attempted to create in its aid program in
Tanzania a model demonstrating to other African
and developing countries China's willingness to ex-
tend generous and politically untied aid without any
danger of foreign subversion or interference in in-
ternal affairs. To this end, the Chinese have ap-
plied themselves to their aid projects in Tanzania
with unusual energy--particularly the. Tan-Zam proj-
ect, which will be completed well ahead of sched-
ule--while carefully avoiding any impression that
they are pressing for direct influence over the
country. Peking, in fact, has gone so far to limit
the impact of its large presence on the domestic
scene in Tanzania as to provoke some criticism from
Tanzanian officials. The low key Chinese approach
has had the overall effect, however, of building
trust and allaying suspicions both in Dar es
Salaam and elsewhere in the region.
The establishment of durable relations between
Peking and Dar es Salaam has also given the Chinese
an important leg up in their competition with Mos-
cow for influence with regional black nationalist
movements. Peking has long acted as Tanzania's
agent in training and equipping various guerrilla
groups. This direct Chinese access and backing
from the influential Nyerere were instrumental in
gaining Peking the inside track with Samora Machel's
forces in Mozambique. The Chinese are moving in a
similar manner to develop a strong position in
Rhodesia, where Peking long backed the Zimbabwe
African National Union (ZANU) and has recently
stated its willingness to train and equip the joint
forces of the African National Council--an um-
brella organization which has absorbed ZANU and other
Rhodesian nationalist groups. The breakdown last
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week of talks between Council leaders and Salisbury
and the increased possibility that guerrilla opera-
tions might resume in Rhodesia have played com-
fortably into Peking's hand.
While China is on the whole probably satisfied
with the returns from its commitment to Tanzania,
the relationship has not been without its strains.
Strident Chinese calls for "armed struggle" in
southern Africa and repeated warnings that efforts
at compromise between black nationalists and the
white-minority governments were "political decep-
tions" leave little doubt over Peking's displeas-
ure with Nyerere's--and Zambian President Kaunda's
--support for talks between Salisbury and the Rho-
desian nationalist groups. Peking has also had to
draw the line on continued requests for arms from
Dar es Salaam and can only view as ingratitude
Tanzanian questioning of the quality of equipment
already delivered. Tanzania's acceptance of
$74 million of Soviet military assistance in 1974
undoubtedly increased Chinese irritation. Peking
has been willing to play down such frictions, how-
ever, and this is another measure of the central
role Tanzania has played and will continue to la
in China's strategy in the area.
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The Restriction of Bourgeois Rights:
Shades of the Great Leap Forward
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Efforts to restrict "bourgeois rights" have
intensified recently as the movement to consolidate
the dictatorship of the proletariat continues. The
major targets of this phase of the campaign include
free markets, private property, private plots and
other types of sideline production. Although these
"bourgeois rights" are protected under the Chinese
constitution--Chang Chun-chiao in his speech on the
revision of the Constitution stressed that these
rights are a necessary supplement to the socialist
economy--a recent Red Flag article indicates that
the party's line now demands their restriction.
The heaviest pressure appears to be directed at
the free markets. Free markets in some provinces
have been closed and hawkers are subject to arrest
by security officials and confiscation of their goods.
Free markets in other provinces, however, remain
open but are subject to stringent controls. Opera-
tions of the remaining free markets in Kwangtung are
controlled by regulations apparently contained in a
recent provincial level document. The new restric-
tions include limited operation of the markets every
fifth day, strictly controlled selling prices, and a
ban on selling goods covered by the state procurement
sli?stem--rice, tea, wheat and flour to name a few.
Moreover, hawkers are required to obtain certificates
stating that their communes have fulfilled the state
quota on those items being offered for sale. Public
security forces, special market personnel, and the
militia have been mobilized to enforce these new
measures.
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Although no clear policy toward the restriction
of the other "bourgeois rights" has yet emerged, re-
cent Red Flag articles indicate that any private
activity which interferes with tt,e collective process
or is not included in the state plan will be restricted.
The absence of any clear central direction has led to
widely disparate methods of implementation in the
provinces. In some provinces all kinds of private
activity including private plots are being banned,
while in others only the more flagrant offenses are
being remedied.
Although the movement to restrict "bourgeois
rights" has many political overtones, recent articles
are stressing the detrimental economic effects that
result from the failure to restrict these rights.
One report suggests that the recent poor harvest in
one area of Kwangtung was caused by too much atten-
tion to private plots. However, the last time the
leadership tried to abolish private plots and other
incentives during the Great Leap Forward the results
were disastrous. Peasant intransigence and bad
harvests forced the leadership to retrench.
These new attempts to restrict "bourgeois rights"
are already meeting with public opposition.
Besides the certain econoinic effects, the restric-
tion of bourgeois rights may have other serious con-
sequences, which could threaten the stability that
the leadership is trying so hard to achieve. Under
the circumstances--a stricter birth control policy
which uses rations as a disincentive plus youths
without ration cards who have returned illegally from
the countryside--the proliferation of black markets
is inevitable. Already hawkers in Peking and Kwangtung
are avoiding the restrictions and militia patrols by
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selling door to door. The expansion of black markets
could also contribute to the rising creme problems in
China's major cities.
Whether the leadership continues to press the
movement to restrict "bourgeois rights" in the
face of certain opposition remains to be seen. Con-
cerns for st.,bility and production may prevail and
prevent the leadership from to this next step
toward full collectivization. tin
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China Trade Delegation To Visit the US
A high-level delegation from China's Council
for the Promotion of International Trade will arrive
in the US on September 5 for an 18-day tour, The
mission will be composed of leaders of the council
and representatives of the machinery, minerals and
metals, and native produce trade corporations.
Meetings will be held with members of Congress,
government officials, and US businessmen to discuss
Chinese exports and imports, trade exhibitions, and
regional trade promotion offices in the US. The
Chinese will also want to discuss the legal issues
in US-China trade, including most-favored-nation
treatment, a subject on which the Chinese are in-
creasingly vocal.
China has expressed concern over the imbalance
in US-China trade and has been seeking to promote
exports to the US. Early this year a Chinese tex-
tile delegation visited the US; a mission from the
light industry trade corporation will arrive here
next month. Last year, China's trade deficit with
the US reached $700 million.
US-China trade is off substantially this year
because of the sharp drop in Chinese purchases of
US agricultural products. US exports to China for
the year will reach about $250 million, compared
with $807 million for 1974. Chinese exports to the
US will total about $150 million, up from $115 mil-
lion last year.
For the first half of 1975, US exports to China
were $147 million and US imports were $73 million.
Deliveries of US cotton from 1974 contracts accounted
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for about half of China's imports from the US dur-
ing th:.s period. Ammonia plants, oil exploration
equipment, and construction and mining machinery
purchased in 1974 made up most of the remainder.
Nonferrous metals, textiles,chemicals, and
foodstuffs made up the bulk of China's sales to the
US. The Chinese are again purchasing US steel
scrap, which will be an important item in trade
through December. No further imports of US grain
or cotton are expected this year.
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 A Smile fox Dacca
Peking has moved rather quickly in the wake
of the 'Bangladesh coup to reinforce its improved
position in South Asia. Last Sunday, only two
weeks after the overthrow of Mujibur Rahman, China
extended recognition to the new government. Peking
consistently had refused to ao this far with the
previous regime.
in mind.
Peking's decision to recognize the Mushtaque
regime was probably taken with the Soviets foremost
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Peking is well aware that the Indians are not
going to take kindly to the decision to recognize
Dacca, but undoubtedly calculates that recognition
will do more to deter rather than provoke moves by
New Delhi. India's somewhat more accommodating
attitude toward Dacca in recent days may have
influenced this judgment. The Chinese all along
have carefully avoided antagonizing the Indians
about developments in Bangladesh.
The change of government in Dacca would seem
to give Peking some badly needed leverage in the
region which it can use in dealing with India.
At the same time the Chinese have generally avoided
critical commentary on Prime Minister Gandhi's
recent internal difficulties. While this approach
will not be lost on New Delhi, the Indians are
likely to consider any Chinese rapprochement with
Dacca as a far more significant development--and
one that is inimical to their interests_
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August 18 Shanghai and Kiangsi are the only
areas to mark the anniversar of
the Red Guards,
August 20 Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien meets
with visiting Thai trade delegation
led by Commerce Minister Thongyot
Chittawira.
Congressional delegation led by
Senator Byrd of West Virginia
visits China; meets with Teng
Hsiao-ping and Chiao Kuan-hua.
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August 21 Japan signs agreement in Tokyo
providing for sale of 720,000 tons
of fertilizer to China before Jan-
uary 1976.
August 23 Cambodian "head-of-state" Prince
Sihanouk returns to Peking from
Pyongyang, accompanied by Deputy
Prime Minister. Khieu Samphan;
party met by vice premiers Teng
Hsiao-ping and Li Hsien-nien;
meets with Chou En-lai on August
26 and with Mao Tse-tung on Aug-
in Chekiang factories.
Peking again reports use of troops
August 25 Anhwei province announces troops
have entered a steel mill.. I
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Au+just 25 China and Thailand sign trade agree-
ment in Peking calling for Chinese
purchase of 200,000 tons of Thai
rice and sale of 563,366 tons of
crude oil and diesel fuel to Bang-
Egypt.
Delegation of Chinese People's As-
sociation for Friendship with For-
eign Countries ends 10-day visit to
August 28 Chinese delegation to the seventh
special session of the United Na-
tions, led by Minister of Foreign
Trade Li Chiang, arrives in New
August 30 National media begin to carry a
series of articles attacking the
novel Water Margin.
August 31 Delegation led by Vice Premier
Chen Hsi-lien arrives in Hanoi for
North Vietnamese National Day cele-
brations.
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