STAFF NOTES: CHINESE AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300080003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 20, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
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Top Secret
311) 25X1
Januar 20, 1975
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January 20, 1975
China Emphasizes Moderation;
Leadership Differences Remain. . . . . . . . .
The Washington Connection. . . . . . . . . . . .
New Year's in the Provinces. . . . . . . . . . .
A New Accomplice for Lin Piao? . . . . . . . . .
1
6
10
14
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China and Strauss: Strange Bedfellows . . . . .
19
Western Troubles Hurt Trade.Balance. .
. . . . .
22
New Twist for an Old Slogan. . . . . .
. . . . .
24
Love the Army--But Love the Party Even More. . .
26
The United Nations: Disappointment. .
.
. . . .
28
New Opportunities in Kinshasa. . . . .
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30
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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32
CHRONOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
. . . .
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China Emphasizes Moderation;
Leadership Differences Remain
The personnel appointments and policy statements
approved by China's Fourth National People's Con-
gress are clearly designed to stress moderation and
continuity. The brevity of the congress, the first
in a decade, and the initial secrecy in which it
was held suggest, however, that leadership differ-
ences have not yet been ironed out fully.
The reappointment of Chou En-lai as premier,
and. the naming of his close ally, Yeh Chien-ying,
to the sensitive post of defense minister, under-
scores Chou's continuing power and prestige as a
seni!, r policy maker.
'I'eng Hsiao-ping, elevated to the Politburo
standing committee and named a vice chairman by the
Central Committee plenum, which preceded the con-
gress, appears to be Chou's logical successor.
Chairman Mao Tse-tung, who attended neither
the plenum nor the congress, has now been away- from
Peking for over six months. Only once before has
Mao been absent from the capital for a longer time,
and that was immediately before the onset of the Cul-
tural Revolution when, Mao complained later, he was
being circumvented and ignored by political oppo-
nents.
Mao's continuing meetings with foreign visitors
indicate that his health remains reasonably good
and suggests that his absence from Peking may have
a political justification. He may, for example,
have been upset with the decision to wind down the
anti-Lira, anti-Confucius campaign last July. Propa-
ganda articles issued as late as November, which
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may well have reflected the Chairman's personal
views, appeared to be calling for a further effort
in the campaign, particularly as it related to an
assault on the military's political position.
If Mao has remained in the countryside as a
political gesture, it is likely that he is "sulk-
ing in his tent" and has not been deliberately ex-
cluded from the capital.
The communiuue issued at the conclusion of
the congress makes relatively little mention of Mao
personally. The guiding role of "Mao Tse-tung
Thought," however, as written into the new consti-
tution and the chairman of the party was designated
commander of the armed forces.
All of this suggests that the Chairman is still
a very active force in Chinese politics.
The congress approved a list of 12 vice pre-
miers, down from 15 before the Cultural Revolution.
Teng Hsiao-ping heads the list, followed by Shang-
hai party boss Chang Chun-chiao, who gave the re-
port on the revision of the state constitution on
behalf of the party Central Committee. This assign-
ment is a..iother indication that Chang is acting in
the post of party secretary general, although he has
never been publicly identified in that role.
Youthful party vice chairman Wang Hung-wen,
who had given the report on the revision of the
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party constitution on behalf of the Central Commit-
tee at the Tenth Party Congress in August 1973, did
not gain a government post.
Only a single military figure, Peking Military
Region Commander Chen Hsi-lien, was included in the
list of vice premiers. This contrasts with four
who served in this capacity before the Cultural
Revolution.
Li Te-sheng, who lc--t his job as head of the
army's political department and was severely criti-
cized last year, has been downgraded and is listed
with the ordinary Politburo members. Contrary to
previous practice, the defense minister is not now
a vice premier. These changes indicate that the
military has been further circumscribed in its
political role.
Even more striking is the downgrading of the
political "left." With the possible exception of
Chang Chun-chiao, who rose to prominence during the
Cultural Revolution but has long since seemed to
have moderated his political views, no easily
recognizable leftist was named vice premier. The
two most prominent leftists, Chiang Ching and Yao
Wen-yuan, both of whom had claims to important
government jobs, were passed over.
There are now 29 ministries, compared with
the 40 that existed before the Cultural Revolution.
Some 15 new ministers were appointed, 6 of whom
held vice-ministerial rank before the Cultural
Revolution. Two former provincial leaders are now
ministers and most of the other new ministerial
appointees held high rank before the congress.
Most ministers are veteran bureaucrats, a number
of whom were severely criticized during the Cultural
Revolution.
January 20, 1975
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The man in th3 aonsitive job of minister of
education falls into this category; he was secretary
general of the State Council before the Cultural
Revolution. Almost none of the ministers could be
considered "youthful" or--with the possible excep-
tion of the new minister of culture--"leftist."
The position of state chairman, which had been
held by the disgraced Liu Shao-chi and had figured
prominently in the Lin Piao affair, has been abol-
ished. According to Chang Chun-chia's speech, this
and other constitutional revisions were designed to
strengthen the party's control over the state struc-
ture.
The new government constitution, which is less
than one third the length of the old one, repeats
the fundamentals of moderate economic policies.
--In agriculture, the production brigade, the
lowest of the three organizational levels within
the commune, remains the basic accounting unit,
as has been the case since the failure of the Great
Leap Forward.
--Private plots and individual non-collective
labor are retained.
--The constitution repeats the standard formu-
lation that agriculture is the economic "base" and
industry the "leading factor."
Compromise is evident in articles that guaran-
tee the right to criticize officials and policies
through public debates and wall posters and state
that revolutionary committees will remain as per-
manent government bodies. Both provisions appear
to be sops to the political left.
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Chang Chun-chiao's speech did provide a hint
that there may be friction ahead. He ncted that
while state enterprises have the form of socialist
ownership, in some cases leadership is not in the
hands of real Marxist:, and the worker masses. The
implication of this phrase is not clear, but it
may mean that new political attacks may develop
as the "New Leap" economic campaign now apparently
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The Washington Connection
Relations with the US have been given a good
deal of attention by the Chinese since Secretary
Kissinger's trip in late November, but the signals
in the public media and in private comments by
Chinese officials have been mixed.
Immediately after the visit, the Chinese gave
some diplomats the impression of dissatisfaction
over the resuli-s of talks on Taiwan, although Chi-
nese continents seemed short on specifics.
An apparently well-orchestrated campaign, which
went further, emerged in early December. It elabo-
rated the themes that China was displeased over the
pace of normalization of Sino-US relations and that
normalization was directly linked to specific
conditions regarding Taiwan. This line was spread
widely to journalists and foreign diplomats by left-
ists in Hong Kong with ties to Peking, by Chinese
diplomats abroad, and by officials in Peking. It
was, for instance, passed on to Senator Mansfield
during his visit to China in mid-December.
January 20, 1975
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Sometime around mid-December, the views of
knowledgeable Chinese officials on Sino-US rela-
tions became more tentative. Senior party offi-
cial Keng Piao and a Foreign Ministry official
who deals with American affairs, in separate
private conversations, avoided characterizing
Sino-US relations or repeating Chinese conditions
for normalization even though both were provided
ideal opportunities to do so. I
Since then, the Chinese line has turned
decidedly positive.
The campaign
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to underscore the negative aspects of Sino-US
relations seemed to fade in late December, and
the lines it espoused regarding Taiwan have not
been heard since. In mid-January, Foreign Trade
Minister Li Chiang downplayed the importance of
the huge imbalance in Sino--US trade which favors
Washington. He indicated that China did not
need an absolute balance and that the PRC planned
to continue costly purchases of equipment and
technology from the US. Earlier, some Chinese
spokesmen had pointed to the trade imbalance as
an important irritant in Sino-US relations.
On another plane, Chinese press criticism
in December and January of several specific US
foreign policies may have added to the impression
of some observers that Peking had soured on
Washington. In fact, attacks on the US position
with regard to Korea, Cambodia, and Third World
power in the UN, and on the recently enacted
Trade Bill followed well-established Chinese
foreign policy lines which have no direct links
to Sino-US bilateral relations. Articles on US
economic problems that tend to put the US in a
negative light have long been a staple of Chinese
propaganda and have not increased in frequency or
intensity, although they have become more ideo-
logical in cast.
Similarly, a more even-handed treatment of
the US and USSR in the joint New Year's editorial
and recent banquet remarks by Vice Premier Li
Hsien-nien and Chiao Kuan-hua are almost cer-
tainly unrelated to Peking's view of Sino-US re-
lations.
(Peking's public remarks dealt
with the likelihood of US-USSR competition resulting
January 20, 1975
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in an outbreak of war--a newly prominent Chinese
propaganda theme--which in effect vindicates Peking
in its opening toward the West at a time of US-USSR
contention. Lastly, a spate of year-end commentary
in NCNA contained some of the harshest attacks
against Soviet foreign and domestic policy seen in
months. The same commentary barely laid a glove
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January 20, 1975
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25X1 New Year's in the Provinces
Chiang and Liao are veteran civilian cadre
with long experience in provincial administration,
as are the three other provincial bosses appointed
in the last year: C1%ao Tzu-yang in Kwangtung, Pai
Ju-ping in Shantung, and Peng Chung in Kiangsu.
Both Chiang and Liao face a tough challenge in
asserting their authority in their new provinces.
Armed clashes between competing factions have been
reported in Kiangsi, and Peking's attempt to
settle the dispute by calling rival leaders to
the capital for consultations apparently has met
with little success. A similar situation exists
in Fukien, where rival groups are split over loy-
alty to the pre - Cultural Revolution first sec-
retary, Yeh Fei, who was rehabilitated 17 months
ago.
Chiang's and Liao's status as rehabilitated
former first secretaries may further complicate
their positions. Some figures who were purged
during the Cultural Revolution apparently have
had difficulty adjusting when returned to
responsible positions. One notable case involves
ex-Anhwei boss Li Pao-hca, who proved ineffective
in Kweichow because he was afraid to alienate
anyone. Moreover, those who have successfully
made the transition first rejoined the fray in
January 20, 1975
The turnout in the provinces on New Year's
was smaller and was reported in less detail than
than on National Day, Octob r 1st
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eeping with the IOW-key celebration last year.
The highlight of the holiday was the identifica-'
tion of two new provincial first secretaries,
Chiang Wei-ching in Kiangsi and Liao Chih-kao
in Fukien.
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lesser posts and were only later promoted to the
top spot. Chiang and Liao are the first to go
directly from Peking to a vacant first secretary-
ship. Peking will undoubtedly monitor their
performances closely.
The appointments in Kiangsi and Fukien leave
only three provinces without a publicly designated
leader: Liaoning, Anhwei, and Hupeh. Liaoning
and Anhwei are closely associated with politburo
member and party vice chaiz;man Li Te-sheng. Li,
who is a military man, was heavily criticized
during the anti-Confucius campaign, and for a
time his political survival was in question. He
still apparently has powerful enemies in Peking,
and his presence in Liaoning as Shenyang Military
Region commander is probably complicating the
appointment of a new civilian first secretary there.
This is possibly true in Anhwei as well, where his
associate Sung Pei-chang is the ranking party sec-
retary and military man. The badly factionalized
politics in Hupeh are probably complicating that
appointment.
Accounts of holiday gatherings in other prov-
inces were notably scanty. The whereabouts--and
fates--of Heilungkiang first secretary Wang
Chia-tao, Shansi first secretary Hsieh Chen-hua,
Canton Military Region political commissar Jsn
Ssu-Chung, and Lanchow Military Region commander
Han Hsien-chu remain unclear, since both their
home provinces and Peking failed to publish a de-
tailed account of the local festivities. The four
senior military men were all under pcster attack
during the anti-Confucius campaign and were unex-
pectedly present in Peking on Nationa'. Day, possibly
to answer to central authorities for ::heir past con-
duct. Three other provincial personalities who were
also in Peking last National Day--Sinkiang Military
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Size of
Turnout
Province
Anhwei
STAT
Chekiang
Fukien
Heilungkiang
Honan
STAT
Hopeh
Hunan
Hupeh
Inner Mongolia
STATxansu
Kwangsi
Kwaagtung
Kweichow
Ningsia
STAThanghai
Shansi
Shantung
Shensi
Sinkiang
Szechwan
Tibet
Tientsin
STATsinghai
Yunnan
Turnout Lod By
Sung Pei-ching, the
ranking secretary
Pi Ting-chun, Foochow
MR commander
Chang Lin-chih, a
provincial party
secretary
Kong Chi-chang, the
ranking secretary
No details of the turnout reported by the province
No details of the turnout reported by the province
turnout reported by the
Chiang Wei-ching
Small Chen Chung, a minor
municipal official
No details of t'.e turnout reported by the province
No details of the turnout reported by the province
Small 7.i Li, a deputy secretary
of the party committee
Li Te-sheng, Shenyang
MR commander
No details of the turnout reported by the province
Large Pai Ju-ping, first secretary
No details of the turnout reported by the province
No details of the turnout reported by the province
No details of the turnout reported by the province
small Hsia Yu-hsien, deputy
commander Tibet MD
No details of the turnout reported by the province
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Liao Chih-kao identified as the now
first secretary.
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Chiang identified as the new first
secretary in Kiangsi.
Those in attendance wore identified in
an unusual manner--as responsible per-
sons of the Revolutionary Committee
only; there was no mention of the pro-
vincial party committee. To date, Peng,
who has been identified as chairman of
the Revolutionary Committee, has not
been identified as first secretary of
the party committee, t'ie more powerful
post. In the past, these two jobs have
been held concurrently.
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Region commander Yang Yung and Liaoning party fig-
ures Mao Yuan-hsin and Chang Shu-te--were back in
their respective provinces on New Year's. Unlike
the others, they were never mentioned as targets of
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A New Accomplice for Lin Piao?
Chen Hsi-lien, politburo member and commander
of the politically sensitive Peking Military Region,
was apparently criticized by historical analogy
in several articles appearing in major domestic
publications last fall. The criticism points up
the current effort to further reduce military polit-
ical power in general and the influence of certain
military region commanders in particular.
Both these objectives became a major focus of
the anti-Lin, anti-Confucius campaign last July.
At that time; posters attacking Chen and politburo
member Hsu Shih-yu, who now commands the Canton
Military Region, began to appear with some frequency,
while poster criticisms of other national arid
provincial leaders were on the wane. Attacks against
Chen-and Hsu had not been prominent during the earlier
wave of poster criticisms. In the case of Hsu, the
poster attacks have continued in his former bailiwick,
Nanking. The attacks against Chen and Hsu, and the
continued stress on enhancing party control over the
military in domestic media, appear to be part of a
continuing tug of war between civilian moderates and
certain regional commanders and their allies at the
center.
One of the themes of the anti-Chen articles
is that Han Hsin, a "senior general" in the Han
Dynasty who is clearly identified as a Lin Piao
figure, plotted with a regional military commander
named Chen Hsi. This man's surname s the same
character as that of Chen Hsi-lien. r:o.:eover, one
article notes that Chen Hsi commanded troops in the
state of Chao, north of the capital. Chen Hsi-lien,
of course, commanded the Shenyang Military Region
in northeast China for years before his rotation
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to Peking. The article also alludes to the fact
that the regional commander was in charge of the
troops defending the border against the Huns (i.e.,
the USSR), and that he conspired with the Huns'
through others to try to overthrow the government.
Lin Piao stands accused of conspiring with the
Soviets in an attempt to seize power, and the article
seems designed to link Chen Hsi-lien with Lin's
alleged plot.
The charges, which appeared in October and
November, are ominous enough by themselves. They
are further underscored, however, by an article in
the November Red FZaa by Lo Ssu-ting. This article
attacks, in the strongest terms, persons and groups
during the Northern Sung period who wanted to capitu-
late to the aggressors from the North. One group
that received heavy fire was the "big landlord die-
hards." Many previous articles in the anti-Confu-
cius campaign have established the parallel between
the landlords or feudal princes and the military
region commanders.
The charge that Chen Hsi-?lien conspired with
Lin does not seem to have validity. Chen was one
of the first military leaders to reappear after the
Lin affair, and he played a major role in the subsequent
investigations. Chen may well have favored a less
intransigent stance toward the Soviets, however--
after all, he bore responsibility for defending
Manchuria against Soviet attacks. In this event,
his stance in this issue could now be the basis
for an effort to undermine his position by linking
him--however transparent the real evidence--to Lin.
At the least, the effort to brand Chen a covert
Lin supporter brings considerable pressure to bear
against him, and this may have been the objective
in the short term. Numerous reports have been re-
ceived that the National People's Congress was
January 20, 1975
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being delayed because of delegate selection prob-
lems, especially in limiting the number of military
men. The criticisms of Chen and Hsu Shih-yu could
have been designed to break this log jam. The at-
tacks on Chen could also have been aimed at under-
cutting his candidacy for defense minister, a post
that was awarded to Yeh Chien-ying at the congress.
Like other civilian and military figures, Chen
survived serious political charges in 1974. Now that
the National reople's Congress has been held, it is
likely that Peking will return to the problem of
civil-military relations, and it would not be surprising
to see the charges against Chen and others revived.
While Chen was the only military man to be named a
vice-premier--an honor that e en the new Defense Mini-
ster did not enjoy--his transfer from Shenyang, where
he was seemingly immune, to Peking in December 1973
may yet lead to a reduction in hi political position.
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China and Strauss: Strange Bedfellows
Peking is using the current visit. of promi-
nent conservative German opposition leader Franz
Josef Strauss to drive home strong Chinese views
about German reunification, Moscow's threat to
European security, and the need for European sol-
idarity against the USSR.
Strauss received unprecedented treatment in
view of the unofficial nature of his visit and of
his stature in German politics. Strauss journeyed
outside Peking for a meeting with Mao, he saw Chou
in a Peking hospital. for an hour, and he talked
with Teng Hsiao-ping, Chiao Kuan-hua, Deputy Army
Chief of Staff Li Ta, and a deputy foreign trade
minister.
The closest recent parallel to Strauss' re-
ception was the treatment accorded former British
Prime Minister Heath in May 1974- Heath, however,
was a former head of government and the leader of
the opposition, and his trip had been planned while
he was still in office. Strauss has not been a
member of a German government for more than five
years, and he is not regarded as a strong candidate
for high office in the future.
China's warm reception plainly reflects that
Strauss shares many of Peking's views on European
security and the USSR. During his stay, Strauss
expressed deep skepticism of Soviet strategic in-
tentions regarding Europe and of the durability of
detente with Moscow. He indicated that he shared
Chinese concern over the naivete of some Europeans
regarding Moscow, and, like the Chinese, he called
for a strong, united Europe in close military al-
liance with the US as a bulwark against the USSR.
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According to the West German press, Strauss also
went so far as to hint at overlapping Peking-Bonn
interests in restraining Soviet strategic ambitions.
Strauss said that the continuing division of
Germany threatened European security, and he praised
Chinese endorsement of eventual German reunification.
The Chinese have been unable to elicit public sup-
port for their views on this subject from several
European visitors over the months, including the
chairman of the Christian Democrats--a major oppo-
sition party--Helmut Kohl who visited Peking last
September.
Judging from initial reports of Strauss' sub-
stantive discussions with senior officials, the Chi-
nese moved away from recent new public themes regard-
ing Europe back toward more familiar and established
policy lines. Earlier this month during visits by
Maltese Prime Minister Mintoff and Dutch Foreign Min-
ister Van der Stoel, the Chinese had publicly stressed
the likelihood of US-USSR competition over Europe
leading to a general war. Strauss questioned Chiao
Kuan-hua closely on this score, and, according to the
Germans, Chiao made evasive and unconvincing arguments.
The burden of Chinese statements during his visit,
however, was that the threat. to Europe lay in Soviet
ambitions.
The Chinese strongly emphasized to Strauss that
Washington should shoulder much of the burden of Eu-
rope's defense, arguing defense of the US begins in
Europe.
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Peking has entertained a number of prominent
Western opposition figures who generally share
Chinese distrust. of Soviet intentions, including
Heath, Kohl, US Senator Henry Jackson, and now
Strauss. Chiao Kuan-hua recently expressed the
view that European socialist governments "duped"
by Moscow are the most dangerous forces in Europe.
Chiao predicted that continued economic problems
in the West would bring to power more conservative
governments, distrustful of Moscow.
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25X1 Western Troubles Hurt Trade Balance
Worldwide inflation is pushing up China's
import costs while stagnation is cutting the demand
for its exports. China's deficit with the West
in 1974 is estimated at $750 million. The US and
Japan caused most of the deficit--$700 million
and $500 million, respectively.
Peking has taken steps to reduce payments
for imports. Several contracts for foodstuffs,
fertilizers, cotton, and steel were canceled or
postponed before the Fall Canton Trade Fair.
Peking ordered state-trading corporations to pur-
chase only the most essential technology and
equipment at the fair. Highest priority went to
imports of petroleum, mining, and food-processing
equipment. Since the fair, however, Peking has
asked suppliers to speed up grain deliveries, re-
flecting concern over a harvest that fell short of
expectations.
In addition to curtailing imports, China is
attempting to switch from cash payments to short-
term credits for some of its major commodity
purchases. Peking has arranged for 150-day credits
from Japanese banks to purchase $40 million worth
of fertilizer and $140 million worth of steel,
payable at 11-12 percent interest. China reportedly
has filed a similar request for deferred payments
on imports of 27 Trident aircrLtt from the British
firm, Hawker Siddeley.
China is also trying to increase exports by
lowering prices for its traditional products--
silk, textiles, and handicraft goods. The export
drive, however, has come at a time when world
demand for many of these products is declining.
January 20, 1975
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Peking hopes that oil exports will provide a growing
source of foreign exchange. Oil exports of 4.5
million tons last year were three times the 1973
level and earned $420 million. Oil exports may reach
11 million tons this year, earning $800 to $900
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January 20, 1975
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25X1 New Twist for an Old Slogan
Chinese propaganda has contained vague refer-
ences to a "new leap forward" in the last severa:'.
weeks,, she phrase calls to mind the frantic and
destructive economic activity of the "Great Leap
Forwaid" that so seriously set back economic de-
velopment from 1958 to 1960. There is no evidence
that the new leap heralds a return to those earlier
radical policies, but the appearance of the phrase
has caused much speculation in China watching circles.
The phrase "new leap forward"as
surfaced perio ica y in routine PITyagallua road-
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ing that the phrase is part of some central docu-
ment. It has not been featured in the national
media, however, as would normally be expected. Even
provincial references to the new leap have been
sporadic and without elaboration.
The new "leap forward" may be just a fresh
slogan in the seven-month-old campaign to boost sag-
ging worker morale and thereby increase production,
The phrase generally is seen in formulas calling on
cadre to step up production "to welcome the new lea
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do not seem to indicate that racii-
ca new economic policies are in the works, although
some adjustments in current production plans are
clearly being made,
Other observers, however; have suggested that
the new leap could be a leftist initiative that may
even culminate in a higher level of agriculture
collectivization, long resisted by Chinese peasants.
A recent editorial in the Hunan provincial paper
can be cited as evidence: the editorial stressed
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the "inevitable trend" toward complete collectiviza-
tion, and demanded that cadre and peasant accept
this unpopular fact. Agriculture was completely
collectivized during the Great Leap, but China's
leaders were forced to retreat as the Great Leap
collapsed,
The Chinese for years have tacitly treated the
original leap as an abysmal failure and in their
present economic difficulties, it is unlikely they
would turn to unpopular policies that had failed
in the past? Moreover, the Hunan editorial states
that the present level of collectivization "suits the
political and economic conditions, and warns against
"blindly" increasing collectivization--a "leftist
error.." There may be some increased emphasis on
working collective holdings in comparison to private
plots, and responsibility for certain functions that
can be better handled at higher levels--e.g?,, water
conservancy projects--may be transferred from produc-
tion teams to parent production brigades or communes,
but an upgrading of the overall level of collectivi-
zation is much less likely. In any case,- the views
in the Hunan editorial are apparently local ones.
So far, they have not appeared in other provinces
nor have they even been repeated in Hunan,
Chang Chun-chiao's report to the 4th National
People's Congress endorsed current economic policies,
including the present level of collectivization, It
did not mention the "new leap," but material sub-
sequent to the congress may help illuminate the "new
leap forward" and further clarify economic policy in
general,. F77 I
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25X1 Love the Army--But Love the Party Even More
A new and potentially significant, aspect of
Peking's continuing drive to reduce the power of
provincial military men has recently been revealed
in provincial circulars issued in conjunction with
the annual "Love the Army and Cherish the People"
campaign. Civilian government and party organi-
zations as well as military units routinely profess
their mutual support under the overall principle
of party control over the army. This time, the
first of the circulars, issued by the Tsinan Military
Region on December .16, was unusually outspoken in
its prescription for army obedience to party authority.
As the other circulars have come in, however, clear
differences have emerged in the degree to which mili-
tary regions have endorsed the subordination of mili-
tary units to civilian party committees at corresponding
levels, indicating that. the idea has encountered re-
sistance.
The Tsinan statement remains the most far-
reaching, and may have been a trial balloon. The
circular emphasized that while relationships
within the military hierarchy were to remain
unchanged, various military headquarters and units
must "regard themselves as departments of military
affairs of local party committees of the same
level and consciously accept the leadership" of
these committees. Moreover, the circular spe-
cifically stated that all field armies must accept
the leadership of the provincial party committee.
This was a new theme and suggested a move to make
field armies, which are under the command of the
military region, more responsive to the direction
of civilian party authorities in the provinces in
which the units are stationed.
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Another reason why Tsinan may have been chosen
to initiate this idea is that the region includes
only one province, Shantung. All but one of the
ten other regions include two or more provinces.
Moreover, the party first secretary i n Shantung is
also the first political commissar of the military
region. Before regional party bureaus were abol-
ished, they were a check on military regions, which
are of higher administrative rank than most prov-
inces. Now, this ranking, plus the multi-provincial
composition of most military regions, gives the
regional commanders some autonomy from provincial
party leaders. Furthermore, some regional commanders
are members of the politburo or the central committee
and outrank or at least equate with the rank of
provincial party leaders. Finally, in provinces
that suffer from provincial strife or lack designated
heads, troop commanders are often persons to be
cultivated rather than ordered around. All these
factors have made it difficult for the divided
leadership to force the genie of military political
power back into the bottle.
Nanking Military Region has come the closest
to repeating Tsinan's extreme stance. It may be
more than coincidence that. Nanking is the former
bailiwick of politburo member Hsu Shih-yu, who now
commands the Canton region and appears to be a major
target of the drive to reduce the military's political
power. Hsu was criticized by wallposters in several
cities in the Nanking region last fall. Several other
regions have ordered their units to obey local party
committees, but Fuchou and Wuhan have said only that
it was necessary to "respect" local party committees--a
b
su
tle but nevertheless significant difference.
Strife-ridden Chengtu Military Region was ambiguous
in its circular, and Lanchou made no mention of the
issue at all. Kunming and Peking (where Commander
Chen Hsi-lien has been under fire, see page 14)
have not commented yet. So far, no clear pattern has
emerged from the eight regions involved in the December
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25X1 The United Nations: Disappointment
I
The Chinese gave the recently concluded Gen-
eral Assembly session low marks and were particu-
larly disappointed by the behavior of the Third
World countries. Although the poorer nations
voted as a bloc more than ever before, they split
ranks when it came to support for the Chinese-
backed resolutions on Korea and Cambodia--the
most important items on the agenda as far as
Peking was concerned.
The General Assembly also took actions that
diluted China's anti-Soviet efforts. Although
Peking co-sponsored resolutions affirming Pales-
tinian rights and inviting the Palestine Libera-
tion organization to participate in General As-
sembly work as an observer, this stemmed from a
desire to keep pace with Third World sentiment
rather than genuine enthusiasm. Indeed, the Chi-
nese did not lobby at all for the resolutions.
Obviously displeasdd about growing links between
the PLO and Moscow, Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-
hua recently told that
the UN votes on the Palestine problem were "not
too realistic and a bit shortsighted." He went
on to depreciate Arafat's speech by commenting
that it was "a bit romantic."
To Peking's dismay, Third World countries
went along with several less important proposals
backed by the Soviets. On a number of disarmament
resolutions, China either had to go down to de-
feat with the minority or acquiesce to popular
opinion. The only bright spot was the passage of
a resolution calling for the establishment of a
nuclear-free zone in South Asia, a move that would
be in the interest of China and Pakistan. The
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Chinese were hoping to use the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties to rally the underdeveloped world
against the super powers. It turned out, however,
that Peking was forced to vote for the charter
while expressing sharp criticism of certain arti-
cles that it said reflected Soviet input. In re-
porting the debate, NCNA cataloged Peking's reser-
vations at some length and characterized certain
provisions as "compromising" and "irrational."
Peking's disenchantment with Third World
voting in the General Assembly may have something
to do with recent comments by a high Chinese of-
ficial who deals with UN agencies. Indicating
that China plans to reduce its contribution to the
UN Development Program, the official criticized
the Group of 77, an influential coalition of poor
countries within the world body.
It is improbable that the Chinese will sig-
nificant.ly downgrade the UN as part of their for-
eign prlicy orchestration. At the same time, the
results of the General Assembly session may give
pause to any plans Peking may have had to increase
the UN's role as a forum for rallying the mho ,,.a
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25X1 New Opportunities in Kinshasa
The Chinese are taking advantage of hard feel-
ings between Kinshasa and Moscow to strengthen their
already cordial relations
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Aside from helping to consolidate Sino-Zairian
relations to the disadvantage of the Soviets, Peking's
military aid may also pay off for the Chinese in An-
gola. As the country moves toward full independence
--set for November 11--and the Portuguese phase out,
Mobutu's influence could well increase. The new mil-
itary aid can only strengthen T lobutu's hand, enabling
him to more effectively promote the National Front for
the Liberation of Angola as it jockeys for power.
China and Zaire both support the Front against the
other major contender, the Soviet-backed Popular Move-
ment for the Liberation of Angola.
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Looking beyond Angolan independence, the Chi-
nese probably calculate that Kinshasa will play an
important role in southern Africa's political evolu-
tion--especially if the Liberation Front ultimately
wins out in Luanda. China apparently believes that
a generous military and economic aid program will at
least help curb Moscow's role and at best may provide
Peking with some influence as black Africa starts to
deal with Rhodesia and South Africa.
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Given the calculus of forces at play, Peking
probably sees greater advantages in peaceful, evo-?
lutionary change in southern Africa, as debilitating
political instability or war could provide new oppor-
tunities for Moscow. This would also threaten to
embroil Peking's prestige in a problem that is rela-
tively low on its list of priorities. For these
reasons, China will be careful to keep its military
assistance program in Zaire on a short string.
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Chiang Chin g's public activities tend to run
in streaks. She often punctuates periods of
activity with unexplained absences. Her return
to view on January 2 after being out of sight for
a month was, in its own unique way, characteristic.
One important aspect of her re-emergence was
unusual--she attended a banquet. The affair was
in honor of E. F. Hill, visiting Australian Com-
munist Party head. Previously, Madame Mao did not
normally attend banquets for visiting dignitaries,
but kept her name in the public eye by showing up
at picture-taking sessions or cultural performances.
The banquet for Hill was hosted jointly by
Wang Hung-wen, Chang Chun-chiao, and Chiang Ching.
Her presence at the banquet--like an earlier NCNA
release in late September, which noted that Chiang
had "entrusted" the Cultural Group under the State
Council to give a soiree for Mrs, Marcos of the
Philippines, and her mention along with Premier
Chou by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien in his banquet
toast to Mrs. Marcos--suggested that she was
attempting to gain a government post at the Na-
tional People's Congress. If so her efforts failed. 25X1
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e clearly still has many enemies and she has
continued to be attacked Ly historical analoav in
Peking has apparently added to the top leader-
ship ranks of the army's General Political Depart-
ment. Analysis of the name list of those attending
the January 15 memorial service for late vice premier
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Li Fu-chun suggests that Liang Pi.-yeh is a deputy
director of the department. He was listed
between Yang Cheng-wu, who was recently named a
deputy chief of staff, and Wei Po-ting, currently
a deputy director of the department. Liang could
be a deputy chief of staff, or even director of
the General Political Department, although his
background makes it more likely that -.- is a dep-
uty.
Liang was a deputy director of the GPD prior
to his fall early in the Cultural Revolution. He
was paraded through the streets of Peking in early
1967 along with former marshal Lo Jui-ching, former
Peking mayor Peng Chen, and other "capitalist
roaders."
Liang was ose to Former Central-South Bureau
chief and politburo member Tao Chu. Tao has been
widely rumored as marked for rehabilitation, but
has not re-emerged. Since Liang's return to the
active ranks came over a year and a half after
his initial reappearance, it does not necessarily
foreshadow the return of Tao.
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In an effort to make the down-to-the-country-
side program more attractive to local youth, Kwang-
tung officials last July launched a series of
incentives, including one that allowed one child of
a retiring urban worker to leave the countryside
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rons, a proviso was a ded in September requir-
ing the retiring parent to take up residence in the
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has now kille& e whole scheme on the grounds that
it did nothing to relieve the urban population
crunch--one of the goals of the down-to-the-country-
side program. The veto was just short of categori-
cal. Peking did hold out the possibility that some-
thing like the Kwangtung plan could become part of 25X1
the program "when the present phase..rcomes to a
When theorist groups were first formed last
May as small study groups of workers and peasants,
there was some question as to their possible role
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in the anti-Confucius campaign 25X1
In a few provinces, local leaders
were apparently using the groups as a buffer between
themselves and unhappy workers, but a broadcast from
Shanghai in July indicated that a less active and
decidedly secondary role was what central leaders
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Since then, Imferences to the groups' earlier, more
active, use have disappeared from the provincial
media, and they apparently have evolved into more
than ordinary study groups. Their latest passion,
according tc: NCNA, is an in-depth review of the
worsening economic conditions in the West.
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signed in Helsinki.
Chinese trade exhibition ens
in Manila.
Sino-Finn trade agreement for 1975
Sino-Swiss trade agreement signed
in Bern.
Vice Foreign Trade Minister Chen
Chieh signs 1975 Sino-Czech trade
and payments agreement in Prague.
December 20- Thai trade delegation, led by Deputy
25 Commerce Minister Prasong Sukhum,
:.sits Peking and meets with Vice
Premier Li Hsien-nien and Foreign
Minister Chiao Ruan-hua.
December 21 Vice Minister of Agriculture and
Forestry Hao Chung-shih arrives in
Upper Volta7 travels to Chad on
December 31.
of scientific and technical pro-
tocol between China and Romania.
Li Hsien-nien and Foreign Trade
Minister Li Chiang attend signing
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December 23 China signs medical protocol with
Senegal.
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December 23 Romanian airline inaugurates
weekly flights to Peking.
December 28 Chinese economic and technical
delegation arrives in Vientiane
for "friendly visit."
Agreement providing for 1975
gratis economic aid to the Viet
Cong government signed by For-
eign Trade Minister LI Chiang
in Peking.
January 3-8 Dutch Foreign Minister Van der
Stoel visits Peking; hosted by
Chiao Kuan-hua and meets with
Chou En-lai and Teng Hsiao-
ping.
January 5-10
Chou En-lai on January 8.
Thai delegation, led by Deputy
Foreign Minister Chatchai,
visits China; meets Premier
January 6 China establishes diplomatic
relations with Botswana.
January 7-10 Maltese Prime Minister Mintoff visits
China; meets with Mao, Chou En-lai,
Li Hsien-nien and Chiao Kuan-hua.
January 20, 1975
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January 8-10 2nd plenum of the tenth central com-
mittee. Teng Hsiao-ping elevated to
politburo standing committee, named
a party vice-chairman. Discussed
NPC preparatory work, and submitted
a list of nominees for the standing
committee of the NPC and the State
Council, the draft revised text of
the state constitution, and reports
on the constitution and the overn-
ment to the NPC.
January 9 Vice Minister of Fuel and Chemical
Industry Tang Ko departs Mexico for
Trinidad and Tobago.
January 12
Vice-Premier Li Fu-chun, veteran eco-
nomic planner, died. Premier Chou
En-lai presided over a memorial ser-
vice on January 15 at which Teng
Hsiao-ping gave a speech. 17
The head of West Germany's Christian
Socialistic Union Franz Josef Strauss
begins visit to China; sees Mao out-
side Peking and holds talks with Chou
En-lai, Tern Hsiao- in and Chiao
Kuan-hua.
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January 13
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Peking.
Malaysia's first ambassador to the
PRC, I-Iashim Bin Sultan, arrives in
for seven-day visit.
Japanese Liberal Democratic Party
leader Shigeru Hori arrives in Peking
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January 16 Preliminary talks on Sino-Japanese
peace and friendship treaty open
in Tokyo with Ambassador Chen Chu
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Chou En-lai meets with Japanese eco-
nomic delegation in Peking hospital.
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Sino-Japanese peace treaty negotiations
resume in Tokyo; Chinese ambassador to
Japan, Chen Chu, heads Chinese dele-
gation.
January 20, 1975
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