CONSEQUENCES WITHIN CAMBODIA OF A COMMUNIST TAKEOVER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300070003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 31, 1975
• Content Type: IM

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January 31, 1975
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Consequences Within Cambodia of a Communist Takeover*
1. The immediate objective of the Khmer Commu:iists (KC)
following any capitulation of the Cambodian Government (GKR)
would be the occupation of urban centers so as to fully disarm
the Cambodian Armed Forces (FANK) and take over the machinery
of state. Bloodletting would be inevitable as KC units mopped
up pockets of resistance and their leaders settled old scores
with some leading provincial and national GKR officials and
senior FANK officers unable to flee the country. Bureaucrats,
technicians, intelligentsia, and former. FANK officers would no
doubt be subjected to an intense indoctrination and "re-educa-
tion" process which would most likely involve incarceration,
coercion, and some, but probably not mass, exemplary executions.
The lower strata of urban society would probably undergo
a less formal and traumatic process.
2. Once in full control of the former GKR zones, the KC
would begin pursuing the long-term objective: centralization
of control over the instruments of production by a KC govern-
ment. Essentially this would mean the implementation in the
former GKR zones of programs long underway in KC controlled
territory. These would include:
-- the confiscation of privately-owned land and the
tools of agriculture and the establishment of
Communist-controlled collectives;
-- the gradual replacement of Buddhism by Communist-
controlled mass front organizations;
-- the destruction of the traditional administrative
system and its replacement by a centralized govern-
ment under the leadership of the Khmer Communist
Party;
-- the nationalization of all light industry and means
of commerce.
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* This memorandum, prepared under the aegis of the National InteZ-
Zigence Officer for South and Southeast Asia, was drafted by
the Office of Current InteZZigence and coordinated within CIA.
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3.' Such measures have not gone down well with the land-
proud and independent-minded Cambodian peasantry and over the
years have caused almost two million peasants to abandon their
farms and flee to the GKR zone. Smoldering resentment among
those that have remained behind has on occasion resulted in
small-scale uprisings which the KC have put down ruthlessly.
Even if they won full control of the country, they would con-
tinue to meet similar resistance to their programs. The KC
lack the organizational pool of well trained cadres possessed
by their Vietnamese allies, but they could be expected to push
their efforts to regiment and collectivize Khmer society re-
lentlessly, using force where necessary.
4. Most population centers in zones presently controlled
by the GKR would have large numbers of refugees following a
KC takeover and, except for the Battambang area., stocks of
basic commodities would be extremely low. Living conditions
for all would deteriorate markedly as these commodities ran
out. To ease the situation the KC would forcefully resettle
the large numbers of refugees now in the GKR zone and might
also have to evacuate many city-dwellers into the countryside
where conditions would not be much better. They Communists
would have major difficulties in coping with refugees and with
supply shortages for some months -- and the population would
suffer real hardship -- unless the KC were provided liberal
and rapid assistance.
5. The situation would ease as soon as the next seasonal
crop cycle began, although difficulties would remain. Some
dependence on imported foods might persist, but consumption of
vegetable crops with short growing spans and use of readily
available fish would reduce external needs. Since so much of
the sharp decline in rice production from the 3.8 million ton
level in 1969 to less than 1 million tons in recent years has
been a function of wartime disruption to the countryside, there
is an excellent chance that Cambodia would rap,ic'ty reapproach
self-sufficiency in basic foodstuffs even without significant
changes in technology or major inputs of equipment or chemicals.
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6. Attached as of possible interest are several earlier
brief memoranda prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency on
various aspects of rule in areas of Cambodia already under KC
control.
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January 29, 1974
The Khmer Communists' "Communal" Campaign
One of the most controversial aspects of the Khmer Com-
munists' administration in rural areas has been the insurgents'
attempts to abolish private land ownership and to collectivize
labor. The communists refer to this activity as their "commune"
program.
0%
_.AL for Khmer Communist officials in the neighboring provinces
of Battambang and Pursat have been imr)lementi-na measures! 4--
collectivize labor.
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Late last year, in pursuit of a directive issued by the
Khmer Communist Central Committee, local Communist officials be-
gan a countrywide push to hasten the development of existing
communes area to create new ones. This task has been undertaken
with considerable zeal in the northern and northwestern regions
of the country. As a first step in Siem Reap Province, for ex-
ample, the Communists recently announced "state" ownership
of all individual and village-held property. At the same time, 25X1
The land-proud and independent-minded Khmer peasant generally
has reacted in a predictably negative manner to these campaigns.
In the northwest, the combination of harsh regulations and strict
penalties has caused the flight of more than 2,000 families into
government areas. To try to deter additional defections, Commun-
ist officials in Pursat Province have on occasion resorted to
arrest and execution of uncooperative villagers. Such actions
have in turn led to minor village uprisings -- not only in Pursat
but also in several other provinces.
Besides their basic opposition to the principle of collecti-
vization, many villagers resent the fact that much of the food
produced by the communes is for the benefit of Khmer Communist
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military forces
There is evidence that in some areas of the countryside the
Communists are looking for ways to make their commune program
less offensive to the villagers. In other areas, however, they
show no sign of relaxing such harsh policies as communal living,
collective farming by small groups, and the rationing of paddy
for individual consumption. These policies prompted a large-
scale peasant demonstration in one Communist-controlled sector
in southeastern Cambodia in late r :cernber. Communist troops
quickly broke up the demonstration an,, local insurgent officials
subsequently indicated that even stricter communal policies
would be instituted. Although the Communists probably will be
able to keep their collectivization program going, it seems
likely that over the long term it will prove to be a significant
barrier to widespread political support for the s in
the countryside.
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I January 22, 1974
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The Khmer Communists are encountering some serious prob-
lems with the Chams, the fourth largest minority group in Cam-
bodia. Chafing under an increasingly harsh Khmer Communist
administration, Cham villagers in the northern provinces of
Kratie and Kompong Cham since last October have staged small-
scale revolts. In some areas, they have killed Khmer Com-
munist officials and troops. Farther south, Chams in Kandal
and Prey Veng Provinces have been subjected to equally severe
treatment, but many have fled to South Vietnam.
The Communists have depended on the Chams as a major
source of manpower for insurgent units northeast of Phnom Penh.
Following their unsuccessful offensive against Kompong Cham
City last September, the Communists increased conscription to
help make up the heavy losses they suffered.
The Chams' Islamic religious beliefs have been another
major source of conflict. Since early 1972, the Communists have
tried to suppress Cham religious practices. Their subsequent
decision to abolish these practices has caused further friction
between themselves and the Chams.
Cham villagers are also dissatisfied with Khmer Communist
economic policies that require collectivization of both land
and labor. Strict Communist travel restrictions, which prevent
villagers from trading and selling goods in government-controlled
areas, have added to the Chams' economic difficulties.
The Cham revolt against the Khmer Communists appears to have
gained fairly widespread support and some degree of organization.
Despite the unrest, the Khmer Communists apparently have been
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Chams.
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The Chams have sought several times to obtain aid from
Phnom Penh in support of their cause. The government has indi-
cated indirectly that the Cambodian Army cannot undertake
operations to help the Chams, however, because it cannot spare
the troops. Many senior Army officers distrust the Chams and
have no desire to help them. Despite the government's negative
response, some leaders still claim that they can successfully
resist the Coi
m
mu sts, if the can somehow obtain sufficient
weapons
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February 5, 1974
Problems in the Pagodas
The Khmer Communists are continuing their efforts to erase
the influence of the Buddhist-clergy and of Buddhist doctrine
over the peasantry.
The Communists consider the monks -- who rely on local vil-
lagers for their subsistence -- as unproductive members of society
who tax the already meager food supply. The Buddhist practice of
encouraging young men to spend time in religious study in local
pagodas has also deprived the Khmer Communists of many needed re-
cruits. In many areas, the Communists have reacted to these tradi-
tional practices by forbidding villagers to give food to the monks
and by limiting visits to the pagodas.
The monks have been ordered to raise their own food and live-
stock. Some have been organized into teams to work at such com-
munal tasks as bridge-repair and the construction of ox-carts.
Boys under 12 years of age are still allowed to study at the
pagodas, but those over that age are forced to join Khmer Com-
munist village militia and territorial units rather than undergo
religious training.
Many monks have reluctantly complied with these changes, but
a few have fled to government-held areas. To encourage greater
cooperation, the Communists have been sending groups of dissident
monks away from their villages for political indoctrination. Such
tactics, however, have made it more difficult for the Communists
to control local villagers. In most villages, the population has
relied on the monks for leadership, and when the monks were drafted
into military service or sent for political. training, the vil-
lagers would not transfer their allegiance to the Khmer Communists.
In an effort to impose tighter control, the Communists have chosen
politically reliable monks to return to the villages to provide
leadership and conduct indoctrination lectures for the other monks.
It is highly unlikely that the clergy will ever fully accept
Communism, Khmer-style. Many monks reportedly believe that if a
peaceful settlement is not reached soon, the combination of Commu-
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nist restrictions which prevent young men from entering the mon-
asteries and the modification of traditional ways will threaten
the survival of their religion.
The monks' opposition to the war and to its disruptive and
destructive impact on the country is not confined to areas under
Communist control. In Phnom Panh, there are signs of increasing
war-weariness among the capital's clergy. Late last month, for
example, a new organization of neutralists staged ,.. :rief hunger
strike to induce "Khmer on both sides" to begin peace negotiations.
Although the head of the organization readily agreed to the gov-
ernment's call for an end to the strike, he promised unspecified
but strong action if the government ignores its responsibility to
rebuild destroyed pagodas. In a related development, the 1,000-
man strong association of student monks in Phnom Penh went on
public record on January 29 in favor of the opening of peace
talks. The association also asked that big powers involved in
the conflict help seek its rapid end, and requested the aid of
all religious and peace-loving international bodies to assist
in restoring peace quickly.
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