PROPOSED AID TO ANGOLAN REFUGEES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060015-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 27, 2003
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: March 25, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2003/04/25 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060015-8
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MICROFIL~IMF~
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State Dept. review completed
MEM012ANDUM
Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
March 25, 1975 .
SUBJECT: Proposed Aid to Angolan Refugees
OCI No. 045:1/75
The facts and assumptions yet .forth in the referenced
cable are essentially correct. National elections may not
be held by October 31, however, as called for in the indepen-
dence agreement. If elections are not held, Angola w:i..ll
enter into independence with a fragile coalition government.
'composed of the three liberation groups, without Portugues e
participation. Moreover, the national election law. stall to .
be drafted could include a residency requirement that would
render refugees ineligible to vote. The Popular Movement
would certainly attempt to get such a provision enacted al-
though its chances of doing so are p~:obably.less than even.
Holden Roberto and the National Front for the Liberaf:on
of Angola would be the major benefactor. in any refugee re-
settlement and voter registration program in Angola. Al-
though the Exact number of refugees is unknown, US government
agencies have accepted 500,000-700,00 0 as a reasonable esti-
mate. The bulk of these refugees have lived :: n Zayre since
the early 1960's and during +:he anti-Portuguese insurgency
the National Front relied heavily on them for military
recruits and financial support. If these refugees return to
Angola in large numbers, they will represent a powerful bloc
of political support for the National Front as well as a
.source of military personnel. 25X1
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The absence of US support would not result in the '
collapse of Roberto's plan to resettle the refugees nor '
would it seriously hurt his chances fora major political
role in an independent Angola. However, Agostinho Neto,
the president of the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola and Roberto's chief rival, could succeed
in slowing down the refugee resettle;ne,nt program through his
movement's representatives in the transitional government:
Thus, the US would stand to gain political credits. with
k2oberto by making alternate sources of assistance available.
Although US assistance is to be offered openly and to '
all three liberation groups, Neto, a number of African nations
that support him, the Soviets, 'and the Armed Forces rovement
in Portugal will interpret the aid as an attempt to "stuff
the ballot box" in favor of the National Front. This inter-
pretation will gain credence from the fact that the N~:tional
Front controls the ministries of agriculture, interior, and
social affairs, on which it intends to rely heavily in
administering refugee resettlement and voter registration.
' Beyond a shrill propaganda campaign that is likely to
sound self--pitying, there is little Roberto's opponents can '
do to discredit the US or impede Roberto's refugee program.'
The possibility exists that Veto, facing a landslide vote
against him, will attempt a coup out of desperation. His .
organization, however; is~outmannecl and outgunned by the
National Front and would lose a military confrontation even
if it were to receive massive assistance from Moscow or
Lisbon, which seems r~ighly unlikely.
' US relations with Zaire might also be aff ected by in-
volvement in refugee resettlement. Zairian President Mobutu
has sought to obtain US support for the National Front for
many years, particularly since the Lisbon coup. The US has
turned aside his. requests. Our assistance at this point,
however implemented, will be interpreted by Mobutu as en-
dorsement of tYie National Front. He will probably be
encouraged to pressure the US for other types of assistance
for Roberto, including military. For the moment Mobutu has
had to curtail his own support for the National Front because
of his government's serious financial difficulties.
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